Opinion
No. KNL CV 06-5000849-S
August 21, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE POST-TRIAL MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES, PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND OFFER OF JUDGMENT INTEREST
The plaintiff, Andrea Charron, moves for an award of attorneys fees, punitive damages and offer of judgment interest against the defendant town of Griswold, her former employer, following a verdict in her favor on August 12, 2008, and the denial of defendant's motion for post-verdict relief on February 18, 2009. The jury rendered a verdict in the amount of $836,871, upon finding that the defendant had violated General Statutes §§ 31-51m and 31-51q, in connection with the termination of the plaintiff's employment. In a post-trial motion originally filed on September 5, 2008, and renewed on March 4, 2009, the plaintiff seeks attorneys fees and punitive damages pursuant to these sections. In a separate motion, also filed on September 5, 2008, the plaintiff seeks offer of judgment interest pursuant to General Statutes § 52-192a(c).
I Attorneys Fees Punitive Damages
Section 31-51m(c), in relevant part, states: "[T]he court may allow to the prevailing party his costs, together with reasonable attorneys fees to be taxed by the court." Section 31-51q, in pertinent part, states: "Any employer . . . who subjects any employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state . . . shall be liable to such employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge, including punitive damages, and for reasonable attorneys fees as part of the costs of any such action for damages." The plaintiff asserts that she is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees measured by the lodestar method. Additionally, the plaintiff claims that she is entitled to punitive damages pursuant to § 31-51q in an amount equal to attorneys fees plus her costs of litigation exclusive of taxable costs.
The defendant, in its objection filed March 5, 2009, and its supplemental objection filed on April 9, 2009, argues that the attorneys fees sought by the plaintiff should be reduced by the amount spent to litigate her common-law claims of invasion of privacy, defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Anne Hatfield, individually, which were settled just prior to the conclusion of jury selection. The defendant also argues that some of the plaintiff's fees are duplicated and that time expended by paralegals is non-compensable. Furthermore, the defendant challenges the plaintiff's claim that she is entitled to certain costs, most notably the cost of an economic expert witness, Arthur Wright.
In her reply, filed March 9, 2009, and supplemented on May 1, 2009, the plaintiff contends that the plaintiff's common-law claims against Anne Hatfield and her statutory claims against the defendant town arc "inextricably intertwined" because Hatfield's conduct provided the sole basis for the plaintiff's claims against the defendant. Thus, the plaintiff argues there is no logical rationale for the downward adjustment that the defendant seeks.
Finally, in its supplemental objection filed April 9, 2009, the defendant asserts for the first time that it is entitled to a "set-off" in the amount of the settlement between the plaintiff and Hatfield. The defendant has made no claim of setoff in a pleading, did not raise it in its post-trial motion addressed to the verdict and has neither offered any evidence as to the settlement amount nor any authority for its position. The court finds that there is no basis for this contention and accordingly, rejects it.
A Attorneys Fees
The Supreme Court has remarked that "[a] court has few duties of a more delicate nature than that of fixing counsel fees." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunch, Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 258, 828 A.2d 64 (2003). "It is well established that a trial court calculating a reasonable attorneys fee makes its determination while considering the factors set forth under rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. . . . A court utilizing the factors of rule 1.5(a) considers, inter alia, the time and labor spent by the attorneys, the novelty and complexity of the legal issues, fees customarily charged in the same locality for similar services, the lawyer's experience and ability, relevant time limitations, the magnitude of the case and the results obtained, the nature and length of the lawyer-client relationship, and whether the fee is fixed or contingent." (Citations omitted.) Id., 259.
Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides: "A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) The likelihood, if made known to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) The amount involved and the results obtained; (5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent."
"The starting point traditionally is the `lodestar' amount determined by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate or rates times the number of hours reasonably expended; the amount may then be adjusted by a set of considerations." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ernst v. Deere Co., 92 Conn.App. 572, 577, 886 A.2d 845 (2005). The partially contingent fee agreement between the plaintiff and Madsen, Prestley Parenteau, LLC has the following provision. "Final Attorneys Fee Calculation. Client agrees to pay Attorney a fee for services rendered based upon a partially contingent arrangement under which the fee is calculated based upon: (a) one-third (33 1/3%) of the gross value of any judgment or verdict, including a court award of attorneys fees, or (b) a court award of attorneys fees calculated by the lodestar method, whichever is greater . . ."
