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Cherry v. Bivens

Supreme Court of Mississippi, Division B
Mar 27, 1939
185 Miss. 329 (Miss. 1939)

Opinion

No. 33468.

March 27, 1939.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

A person is entitled to notice and hearing before being deprived of his rights (Const. Miss. 1890, sec. 24; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14).

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Positions in fraternal, social or religious organizations are valuable rights, of which holders cannot be deprived without notice and opportunity for hearing (Const. Miss. 1890, sec. 24; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14).

3. BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS.

The expression "good cause" in Masonic grand lodge's "landmark," authorizing grand master to suspend any lodge officer for good cause, implies that suspension shall not be arbitrary and that officer shall have right to hearing as to facts alleged to constitute good cause for his suspension.

4. EQUITY.

Arbitrary action is not favored in any field of social, fraternal, religious or other organization, and equity court will not afford relief to one guilty of misconduct or acts which would perpetrate wrong and injustice to others.

5. BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS.

Generally, members of fraternal organization must have hearing and opportunity to defend or meet charges preferred against them before being deprived of their offices, membership and other rights (Const. Miss. 1890, sec. 24; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14).

6. EQUITY.

A bill for accounting of moneys collected, and proceeds of sales of lodge's property, by persons suspended as lodge officers and members without notice or opportunity for hearing on charges against them, was properly dismissed, as complainants, claiming to be officers of lodge, did not come into equity with clean hands. (Const. Miss. 1890, sec. 24; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14).

APPEAL from the chancery court of Washington county; HON. J.L. WILLIAMS, Chancellor.

Wynn, Hafter Lake, of Greenville, for appellants.

The appellees were duly and legally suspended as officers of the W.B. Derrick Lodge by the Grand Master of the Stringer Grand Lodge of the state of Mississippi by a proper order issued by the Grand Master to the appellees on October 15, 1936.

If the suspension of the appellees from office by the Grand Master was irregular and of no effect, then the appellants were entitled to the relief sought because they had been duly and legally elected officers of the W.B. Derrick Lodge for the year 1937 and that as such officers were entitled to the custody and possession of the jewels, books, charters, seals, monies and other properties of the said W.B. Derrick Lodge.

It is the contention of the appellants that in issuing this order of suspension, John L. Webb acted in strict accordance with his right and duties under the landmarks, constitution and by-laws of the Stringer Grand Lodge and its subordinate lodge, the W.B. Derrick Lodge No. 184.

Certainly, it cannot be said to be practical or logical to hold that officers charged with embezzlement could govern a lodge which would eventually have to pass on their right to continue as members of the order. It is our position that their suspension from office could be made and was made by the Grand Master for good cause and that the suspension could be made before any trial was given to the appellees, and that if the appellees felt aggrieved at the suspension they should have adopted the proper method, provided by the constitution and by-laws of the Stringer Grand Lodge, to relieve themselves from this suspension. They should have made a written appeal to the Grievance Committee of the Grand Lodge through the Grand Senior Warden. This was not done.

Conceding for the sake of argument that the suspension of October 15, 1936, was defective or insufficient to suspend the appellees from office, on November 1, 1937, when this suit was filed, the appellants had been duly elected as the successors in office to the appellees and that, as such officers, were entitled to the possession and custody of the lodge properties, as sued for.

The position of the appellants is further strengthened by the conclusive showing that at its assembled meetings in 1936-37, the Stringer Grand Lodge of the state of Mississippi recognized, and by their minutes show, that the appellants, were the duly elected, qualified and acting officers of the subordinate lodge, the W.B. Derrick Lodge.

It cannot be denied that the Grand Auditor and Deputy sent here by the Grand Master gave the appellees personal notice of time, place and purpose of meeting and that the appellees arbitrarily declined to attend. Certainly it cannot be said that the method of determining the truth or falsity of the charges were unreasonable for it seems that the Grand Master acted with wisdom in not leaving this question solely to the two factions of the W.B. Derrick Lodge, but, as a further safeguard to the appellees' rights, he delegated the Grand Auditor and Deputy Grand Master and the members of a disinterested sister lodge.

There are no formal requisites for form of notice or procedure of the hearing for the suspension of an officer.

Harris v. Aiken, 123 A.S.R. 149.

