Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC269040 Edward A. Ferns, Judge.
Lady Cage-Barile, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Mark B. Hartzler and Mark B. Hartzler for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
MALLANO, Acting P. J.
In February 2003, plaintiff Church of Christ in Hollywood (Church) obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting an expelled member, defendant Lady Cage-Barile, from entering Church property.
In April 2003, Cage-Barile filed a motion in the trial court, contending that the injunction violated her First Amendment rights and that the Church had not terminated her membership in accordance with Corporations Code section 5341. The trial court, Judge Edward A. Ferns presiding, denied the motion. Cage-Barile appealed. We affirmed (B168776, Dec. 21, 2004 [nonpub. opn.]).
In May 2006, Cage-Barile filed a motion to dissolve the injunction. Judge Ferns denied the motion, finding there had not been a change in the facts or law, nor would dissolution serve the ends of justice. Cage-Barile appealed. We affirmed (B192912, July 30, 2007 [nonpub. opn.]).
On August 22, 2008, Cage-Barile filed another motion, repeating the arguments made in the prior motions. She argued that the injunction should be dissolved, the injunction violated her First Amendment rights, and the Church had failed to terminate her membership pursuant to Corporations Code section 5341. Judge Ferns denied the motion. For the reasons we have previously given, we affirm again.
I
BACKGROUND
This is the fourth time this case has been before us. We rely on our prior opinions for the facts, primarily because Cage-Barile’s brief does not reference any facts in the record.
The Church, located in Los Angeles, is a nonprofit religious corporation. Pursuant to a set of bylaws, the Church is governed by a board of trustees, including officers such as president, secretary, and treasurer. The Church owns the land on which it is situated.
Cage-Barile is a former member of the congregation who disagreed with how the Church was run. In January 2001, she began to engage in disruptive conduct at the Church.
On occasion, Cage-Barile entered the Church building and followed certain members, shouting that they were adulterers, agents of Satan, and demon worshipers. She shouted at Church leaders, calling them Satan’s agents because they allowed divorced and remarried persons to participate in Church ministries. Members of the young adult ministry were so intimidated by her conduct that they met secretly; those wishing to attend had to dial a central telephone number to learn the time and location of the meeting.
After learning that one congregant, who led a popular weekly Bible study, had been divorced and remarried, Cage-Barile started attending Bible study each week, loudly chastising him about his marital history. As a result, he left the Church. Cage-Barile also interfered with an Alcoholics Anonymous group by surreptitiously recording its meetings.
The minister, Daniel Rodriguez, and others repeatedly asked Cage-Barile not to return to the Church. Rodriguez asked her to attend services at a different church - one where she would respect the leadership. Cage-Barile refused these requests and said she would not change her behavior absent a court order.
In January 2002, the Church held a noticed meeting, to which the congregation was invited, in order to discuss Cage-Barile’s membership. Cage-Barile was allowed to present her views. The meeting was conducted in accordance with all religious and corporate procedures. At the end of the meeting, the Church terminated Cage-Barile’s membership.
By letter to Cage-Barile dated February 16, 2002, the Church informed her that “this letter constitutes formal written notice to you that your membership at the Church of Christ [in] Hollywood is terminated. You are no longer a member of this particular Church. You may not participate in Church activities, you may not vote, and you may not petition members. The termination procedures allowed by law were followed, you were allowed a hearing, and the board and membership reached a decision to terminate your membership in January 2002.”
The letter continued: “[T]his letter constitutes... [a] demand that you immediately cease and desist from your incessant harassment and intimidation of the Minister, the leaders, the Trustees, and the membership.... You are specifically not welcome to enter upon the Church premises.... If you attempt to enter upon the Church premises, you will be considered a trespasser.”
The letter proved fruitless. Cage-Barile continued to disrupt worship services. In Rodriguez’s words, “Lady Cage-Barile’s actions and course of conduct have caused me to suffer substantial emotional distress. I feel tense delivering sermons. Her constant harassment has made it extremely difficult for me to minister to my congregation. I had trouble concentrating because I knew she would confront me before, during, and after worship services or Bible study.”
As a consequence of Cage-Barile’s conduct, the Church lost members. Some of the members and children were frightened by her conduct, causing the Church to cancel ministries or hold meetings in secret. The Church could not freely hold events on its property.
