Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-8769.
June 10, 2003
MEMORANDUM
In this six-count amended complaint, plaintiff has sued defendants Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. ("Comcast Cable") and Comcast Business Communications ("Comcast Business") for various violations of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. He also asserts state law claims against Comcast Cable, Comcast Business, Robert Keane, Ronald Tonge, and Vincent Johnson under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 260.1 et seq., and for breach of contract and intentional misrepresentation. Before the court is the motion of defendants for summary judgment.
In footnote 24 of his response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff has withdrawn Counts IV and VI of his amended complaint. He concedes that Count VI of his amended complaint, which asserts a claim for intentional misrepresentation under Pennsylvania law, is preempted by ERISA. Furthermore, he concedes that Count IV, which asserts a claim under ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty, comprises a claim for additional benefits under ERISA.
We may grant summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Although the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact, the non-movant must then come forward with admissible evidence containing "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem'l Hosp., 192 F.3d 378, 387 n. 13 (3d Cir. 1999); Wetzel v. Tucker, 139 F.3d 380, 383 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1998). We review all evidence and make all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 696 (3d Cir. 1998).
I.
The following facts are undisputed. On September 30, 1999, defendant Comcast Cable hired plaintiff, Jerome Chaney, as Senior Director of Sales. In this capacity, plaintiff was responsible for managing salespeople, adding revenue and growing the customer base in a start-up organization that eventually became defendant Comcast Business. As part of his employment, Chaney was entitled to fringe benefits, including health care coverage and participation in 401(k) and deferred compensation plans. As set forth in the relevant employee handbook, Comcast Corporation was designated as the Administrator and Sponsor of Chaney's benefit plans.
On February 12, 2001, defendant Vincent Johnson, Vice President of Human Resources for Comcast Cable notified Chaney that he was being terminated effective February 16, 2001. Following his discharge and until May, 2002, Chaney received severance pay. In addition, he continued to receive certain health care benefits. Ultimately, he himself began paying to continue health care coverage pursuant to the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), which coverage ended in the Fall of 2002.
II.
We turn first to plaintiff's ERISA claims. In Count III of his amended complaint, Chaney seeks benefits and costs from defendants Comcast Cable and Comcast Business under § 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. He specifically contends that he was entitled to participate in defendants' 401(k) and deferred compensation plans until the end of his severance period. He also asserts an entitlement to eighteen months of COBRA coverage beginning from the end of his severance period in May, 2002. Finally, he seeks reimbursement of out-of-pocket medical and prescription drug costs resulting from an alleged misadministration of his health care benefits during his severance period.
Comcast Cable and Comcast Business contend that summary judgment in their favor is warranted on the § 1132(a)(1)(B) claim because neither defendant is the proper party defendant under ERISA. We agree. The proper defendant to a claim under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is either the plan itself or a plan fiduciary.See Brown v. Continental Baking Co., 891 F. Supp. 238, 240 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (citing Curcio v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 232-34 (3d Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff does not aver that Comcast Cable and Comcast Business are the 401(k), deferred compensation and health care plans in which he participated.
A person is a fiduciary with respect to an ERISA plan "to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). Our Court of Appeals has commented that "the linchpin of fiduciary status under ERISA is discretion." See Curcio, 33 F.3d at 233.
Plaintiff's employee handbook designates a different entity, Comcast Corporation, as Administrator of plaintiff's employee benefit plans. Comcast Corporation is not a defendant. Despite the language in the handbook, plaintiff asserts that Comcast Cable and Comcast Business are fiduciaries subject to suit based on certain misstatements about plan coverage allegedly made to him by Johnson, the Vice President of Human Resources for Comcast Cable. Chaney specifically contends that Johnson was acting with apparent authority as an agent for fiduciary Comcast Corporation when the latter made these misstatements. For support, he cites to the employee handbook, which states: "Comcast [Corporation] has delegated various responsibilities and activities involved in administering the benefits program to a number of claims administrators and plan committees. For routine questions about your benefits, check with your supervisor or Human Resources Representative." He asserts that Comcast Cable and Comcast Business are liable as Johnson's principals for these alleged misstatements.
Chaney's argument is without merit. He failed to adduce any evidence that these two defendants possessed discretionary control or authority over management or the assets of the benefit plans, or otherwise met the definition of a plan fiduciary under § 1002(21). Instead, he relies primarily on our Court of Appeals' decision in Taylor v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 49 F.3d 982, 989 (3d Cir. 1995). That case permits a plan fiduciary to be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA arising out of misstatements made by an individual selected as a non-fiduciary agent by the plan fiduciary and acting with apparent authority as agent of the fiduciary. Id. Even assuming that Johnson made misstatements to Chaney and was a non-fiduciary agent acting with apparent authority for Comcast Corporation, Chaney is not suing Comcast Corporation. Given that he failed to come forward with any evidence that Comcast Cable and Comcast Business met the definition of a fiduciary, we do not see how Taylor supports his argument. He cites to no authority, and we are aware of none, that permits an entity in the position of Comcast Cable or Comcast Business to be held liable as fiduciaries under § 1132(a)(1)(B). His reliance on Watts v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 316 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2003), which deals with exhaustion of remedies under ERISA, is unavailing. Accordingly, we will grant defendants' motion for summary judgment on Count III of plaintiff's amended complaint.