It has been held in reference to expulsion of members that the courts have no right to interfere with the decision of a society except in the following cases: 1. If the decision arrived at was contrary to natural justice, such as the member complained of not having an opportunity to explain misconduct; 2. If the rules of the club have not been observed; 3. If the action of the club was malicious, and not bona fide.

Otto v. Journeyman Tailors P. B.U., 75 Cal. 308, 9 Am. St. Rep. 156.

At the trial of this cause, no attempt was made to show that reasonable grounds for suspension did not actually exist. It certainly appears from the record that the Grand Master was most careful and considerate in endeavoring to determine the true facts and to give the appellees an opportunity to make and also clear up their position. Certainly, the action of the Grand Master was not malicious for it appears throughout the entire transaction he was most careful to endeavor to preserve the peace and harmony of the lodge, and to show the appellees every consideration.

The decision of an unincorporated association, upon the question of election to office is a matter peculiarly and expressly to be determined by the association, and in the absence of fraud is final and binding on the courts.

5 C.J. 1347.

Percy Farish, of Greenville, for appellees.

We submit that the legality of the order suspending appellees from office is the sole issue in this case. If that order was valid, the proof shows that appellants became the legal officers of the lodge in an election authorized by the Grand Master; but if that order was void and of no effect, the proof shows that the appellees have continued to act as the officer of the lodge, that appellants failed to pay their lodge dues and were suspended from the lodge, and that consequently they were, in 1937, rendered ineligible to hold office.

We contend the order of suspension was void and of no effect because it was issued without notice to appellees, without a preferment of charges against them, and without an opportunity for them to make a defense thereto. There has never been a trial on the merits of the charges either by the Grand Master or by the Grand Lodge. The Grand Master was under a legal duty to act reasonably towards the appellees and the rights which they exercised over the subordinate lodge, and this he failed to do.

We believe that the words "good cause" necessarily require a notice of the charge and an opportunity for defense together with a trial on the merits, before the Grand Master has the authority to suspend an officer of a subordinate lodge. He did not comply with the landmarks in the issuance of the order of October 15, 1936.

Wichita Council No. 120 of Security Benefit Assn. v. Security Benefit Assn., 138 Kan. 841, 94 A.L.R. 629; 94 A.L.R. 639, Ann.

Unless this court construes the words "for good cause" to require a notice of the charge with opportunity for defense, and a fair trial thereon, the landmarks of the Grand Lodge are in obvious conflict with the requirements of due process of law of both the state and federal Constitutions. A by-law which arbitrarily suspends officers from the exercise and enjoyment of property rights, as is admittedly the case here, is a denial of due process, according to all of the authorities. It is elementary that due process of law means a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on inquiry, and renders judgment after trial.

6 R.C.L. 446; 12 C.J. 1190; Vicksburg Lodge v. Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masonry, 116 Miss. 214; Bacon on Benefit Societies (4 Ed.) section 109; Grand Grove of U.A.O. of D. v. Garibaldi Grove, No. 71, 105 Cal. 219, 38 P. 947; 94 A.L.R. 635.

The record of this case clearly shows that no notice was ever given to the appellees about being charged with embezzlement or other misdemeanors in office, that there was no hearing, or opportunity for hearing, for appellees to make a defense to the charges after the auditor's report was submitted to the Grand Master. Appellees have never had a trial before either the Grand Master or the Grand Lodge. The record further shows that after the suspension of appellees from office, they appealed to the Grand Master for a trial or a hearing on the matter, and that they were informed that his decision was absolutely final. The Grand Lodge has never allowed them an opportunity for a hearing although appellees testify that they have on several occasions attempted to attend the sessions of the Grand Lodge and have their complaints heard. These are the undisputed facts of the case.

In conclusion we submit that the Grand Master issued a void order of suspension because he did not comply with the by-law authorizing him to act "for good cause;" that if the by-law be construed to authorize him to act summarily and arbitrarily as he did, it is in obvious conflict with the essential requirements of due process of law.


