Opinion
4-22-0558
06-14-2023
VIDYASAGAR CHEEKATI and VIJAYA KASIREDDY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GEOFFREY A. ABRAHAM, Individually and as Agent of Farmers Insurance Company, a/k/a Farmers Insurance and FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a/k/a FARMERS INSURANCE, Defendants-Appellees.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County No. 21L34 Honorable Rebecca S. Foley, Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Steigmann and Knecht concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
DeARMOND PRESIDING JUSTICE.
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal based on the two-year statute of limitations of plaintiffs' claim for negligent procurement of insurance when the insureds received a declarations page to renew their policy in 2016 but did not plead they made any effort to request and read their policy until the insurer denied their claim in 2019 for a 2017 injury. The discovery rule did not act to toll the limitations period because the terms of the policy were unambiguous.
¶ 2 In March 2021, plaintiffs, Vidyasagar Cheekati and Vijaya Kasireddy, filed a complaint against defendants, Geoffrey A. Abraham and Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers), alleging, in part, defendants were negligent in failing to procure insurance covering injuries sustained by a tenant of their property in January 2017. Plaintiffs alleged they told defendant Abraham they had a tenant before the issuance of an insurance policy for the time period from February 27, 2016, to February 27, 2017. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under section 2- 619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2020)) based on the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion.
¶ 3 On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss. Specifically, plaintiffs contend the statute of limitations does not apply because the cause of action accrued in March 2019, when Farmers denied their claim and sent them a copy of their policy. In the alternative, they argue the discovery rule applied to toll the limitations period because they could not reasonably be expected to understand that their policy did not include coverage for a tenant's personal injury. We determine the action accrued when the defective policy was issued in 2016. We further find the discovery rule does not apply. Accordingly, we affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 On March 8, 2021, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging they lived in Pennsylvania and owned a property in Bloomington, Illinois. The property was insured by policy No. 9378358-33, issued by Farmers through Abraham, acting as their agent, with a policy period of February 27, 2016, through February 27, 2017. Without providing dates, plaintiffs alleged, "[n]o less than two times prior to the issuance of [the policy]," they "informed [Abraham] that they had tenants in their property." Plaintiffs further alleged the policy provided coverage for bodily injury arising from the rental of the property.
¶ 6 Plaintiffs alleged that, in November 2016, after they were unable to sell the property, they leased the property to Cynthia Donnelly. In "late April 2017," plaintiffs became aware of an injury to Donnelly. Plaintiffs alleged they promptly notified Abraham by telephone, who told them to "send him the information and they will take it from there." On May 3, 2017, plaintiffs notified Abraham in writing of the injury, and a claim number was generated. On May 4, 2018, Farmers sent plaintiffs a letter stating it would continue with its investigation to resolve the claim and would keep plaintiffs advised of its status. The letter stated defending plaintiffs based on the protection of their policy was Farmers's "first priority." Plaintiffs continued to pay their policy premiums, which were accepted by Farmers until they sold the property in April 2018. On August 4, 2018, Farmers sent plaintiffs a letter advising them of the policy limits and stating, "We will continue to investigate this matter on your behalf." However, Farmers later sent plaintiffs a letter, dated March 7, 2019, advising them Donnelly had filed a complaint against plaintiffs based on a January 25, 2017, injury and that Farmers was disclaiming coverage.
¶ 7 In the first three counts of the complaint, plaintiffs alleged (1) breach of contract, (2) unreasonable delay in settling a claim, and (3) breach of duty to defend. Plaintiffs later voluntarily dismissed those claims, consistent with the holding of a related declaratory judgment action Farmers filed on March 11, 2019. In that action, the trial court held Farmers had no duty to defend or indemnify plaintiffs because policy exclusions applied to exclude Donnelly's claims from coverage, and we affirmed. See Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Cheekati, 2022 IL App (4th) 210023, ¶ 25, 196 N.E.3d 1209. Counts IV and V of the complaint asserted negligence claims against Abraham and Farmers, alleging plaintiffs had a duty to ensure plaintiffs had adequate insurance based on facts they twice communicated to Abraham.