The plaintiff requests this court to apply the lodestar method. It is within the discretion of the court to do so as long as the fees are reasonable. In Stokes v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, 289 Conn. 465, 494, 958 A.2d 1195 (2008), the Supreme Court addressed the plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly based its calculation of the reasonable hourly rate for the plaintiff's counsel on the local rate in the New London judicial district rather than relying on a statewide standard or awarding attorneys fees pursuant to the plaintiff's counsel's current hourly rate. The Court rejected the plaintiff's claim and re-affirmed the trial court's broad discretion to determine the reasonable hourly rate. See id., 495-96.
As to the hourly rate of the plaintiff's counsel, the court finds the following: Madsen, Prestley Parenteau, LLC, is a well known firm that dedicates ninety-five percent of its practice to employment litigation, including litigation matters which assert claims for wrongful termination, discrimination, harassment and retaliation. Attorney Parenteau is a principal of Madsen, Prestley Parentean, who has practiced law since 1982, with a focus on employment litigation since 1991. From the time he joined the firm in 2000, he has dedicated all of his time to representing plaintiff employees in all areas of employment law and litigation. Attorney Parenteau is an accomplished member of the bar, who was named one of the "Best Lawyers in America" in the area of employment litigation in 2006-2008. Attorney Madsen is also a principal of Madsen, Prestley Parenteau, who has been a member of the Connecticut Bar since 1992. He too was named one of the "Best Lawyers in America" in the area of employment litigation in 2007 and 2008. Attorney Heena Kapadia is a partner at Madsen, Prestley Parenteau. All three attorneys represented the plaintiff competently and efficiently in this complex and extremely contentious lawsuit. Although their practice is based in the New London judicial district, it is by no means limited to the New London-Norwich area. In fact, their expertise in employment litigation on behalf of plaintiff-employees historically has been statewide. Prior to January 1, 2008, Attorneys Parenteau and Madsen billed at an hourly rate of $350 and Attorney Kapadia billed at an hourly rate of $300. As of January 1, 2008, Attorneys Parenteau and Madsen began billing at an hourly rate of $360 and Attorney Kapadia began billing at an hour rate of $330.
This court finds that Attorneys Parenteau and Madsen are entitled to a fee award at the hourly rate of $350 throughout and Attorney Kapadia is entitled to an award at the rate of $300. In light of the time and labor spent by the attorneys, the novelty and complexity of the legal issues presented by this action, the fees customarily charged for similar services in difficult cases, the lawyers' experience and ability, the magnitude of the case and the results obtained and the nature of the lawyer-client relationship, the court finds that these rates are reasonable and well justified. The court is also persuaded by the high quality of advocacy exhibited by all counsel. Further, the defendant does not contest the reasonableness of the hourly rates claimed by plaintiff's counsel. However, under all the circumstances, the court has opted to apply the pre-January 1, 2008 rates. Although the court acknowledges the skill, experience and accomplishments of all trial counsel in this novel and challenging case, and in other complex cases statewide, based on observation and experience as a trial judge in the New London judicial district, the court is mindful that hourly rates tend to be more modest in this area than those in some other judicial districts. See Stokes v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, supra, 289 Conn. 494-95.
The defendant argues that some of the plaintiff's fees are duplicated and that time expended by paralegals is noncompensable. The Supreme Court has stated: "It is not unreasonable per se for attorneys to engage and to bill clients for the services rendered by nonlawyers. It is likewise not unreasonable per se for two attorneys representing the same client to bill separately for the individual services provided by each, regardless of whether these services were performed at different times or simultaneously." Sorrentino v. All Seasons Services, 245 Conn. 756, 776, 717 A.2d 150 (1998). The Sorrentino court held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award attorneys fees in accordance with what it deemed to be a reasonable fee agreement, when it awarded a lesser amount in accordance with its finding that the billing records described work performed by nonattorneys and showed that plaintiff had been represented by two lawyers, each billing separately for hours worked simultaneously. See id. On remand, the Supreme Court directed the trial court to order the payment of additional attorneys fees in accordance with the fee agreement for the conduct of the trial. See id., 777. The plaintiff requests reimbursement for work performed by paralegals at a rate of $120 per hour, a rate that this court finds reasonable. Furthermore, this court rejects the defendant's argument regarding duplication of effort.