In Taylor, the plaintiff plan participant sued his former employer, which was the plan sponsor, and the plan administrator for violations of ERISA arising out of certain alleged misstatements made to him by his former employer's supervisor of employee benefits. 49 F.3d at 984. The court found that in making the alleged misstatements to the plaintiff, the supervisor of employee benefits was acting on behalf of the plan administrator. The relevant plan language explained that "`a fiduciary with respect to a plan may rely on . . . persons who perform purely ministerial functions for such plan,' such as `advising participants of their rights and options under the plan.'" Id. at 987-88. Accordingly, the court held that the plan administrator could be liable under ERISA for any material misrepresentations that the supervisor may have made, even though the administrator did not formally employ the supervisor.Id.
III.
Plaintiff's claims under Count V similarly fall. In that count, Chaney avers that defendants violated § 1132(c) of ERISA by failing to comply with certain requests he made for information concerning the scope, extent and expiration of his participation in the plan. Among other things, defendants contend that they cannot be held liable under § 1132(c) because neither is the plan administrator.
Pursuant to §§ 1132(a)(1)(A) and (c) of ERISA, a plan participant may bring a civil action against a plan administrator "who fails or refuses to comply with a request for any information which such administrator is required . . . to furnish to a participant. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1). A plan "administrator" is "the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which the plan is operated. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(i). As noted above, the employee handbook designates Comcast Corporation as the administrator of Chaney's employee benefit plans. Plaintiff offers no evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, Comcast Corporation and not any of the defendants is the entity subject to liability for an alleged violation of § 1132(c). See McKinsey v. Sentry, Ins., 986 F.2d 401, 404-05 (10th Cir. 1993); Moran v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 872 F.2d 296, 299-300 (9th Cir. 1989); Estate of Fields v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., No. 99-CV-4261, 1999 U.S.Dist. Lexis. 19500, at *4-7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1999); Fox v. Law Offices of Shapiro Kreisman, No. 97-7393, 1998 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 5096, at *25-26 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 1998). Because defendants Comcast Cable and Comcast Business are not plan administrators within the meaning of that term, they are entitled to summary judgment on the claims in Count V.
IV.
Plaintiff asserts two remaining state law claims for violations of the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 260.1 et seq., against all defendants (Count I) and for breach of contract against Comcast Cable and Comcast Business (Count II). To the extent that these claims relate to an employee benefit or welfare plan, they are preempted by ERISA. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44 (1987); Bunnion v. Consol. Rail Corp., No. 97-4877, 1998 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 219, at *21 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 1998) (citations omitted). To the extent that any state claims remain, we decline to exercise jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 1967). We therefore will dismiss these claims without prejudice. See 42 Pa. Cons Stat. Ann. § 5103.
We note that the parties are non-diverse.
V.
Finally, in his response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff has requested additional discovery concerning whether he was treated differently than other employees and thus was denied the health care and other benefits which similarly situated employees received. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). Rule 56(f) allows us to refuse an application for summary judgment and permit additional discovery to be conducted where "it appear[s] from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition. . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). This request comes much too late. Plaintiff has had a full and fair opportunity to conduct discovery in this matter. By his admission, the information he now seeks was first made the subject of a discovery request nearly eighteen months ago, before this matter was removed to federal court. Moreover, following removal to this court, the parties had more than three months to conduct discovery. Considering all the circumstances, we will deny the request.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of June, 2003, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
(1) plaintiff's request for additional discovery under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is DENIED;
(2) at plaintiff's request, Counts IV and VI of his amended complaint are marked WITHDRAWN with prejudice;
(3) the motion of defendants for summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (Counts III and V of the amended complaint) is GRANTED;
(4) judgment is entered in favor of defendants Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. ("Comcast Cable") and Comcast Business Communications ("Comcast Business") and against plaintiff Jerome Chaney on Counts III and V of his amended complaint;
(5) the motion of defendants for summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims for violations of the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law against all defendants (Count I of the amended complaint) and for breach of contract against Comcast Cable and Comcast Business (Count II of the amended complaint) is GRANTED to the extent that such claims relate to plaintiff's employee benefit plans;
(6) judgment is entered in favor of all defendants and against plaintiff Jerome Chaney on the claims set forth in Count I of plaintiff's amended complaint to the extent that such claims relate to an employee benefits plan;
(7) judgment is entered in favor of defendants Comcast Cable and Comcast Business and against plaintiff Jerome Chaney on the claims in Count II of plaintiff's amended complaint to the extent that such claims relate to an employee benefits plan; and
(8) to the extent that the claims set forth in Counts I and II of plaintiff's amended complaint do not relate to an employee benefits plan, they are DISMISSED without prejudice.