¶ 8 Plaintiffs attached an exhibit to the complaint consisting of several documents. Included first was a document from Farmers dated March 7, 2019, with a box checked stating: "Attached is a true copy of the original declaration page. The attached policyback and endorsements did not mail with this declaration page but are included as requested." It also stated:
"Any additional Declaration Sheet(s) included with these documents labeled as 'change or change-misc' may reflect a mid-term change in the policy and therefore a time period of less than the original policy term; however, the dates reflect the most current policy information on file, up to and including the date of loss for the above-referenced claims."
Next was a declaration page listing the policy No. 93783-58-33, plaintiffs' mailing address in Pennsylvania, and the property address in Bloomington. The declaration page stated the property was "Owner Occupied (Primary Res.)" and had no mention of rental use. The declaration noted a premium of $883.65 and "prorated premium (12/21/2016-2/27/2017)" of $0. The bottom of the page also included the date "12/22/2016."
¶ 9 Plaintiffs also attached the policy. The policy contained certain liability coverage, including stating Farmers would pay damages an insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury resulting from an occurrence. However, the policy also contained a liability exclusions section, which provided personal injury coverage did not apply to "any insured or other residents of the residence premises," including "any resident of the residence premises, whether resident in the dwelling or a separate structure." The term "resident" was not defined in the policy. The definition of the term "resident" was at issue in Farmers's declaratory judgment action, in which we held that it included a tenant such as Donnelly. Cheekati, 2022 IL App (4th) 210023, ¶ 22.
¶ 10 As a separate exhibit, plaintiffs attached a letter from Farmers, dated March 7, 2019, stating it had been served with Donnelly's complaint. Farmers asserted it was disclaiming coverage because Donnelly was a tenant and resident of the property.
¶ 11 On November 29, 2021, defendants moved to dismiss, alleging the claims were barred by res judicata because they could have been raised in Farmers's declaratory judgment action. Defendants also alleged the action was barred by the statute of limitations under section 13-214.4 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-214.4 (West 2020)) because it was not brought within two years of the issuance of a policy that did not conform to plaintiffs' purported request. Defendants alleged the "policy, in effect from February 27, 2016, to February 27, 2017, was delivered prior to the effective date of the policy in 2016." Thus, defendants argued the cause of action needed to be filed in 2018. Defendants did not attach an affidavit or documents showing when the policy was physically delivered to plaintiffs.
¶ 12 On February 7, 2022, plaintiffs filed a response, arguing res judicata did not apply and defendants failed to support their allegation the policy was delivered before the effective date of the policy at issue. They argued their exhibits showed the "policyback and endorsements did not mail with the declaration page." Plaintiffs further argued, as unsophisticated insureds, they could not reasonably be expected to understand the terms of the policy or anticipate a denial of coverage before March 11, 2019, when Farmers filed their declaratory action.
¶ 13 Defendants filed a reply, stating the policy issued to plaintiffs had a renewal term that started in February 2016. Defendants maintained, even if plaintiffs could not discover their claim before 2016, they were notified of the denial of coverage on March 7, 2019, but failed to file their complaint until March 8, 2021.
¶ 14 On February 28, 2022, the trial court held a hearing. The court held defendants were pursuing a statute-of-limitations defense without supporting affidavits. The court found, without any additional information as to when plaintiffs received the policy, there was an issue of fact as to whether the limitations period had run. The court gave defendants leave to supplement the motion to dismiss with any necessary materials. The court did not decide issues of res judicata as to those counts, stating, after any supplement to the motion to dismiss, "we will come back and figure out where we are at on Counts IV and V."
¶ 15 On March 22, 2022, defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. In it, defendants stated the policy issued for the February 27, 2016, to February 27, 2017, term was a "renewal policy" and recognized that plaintiffs' documents stated "policyback and endorsements did not mail with this declaration page." However, defendants stated, "Notably absent from Plaintiffs' argument was any assertion that Farmers and/or Abraham did not provide a copy of the full insurance policy upon request. This is because Plaintiffs made no such request." Defendants alleged plaintiffs held the same policy since 2008, which was renewed without material changes.
¶ 16 Defendants attached a certified copy of the 2008 policy sent to plaintiffs. The declarations page showed coverage from September 29, 2008, to September 29, 2009, for policy No. 93783-58-33 at the Bloomington address. The copy of the policy attached contained some differences in fonts, style, and page numbering from the policy attached to plaintiffs' complaint, but the substance of the provisions at issue were the same. There were also differences in premium amounts.