On February 28, 2002, the Church and Rodriguez filed this action against Cage-Barile, seeking injunctive relief to bar her from (1) impeding ingress or egress on Church premises, (2) trespassing on Church property, and (3) approaching within 10 yards of, intimidating, interfering with, oppressing, or otherwise threatening the membership or leadership of the Church as they entered or exited the Church premises. (In discussing the court proceedings, we sometimes refer to the Church and Rodriguez collectively as the Church.)
On March 5, 2002, the Church sought a temporary restraining order. The trial court, Judge David P. Yaffee presiding, denied the application.
On March 31, 2002, Cage-Barile was seen removing Easter related announcements from the Church bulletin board and tearing them up. A Church official asked her to stop it. She replied, “‘[T]here is no Easter in the Bible,’” and continued to remove all of the remaining announcements. The missing items were soon replaced. Cage-Barile tore them down a second time.
On April 12, 2002, the Church again requested a restraining order. The trial court denied the application, stating that the requested relief, if granted, would interfere with Cage-Barile’s right to free speech (U.S. Const., 1st Amend.) and would entangle the court in a dispute over religious doctrine.
On May 13, 2002, the Church filed a petition for writ of mandate with this court, seeking a peremptory writ directing the trial court to grant the relief sought in the complaint. On May 24, 2002, we issued an order to show cause (OSC) why the trial court’s ruling should not be vacated. Cage-Barile did not file any papers or appear for argument. In a published opinion, Church of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1244, we reversed the trial court, concluding that the Church was likely to prevail on the merits of the case, and it would be irreparably harmed without prompt injunctive relief. We directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the temporary restraining order and to enter a new order granting the requested relief.
On September 17, 2002, the trial court issued an OSC and a temporary restraining order, setting the hearing on the preliminary injunction for October 8, 2002. On September 22, 2002, counsel for the Church personally served Cage-Barile with a copy of the summons, complaint, the trial court’s OSC and temporary restraining order, and the Church’s supporting declarations and memorandum of points and authorities. Counsel informed Cage-Barile of the nature of the documents.
On October 1, 2002, Cage-Barile filed a “Response to Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order [and] Opposition to Temporary Restraining Orders.”
At the October 8, 2002 hearing, Cage-Barile appeared and requested a continuance. The trial court continued the hearing until November 26, 2002. Cage-Barile appeared at the November 26 hearing, as did counsel for the Church. Judge Ferns announced his intention to grant the requested relief and asked the Church’s counsel to prepare a proposed preliminary injunction. On December 3, 2002, Judge Ferns signed the injunction, prohibiting Cage-Barile from: (1) tearing down or destroying Church literature; (2) obstructing or impeding ingress or egress on Church property; (3) disturbing or disquieting the assemblage of the congregation by profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior, or by any unnecessary noise; and (4) trespassing on Church property.
Cage-Barile did not file an answer to the complaint, and a default was entered. On February 14, 2003, the Church filed a request for a court judgment, a “Summary in Support of Default Judgment for Permanent Injunction,” and supporting declarations. The parties appeared before Judge Ferns on the same day. He entered a permanent injunction, which tracked the language of the preliminary injunction. Cage-Barile appealed. We affirmed (B168776, Dec. 21, 2004 [nonpub. opn.]).
In May 2006, Cage-Barile filed a motion to dissolve the injunction. Judge Ferns denied it. Cage-Barile appealed. We affirmed (B192912, July 30, 2007 [nonpub. opn.]).
On August 22, 2008, Cage-Barile filed another motion to dissolve the injunction. She also argued that the injunction violated her First Amendment rights and that the Church had not terminated her membership pursuant to Corporations Code section 5341. Judge Ferns denied the motion by order dated September 25, 2008. Cage-Barile appealed. We affirm for the reasons stated in our prior opinions.
II
DISCUSSION
Because this appeal involves the application of statutes to undisputed facts, we review the trial court’s decision de novo. (See Brasher’s Cascade Auto Auction v. Valley Auto Sales & Leasing (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1048; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1081.)
A. Dissolution of the Injunction
An injunction issued to prohibit harassment is limited in duration to three years. (See Civ. Proc. Code, § 527.6, subd. (d); all undesignated section references are to that code unless otherwise indicated.) Section 527.6 authorizes injunctive relief to prohibit “harassment,” that is, “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b).)
