Opinion
NO. 2014-CA-000963-MR
02-17-2017
STEVE CHANDLER APPELLANT v. WILLIAM ROBINSON, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF HAROLD KEITH CHANDLER; RANDY FISH; and PAYETON FISH APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Kayce R. Powell Hopkinsville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Steven D. Downey Bowling Green, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM CRITTENDEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RENE WILLIAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 11-CI-00150 OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KRAMER, CHIEF JUDGE; D. LAMBERT AND J. LAMBERT, JUDGES. KRAMER, CHIEF JUDGE: Keith Chandler worked at a factory with William Robinson and Randy Fish for several years, and Robinson and Fish testified they were Keith's friends. They occasionally hunted together on Keith's 238 acres of farmland situated in Crittenden County, Kentucky, and Randy's minor son, Payeton, would occasionally join them. On October 23, 2006, Keith executed a last will and testament. His will named Robinson as the executor of his estate; it designated Payeton the beneficiary of Keith's estate; and Keith's estate included the 238 acres of farmland.
Keith subsequently passed away in mid-July 2011. Thereafter, Keith's elder brother, Steve Chandler, filed suit in Crittenden Circuit Court to challenge the validity of the will. Steve's challenge was based upon his claim that Keith either lacked the requisite capacity to execute a will, or that Keith's will was the product of undue influence. On May 15, 2014, following a period of litigation and a three-day trial, a jury found in favor of the appellees and the circuit court accordingly entered judgment in conformity with the jury's verdict, dismissing Steve's will contest. Steve now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
Steve's first argument on appeal asserts the circuit court erred by striking "60%" of the allegations in his 10-page complaint on the ground of relevance. As to why, Steve contends in his brief: "Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12.06, provides that 'the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any sham, redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.' Unlike the federal counterpart, relevancy is not amongst the list."
Steve is incorrect. Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.06 authorized the circuit court to strike irrelevant allegations from his complaint. See City of Ludlow v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 299 Ky. 621, 186 S.W.2d 640, 641 (1945). "Immaterial" and "impertinent," as used in the rule, are synonymous with "irrelevant." To the extent Steve's contention could also be considered an invitation to review the relevance of the "60%" of his stricken allegations, we decline. With the exception of Paragraph 37 of his complaint, Steve does not explain why any specific allegations were relevant, nor does he cite any legal authority to that effect. Thus, Steve has offered no argument for our review in that vein. See Cherry v. Augustus, 245 S.W.3d 766, 781 (Ky. App. 2006).
With that said, Paragraph 37 of Steve's complaint stated:
Keith a lifelong Crittenden County resident who previously worked with Rebecca Johnson, a Crittenden County attorney during the probate process of his mother's will, instead went and had Brucie Moore, who has a private practice in Union County, Kentucky.
Steve argues this paragraph was relevant and should not have been stricken from his complaint because it demonstrates Keith hired attorney Brucie Moore to draft his will after appellee Randy Fish recommended her services. But even if Paragraph 37 could be read that way and was relevant, it is unclear why Steve believes the circuit court's decision to strike it qualified as more than harmless error. During trial, Brucie Moore testified she drafted Keith's will, and Randy Fish testified that he recommended her services to Keith.
In a related argument, Steve contends the circuit court did not permit him to question Brucie Moore at trial concerning "her continuous involvement in this case." However, in addition to what is stated above, the circuit court informed the jury during voir dire that William Robinson, Randy Fish, and Keith's estate were represented by an attorney from Brucie Moore's law firm. It is unclear from Steve's brief what he expected to elicit from Brucie Moore that would not have been cumulative of those facts.
Steve also states, without citation to the record, that he asserted an "equity argument within his complaint for his legal interest in 50% of undistributed property of [their mother's estate]" that remained in Keith's house following Keith's passing; that the circuit court struck from his complaint the allegations that comprised his "equity argument"; and "[t]o make sure that regardless of the outcome of the case, Steve's interest in family heirlooms was preserved, immediately following trial, Steve filed a petition to reopen his mother's probate simply to preserve his claim in the personal property."