¶ 17 Plaintiffs filed a response, noting Farmers had failed to provide an affidavit supporting their claims. Plaintiffs further noted the differences among the policies and reasserted their argument they could not discover the failure of Farmers to procure insurance based on their information provided to Abraham until they received the current renewal policy and had an opportunity to read it and reasonably be expected to understand its terms. They further argued, because it took Farmers two years to determine the policy did not cover the claim, they too could not be expected to reach that determination.
¶ 18 On May 18, 2022, defendants filed a reply, noting plaintiffs' argument concerning the lack of an affidavit. Defendants attached additional documentation and argued plaintiffs were sent the full policy more than two years before they filed their complaint. Defendants attached an affidavit from Abraham averring plaintiffs originally purchased the homeowner's policy in 2008 with policy No. 93783-58-33 from another agent for the residence in Bloomington. On December 23, 2010, the account was transferred to Abraham's agency. Abraham averred he consulted with all new clients and, after consulting with plaintiffs, Kasireddy was added as a primary named insured in 2011. He then averred, "The policy continued to be renewed by the couple without changes." Before February 2014, the policy lapsed. Abraham averred that, in February 2014, his agency reinstated the policy under the same policy number and, at that time, Cheekati verified on his application that he did not rent the property and the home was an owner-occupied residence. Abraham further averred, in 2016, Cheekati notified Abraham that he would be moving to Pennsylvania and Kasireddy would continue staying at the Bloomington home while she worked to sell the property. Abraham then averred, "Neither Cheekati nor Kasireddy ever requested that I renew or change their homeowner's policy to be converted into a nonowner occupied landlord policy type prior to January 25, 2017." Defendants also attached documentation of the 2008 policy and the 2014 declarations page.
¶ 19 The trial court record sheet shows it held a hearing on June 2, 2022. However, a transcript or substitute for a transcript of the hearing does not appear in the record. On June 3, 2022, the court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss based on the expiration of the statute of limitations.
¶ 20 This appeal followed.
¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint because there are issues of material fact as to when they received the deficient policy and had an opportunity to read and understand it. Plaintiffs also argue defendants' affidavit attached to a reply was insufficient when it was not attached to a motion. Defendants argue the record shows plaintiffs had the opportunity to read and understand their policy because they received copies of their policy in 2008 and 2014, and the 2016 policy was merely a renewal of the same policy. They also argue their affidavit was properly filed. Although defendants previously raised issues of res judicata in the trial court, they do not raise res judicata as an issue on appeal.
¶ 23 A. Forfeiture
¶ 24 Before addressing the issues raised on appeal, we note the record contains no report of proceedings, bystander's report, or agreed statement of facts pertaining to the June 2, 2022, hearing. Normally, the appellant has the burden of presenting a sufficiently complete record of the trial court proceedings to support a claim of error. In the absence of such a record on appeal, we presume the trial court's order conformed to the law. Foutch v. O 'Bryant, 99 Ill.2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958, 959 (1984). "Any doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant." Foutch, 99 Ill.2d at 392. However, notwithstanding Foutch, a record of the proceedings in the lower court may be unnecessary when an appeal raises solely a question of law, which we review de novo. Watkins v. Office of the State Appellate Defender, 2012 IL App (1st) 111756, ¶ 19, 976 N.E.2d 387.
¶ 25 A trial court's dismissal of a complaint under section 2-619 for failure to file a claim within the applicable statute of limitations is reviewed de novo. Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill.2d 248, 254, 807 N.E.2d 439, 443 (2004). Under the de novo standard of review, we owe no deference to the trial court. Trzop v. Hudson, 2015 IL App (1st) 150419, ¶ 63, 43 N.E.3d 178. The record here is sufficient for us to undertake a de novo review. Accordingly, the lack of a report of proceedings for the June 2, 2022, hearing does not impede our ability to decide the appeal's merits.
¶ 26 B. Section 2-619 Proceedings
¶ 27 Plaintiffs argue there are genuine issues of material fact concerning when they received and could reasonably understand the provisions of their policy that prevent dismissal under section 2-619.