Next, the court must determine the reasonable number of hours expended on this litigation and more specifically, address the defendant's argument that the plaintiff is not entitled to fees relating to her suit against Anne Hatfield, settled just prior to trial. Connecticut courts have relied on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), in determining whether fees directed at unsuccessful or settled claims should be included in a prevailing party's award of attorneys fees. The Court stated: "In some cases a plaintiff may present in one lawsuit distinctly different claims for relief that are based on different facts and legal theories. In such a suit, even where the claims are brought against the same defendants . . . counsel's work on one claim will be unrelated to his work on another claim. Accordingly, work on an unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have been expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved . . . The congressional intent to limit awards to prevailing parties requires that these unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 434-35. Nevertheless, the Court noted that: "Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorneys fee reduced simply because the . . . court did not adopt each contention raised." Id., 440. The Connecticut Supreme Court has cited the rationale of Hensley with approval in upholding a trial court's rejection of a contention that because a plaintiff had won on only three of five related counts, two-fifths of the fees should not be awarded. See Russell v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 200 Conn. 172, 194-95, 510 A.2d 972 (1986).
Here, the defendant asks this court to reduce the award of attorneys fees by the time spent litigating the plaintiff's common-law tort claims against Anne Hatfield. However, the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the claims against the defendant are attributed almost exclusively to the acts of Hatfield in her capacity as the first selectperson of the town of Griswold. Therefore, it is impossible to totally separate out the time spent litigating the claims against her personally from those against the town. Because the plaintiff's complaint against the defendant town is predicated on Anne Hatfield's conduct, the time expended by plaintiff's counsel preparing the complaint, conducting written discovery, taking and reviewing depositions and preparing for trial was reasonably "expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved." Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, 461 U.S. 435. The only time exclusively dedicated to the Hatfield claims was that in defense of Hatfield's request to revise, motion to strike and motion for summary judgment. As such, these hours will not be included in the plaintiff's award of attorneys fees.
In sum, this court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees measured by the reasonable hourly rate for each attorney and nonattorney, as previously discussed, multiplied times the reasonable number of hours expended. The number of hours expended, however, is to be reduced by the number of hours spent litigating Hatfield's request to revise, motion to strike and motion for summary judgment addressed exclusively to the plaintiff's common-law tort claims.
B Punitive Damages under § 31-51q
The Appellate Court in Arnone v. Enfield, 79 Conn.App. 501, 521, 831 A.2d 260, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 932, 837 A.2d 804 (2003), discussed the awarding of punitive damages to a prevailing party pursuant to § 31-51q. "[I]n order to award punitive damages, evidence must reveal a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights . . . Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts . . . It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence . . . The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them . . . Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct . . . It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The Arnone court addressed the town of Enfield's argument that there was insufficient evidence justifying an award of punitive damages. See id., 520. In rejecting the defendant's contention, the court noted that an award of punitive damages is discretionary and addressed the measure of an award of punitive damages pursuant to § 31-51q. See id., 521-22. "Section 31-51q allows for the imposition of punitive damages if an employer disciplines or discharges an employee because of the employee's exercise of constitutionally protected rights. The jury found that the defendant had punished the plaintiff for exercising his rights and awarded him punitive damages . . . Section 31-51q does not embody a specific test to determine [the standard for] the awarding of punitive damages. We therefore defer to the common-law test." Id., 521. The Supreme Court has reiterated that the common-law test limits punitive damages awards to the expenses of litigation less taxable costs. See Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 827, 614 A.2d 414 (1992). The Berry court "affirmed the continuing viability of a long line of cases holding that common law punitive damages serve primarily to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries and, thus, are properly limited to the plaintiff's litigation expenses less taxable costs." Id. The court further stated: "[A] rule limiting punitive damages awards to the expenses of litigation less taxable costs fulfills the salutary purpose of fully compensating a victim for the harm inflicted on him while avoiding the potential for injustice which may result from the exercise of unfettered discretion by a jury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In the present case, the court charged the jury as follows: "In addition to seeking other damages, the plaintiff seeks an award of punitive damages in connection with her claim under Section 31-51q. In order to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must prove that the wrong or wrongs done to her arose from some improper motive or intent, or that the defendant acted wantonly or wilfully or recklessly. While there have been attempts to draw distinctions in the definitions of the terms wanton, wilful and reckless, in practice they are treated as meaning the same thing. The result is that wilful, wanton and reckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care. If the plaintiff has proven to you that the conduct of the defendant had any one of these characteristics, then she is entitled to punitive damages. Punitive damages are damages awarded not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury or losses but to punish the defendant for highly unreasonable conduct and to deter the defendant or others like the defendant from similar conduct in the future. In Connecticut, the measure of punitive damages includes the costs of litigation. The law does not require the jury to award punitive damages. It is, instead, a matter for your sound discretion. In connection with punitive damages, you need not decide the amount of punitive damages to award; you need only decide whether the plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to punitive damages. If you find for the plaintiff, you will be asked in the interrogatories to further determine if she is entitled to punitive damages. The issue as to the amount of punitive damages, if awarded, is thereafter left to the court."
