Opinion
No. CV-02-0471200 S
August 16, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION TO STRIKE
The defendants Maganagie Pallay and Kevin Visnic have filed a motion to strike the Second Count of the plaintiff's revised complaint, dated August 11, 2003, as well as, the corresponding prayer for relief for double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. The plaintiffs argue that the Second Count is legally insufficient as the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support her claim for recklessness pursuant to § 14-295 and therefore, should be stricken. The plaintiffs also argue that the Second Count and its corresponding prayer for relief is inapplicable to the defendant Visnic, as double or treble damages may not be assessed against a non-operator owner of an automobile alleged only to be vicariously liable.
This lawsuit arises out of a motor vehicle accident on December 17, 2000, in Branford, Connecticut. The plaintiff has brought a two-count complaint alleging negligence in the First Count and statutory recklessness per General Statutes § 14-295. The plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile owned by Visnic and operated by Pallay. It is alleged that Pallay carelessly and negligently caused the vehicle to go out of control and leave the travel portion of the roadway. The vehicle then traveled across the southbound lane and struck a utility pole, causing the plaintiff to suffer injuries and damages. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant Pallay was negligent in numerous ways, including that the defendant Pallay operated the vehicle at an unreasonable speed in violation of General Statutes § 14-218a. The plaintiff also alleges that Pallay was operating the motor vehicle as the agent, servant and/or employee of the defendant owner, Visnic, or with his permission or under the family car doctrine.
Sec. 14-218a. Traveling unreasonably fast reads in relevant part as follows:
(a) No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state, or road of any specially chartered municipal association or any district organized under the provisions of chapter 105, a purpose of which is the construction and maintenance of roads and sidewalks, or on any parking area as defined in section 14-212, or upon a private road on which a speed limit has been established in accordance with this subsection, or upon any school property, at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable, having regard to the width, traffic and use of highway, road or parking area, the intersection of streets and weather conditions.
In the Second Count, the plaintiff sets forth a claim for double or treble damages against both the operator Pallay and the vehicle owner Visnic. The plaintiff alleges that Pallay recklessly caused the vehicle to go out of control and strike the utility pole. It is alleged that Pallay was operating at a high rate of speed in an area in which she was not familiar with after having consumed alcohol earlier in the evening. The plaintiff alleges that Pallay violated General Statutes § 14-222 in that she operated the vehicle in a reckless and dangerous manner.
The legal standards for reviewing a motion to strike are well-settled. "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). A motion to strike shall be granted if "the plaintiff's complaint [does not] sufficiently [state] a cognizable cause of action as a matter of law." Mora v. Aetna Life and Casualty Ins. Co., 13 Conn.App. 208, 211, 535 A.2d 390 (1988).
A motion to strike "admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings" (Emphasis omitted.) Id. "A motion to strike is properly granted where a plaintiff's complaint alleges legal conclusions unsupported by facts." Id. "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 170, 544 A.2d 1185 (1988). A motion to strike "is to be tested by the allegations of the pleading demurred to, which cannot be enlarged by the assumption of any fact not therein alleged." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541-50, 427 A.2d 822 (1980).
Upon deciding a motion to strike, the trial court must construe the "plaintiff's complaint in [a] manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). "The allegations of the pleading involved are entitled to the same favorable construction a trier would be required to give in admitting evidence under them and if the facts provable under its allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the motion to strike must fail." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra, 196 Conn. 108-09. However, if the plaintiff has alleged mere conclusions of law unsupported by the requisite facts, the motion to strike should be granted. Cavallo v. Derby Savings Bank, 188 Conn. 281, 285, 449 A.2d 986 (1982).
I
The defendants claim that the plaintiff's revised complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support her claim for recklessness pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295.
General Statutes § 14-295 reads as follows:
In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.
This court has addressed this issue previously in Stiber v. Adjei, CV 00 0070751S, Superior Court, Ansonia/Milford Judicial District, January 3, 2001 (Arnold, J.), and Henriques v. Landisi, Superior Court, Judicial District of Ansonia/Milford No. CV 00 0072768 S (Jun. 6, 2001, Arnold, J.), and the relevant citations contained therein. The instant case, involves a statutory claim grounded in recklessness under Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295. This merely requires that a plaintiff plead that another party violated certain statutes set forth specifically in § 14-295 with reckless disregard in order for the trier of fact to consider awarding multiple damages. Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295 does not require the same specificity of pleading which is required to support a cause of action predicated on recklessness. General Statutes § 14-295 is clear and sets forth the essential components of a properly pleaded statutory recklessness claim: deliberate or reckless operation; violation of one or more of the listed statutes; and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Where a plaintiff specifically pleads each of these components, the plaintiff has fully complied with all that the statute requires. See Rocco v. Hall, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 358709 (April 7, 1999, Skolnick, J.). The plaintiff, in the Second Count, has pleaded that the defendant Pallay "was operating said motor vehicle at a high rate of speed in an area in which she was not familiar after having consumed alcohol earlier in the evening," and that "she operated said motor vehicle in a reckless and dangerous manner, in violation of § 14-222 of the [Connecticut] General Statutes . . ." The plaintiff further alleges that her injuries and claimed damages were caused by the reckless conduct of the defendant Pallay.