On November 1, 1937, the appellants filed a bill in the Chancery Court of Washington county, alleging that they were officers of the W.B. Derrick Lodge No. 184 of Free and Accepted Masonry in the State of Mississippi, a subordinate of the Grand Lodge of the State of Mississippi; that the Lodge of which the complainants claimed to be officers, composed of members of the colored race, had existed in the city of Greenville, Mississippi, a long time; and set out certain other persons as being members thereof, alleging that the complainants were duly recognized as officers and members of the Lodge by the Grand Lodge, under whose jurisdiction the W.B. Derrick Lodge exists and operates. The bill alleged that the defendants, J.H. Bivens, C.H. Garrett, H.C. Thomas, Clarence Young, and Will Reed, are now, and have been in the past, falsely and fraudulently representing themselves as officers and members of the said W.B. Derrick Lodge, but that, in fact, they are not members of said Lodge, and are not entitled to hold themselves out as such, or to represent the Lodge in any way.

Complainants further allege that the defendants now retain, and are using, minute books, paraphernalia and cash books belonging to the Lodge; that they are holding in their possession certain real estate known as the "Live Oak Cemetery," and have in the past sold lots in the cemetery, and are now offering other lots for sale for burial purposes; that their conduct in this behalf is resulting in confusion, and that persons desiring to purchase lots are misled by the defendants in asserting ownership and custodianship of said lots. They allege that in the past the defendants executed conveyances to lots in the cemetery, and received large amounts of money therefor, acting without authority or consent of the complainants or the Lodge which they represented, and refused to account for the funds received for the sale of the lots; that they have attempted to sell buildings belonging to the complainants, and will continue to do so unless restrained by the court.

The complainants further allege that up to December 4, 1935, the defendants were officers of this Lodge, and as such collected dues and emoluments belonging to the W.B. Derrick Lodge, for which they failed and refused to account to the Lodge or its proper officers; that the complainants did not have the records showing the amount of money so collected by the defendants, who have in their possession the books and records which show the true and correct amounts which the defendants have so collected, and to which the complainants contend that they are entitled to an accounting. The complainants pray for an accounting, and that the defendants shall plead, answer and demur to the bill, and be required, under oath, to render a complete and adequate accounting of all sums of money collected by them as members of the W.B. Derrick Lodge, and that they be required to render, under oath, a complete and adequate accounting of all sums collected from the sales of lots and property of the W.B. Derrick Lodge, etc.

The defendants answered, denying that the complainants were officers of the Lodge, admitting that all parties to the suit were members of the colored race, denying that those named as officers by the complainants are legally officers of the W.B. Derrick Lodge, or have been in the past, or that defendants are not members of the Lodge. They admit that they retained and are using the minute book, official paraphernalia and cash books of the Lodge, and that they are holding certain real estate, and have in the past executed conveyances to lots in the cemetery, and received money therefor; but deny that the complainants are entitled to the money so collected, or that they have done anything in fraud of the rights of the complainants. In other words, the defendants deny the material allegations of the bill, so far as the right to hold office in the complainants is concerned, or as to their being officers, the defendants claiming to be the true officers in charge of the Lodge, etc.

It appears from the evidence that an auditor, or a person claiming to be an auditor, of the Stringer Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of Mississippi, undertook to audit the Lodge, and claimed to have found some discrepancies, which he reported to John L. Webb, Grand Master; whereupon Webb, on the 15th day of October, 1936, addressed a communication to the defendants, charging them with being in open rebellion to the mandates of the Grand Lodge, and with being guilty of embezzlement; "and it therefore becomes my painful duty to arrest your jewel and suspend you and your associates from office until after this whole audit is cleared up, and justice is meted out to all concerned. And you and your associates are hereby ordered to turn over to Bro. Cherry the charter, books, seal, money and all property of whatever nature of W.B. Derrick Lodge, and have nothing further to do with Derrick Lodge as officers."

No notice or hearing was given to the defendants of any charges brought against them, or opportunity to be heard before being suspended and deprived of their offices and positions in the Lodge.

The powers of the said Grand Master, upon which he relied to justify his action in suspending defendants and depriving them of their offices, are what are termed "Landmarks," adopted by the Stringer Grand Lodge, which were as follows: "(1) The Grand Master may suspend any lodge or officer of the lodge from his official station for good cause. (2) The Grand Master may arrest the charter of a lodge or the jewel of any officer for good cause. (3) When the jewel of an officer is arrested he cannot serve in the capacity of an officer. (4) When the charter of a lodge is arrested it cannot meet and transact business as such. (17) Every Free Mason is amenable to the laws and regulation of the Masonic jurisdiction in which he resides."