The jury answered the query, "Did Andrea Charron prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to an award of punitive damages?" in the affirmative. In addition, the jury answered the following interrogatory in the affirmative: "Did Plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant's claim that it discharged or disciplined her based on substantial or material interference with her bona fide job performance or working relationship with the Town of Griswold was pre-textual or unworthy of belief and the real reason was retaliation, or that defendant was motivated to discipline or discharge plaintiff in retaliation for the exercise of her right to speak on matters of public concern?" Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages which reflects the expenses of litigating her claims against the defendant town.
When, as in the present case, there is a statutory provision for both attorneys fees and punitive damages, the court is faced with the difficult task of determining the appropriate award of punitive damages. There is no legal impediment to an award of punitive damages which essentially doubles the amount of attorneys fees. See Burrehl v. Yale University, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X02 CV 00 0159421 (May 10, 2004, Schuman, J.) (37 Conn. L. Rptr. 60, 61) (punitive damages awarded by trial court in an equal amount to attorneys fees) citing Ford v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40, 64-65, 578 A.2d 1054 (1990); see also Trimachi v. Connecticut Workers' Compensation Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 97 0403037 (June 14, 2000, Devlin, J.) (27 Conn. L. Rptr. 469, 470-72). In Burrell v. Yale University, supra, 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 61, the court stated: "Essentially the statutory scheme [of § 31-51q] calls for the plaintiff to receive an initial award of attorneys fees, mandatory upon prevailing, and the possibility of a second award of attorneys fees, contingent on the jury finding that the defendant acted with reckless indifference to the rights of others or [based on] an intentional and wanton violation of those rights." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Although the court has wide discretion in making an award of punitive damages, including doubling the amount of the attorneys fees, the court is troubled by the impact of doubling the attorneys fees in this case where the defendant is a relatively small municipality. The trial record is replete with references by witnesses and counsel as to the small size of the town of Griswold. In addition, the defendant points out that were it not for the explicit statutory authorization set forth in § 31-51q, punitive damages against the town would be barred on public policy grounds. See Hartford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, Local 760, 49 Conn.App. 805, 817-18, 717 A.2d 258, cert. denied 247 Conn. 920, 722 A.2d 809 (1998).
Other cases based on statutory awards of punitive damages against municipalities pursuant to statutory provisions are either nonexistent or unenlightening. In Arnone v. Enfield, supra, 79 Conn.App. 521, punitive damages were awarded by the jury against the town of Enfield in the amount of $36,000. The memorandum of decision of the trial court denying the motion to set aside the verdict and upholding the punitive damage award noted that "it [was] not entirely unreasonable to conclude that the decision makers were acting [with] an improper motive [or] with a reckless indifference to the constitutionally protected rights of the plaintiff." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 522. There was no specific discussion by the Appellate Court or the trial court concerning the size of the award or how it may have been determined. In Hartford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, Local 760, supra, 49 Conn.App. 817-18, the Appellate Court noted: "In denying punitive or exemplary damages, most courts have reasoned that while the public is benefitted by the exaction of such damages against a malicious, willful or reckless wrongdoer, the benefit does not follow when the public itself is penalized for the acts of its agents over which it is able to exercise but little direct control." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Here, as the defendant suggests, although the entire board of selectman voted to terminate the plaintiff's employment in violation of § 31-51m and § 31-51q, Anne Hatfield, the first selectperson, was the principal bad actor. Indeed, her actions were the focus of the plaintiff's case. Under the circumstances, on balance, it would seem unfair to punish the citizenry of the town of Griswold by doubling the attorneys fees award. The court hereby exercises its discretion in favor of a modest punitive damage award limited to the plaintiff's litigation expenses not otherwise provided.
Limiting the punitive damages award will have a corresponding impact on the amount of the § 52-192a(c) interest.
