Opinion
Case No. 5:01-CV-9
December 10, 2002
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. The Court denies Plaintiff's Objections and adopts the Report and Recommendation ("Report") of the Magistrate Judge. As a result, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as described in the Report.
I. Background
Plaintiff presently is incarcerated at the Oaks Correctional Facility. In his original pro se Complaint, he sued twelve defendants. A thirteenth defendant was added in Plaintiff's June 19, 2001 Amended Complaint. By prior Order of this Court, five of the original defendants were dismissed. Seven of the eight remaining defendants have filed for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(b). Plaintiff's remaining claim arises from his continuing placement in segregation for more than twelve years and involves whether he received procedural due process in the continuing reviews and decisions to maintain his placement in administrative segregation. Plaintiff alleges he was deprived of a liberty interest without due process by being detained in administrative segregation for more than ten years.
The Court notes that the Motion was filed on behalf of Defendants Luoma, Wolfe, Panzer, Szymke, Abbott, Sharpe, and Porter. Defendant Pager was not named as a moving party.
II. Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), a magistrate judge's report that is case-dispositive shall be reviewed de novo by the district court, and the court may accept, reject, or modify the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); L. Civ.R. 72.3(b).
Review of a motion for summary judgment requires the Court to determine if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). It is the function of the Court to decide "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The question is "whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [non-moving party] on the evidence presented." Id. at 252. The facts are to be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and ". . . all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Schaffer v. A. O. Smith Harvestore Prod., Inc., 74 F.3d 722, 727 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255) (other citations omitted). The non-moving party may not rest on its pleadings but must present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(e)).
III. Analysis
The Report addresses two issues in responding to Plaintiff's claim. The first is whether Plaintiff has a liberty interest and the second is whether Plaintiff has been denied any life, liberty, or property interest without due process. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (finding prisoners may claim protection of the due process clause). With respect to both, the Report recommends this Court find the answer is no. Plaintiff's objections do not address the Report's recommendation per se, but rather the information considered in reaching the recommendation. This Court finds Plaintiff's objections are without merit.
Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge considering an October 2, 2001 incident at Marquette Branch Prison as meaningful to segregation reviews while Plaintiff was still housed at Oaks Correctional Facility. Plaintiff misunderstands the Magistrate Judge's conclusion. On October 2, 2001, following Plaintiff's transfer to Marquette Branch Prison because of a decision to reduce his classification and place him in Level V general population, corrections officers found a handcuff key amongst Plaintiff's belongings. The reference in the Report to this incident is intended to underline the rationale behind Defendants' repeated determinations to keep Plaintiff in administrative segregation because of the risk of escape he presented. While the October incident has nothing to do with whether Plaintiff received procedural due process with respect to his continued stay in administrative segregation, it does exemplify exactly the sort of behavior Defendants were hoping to prevent by placing Plaintiff in administrative segregation. The reference in the Report serves to demonstrate that Plaintiff has again violated the trust placed in him and will be required to display good behavior for a period of time again before he can expect to return to general population.
Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's reliance on and interpretation of certain facts. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the Report omitted reference to the fact that Plaintiff committed no rule infractions while an inmate at Oaks Correctional Facility from April 1996 to August 1998 and yet was held in punitive detention during that time. Plaintiff also objects to the Magistrate Judge finding support in the record for continuance of Plaintiff's segregation despite also finding that his security classification reviews improperly considered charges of hostage taking of which Plaintiff was acquitted.
The Report, in fact, does refer to Plaintiff's eleven years without a misconduct and concludes that despite that clean record, prison officials appropriately determined, in light of Plaintiff's history, that continued administrative segregation was appropriate.
Federal Courts should not engage in oversight of prison management, but should defer to prison officials' decisions regarding prison administration and safety. Shaw v. Murphy, 121 S.Ct. 1475, 1480 (2001). The Court may only insure that a prisoner is not denied any of his rights. United States Civil Service Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (holding prisoners' due process rights are subject to restrictions imposed "by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully committed"). Plaintiff was not denied any rights by being kept in administrative segregation for twelve years. As the Report states, the inquiry is whether the restraint "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly found that an inmate's placement in administrative segregation does not violate the Due Process Clause. Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1998); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 1997); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 1995). The Sixth Circuit's analysis has rested on whether segregation affects the duration of the inmate's overall sentence. Although Plaintiff's stay in segregation was lengthy, it had no impact on the duration of his overall sentence since he had received a life sentence. Based on the evidence presented, his stay has been no different from other prisoners in administrative segregation. Therefore, Plaintiff has no liberty interest in being released from administrative segregation.
Plaintiff expresses concern that the Magistrate Judge improperly relied on Ohio law. This, however, is not the case. The reference to Ohio law was in Jones v. Baker in which the Sixth Circuit held that the length of segregation is not a determining factor in deciding whether segregation presents an "atypical and significant" hardship implicating a protected liberty interest. Jones, 155 F.3d 810 (applying the Supreme Court's analysis in Sandin). The Court's reference to Ohio in Jones was to indicate that Ohio law permits segregation to continue for an indefinite period, which is irrelevant to deciding whether segregation presents an "atypical and significant" hardship implicating a protected liberty interest.
The Magistrate Judge's conclusion that the record provided sufficient support for Plaintiff's original placement and continuation in segregation and therefore meets due process standards, did not rely solely on the security classification reviews, as Plaintiff suggests. The Report includes a description of a series of incidents leading to administrative misconduct findings and criminal convictions which formed the basis of the decision to place Plaintiff in segregation and to continue his placement. Plaintiff is incorrect to argue that evidence of prior bad acts should have been excluded as prejudicial and not relevant to the issue of whether security classification reviews of Plaintiff's segregation met due process requirements. The prior bad acts are more than relevant to the issue at hand because they all resulted in some form of finding of guilt either by the Corrections Department or by a criminal court and appropriately formed the basis for the decision to retain him in administrative segregation. Furthermore, the record indicates Defendants undertook periodic reviews of Plaintiff s classification and, in light of Plaintiff's potential for future escapes and assaults and the needs of the prison officials to manage the prison, decided to keep Plaintiff in administrative segregation. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (finding that prison officials must conduct periodic review of confinement of inmates in administrative segregation, but review need not include submission of additional evidence or statements). Plaintiff's procedural due process rights are satisfied by having his security classification determined by administrative misconduct findings and convictions, with periodic review of the determination.
The decision to place Plaintiff in segregation in 1990 followed a finding that Plaintiff was guilty of a major misconduct for escape, assault on staff not causing serious injury, misuse of state property, possession of money, and theft of property. Plaintiff also was convicted in a criminal trial of escape, kidnaping, assaulting a prison employee, and unlawfully driving away an automobile. The 1990 escape followed escapes in 1971 and 1984, the first of which resulted in the death of a deputy and Plaintiff's conviction for first degree murder, and a reduction in Plaintiff's classification. While nothing happened in 11 years in administrative segregation, Plaintiff's history of escaping and the risks posed to officers during prior escapes represent a more significant risk than a single escape attempt.
Plaintiff argues he was denied his state created right to participate in the clemency process. There is no federally protected liberty or property interest in a state procedure. Rimmer-Bey, 62 F.3d at 789. Plaintiff received regular review of his confinement status, which is all that is required under federal law. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n. 9.
IV. Conclusion
Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiff's Objections and grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
ORDER
In accordance with an Opinion filed this day,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation (Dkt. No. 29) are DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody's Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 28) is ADOPTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Luoma's, Wolfe's, Panzer's, Szymke's, Abbott's, Sharpe's, and Porter's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 20) is GRANTED as described in the Report and Recommendation.