¶ 28 A section 2-619 motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint but asserts that certain defects, defenses, or other affirmative matters outside the pleadings defeat the claims. Austin Highlands Development Co. v. Midwest Insurance Agency, Inc., 2020 IL App (1st) 191125, ¶ 10, 153 N.E.3d 1049. Specifically, under subsection (a)(5), dismissal is appropriate when "the action was not commenced within the time limited by law." 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2020).
¶ 29 The purpose of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss is to dispose of issues of law and easily proved issues of fact at the outset of litigation. Zedella v. Gibson, 165 Ill.2d 181, 185, 650 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (1995). When ruling on such a motion, a court must interpret all pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Paszkowski v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 213 Ill.2d 1, 5, 820 N.E.2d 401, 404 (2004). "[T]he question on appeal is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether [a] defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Mitchell v. State Farm Fire &Casualty Co., 343 Ill.App.3d 281, 284, 796 N.E.2d 617, 619 (2003). Section 2-619 further provides that if the grounds for dismissal do not appear on the face of the pleading attacked, the motion shall be supported by affidavit. 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2020).
¶ 30 C. The Limitations Period
¶ 31 Plaintiffs' complaint is premised on defendants' alleged negligence in procuring an insurance policy that would cover injuries to a tenant. Section 2-2201(a) of the Code states, "An insurance producer, registered firm, and limited insurance representative shall exercise ordinary care and skill in renewing, procuring, binding, or placing the coverage requested by the insured or proposed insured." 735 ILCS 5/2-2201(a) (West 2020). Section 13-214.4 of the Code provides a two-year statute of limitations for such claims:
"All causes of action brought by any person or entity under any statute or any legal or equitable theory against an insurance producer, registered firm, or limited insurance representative concerning the sale, placement, procurement, renewal, cancellation of, or failure to procure any policy of insurance shall be brought within 2 years of the date the cause of action accrues." 735 ILCS 5/13-214.4 (West 2020).
¶ 32 In American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Krop, 2018 IL 122556, 120 N.E.3d 982, our supreme court clarified when a cause of action for negligent procurement of insurance accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations. There, the court determined such claims are torts arising out of a contractual relationship, under which the cause of action ordinarily accrues at the time of the breach of contract, not when a party sustains damages. Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶ 35. Thus, in Krop, our supreme court clearly held, in actions premised on the negligent procurement of insurance, the action accrues on the date of the breach of the duty or contract, not the date of damages. Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶ 18. Accordingly, the breach occurs the moment the insurance producer delivers the allegedly deficient policy. Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶ 35. The court recognized the discovery rule generally delays the start of the "limitations period until the plaintiff should discover the injury" but found "insurance customers are injured as soon as an insurance producer delivers a policy that does not conform to the customers' request." (Emphasis in original.) Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶ 35.
¶ 33 The supreme court based its rationale in part on the fact that insurance producers do not owe their customers a fiduciary duty. See Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶ 29. The court stated insureds "generally know their own goals better than their insurance agent does, but determining if a policy achieves those goals will be difficult when customers do not read the policy." Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶ 29. Further, "[e]xpecting customers to read their policies and understand the terms incentivizes them to act in good faith to purchase the policy they actually want, rather than to delay raising an issue until after the insurer has already denied coverage." Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶ 29. Thus, under Krop, a cause of action for negligent procurement of insurance generally accrues when the insured receives the policy. Austin Highlands, 2020 IL App (1st) 191125, ¶ 16.
¶ 34 The supreme court in Krop also noted there were, under the discovery rule, a "narrow set of cases" where a cause of action would not accrue upon receipt of the insurance policy, but the insured would have to plead facts showing that it "reasonably could not be expected to learn the extent of coverage simply by reading the policy." Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶¶ 36, 38. "In some cases the insurance policies may contain contradictory provisions or fail to define key terms. In others the circumstances that give rise to the liability may be so unexpected that the typical customer should not be expected to anticipate how the policy applies." Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶ 36. The Krop court summarized their holding thusly: "[W]hen customers have the opportunity to read their insurance policy and can reasonably be expected to understand its terms, the cause of action for negligent failure to procure insurance accrues as soon as the customers receive the policy." Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶ 2.