The defendant argues that the costs relating to the testimony of Arthur Wright, an economic expert witness for the plaintiff, should be excluded from the court's calculation of the expenses of litigation. First, we note that the plaintiff requests that the litigation expenses relating to Arthur Wright be included in her award of punitive damages pursuant to § 31-51q and not as part of the costs of litigation pursuant to § 31-51m. In Arnone v. Enfield, supra, 79 Conn.App. 530, the court addressed whether the expert testimony of the same economist, Arthur Wright, should be included in determining the costs of the litigation under § 31-51m. The defendant argued that because § 31-51m does not define the term "costs" and because § 52-260(f) limits expert witness fees to practitioners of the healing arts or real estate appraisers, the fees charged by Arthur Wright as stated in his invoices should be excluded. See id., 531. The court agreed stating: "It is a settled principle of our common law that parties are required to bear their own litigation expenses, except as otherwise provided by statute . . . [b]ecause costs are the creature of statute . . . and unless the statute clearly provides for them courts cannot tax them. Accordingly, the defendant can prevail only if the statutory provisions on which it relies clearly empower the trial court to tax the cost of the economist's testimony. The defendant correctly notes that § 31-51m is silent as to the definition of `costs.'" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 531-32. The court went on to find that both the non-testimonial and testimonial work performed by economist Arthur Wright were not taxable as costs and accordingly, reversed the trial court's award of expert witness fees. See id., 533-35.
General Statutes § 52-260(f) provides: "When any practitioner of the healing arts, as defined in section 20-1, dentist, registered nurse, advanced practice registered nurse or licensed practical nurse, as defined in section 20-87a, or real estate appraiser gives expert testimony in any action or proceeding, including by means of a deposition, the court shall determine a reasonable fee to be paid to such practitioner of the healing arts, dentist, registered nurse, advanced practice registered nurse, licensed practical nurse or real estate appraiser and taxed as part of the costs in lieu of all other witness fees payable to such practitioner of the healing arts, dentist, registered nurse, advanced practice registered nurse, licensed practical nurse or real estate appraiser."
Here, the plaintiff seeks reimbursement of the fees charged by Arthur Wright not as an element of her "costs" but in the context of her request for punitive damages authorized by § 31-51q, and consequently, this action is distinguishable from Arnone v. Enfield. The trial court has broad discretion to award punitive damages framed by litigation expenses. See e.g., Utzler v. Braca, 115 Conn.App. 261, 280-81, 972 A.2d 743 (2009) (noting trial court's discretion to award punitive damages to a party who has suffered any ascertainable loss pursuant to CUTPA); Richey v. Main St. Stafford, LLC, 110 Conn.App. 209, 222-23, 954 A.2d 889 (2008) (same); Bhatia v. Debek, 287 Conn. 397, 420-21, 948 A.2d 1009 (2008) (noting trial court's broad discretion to award punitive damages in the form of attorneys fees in a malicious prosecution action). Thus, the court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement of the fees of Arthur Wright as an expense of litigation within the award of punitive damages.
The court notes that a trial court's broad discretion to award punitive damages has primarily been in the context of CUTPA litigation. The court further notes that there is sparse precedent on the award of punitive damages pursuant to § 31-51q. The trial court in Arnone v. Enfield, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 96 0558333 (July 23, 2001, Beach, J.), awarded punitive damages pursuant to this statute, but the amount of the award ($36,000) was determined by the jury. See Arnone v. Enfield, supra, 79 Conn.App. 505, 521.
This court, however, denies the plaintiff's request to include the fees of Attorney Richard Pascal as an element of her punitive damages award. Attorney Pascal represented the plaintiff prior to her representation by present counsel and testified at trial as a fact witness. The plaintiff's counsel elected to pay him at his hourly rate, a cost which is not properly attributable to the defendant. Pascal's services, by the plaintiff's own admission, cannot be classified as attorneys fees and he is not an expert witness. Therefore, his services are to be omitted as an expense of litigation.
Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages in an amount equal to her expenses of litigation beyond attorneys fees and taxable costs.
II Interest Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-192a(c)
This court further finds that the plaintiff is entitled to offer of judgment interest, pursuant to § 52-192a(c). Section 52-192a(c), in pertinent part, states: "After trial the court shall examine the record to determine whether the plaintiff made an offer of compromise which the defendant failed to accept. If the court ascertains from the record that the plaintiff has recovered an amount equal to or greater than the sum certain specified in the plaintiff's offer of compromise, the court shall add to the amount so recovered eight per cent annual interest on said amount . . . The interest shall be computed from the date the complaint in the civil action . . . was filed with the court if the offer of compromise was filed not later than eighteen months from the filing of such complaint . . ." Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated: "The punitive nature of § 52-192a has been recognized repeatedly . . . This interest is mandated when the amount recovered is greater than or equal to the offer of judgment . . . and that amount can include interest and attorneys fees . . . as well as double or treble damages . . . The offer of judgment statute was enacted to promote fair and reasonable pretrial compromises of litigation by penalizing defendants who do not settle cases prior to trial." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nunno v. Wixner, 257 Conn. 671, 684, 778 A.2d 145 (2001).
