Opinion
November 27, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Goldstein, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs payable by the appellants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
Because the third-party defendant Augiwicz Excavating Corp. (hereinafter Augiwicz) joined in the motion for summary judgment, inter alia, dismissing the plaintiff's causes of action under Labor Law §§ 240, 241, it was aggrieved by the denial of that relief, and can properly appeal from the order (see, CPLR 5511; Voorhees v. Babcock Wilcox Corp., 150 A.D.2d 677). In any event, as conceded by the plaintiff, the issue of whether Augiwicz can appeal is largely academic in view of the fact that the appeal of the defendants second third-party plaintiffs raises the same issues.
The Supreme Court did not err in denying that branch of the motion which was to dismiss the Labor Law § 240 cause of action, as the evidence indicates that the plaintiff was injured as a result of a gravity-related risk (see, Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 N.Y.2d 555; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494; Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509). The fact that the ladder from which the plaintiff fell was permanently installed, rather than a temporary apparatus, is irrelevant (see, Richardson v Matarese, 206 A.D.2d 353). The argument that the accident did not occur at the actual worksite but while the plaintiff was gaining access to the worksite, and therefore the accident did not occur in an area afforded the protections of Labor Law § 240, is equally without merit. It cannot be said on this record that the ladder was not part of the worksite. In any event, the Court of Appeals has noted that the safety devices enumerated under section 240 "are for the use or protection of persons in gaining access to or working at sites where elevation poses a risk" (Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., supra, at 514).
As for the plaintiff's causes of action under Labor Law § 241 (6), the plaintiff's allegation of a violation of at least one provision of the Industrial Code ( 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 [d]) which requires "compliance with concrete specifications" (Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., supra, at 505) allows this cause of action to withstand a motion for summary judgment (see, Durfee v Eastman Kodak Co., 212 A.D.2d 971; Hammond v International Paper Co., 178 A.D.2d 798). However, we note that alleged violations of Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations do not support a Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action (see, Vernieri v Empire Realty Co., 219 A.D.2d 593).
The parties' remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Bracken, J.P., Miller, Altman and Florio, JJ., concur.