The defendants were in possession of the offices and Lodge, and retained possession and continued to hold meetings, etc. But after the attempted deprivation of their offices and suspension of their jewels by the said Grand Master of the Stringer Grand Lodge, the Grand Lodge refused to receive the delegation selected by the defendants, and the Lodge members associated with them, but recognized a contending faction without any trial or hearing or notice of the charges or act for which the deprivation of offices and jewels of the Lodge were undertaken to be had.

There was an effort on the part of the officers of the Grand Lodge to get all the members of the Derrick Grand Lodge to meet in the lodge room of another Lodge in the city of Greenville, and to permit the members of both Lodges to hear and settle the rights of the parties plaintiff and defendant; and such open Lodge was held by the members of both Lodges, which the defendants declined, and offered to submit to an open meeting of the Lodge with its members in their own hall, which the Grand Officers refused to accept.

The Chancellor dismissed the bill, and from that dismissal this appeal is prosecuted.

As stated, the bill was filed in a court of equity, and it is contended in the case that the Grand Master did not have to give any notice, that he was the sole judge, and from his judgment no appeal lay, and that his action debarred the defendants from further holding office; and required them to surrender their positions and jewels, as directed.

The proceedings by which the powers of the Grand Master should be exercised were not prescribed; but those powers were to be exercised for good cause.

It is a fundamental principle that a person is entitled to notice and hearing before being deprived of his rights. Under the Constitution of Mississippi, section 24, every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation is entitled to remedy in due course, and by the Mississippi Constitution, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, U.S.C.A., no person can be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law. And while a fraternal society, social or religious organization is not within the letter of the provisions named, yet the state has established, as a matter of public policy, the rights mentioned, and the positions in such organizations, are valuable rights pertaining to the liberty of the citizen, and affects his reputation if he is expelled from such organization, or deprived of his rights without an opportunity to be heard. It would be fundamentally unjust to deprive a person of these offices in such organizations, and to have his reputation affected by the fact that he was expelled, or his rights forfeited by superior officers.

The expression, "good cause," implies that it shall not be arbitrary, and that the defendant shall have a right to a hearing as to the facts alleged to constitute such "good cause." Arbitrary action is not favored in any field of social, fraternal, religious, or other organization; and a court of equity will not afford relief to one who seeks relief while guilty of misconduct, or of such acts as would perpetrate wrong and injustice to others.

It is generally held by the authorities that members of an organization of the character here involved, before being deprived of their offices, membership and other rights, must have a hearing and opportunity to defend, or to meet the charges preferred against them. We are not confronted here with the rule that would give plenary authority to the Grand Master without cause, and without a hearing, to suspend or expel, provided that was stipulated in the proceedings by which a person became a member. It is doubtful whether such a rule would be upheld, because it would be purely arbitrary, and capable of inflicting a wrong upon a person, without remedy. But the meaning of the rule here, when it stipulates for "good cause," must be that it shall not be arbitrary, and that a hearing shall be had. The law upon the subject is contained in a case reported in 94 A.L.R., page 629, to which an annotation is appended by the A.L.R. editorial staff. The style of this case is Wichita Council No. 120 of Security Benefit Ass'n et al. v. Security Benefit Ass'n., 138 Kan. 841, 28 P.2d 976, 94 A.L.R. 629, with case notes beginning at page 639. The complainants here have not come into equity with clean hands.

On a consideration of the law and facts contained in this record, we are of the opinion that the action of the Chancellor in dismissing the bill was proper. Had there been a hearing in the matter, a different question would have been presented.

Affirmed.


Summaries of

Cherry v. Bivens

Supreme Court of Mississippi, Division B
Mar 27, 1939
185 Miss. 329 (Miss. 1939)
Case details for

Cherry v. Bivens

Case Details

Full title:CHERRY et al. v. BIVENS et al

Court:Supreme Court of Mississippi, Division B

Date published: Mar 27, 1939

Citations

185 Miss. 329 (Miss. 1939)
187 So. 525

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