“Section 527.6 was enacted to provide an expedited procedure for preventing ‘harassment’ as defined.... The motivation for the statute was the experience of a young woman who was hounded by a male admirer who followed her, incessantly telephoned her, etc.... The statute was designed to provide a quick and simple procedure by which this type of wholly unjustifiable conduct, having no proper purpose, could be enjoined.... Nothing in the statute indicates that it was intended to supplant normal injunctive procedures applicable to cases concerning issues other than ‘harassment’ as statutorily defined.” (Byers v. Cathcart (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 805, 811, citations omitted.)
“Normal injunctive procedures allow time for research and investigation, pleading and other motions if necessary, discovery and preparation, etc., followed by opportunity for a full trial.... A temporary restraining order is initially available to stabilize a situation; a preliminary injunction can follow. Thereafter the matter can proceed to a full trial. If [a] matter ha[s] been handled according to normal injunctive procedures, [a] plaintiff [has] ample time to develop evidence and prepare [the] case....
“Section 527.6, by contrast, provides a quick and truncated procedure. Offsetting the truncated nature of this procedure is the limited scope of the antiharassment orders which can legitimately follow. Section 527.6 provides for temporary restraining orders to handle immediate problems, followed quickly by a court hearing on a limited scope antiharassment injunction - normally within 15 days, but in no case more than 22 days even if time is extended for good cause.... This expedited and summary proceeding is subject to several limitations designed to confine it to its proper scope. One such limitation is that any injunction which results cannot exceed three years in duration. Section 527.6 hence does not allow for final resolution of disputed rights.” (Byers v. Cathcart, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at pp. 811–812, citations omitted.)
A review of the record in this case establishes that the permanent injunction was not issued pursuant to section 527.6. Rather, the more general injunction statute, section 526, provided the basis for relief. Here, the injunction was not limited to the prohibition of harassment; it was broadly directed at protecting the Church’s property rights and prevented Cage-Barile from trespassing on Church premises. (See Church of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior Court, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1252–1256.)
Consequently, section 533 governs the life of the injunction. That statute provides: “In any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order.”
In the trial court, Cage-Barile offered no evidence of a change in facts, made no argument that the law had changed, and did not show that the ends of justice supported her position. Nor has she done so on appeal. The trial court therefore properly declined to dissolve the injunction.
B. First Amendment Rights
Cage-Barile contends that the First Amendment of the federal Constitution and the comparable provision of the state Constitution preclude this and any other court from adjudicating whether she has a right to enter Church property. We disagree.
“[I]n reviewing a trial court’s order restricting First Amendment rights, an appellate court has ‘a constitutional duty to conduct an independent examination of the record as a whole, without deference to the trial court.’... The trial court’s order may be upheld only when the reviewing court concludes, after independently examining the record, that the judgment ‘“does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.”’” (Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1009, 1027, citation omitted.)
“In resolving intra-church schisms or property disputes, the [United States Supreme Court has] identified two categories of church polities: congregational and hierarchical.... ‘In... cases [involving congregational churches,] where there is a schism which leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of such bodies to the use of the property must be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations. If the principle of government in such cases is that the majority rules, then the numerical majority of members must control the right to the use of the property. If there be within the congregation officers in whom are vested the powers of such control, then those who adhere to the acknowledged organism by which the body is governed are entitled to the use of the property. The minority in choosing to separate themselves into a distinct body, and refusing to recognize the authority of the governing body, can claim no rights in the property from the fact that they had once been members of the church or congregation. This ruling admits of no inquiry into the existing religious opinions of those who comprise the legal or regular organization; for, if such was permitted, a very small minority, without any officers of the church among them, might be found to be the only faithful supporters of the religious dogmas of the founders of the church. There being no such trust imposed upon the property when purchased or given, the court will not imply one for the purpose of expelling from its use those who by regular succession and order constitute the church, because they may have changed in some respect their views of religious truth.’...
“... In a hierarchical organization, ‘the local congregation is itself but a member of a much larger and more important religious organization, and is under its government and control, and is bound by its orders and judgments.’... ‘In this class of cases we think the rule of action which should govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church and state under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial authority is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.’...