¶ 35 Ultimately, the plaintiffs in Krop did not plead facts showing they could not have read their policy and understood its terms. Thus, the cause of action accrued when they first purchased the policy. The plaintiffs in Krop did not claim they never received the policy or had no copy available to them. Because they were obligated to read the policy and understand the terms, the earliest date they should have known of their injury was when the policy was issued. Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶ 37.
¶ 36 Here, the date of the alleged breach was when defendants procured an insurance policy for plaintiffs that failed to cover liability to a tenant. Based on the face of the complaint, that was the policy in effect beginning February 27, 2016-a date well over two years from the date of the filing of the complaint. However, plaintiffs argue a later date should apply to their case.
¶ 37 Plaintiffs first stress our supreme court's statement of its holding in Krop that the cause of action accrues "as soon as the customers receive the policy." Pointing to the statement on the declaration page attached to their complaint that the policy did not mail with the declaration page, plaintiffs argue they did not receive the policy until after defendants mailed it to them on March 7, 2019. Because of the time it takes to receive mail, they argue they could not have received the policy until after March 8, 2019, which is within the two-year limitations period of the filing of their complaint. Defendants argue the policy was a renewal and plaintiffs received copies of the policy in 2008 and 2014. Thus, they suggest the cause of action accrued as early as those dates.
¶ 38 We do not agree with defendants that the cause of action accrued in 2008 or 2014. Those dates preceded the policy term at issue, and it would be nonsensical to hold that the cause of action accrued before plaintiffs had a reason to seek a change in the policy terms. However, we determine the cause of action accrued in 2016, when the allegedly deficient policy renewal was issued. Under Krop, that is when the alleged breach occurred.
¶ 39 Plaintiffs' argument that the action did not accrue until 2019 fails for several reasons. First, although the Krop court stated in its summary of the holding that the cause of action accrues when the insured receives the policy, a reading of Krop, as a whole, shows the action accrues when the plaintiff should have known of the injury-that is, when the plaintiffs had the ability to read the policy. While this often will be when an insured receives the policy, certainly in cases such as a renewal, it is logical that a cause of action would accrue when the insured asks for a change in the policy and the lack of an issuance of a new policy or the issuance of a declaration page indicating a change was not made should trigger the customer to make an inquiry. The Krop court specifically noted with favor that "[m]any Illinois cases have found that insurance customers should know the specifics of their policy as soon as they purchase it." Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶ 22. Thus, the court stated multiple times that customers have an obligation to read their policies and understand the terms. Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶¶ 29, 36, 38. We do not read Krop's summary of its holding so literally as to mean that a cause of action accrues only when an insured has a physical receipt of the policy, regardless of any other facts.
¶ 40 Instead, we look to Krop's facts. There, the plaintiffs did not plead any facts showing they could not have read their policy or had no copy available to them. Similarly, plaintiffs here did not plead they could not have read their policy. Rather, they merely alleged a policy was issued with a policy period beginning February 27, 2016. They attached a copy of the March 7, 2019, mailing from defendants with what was purported to be the "the original declaration page," with a date indicating it was issued mid-term on December 22, 2016. The document showed a policy utilizing the same policy number as plaintiffs' previous policy and that listed the property as "Owner Occupied (Primary Res.)," a fact that should have put plaintiffs on notice that the residence was insured as an owner-occupied primary residence.
¶ 41 Meanwhile, notably absent from plaintiffs' complaint is any allegation that plaintiffs did not receive a copy of the declaration page in 2016, did not receive a copy of the policy during the period at issue, or did not have the means to obtain a copy. Nothing indicates they asked for a copy of the policy or could not have obtained a copy had they asked for it. As in Krop, given the lack of allegations of an inability to obtain the policy, we determine that, based on the face of the pleading, the action accrued when plaintiffs renewed their policy for the February 27, 2016, to February 27, 2017, term. It was at that time defendants issued an allegedly defective policy, and plaintiffs had an obligation to read and understand their policy to determine whether it contained the coverage they desired. That defendants mailed plaintiffs a copy of the policy in March 2019 with their letter denying coverage does not show plaintiffs were unable to obtain and read their policy before that time. Ultimately, here, plaintiffs needed to point to something more or some specific reason for their reliance on telling Abraham that they had a tenant to justify departing from the normal rule that requires insureds to read their policies. See Kridner v. Estate of Padilla, 2021 IL App (4th) 200453-U, ¶ 71 (cited as persuasive authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023)).