This court continues to adopt the position that all that is required under General Statutes § 14-295 is that the plaintiff pleads another party has operated a motor vehicle deliberately or with a reckless disregard in violation of certain statutory sections. Section 14-222 is one of those listed statutory violations. The plaintiff has pleaded the necessary statutory violation, and therefore, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages.
The court no longer adheres to its earlier decision in Chatterton v. Infinity Insurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia/Milford at Milford, Docket No. 64615 (October 1, 1999, Arnold, J.).
The motion to strike the Second Count and the prayer for relief is denied as it pertains to the defendant Pallay, the operator of defendant Visnic's vehicle.
II
The defendants also seek to strike the Second Count and the prayer for relief of double or treble damages as it pertains to the owner of the vehicle, the defendant Visnic. The defendants argue that multiple damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295 may not be assessed against a non-operator owner of a motor vehicle.
The parties do not dispute that, at common law, there is no vicarious liability for punitive damages; Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822 (2003) 836 A.2d 394 (2003) citing, Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 285, 472 A.2d 306 (1984); and Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 379-80, 42 A. 67 (1899); and that under that common-law doctrine, the owner of a motor vehicle is not vicariously liable for punitive damages resulting from the driver's reckless operation of the vehicle. Matthiesen v. Vanech, supra, 266 Conn. 822.
There is a division of opinion among the judges of the Superior Court as to whether a plaintiff may recover multiple damages from a defendant owner who is alleged to be vicariously liable for the operator's reckless conduct pursuant to § 14-295. The decision of CT Page 12308 Pirro v. Berardi, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 01-0165815S (Alvord, J., October 3, 2003) ( 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 541), summarizes the conflicting analyses of the trial bench: "The first line of cases, representing the minority view, holds that §§ 14-295, 52-182 and/or 52-183 do not contain language allowing for an expansion of the common-law restraint on the imposition of multiple damages upon a non-operator owner for the reckless conduct of the defendant operator. See Clark v. Gallup, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. 074117(June 13, 2001, Sferrazza, J.) ( 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 655); Little v. Bonesse, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 427368 (July 5, 2000, Levin, J.) ( 27 Conn. L. Rptr. 458); Lyte v. Kane, Superior Court, judicial district of Milford at Milford, Docket No. 063138 (August 25, 1998, Flynn, J.) ( 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 136); Marin v. Plaskawicki, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 313690 (December 8, 1994, Maiocco, J.) (13 Conn. L. Rptr. 174)." Id.
"The majority view, on the other hand, holds that multiple damages under § 14-295 may be assessed against the non-operator owner as a result of the defendant operator's violation of one or more of the motor vehicle statutes. See Bostick v. Dvornek, Superior Court, Docket No. 383575; Shields v. Labriola, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 504276 (November 9, 2001, Kremski, J.) ( 30 Conn. L. Rptr. 697); Santillo v. Arredona, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 442323 (March 21, 2001, Blue, J.) ( 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 458); McCarthy v. Yantorno, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 78474 (August 18, 1999, Sheedy, J.) ( 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 377); Sullivan v. Skully, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury at Waterbury, Docket No. 125823 (March 20, 1998, Espinosa, J.) ( 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 550); Rubbo v. Rubbo, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 130961 (May 22, 1997, Pellegrino, J.) ( 19 Conn. L. Rptr. 547); Prezioso v. Greater Bridgeport Transit Authority, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 333757 (December 24, 1997, Skolnick, J.) ( 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 274); Coman v. Mannix, No. 065645 (Apr. 11, 2002) (Foley J.), 2002 Ct.Sup. 4790 (31 Conn. L. Rptr. 680)." Id.
