Opinion
No. 1:03-cv-01297-SEB-JPG.
November 18, 2004
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is only to be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To determine whether any genuine fact exists, the Court examines the pleadings and the proof as presented in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits made a part of the record. First Bank Trust v. Firstar Information Services, Corp., 276 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2001). The Court also draws all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and views the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). The non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings or upon conclusory statements in affidavits; rather it must go beyond the pleadings and support their contentions with proper documentary evidence. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff is permitted a more lenient standard with respect to her pleadings than that imposed on a practicing attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nonetheless, the substantive law applicable to her claims cannot be ignored simply because of her pro se status. Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir. 1994).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Iris Cintron ("Cintron"), identifies herself as Hispanic by national origin and her color as Black. She was originally employed by Defendant, Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc. ("SGAI"), as a temporary employee on January 23, 2002. On March 11, 2002, Cintron accepted SGAI's offer to become a full-fledged, at-will employee. Both as a temporary employee and an at-will employee, Cintron held the position of Material Handler, working continually as such until August 1, 2002, when she voluntarily resigned. Cintron's departure was due to what she regarded as unjust treatment by SGAI and, as a result, after resigning, she filed this lawsuit alleging that she had been discriminated against, retaliated against, harassed and constructively discharged because of her national origin and color, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). 42 U.S.C. § 2000.
When Cintron assumed at-will status, she was provided a copy of SGAI's Associate Handbook containing the company's equal employment opportunity policy and anti-harassment policy; indeed, Cintron signed an Acknowledgment of Receipt of Associate Handbook ("Handbook Receipt"), evidencing that she had read the handbook and would abide by its policies, procedures, and guidelines. SGAI's anti-harassment policy expressly prohibits all forms of harassment based on any and all protected characteristics. Further, it requests that employees immediately report any complaints of harassment to a supervisor, human resources or the plant manager. SGAI's anti-harassment policy provides that it will investigate all complaints and take the necessary corrective action as appropriate. It also strictly prohibits retaliation in any form against an employee who has exercised her rights under Title VII and pledges corrective action if any retaliation brought to its attention is confirmed.
SGAI is a manufacturer and distributor of bonded abrasives, coated abrasives and superabrasives which are used to cut, shape and polish various materials. It operates a large distribution center in Plainfield, Indiana, where Cintron was employed. At the distribution center SGAI receives and unloads product from its manufacturing facilities and prepares and processes orders from all over the world for its various products. Material handlers, such as Cintron, would use a motorized cart with a flatbed to go about the building "picking" product needed to fill orders. They would also stand at assigned stations and "pack" the picked products for shipping. Finally, material handlers would "process" the order by examining the final package to make sure it contained the entire order.
During her employment, Cintron was supervised by a Distribution Supervisor and a Team Lead. The Distribution Supervisor has the authority to hire, fire, and discipline material handlers, but a Team Lead lacks this authority. While with SGAI, Cintron had two Distribution Supervisors, Dane Morrison ("Morrison") and, later, Tina Miller ("Miller"). She also worked under two Team Leads, first Phil Klein ("Klein") and later Keith Downing ("Downing"). As a Material Handler, Cintron was required to perform the tasks of picking, packing, and processing as assigned from time to time.
SGAI did not permanently assign Cintron to any one of the these work duties, because SGAI's policy and practice was to not permanently assign any Material Handlers to any single duty. Whether a Material Handler was performing the task of picking, packing, or processing did not impact her salary, since each employee was paid the same rate regardless of which responsibility she was undertaking at any given time. Cintron, herself, preferred to process, since apparently it was an easier and more desirable job than packing or picking.
On April 3, 2002, Cintron submitted a discrimination complaint to SGAI's Human Resources Generalist, Betty Stephen, alleging that she had been discriminated against in that she had been assigned to do the job of picking (the less desirable job) on certain occasions while a less senior employee had been assigned to process (the more desirable). In March 2003, Cintron followed up her in-house complaint with a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), stating that, among other things, SGAI harassed and retaliated against her. The EEOC issued Cintron a right to sue letter in June 2003.
ANALYSIS
Cintron's claim is one for disparate treatment, but she has not demonstrated that any other similarly situated employee was permitted or assigned to work exclusively at one task and further, she admits that at times her supervisors acquiesced to her requests to work at her preferred station. She claims harassment, but has failed to provide evidence of conduct that could be the basis for an objective finding of harassment. She claims retaliation, but had no adverse employment action taken against her by SGAI. Cintron claims she was constructively discharged, but the conduct complained of fails to sustain an objective finding that she was forced to leave; in fact, the record reflects that, in part, she left SGAI to take a higher paying job.