¶ 42 Because we determine the action accrued in 2016 based on the face of the complaint, we need not address plaintiffs' claims that defendants failed to support their motion to dismiss with a timely affidavit. In any event, we note the trial court gave leave for defendants to supplement their motion and, "[e]ven if an affidavit should have been filed, the absence of an affidavit may not be fatal." Acceptance, LLC v. Tyler, 2012 IL App (1st) 093559, ¶ 24, 966 N.E.2d 1039.
¶ 43 The Code is liberally construed to fulfill its purpose of providing substantial justice and resolution on the merits, rather than imposing seemingly insurmountable procedural obstacles to litigation. Tyler, 2012 IL App (1st) 093559, ¶ 24. Further, given our holding that the action accrued in 2016, defendants' arguments regarding style and font differences between the 2016 policy and the 2008 and 2014 documents are irrelevant.
¶ 44 D. The Discovery Rule
¶ 45 Because "insurance customers can read their policies and learn of any defects, the discovery rule typically will not delay the start of the two-year limitations period for negligent failure to procure insurance." Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶ 29. However, plaintiffs argue, even if the action accrued in 2016, under the discovery rule, an exception to Krop applies because they could not reasonably be expected to learn the extent of coverage simply by reading the policy. Plaintiffs note Abraham indicated to them he was working on the matter, and it took two years for Farmers to deny coverage. Then, the matter of whether the policy provided coverage was litigated and appealed.
¶ 46 In the appeal of Farmers's declaratory judgment action, we addressed the policy language, which stated coverage for personal injury did not apply to any insured or resident of the residence premises. Plaintiffs in that case argued Donnelly, as a tenant, was not a "resident" of the premises. Although the term "resident" was not defined in the policy, we held the term was unambiguous and included tenants such as Donnelly. Cheekati, 2022 IL App (4th) 210023, ¶ 20. In doing so, we noted plaintiffs offered no reasonable interpretation for the term "resident" other than their claim it could not include tenants and their observation that the policy used the term "tenant" in two other unrelated provisions. We found that argument unreasonable, stating that separating tenants from residents for purposes of the resident exclusion because the policy uses "tenant" in two other unrelated policy provisions amounted to plaintiffs suggesting a creative possibility instead of a reasonable interpretation of the term "resident." Cheekati, 2022 IL App (4th) 210023, ¶ 21. We also rejected an argument that an exception to the exclusion pertaining to" 'roomers or boarders'" who rent part of the residence was applicable. Cheekati, 2022 IL App (4th) 210023, ¶ 23. While we did not as explicitly state that plaintiffs' argument on that point was unreasonable, we stated they "cling to this exception" as an argument. See Cheekati, 2022 IL App (4th) 210023, ¶ 23. We now find the provision's plain language was clear that the exception did not apply to a tenant of the entire property, such as Donnelly. Thus, the policy was clear that a tenant's personal injury was not covered.
¶ 47 We recognize in Krop, the supreme court cited a policy that failed to define key terms as an example of a narrow set of cases providing for application of the discovery rule. However, while the term "resident" was not defined in plaintiffs' policy, given the clear and unambiguous meaning of the term, we find the term was not a "key term" as contemplated by Krop to provide an exception to the premise that plaintiffs could reasonably be expected to learn the extent of coverage simply by reading the policy. To the extent plaintiffs argue defendants lulled them into acting, we further note, in the declaratory judgment action, we rejected similar estoppel claims. Cheekati, 2022 IL App (4th) 210023, ¶ 29. Further, plaintiffs have not alleged or argued that estoppel applies in the current action.
¶ 48 In sum, plaintiffs' cause of action accrued when the policy was issued and they had the opportunity to read it and discover its terms. Based on the face of the pleadings, that occurred in 2016, when they were issued the policy for the February 27, 2016, to February 27, 2017, term. Absent allegations that plaintiffs were denied an opportunity to obtain and read their policy at that time, a later accrual date does not apply. We further determine an exception does not apply based on arguments plaintiffs could not reasonably be expected to learn the extent of coverage simply by reading the policy because the policy language was clear and unambiguous.
¶ 49 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 50 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's section 2-619 dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint.
¶ 51 Affirmed.