“[C]ourts ‘will entertain jurisdiction of controversies in religious bodies although some ecclesiastical matters are incidentally involved’ as long as civil or property rights are involved.... ‘[A congregational] type [of church] exists “where each local group is in charge of all its affairs through majority vote of its members and there is no control from above.”...’... ‘[W]here a religious society has no tribunal but the congregation, a court may determine whether the meeting at which a pastor was removed was properly conducted according to the usage, contracts and rules of the society, or according to pertinent principles of law where civil and property rights, such as the emoluments of the property rights, are involved, and that in so doing the court is not interfering with any ecclesiastical function.’... [¶]... [¶]
“‘... [T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters. When this choice is exercised and ecclesiastical tribunals are created to decide disputes over the government and direction of subordinate bodies, the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them.’... [¶]... [¶]
“... [I]t remains unclear whether the constitutional analysis for congregational and hierarchical religious institutions is identical. However, no matter whether the religious organization is hierarchical or congregational, it is clear that the decisions of the highest religious tribunal on questions of discipline, faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law must be accepted.... ‘However, when the dispute to be resolved is essentially ownership or right to possession of property, the civil courts appropriately adjudicate the controversy even though it may arise out of a dispute over doctrine or other ecclesiastical question, provided the court can resolve the property dispute without attempting to resolve the underlying ecclesiastical controversy.’” (Singh v. Singh (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1275–1280, citations and fn. omitted.)
In this case, the record suggests that the Church is a congregational organization. The bylaws vest the board of directors with authority to run the Church, and there is no evidence that the Church is under the governance or control of a higher tribunal. But regardless of whether the Church is congregational or hierarchical, its decision to terminate Cage-Barile’s membership is binding on us. That decision was based on religious doctrine and, as a matter of constitutional law, is not subject to review by civil courts.
Nor is there any suggestion in the record that the Church failed to follow the proper procedures in making its decision. The Church held a noticed meeting, invited the congregation, allowed Cage-Barile to speak to the assembly, and, thereafter, the board and membership expelled her. In a letter to Cage-Barile dated February 16, 2002, the Church informed her that she was no longer a member of the Church, stating in part, “The termination procedures allowed by law were followed....”
In short, the Church terminated Cage-Barile’s membership, not the trial court or this court. Under the First Amendment, the courts must accept the Church’s decision. The question before us is whether, having expelled Cage-Barile, the Church can prevent her from entering its property. The answer is yes, as we explained in Church of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior Court, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 1244, as follows:
“Cage-Barile’s right[s] of free speech [and free exercise of religion do] not trump the Church’s right to prohibit her disruptive conduct on its property. Indeed, ‘[e]very person who intentionally disturbs or disquiets any assemblage of people met for religious worship at a tax exempt place of worship, by profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior, or by any unnecessary noise, either within the place where the meeting is held, or so near it as to disturb the order and solemnity of the meeting, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail for a period not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.’ (Pen. Code, § 302.)
“‘“The examples are many of the application... of the principle that certain forms of conduct mixed with speech may be regulated or prohibited. The most classic of these was pointed out long ago by Mr. Justice Holmes: ‘The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.’... A man may be punished for encouraging the commission of a crime,... or for uttering ‘fighting words,’.... These authorities make it clear... that ‘it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.’...”
“‘Criminal laws penalize conduct. If the conduct is permissibly prohibited under the state and federal Constitutions, the fact that the conduct may peripherally involve speech or association does not cloak it with constitutional protections that invalidate the criminal statute prohibiting the conduct.’ (People v. Pulliam (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1438–1439, citations omitted.)
“‘“[T]he state may penalize threats, even those consisting of pure speech, provided the relevant statute singles out for punishment threats falling outside the scope of First Amendment protection.... In this context, the goal of the First Amendment is to protect expression that engages in some fashion in public dialogue, that is ‘“communication in which the participants seek to persuade, or are persuaded; communication which is about changing or maintaining beliefs, or taking or refusing to take action on the basis of one’s beliefs....”’... As speech strays further from the values of persuasion, dialogue and free exchange of ideas, and moves toward willful threats to perform illegal acts, the state has greater latitude to regulate expression.... [¶] A threat is an ‘“expression of an intent to inflict evil, injury, or damage on another.”’...”’ (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 233, citations and italics omitted.)
