Opinion
2:01-CV-0445
February 11, 2003
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff BILLY SHAWN CHAUNCEY, acting pro se and proceeding in forma pauperis while a prisoner confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, has filed suit pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, section 1983 complaining against the above-named defendants. On January 16, 2003, a Report and Recommendation was filed by the United States Magistrate Judge analyzing defendants' motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs response, as well as the summary judgment evidence presented, and recommending defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted and plaintiffs claims be dismissed with prejudice. The Magistrate Judge based this recommendation on the finding that plaintiff had failed to present facts defeating defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity and had failed to present evidence showing an essential element of his claim, deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff filed his Objections on February 3, 2003. By his Objections, plaintiff narrows his allegations, adopting the position that the defendants were employed by Coon Memorial Hospital, a private hospital, and vigorously argues defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
"Defendants' pleadings are inconsistent and represent that defendants were employed through UTMB-Galveston and, in their reply to plaintiffs response to their summary judgment motion, that defendants were employed by Texas Tech Medical Center.
Even if correct, plaintiffs argument does not avail him for, as the Magistrate Judge found, plaintiff has failed to present a critical element of his claim, that of subjective deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (for an official to act with deliberate indifference, he "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference"). In his Objections, plaintiff ignores this leg of the Report and Recommendation, and does not point to any record evidence which satisfies this requisite.
Nevertheless, the second leg of the Report and Recommendation remains whole as well, and, as explained below, plaintiff has failed to defeat defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity.
Review of the summary judgment evidence on which plaintiff depends shows defendant WILCOX states she is "employed by Coon Memorial Hospital, Texas Department of Criminal Justice Division," has worked at the Dalhart Unit for one year, and has been "employed in [the] criminal justice division for eight years." Defendant EVANS states she is "employed by Coon Memorial Hospital . . . under contract with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice." Further, review of the events forming the basis for plaintiffs complaint shows they occurred at the onsite infirmary at the Dalhart Unit, where plaintiff was incarcerated.
Defendant's Exhibit D-1 to defendants' motion for summary judgment.
As the Magistrate Judge concluded in his Report and Recommendation, the exact employing entity is not material; and plaintiffs present argument can be made regardless of the entity through which defendants had contracted with TDCJ-ID; however, this analysis will assume Coon Memorial Hospital was the relevant entity.
Plaintiff argues Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997), teaches that contract employees may not assert the defense of qualified immunity. This construction of Richardson is too broad. The Richardson Court stressed that the immunity issue addressed therein was "answered narrowly, in the context in which it arose and [did not] involve a private individual . . . acting under close official supervision." The defendants plaintiff sues worked each day as medical professionals providing care to inmates at the prison unit where plaintiff was incarcerated. Just as "[i]nstitutional physicians assume an obligation to the mission that the State, through the institution, attempts to achieve," Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320, 102 S.Ct. 445, 451, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981), so must the other medical care providers who labor at the prison site. In West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988), the Supreme Court noted the State's control over the circumstances and sources of a prisoner's medical treatment affects the delivery of medical care and that the inherently coercive institutional setting significantly impacts the provision of medical services in prisons, creating problems and conflicts which are "virtually unknown to other health care services." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 n. 15, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2259 n. 15, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). Because the provision of onsite medical care to prisoners is a "joint effort" requiring "close cooperation and coordination" between medical care providers and other prison officials, the present defendants are not in the same position as the Richardson defendants, who were supervised not by State prison officials, but by the private company which employed them. Instead, EVANS and WILCOX performed their duties entirely within the context of the prison unit and acted under close official supervision, with the result that the Richardson holding is not determinative of their entitlement to qualified immunity. Given the nature of the responsibilities of the defendants, the provision of medical care which the State is obligated to provide to prisoners, and the prison setting in which the provision of such care occurred, the Court concludes defendants are entitled to claim qualified immunity against plaintiffs claims. See, Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201, 106 S.Ct. 496, 501, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 1985) (immunity "flows not from rank or title or "location within the Government," . . . but from the nature of the responsibilities of the individual official."); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 n. 15, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2259 n. 15, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (State's control over the circumstances and sources of a prisoner's medical treatment affects the delivery of medical care and that the inherently coercive institutional setting significantly impacts the provision of medical services in prisons).
Plaintiff's Objections at page 2, Objection No. 1.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 51, 108 S.Ct. 2256, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).
As to plaintiffs claims against the defendants in their official capacities, plaintiff has requested only monetary relief, and, if the Court accepts his contention that Coon Memorial Hospital is a private hospital, his only avenue for such relief from this entity is respondeat superior; however, such a theory of vicarious liability cannot support a claim under section 1983. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987).
By his last objection, plaintiff seeks to defeat defendants' qualified immunity with the argument that their conduct amounted to the practice of medicine without a license and was a criminal act which cannot be shielded by qualified immunity. The Court does not agree with plaintiffs characterization of defendants' actions and notes plaintiff has not shown the defendants acted independent of the supervision, if not in the actual presence of, a physician. Nevertheless, this argument, even were it supported by record evidence, leaves unaddressed the fact that the defendants' acts, as shown by the medical record provided by plaintiff and with which plaintiff agrees, do not demonstrate subjective deliberate indifference to plaintiffs serious medical needs; and plaintiff has adduced no other evidence to establish this critical element of his claim.
The Court has made an independent examination of the records in this case and has examined the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, as well as the objections filed by the plaintiff.
The Court is of the opinion that the objections of the plaintiff should be OVERRULED and that the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge should be ADOPTED by the United States District Court, as supplemented herein.
This Court, therefore, does OVERRULE plaintiffs objections, and does hereby ADOPT the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, as supplemented herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment by defendants KAREN EVANS and EVELYN WILCOX is GRANTED and that plaintiff BILLY SHAWN CHAUNCEY's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
All pending motions are hereby DENIED.
The Clerk will mail a copy of this Order to the plaintiff, and to any attorney of record by first class mail.
IT IS SO ORDERED.