Cintron apparently did not enjoy certain experiences connected with her employment with SGAI, but has not mustered any indicia of discrimination emanating from any employment decisions. As the Seventh Circuit has noted on numerous occasions, "(N)ot everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action." E.g., Hilt-Dyson v. City Of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2002). Title VII does not guarantee a pleasant place to work or a place where the employee's view of how things should be done is taken into consideration, never mind controlling. Vore v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 1161, 1162 (7th Cir. 1994). Even applying the lenient standard accorded pro se plaintiffs, Cintron's claims lack any factual basis.
A. Disparate Treatment
Cintron lacks any direct evidence of disparate, discriminatory treatment and so, to prove her case, she may utilize the indirect method requiring a prima facie showing of disparate treatment. In utilizing this approach, Cintron must establish that 1) she is a member of a protected class or was engaged in protected activity (such as registering a complaint), 2) in terms of her job performance, she met the employer's legitimate expectations, 3) her employer took adverse employment action against her, and 4) her employer treated more favorably similarly situated employees outside of the protected class or who did not make complaints of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Patt v. Family Health Systems, Inc., 280 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 2002).
Cintron's job at SGAI required her to be assigned from time to time to work on picking, processing, or packing. She had a personal preference for processing, because she considered it an easier job and felt slighted when her assignment did not allow her to process regularly. She concedes that the other two positions were as much a part of her duties at SGAI as processing was. Cintron was never permanently assigned only to a single one of the three stations, but neither was any other SGAI material handler assigned permanently to a single station, no doubt based on SGAI's policy not to permanently assign any material handlers to a specific station, but to rotate them among the stations as needed. Therefore, in assigning her to complete other tasks that were as much a part of her job responsibilities as the processing that she preferred, SGAI did not subject Cintron to an adverse employment action.
B. Harassment
To establish a prima facie case of harassment under Title VII, Cintron needs to demonstrate that: 1) she is a member of a protected class; 2) she was subjected to unwelcome racial harassment; 3) the harassment was based on race; 4) the harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and 5) the existence of employer liability. Mason v. Southern Ill. Univ. at Carbondale, 233 F.3d 1036, 1043 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, for the incidents that Cintron claims to be actionable, each must have been motivated on the basis of her race. Cintron has adduced no evidence that she was treated negatively because of her race nor has she shown any pattern of SGAI treating similarly situated individuals of a different national origin or color more favorably than her.
The incidents Cintron asserts as abusive do not reach the level of actionable harassment. They were no more than work assignments which Cintron felt were more disagreeable than those given to other employees. "In the typical cases, the question is whether the quantity, frequency, and severity of the racial, ethnic, or sexist slurs create a work environment so hostile as to discriminate against the minority employee." Vore v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 32 F.3d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1994). Cintron has not established that any SGAI employee made any negative statements at any time or otherwise treated her adversely due to her national origin or color. She also has failed to show that any action taken by SGAI during her employment was motivated by an animus based on her national origin or color.
C. Retaliation
The requisite elements of an actionable claim of retaliation are that the Plaintiff (1) engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal relationship existed between the protected expression and the adverse action. Maarouf v. Walker Manufacturing Co., 210 F.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 2000).
Cintron's retaliation claim stems from her April 3, 2002 complaint to Betty Stephen, a Human Resources employee, which allegation satisfies the required element that Cintron engage in statutorily protected expression. In her complaint to Ms. Stephen, Cintron claimed that Klein, her team leader, was discriminating against her. In response to the complaint, Ms. Betty Stephen undertook a full investigation, which turned up nothing to support Cintron's allegation. Cintron nonetheless claims that following her complaint she was continually assigned to picking.
An adverse employment action is defined as a "materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment [that is] more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities." Stockett v. Muncie Indiana Transit System., 221 F.3d 997, 1001 (7th Cir. 2000). Cintron's conditions of employment never changed nor was there an alteration of job responsibilities; as we have repeatedly noted in this entry, she was simply assigned to complete one of three tasks, all of which were within her job description.
D. Constructive Discharge
Cintron's final claim against SGAI is that she was constructively discharged. The required proof for this claim is quite high. The "working conditions for constructive discharge must be even more egregious than the high standard for hostile work environment." Tutman v. WBBM-TV, Inc./CBS, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044 (7th Cir. 2000). That standard has not been satisfied here. Plaintiff admits that, generally, her work environment was fine. It was only the work assignments that displeased her.
Furthermore, regarding constructive discharge, Cintron's deposition testimony is a bit inconsistent. Though at some point she apparently decided she could no longer tolerate the discrimination and began looking for other employment, she also testified that when she finally left SGAI several months later in August of 2002, she left to accept a higher paying job. If the opportunity to make more money was what triggered her decision, she cannot now claim to have been constructively discharged. However, even if the manner in which her work was assigned at SGAI was what truly spurred her to leave, there was nothing discriminatory about those assignments, since no evidence exists that the jobs were divvied out on the basis of race or national origin.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment is GRANTED. All other pending motions are deemed moot by this order.
SO ORDERED.