“‘Although... the courts properly have shown a special solicitude for the guarantees of the First Amendment, [the United States Supreme Court] has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free speech on property privately owned....’ (Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner (1972) 407 U.S. 551, 567–568.) ‘As a general rule, landowners... have a right to exclude persons from trespassing on private property; the right to exclude persons is a fundamental aspect of private property ownership.’ (Allred v. Harris (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1390.)
“In a case similar to this one, a protester entered a church carrying a placard containing citations to the New Testament. He was convicted of disturbing a religious assembly. On appeal, the defendant argued that the First Amendment protected his conduct. The court rejected that contention, stating: ‘The First Amendment afford[ed] [the protester] no protection in what he was doing; it afford[ed] members and visitors of the church... freedom and security against what he was doing. It is not contemplated by freedom of religion that one should be so free in the promulgation of his religious views that he can exercise unlawful force in his efforts to destroy the religious views of another.’ (Hill v. State (Ala.Crim.Ct.App. 1979) 381 So.2d 206, 211–212, italics added.)
“In another case, the court explained: ‘The First Baptist Church... privately owns a street... bordered on both sides by church property. The church retain[ed] control of the privately owned street at all times and reserve[d] the right to close it off to the public at any time. [A protestor] ignored warnings to stay off the church’s private property and was arrested for criminal trespass. Based on the line of Supreme Court cases addressing the protection of the first amendment with regard to private property, we hold that [the church owned street] is not the functional equivalent of a public street or a municipality.... Accordingly, [the street] does not fall within the umbrella of first amendment protection.... We hold that, under the first amendment, freedom of expression is not protected on a privately owned street....’ (Gibbons v. State (Tex.Ct.App. 1989) 775 S.W.2d 790, 793; accord, Intern. Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Reber (C.D.Cal. 1978) 454 F.Supp. 1385.)
“In light of Cage-Barile’s constant vocal disagreement with the religious beliefs of Church leaders and the congregation, we find guidance in a... California Supreme Court decision where a nonprofit Catholic hospital terminated the employment of an individual who had been proselytizing among coworkers and patients. The employee sued for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, alleging discrimination based on his religious beliefs.
“The high court upheld the hospital’s decision, stating: ‘[W]e address whether terminating an employee of a religiously affiliated health care organization for using what it considers objectionable religious speech in the workplace constitutes a form of religious discrimination that violates a fundamental public policy. We conclude that a religious organization may not be held liable under these circumstances. Although there is a clear, constitutionally based state policy against religious discrimination in employment..., there is also a countervailing policy... that permits religious organizations to define themselves and their religious message. We therefore conclude there is no clear public policy against religious organizations prohibiting what they consider to be inappropriate religious speech in the workplace.’ (Silo v. CHW Medical Foundation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1097, 1100, citations omitted, italics added.) Just as a religious hospital may base employment decisions on the religious beliefs and conduct of its employees, a church may consider the same factors regarding its membership.
“Of course, ‘[o]wnership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.’ (Marsh v. Alabama (1946) 326 U.S. 501, 506.) But, in this case, the Church is not an open forum. And ‘[i]f the expression [of speech] is inappropriate for the property or is incompatible with the intended use of the property, then the expression may be totally barred and the property is considered a “non forum.”’ (Gannett Satellite Inf. Net. v. Metro. Transp. A. (2d Cir. 1984) 745 F.2d 767, 773.)
“Here, ‘[t]he means of expression [that] [Cage-Barile] insisted on exercising [were] incompatible with the nature of the [Church’s services].’ (Crist v. Village of Larchmont (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 797 F.Supp. 309, 313, affd. mem. (2d Cir. 1993) 9 F.3d 1537.) ‘[Cage-Barile]... possessed the same rights and privileges as the rest of the [congregation] attending [Church services]. However, neither [her] firmness of convictions [nor] the severity of [her] disagreement with the opinions expressed by [Church leaders]... elevate [her] rights to attend and speak any higher than the rights of other [Church] members. Affording [Cage-Barile] a right to speak any greater than the rights of others in attendance would [be] totally inappropriate....’ (Crist v. Village of Larchmont, supra, 797 F.Supp. at p. 313.)
