Opinion
Case No. 96 C 6025
July 19, 2002
ORDER
On March 30, 2001, this court issued an order awarding limited attorney's fees to plaintiffs' counsel in this class action suit. The court explicitly limited fees for class counsel to five narrow categories, holding that it would award fees and costs
only for those aspects of this litigation that actually benefitted the class, financially or otherwise, specifically, the fees and costs incurred in [1] obtaining the partnership lists and [2] forcing the resumption of distributions and in litigating the issues of [3] advancement of litigation costs from partnership funds (including necessary discovery on this issue) and [4] the impropriety of proxy voting under the partnership agreement. Class counsel is further, in the court's view, entitled to fees and costs incurred in [5] rebuffing the Individual Plaintiffs' efforts to unseat the named plaintiffs as class representatives.
Order of 3/30/01 at 17. The court denied fees and costs with respect to other aspects of the case, including the substantive merits and settlement negotiations, observing that any benefit provided by counsel to the plaintiff class was limited at best. Id. at 8 ("Plaintiffs' victories, . . . with the exception of the [issue of partnership lists], did not unambiguously confer benefits on the class sufficient to justify the litigation."); see also id. at 17 ("The court cannot help but view this litigation as having been ill-advised from the start. . . ."). The court subsequently referred class counsel's fee petition to Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys, to determine the amount of fees to be awarded in compliance with the court's March 30, 2001 order.
On November 8, 2001, Magistrate Judge Keys issued a memorandum opinion and order ruling that class counsel should be awarded attorney's fees in the following amounts: (1) The Mills Law Firm ("Mills"): $523,882.08 in fees; $74,370.76 in costs; and (2) Futterman Howard: $106,625.10 in fees; $3,585.92 in costs. Mills timely filed objections to the magistrate judge's ruling, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), arguing that the magistrate judge read this court's March 30, 2001 order too narrowly.
Before the magistrate judge, Mills requested a broad reading of this court's March 30, 2001 order. Specifically, Mills sought compensation for "time spent on matters indirectly related to the five issues," but not explicitly listed by this court. (Mills Objections at 3.) Mills characterizes these indirect matters as "connective tissue, i.e., the ligaments that hold the litigation together and without which the case could not proceed." (Id.) Categories for these general litigation matters include drafting and amending complaints, addressing jurisdictional issues, opposing motions to dismiss the complaint, appearing for status conferences, conducting conferences with colleagues and class members, and addressing procedural matters including compliance with court rules.
The magistrate judge held that the correct interpretation of this court's March 30, 2001 order was a narrow one and that this court intended class counsel to be awarded fees only for their work in the five specific categories of work. The magistrate judge based his holding, at least in part, on his observation that this court's order "expresse[d] the court's frustration with Plaintiffs' decision to file this suit, noting that many of the benefits conferred on the class were illusory. . . ." Christman v. Brauvin Realty Advisors, Inc., No. 96 C 6025, 2001 WL 1403024, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 9, 2001).
Therefore, the magistrate judge determined that this court did not intend to compensate class counsel for time spent on the "normal incidents of litigation." Id. Mills objects to this reasoning, arguing that the actual benefits of the suit, identified by this court, could not have been attained without the general litigation matters. The magistrate judge's improperly narrow reading of this court's order, Mills argues, is thus clearly erroneous. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a).
This court concludes that Magistrate Judge Keys's memorandum opinion and order is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See id. The detailed, comprehensive opinion is carefully reasoned and accurately characterizes this court's March 30, 2001 order. While this court's order was not specific regarding the disputed "normal litigation tasks," the magistrate judge reasonably concluded that this court intended to deny fees and costs for such matters. The court agrees with the magistrate judge's interpretation and would have reached the same conclusion itself. The problem with this case is that it is doubtful that the litigation as a whole provided any benefit to the class; indeed, it is quite possible that the class would have been better off without it. While plaintiffs' counsel prevailed on some limited issues and even provided some modest benefit by forcing the general partners to act in compliance with their contractual obligations, an attorney's fee covering all the normal incidents of litigation is, from this court's point of view, unjustified in this case. Accordingly, the court sees no basis for disturbing Magistrate Judge Keys's careful analysis of the issues. The Mills Law Firm is granted fees in the amount of $523,882.08 and costs in the amount of $74,370.76, as determined by Magistrate Judge Keys.