Summary
In Parker v. Browning (8 Paige, 388) it is held: "If a receiver takes possession of goods under the express directions of the court, or where the master has decided that the goods are in the possession and under the control of the defendant, and has directed the defendant to deliver the possession to the receiver, the court will assume the exclusive jurisdiction of the subject, and will not suffer the receiver to be sued at law for taking such goods.
Summary of this case from Fallon v. Egberts Woolen Mills Co.Opinion
No. ED 80415
August 13, 2002 Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied October 8, 2002
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Louis County; Michael D. Burton, Judge.
Alan E. DeWoskin, St. Louis, for appellant.
Paul E. Martin, Clayton, for respondent.
Before Gary M. Gaertner, Sr, P.J. and Paul J. Simon and Clifford H. Ahrens, JJ.
ORDER
Gary Parker (Parker) appeals the judgment entered in favor of the City of Breckenridge Hills (Breckenridge) on its motion for partial summary judgment. Parker contends that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment to Breckenridge with respect to Parker's alleged violations of Breckenridge Code (Code) sections 410.050, 605.020, and 605.030 because (1) "genuine issues of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment by finding the following as undisputed facts: A. [Parker] was a `Merchant' as defined under [sections] 605.010 and 605.030 of [the Code]; B. [Parker] delivers trucking services from 3111 Woodson Road in the city as defined under [sections] 605.010 and 605.020 of [the Code]; C. [Parker] is operating a `Business' at 3111 Woodson Road; D. [Section] 365.090 of [the Code] does not authorize [Parker] to park his trucks on his property with his permission; E. The act of parking trucks at 3111 Woodson Road constitutes delivering trucking services from 3111 Woodson Road; and F. [Parker] is engaged in hauling and dumping from 3111 Woodson Road;" (2) it allowed Breckenridge to raise new issues, grounds, and arguments after the motion for partial summary judgment and response had been filed; and (3) further, it amended its opinion after ruling on Breckenridge's motion for partial summary judgment in violation of Rule 74.04(c)(3).
We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and no error of law appears. An extended opinion reciting detailed facts and restating principles of law would have no precedential or jurisprudential value. We affirm the judgment pursuant to Rule 84.16(b).