“Cage-Barile seems to believe that ‘“people who want to... protest[] or [express their] views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please. That concept of constitutional law [has been] vigorously and forthrightly rejected [by the United States Supreme Court].”’ (Hill v. State, supra, 381 So.2d at p. 211, italics omitted.) ‘“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.”’ (Crist v. Village of Larchmont, supra, 797 F.Supp. at pp. 313–314.)
“In sum, the Church leaders and members ‘were within their rights to [bar] [Cage-Barile] from participating on the terms [she] demanded. [Her] refusal and continued presence on church property could support a valid charge of trespass.’...” (Church of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior Court, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1252–1256, citation omitted.)
Cage-Barile also contends that the Church was not irreparably harmed by her behavior. Not so. As we previously explained: “[I]n the absence of a restraining order, the Church and the congregation would continue to suffer from Cage-Barile’s outbursts and disruptive behavior. This is not a dispute over free speech. The Church has expelled a member who was harassing the congregation and disrupting religious services. With each passing day, the Church risks losing more members. And the Church should not have to conduct services or meetings in secret just to avoid the interference of an expelled congregant. Without a restraining order, the Church and its members would suffer irreparable harm.” (Church of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior Court, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1257.)
C. Termination of Membership under Corporations Code
Cage-Barile argues that the Church did not comply with section 5341 of the Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law, which states:
“(a) No member may be expelled or suspended, and no membership or membership rights may be terminated or suspended, except according to procedures satisfying the requirements of this section. An expulsion, termination or suspension not in accord with this section shall be void and without effect.
“(b) Any expulsion, suspension or termination must be done in good faith and in a fair and reasonable manner. Any procedure which conforms to the requirements of subdivision (c) is fair and reasonable, but a court may also find other procedures to be fair and reasonable when the full circumstances of the suspension, termination, or expulsion are considered.
“(c) A procedure is fair and reasonable when: [¶] (1) The provisions of the procedure have been set forth in the articles or bylaws, or copies of such provisions are sent annually to all the members as required by the articles or bylaws; [¶] (2) It provides the giving of 15 days prior notice of the expulsion, suspension or termination and the reasons therefor; and [¶] (3) It provides an opportunity for the member to be heard, orally or in writing, not less than five days before the effective date of the expulsion, suspension or termination by a person or body authorized to decide that the proposed expulsion, termination or suspension not take place.
“(d) Any notice required under this section may be given by any method reasonably calculated to provide actual notice. Any notice given by mail must be given by first-class or registered mail sent to the last address of the member shown on the corporation’s records. [¶]... [¶]
“(f) This section governs only the procedures for expulsion, suspension or termination and not the substantive grounds therefor. An expulsion, suspension or termination based upon substantive grounds which violate contractual or other rights of the member or are otherwise unlawful, is not made valid by compliance with this section.” (Corp. Code, § 5341.)
As noted, the record supports the conclusion that the Church followed the proper procedures in terminating Cage-Barile’s membership. Nevertheless, she contends the Church violated the Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law in particular. We conclude otherwise.
Assuming for the sake of argument that section 5341 of the Corporations Code applies to the Church, Cage-Barile is mistaken in asserting that the Church had to comply with all of the specifics set forth in subdivision (c). The purpose of the statute is to ensure that a member’s expulsion is determined “in good faith and in a fair and reasonable manner.” (Corp. Code, § 5341, subd. (b).) To that end, “a court may also find other procedures to be fair and reasonable when the full circumstances of the suspension, termination, or expulsion are considered.” (Ibid.) That is the case here.
Church leaders tried to get Cage-Barile to change her behavior for an entire year before they sought an injunction against her. During that time, she was repeatedly told to stop harassing other members and disrupting Church activities. Cage-Barile refused to cooperate, saying she would continue her pattern of conduct until a court ordered otherwise. Eventually, the Church gave notice of a meeting, invited her and the congregation, allowed her to speak, and openly discussed her membership. Thereafter, the Church terminated her membership. She was sent a letter to that effect. Thus, the evidence supports the conclusion that Cage-Barile was expelled in good faith and in a fair and reasonable manner.
Accordingly, any rights Cage-Barile had under section 5341 of the Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law were not violated.
III
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: ROTHSCHILD, J., JOHNSON, J.