Here, the plaintiff filed her original complaint on April 11, 2006, and less than 18 months later on October 10, 2007, filed an offer of judgment in the amount of $300,000. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to interest at eight percent annually on her total award of damages, including attorneys fees and punitive damages, for a period of thirty-one months from April 11, 2006 to November 12, 2008, ninety days after the jury rendered a verdict in this action. The court arrives at the latter date for the following reasons. In Oram v. deCholnoky, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. X05 CV 05 4005513 (January 16, 2009, Adams, J.) (47 Conn. L. Rptr. 105), the court addressed the defendants argument that the offer of judgment interest should only run to the time of verdict and not to the time judgment was entered, which the plaintiffs contended was the applicable ending date. The court noted that: "Section 52-192a does not, by its terms, establish a date by which its interest rate terminates." See id., 107. In reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car Systems, 192 Conn. 301, 308, 472 A.2d 316 (1984), the court went on to read § 52-192a in conjunction with § 37-3b. See id. Section 37-3b(a) states: "For a cause of action arising on or after May 27, 1997, interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, shall be recovered and allowed in any action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, computed from the date that is twenty days after the date of judgment or the date that is ninety days after the date of verdict, whichever is earlier, upon the amount of the judgment." Thus, the Oram court determined that § 37-3b(a) provided a sound basis for concluding that offer of judgment interest ended ninety days after the verdict was rendered. See Oram v. deCholnolcy, supra, 107.
At the March 9, 2009 hearing on this motion, the defendant argued that interest should be calculated from the time of the plaintiff's filing of her amended complaint. It relies on Ceci Brothers, Inc. v. Five Twenty-One Corp., 81 Conn.App. 419, 840 A.2d 578, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 922, 846 A.2d 881 (2004), for this proposition. In that case the plaintiff's offer of judgment was filed before the amended complaint, which contained the count for which damages finally were awarded. See id., 432. Here, the plaintiff's original complaint alleged that the defendant violated §§ 31-51m and 31-51q. The fact that the plaintiff later revised her complaint is irrelevant, as her original complaint contained the counts for which damages were awarded by the jury. Therefore, this court finds that Ceci Brothers, Inc. is distinguishable and inapplicable to the present action.
The court agrees with this line of reasoning and thus, finds that interest terminates on November 12, 2008, ninety days after the jury verdict was rendered on August 12, 2008.
CONCLUSION The Plaintiff's Award Attorneys Fees
$ 223,650 Punitive Damages $ 14,723.42 Offer of Judgment Interest 52-192a $1,297,461.60
Attorney Parenteau: 446.20 hours Hatfield motion to strike (.3) Hatfield motion for summary judgment (33.7) Total hours 412.20 x $350 per hour = $ 144,270 Attorney Madsen: 168 hours X $350 per hour = $ 58,800 Attorney Kapadia 45.8 hours Hatfield request to revise (4.5) Hatfield motion to strike (5.5) Total hours 35.8 x $300 per hour = $ 10,740 Paralegal: 85 hours Hatfield motion for summary judgment (3) Total hours 82 x $120 per hour = $ 9,840 Total Attorneys Fees Requested Costs of Litigation (exclusive of taxable costs) $ 19,113.67 Less fees of Attorney Pascal — ($ 4,390.25) Total Punitive Damages Award = Jury Award $836,871.00 Attorneys Fees $223,650.00 Punitive Damages $ 14,723.42 Total (jury award, attorneys fees, punitive damages) = $1,075,244.42 X 8% per annum for a period of 31 months = $ 222,217.18 TOTAL INCLUDING § interest =Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the court finds the plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys fees in the amount of $223,650, an award of punitive damages in the amount of $14,723.42, and offer of judgment interest pursuant to § 52-192a(c) in the amount of $222,217.18. Together with the jury award of $ 836,871, previously accepted by the court on August 12, 2008, the court orders that judgment enter in the amount of $1,297,461.60 plus taxable costs in the amount of $1,057.90, for a total judgment of $1,298,519.50.