The defendants argue that Matthiessen v. Vanech, supra, 266 Conn. 822, supports the rationale that multiple damages under § 14-295 cannot be assessed against a non-operator owner of a motor vehicle. In Matthiessen, the jury awarded common-law punitive damages to the plaintiff against a non-operator owner and declined to award double or pursuant to § 14-295. The non-operator owner, Vanech, argued that, as a matter of common law, a principal cannot be held liable for punitive damages for the acts of his or her agent unless the principal authorized or ratified the agent's acts. The plaintiff Matthiessen contended that General Statutes § 52-183 abrogated the common-law principle, thereby permitting an award of punitive damages against Vanech. The thrust of Matthiessen's claim was that the legislature's inclusion of the word "reckless" in § 52-183 evinced an intent by the legislature to render the non-operator owner of a motor vehicle liable for any punitive damages arising out of the reckless conduct of the operator in derogation of the common law. The court agreed with the non-operator owner and set aside the common-law punitive damages against him. Matthiessen v. Vanech, supra, 266 Conn. 836.
Sec. 52-183. Presumption of agency in motor vehicle operation reads as follows:
In any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment.
The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption.
In applying principles of strict statutory construction the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that § 52-183 abrogates the common-law prohibition against the imposition of punitive damages predicated on vicarious liability. "[W]hen a statute is in derogation of common law . . . it should receive a strict construction and is not to be extended, modified, repealed or enlarged in its scope by the mechanics of [statutory] construction . . . In determining whether or not a statute abrogates or modifies a common law rule the construction must be strict, and the operation of a statute in derogation of the common law is to be limited to matters clearly brought within its scope . . . Although the legislature may eliminate a common law right by statute, the presumption that the legislature does not have such a purpose can be overcome only if the legislative intent is clearly and plainly expressed . . . The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed can be seen to serve the same policy of continuity and stability in the legal system as the doctrine of stare decisis in relation to case law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Matthiessen v. Vanech, supra, at 838-39, quoting Alvarez v. New Haven Register, Inc., 249 Conn. 709, 715, 735 A.2d 306 (1999).
The court found that in light of the language and limited purpose of § 52-183, it was not persuaded that § 52-183 could be construed to authorize an award of punitive damages on the basis of vicarious liability. The court stated that "Nothing in the statute suggests that the nonoperator owner of a motor vehicle may be held liable for any damages other than those customarily assessed against an employer for the tortious conduct of an employee, namely, compensatory damages." Id. at 840.
The court further stated, "[T]here is nothing in the statutory language to suggest that the liability of the vehicle's owner for the negligent or reckless conduct of the vehicle's operator is any greater than that of an employer for the tortious conduct of his employee. Because an employer is not vicariously liable for punitive damages arising out of the conduct of his employee, we see no reason to conclude that § 52-183 impliedly gives rise to such liability on the part of a nonoperator owner of a motor vehicle." Id. 840-41.
The defendants now ask this court to apply the rationale in Matthiessen, to the present case, involving § 14-295, while the plaintiff argues that the holding in Matthiessen is limited to common-law punitive damages. The court agrees with the defendants and holds that the double or treble damages provisions contained in § 14-295 are not applicable to a non-operator owner of a vehicle.
In doing so, the court also notes that the Legislature repealed § 14-295 by virtue of its passage of Public Act 03-250. Section 2 of P.A. No. 03-250 provides as follows:
Section 14-295 of the General Statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof. (Effective October 1, 2003, and applicable to causes of action accruing on or said after said date):
In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or triple damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property. The owner of a rental or lease to motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle. CT Page 12311
This court agrees with and adopts the reasoning in Aurio v. Allstate Insurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury at Waterbury No. CV 02-0175465 S (November 26, 2003, Gallagher, J.), 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 39, which states, "It appears that the Legislature has clarified its original intent by the addition of the last sentence," and "finds that neither General Statute § 52-182 nor § 52-183 permits imposing liability for double or treble damages on the non-operator owner of a motor vehicle." Section 14-295 of the statutes unambiguously applies to vehicles operated by a defendant. Punitive damages are therefore inappropriate given the language of the law which authorizes them. The purpose of statutory punitive damages is to deter egregious conduct and imposing them in this case could not serve to deter the owner from conduct in the manner of `operation' of the motor vehicle by the driver which, albeit wrongful, the owner did not cause or have reason to know about or expect. Aurio v. Allstate Insurance Co., supra.
III CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the motion to strike the Second Count is denied. As to the prayer for relief seeking double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295, the motion to strike is granted as to the defendant non-operator owner Visnic and denied as to the defendant operator Pallay.
THE COURT
By Arnold, J.