This appears to be a contention that the circuit court erred by striking a claim from Steve's complaint and effectively dismissing it without adjudicating its merits (i.e., without prejudice). To that extent, it is Steve's burden to demonstrate the circuit court abused its discretion in doing so. Sublett v. Hall, 589 S.W.2d 888, 893 (Ky. 1979). Steve cites no authority in support of that proposition, nor does he explain how the circuit court's decision not to adjudicate the merits of his "equity argument" amounted to more than harmless error. See CR 61.01. Thus, it is unnecessary to discuss this point further.
Next, Steve argues the circuit court judge demonstrated "extreme bias" and should have recused. In support, Steve broadly states that the circuit court overruled several of his motions; "asserted many conclusory opinions on various aspects of the case"; excluded evidence he sought to introduce; made legal conclusions that he believed were incorrect; incorporated language and reasoning from some of the appellees' pleadings into several of its orders; did not dismiss an abuse of process counterclaim asserted against him by the appellees until two years after it was filed; and in one of its orders, referred to him as Keith's "estranged brother."
Steve also adds that during the December 8, 2011 hearing regarding the appellees' motion to strike, the circuit court demonstrated it had prejudged the merits of his case because it asked him whether Keith had ever been adjudged mentally incompetent; and asked him to explain why he had indicated in his complaint that: (1) Keith had been appointed executor of their mother's estate through her will and had eventually served her estate in that capacity from 2007 until 2008; (2) Steve had not challenged Keith's appointment as their mother's executor; (3) Keith had been employed full time for several years before and after he executed his will; and (4) Keith had been capable of driving an automobile., Steve also argues that, due to this line of questioning, he "left that hearing in tears, feeling as if he was personally attacked and cross examined by the Court for his action or inactions taken on behalf of his brother or mother."
During the hearing, Steve acknowledged Keith had a valid driver's license.
Steve asserts that during the December 8, 2011 hearing, the circuit court also told him Keith "made his will in 2006, but didn't pass away until 2011, so if he wanted to change his will he could have." The portion of the record Steve has cited in support of his assertion does not, however, demonstrate that the circuit court made any statement; he has cited a segment of the appellees' closing arguments on the last day of trial, April 21, 2014.
The legal standard for disqualifying a judge on the basis of bias is set forth in Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 26A.015(2). What Steve has broadly asserted lends no support to the notion that the judge should have been disqualified under this high standard. At most, it indicates that over the course of the litigation the judge arrived at legal conclusions on the basis of what was represented in the various pleadings and motions; and that Steve either disagreed with the circuit court's interpretations of the law, or took issue with the speed at which they were made. We are also unaware of any authority—and Steve cites none—indicating that a court's characterization of an individual as "estranged" on one occasion, or its incorporation of language used by a litigant into its orders, approaches this high standard.
KRS 26A.015(2) provides: Any justice or judge of the Court of Justice or master commissioner shall disqualify himself in any proceeding:
(a) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings, or has expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the proceeding;
(b) Where in private practice or government service he served as a lawyer or rendered a legal opinion in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter in controversy, or the judge, master commissioner or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning the matter in controversy;
(c) Where he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a pecuniary or proprietary interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding;
(d) Where he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
1. Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
2. Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding and the disqualification is not waived by stipulation of counsel in the proceeding filed therein;
3. Is known by the judge or master commissioner to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
4. Is to the knowledge of the judge or master commissioner likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
Regarding Steve's contention that the circuit court's line of questioning at the December 8, 2011 hearing reflected it had already formed an opinion of the merits of his case, we disagree. A central purpose of filing a complaint is to provide a short and plain statement of a claim showing entitlement to relief. CR 8.01(1). As set forth in his complaint, Steve claimed Keith's last will and testament was invalid because Keith suffered from a lifelong mental illness that completely prevented him from making any decisions or exercising any judgment. However, Steve's additional allegations discussed above (i.e., Keith drove and was licensed to drive a motor vehicle; was appointed and functioned as the executor of his mother's estate; and was employed at a full-time job before and after he executed his will) appeared to undermine that proposition. Having reviewed the recording of the December 8, 2011 hearing, nothing about it indicates the circuit court was prejudging the merits of Steve's claim or attempting to impugn his character; it was asking Steve for further explanation and clarity.
To illustrate, Steve's complaint alleged in relevant part:
8. That the deceased Harold Keith Chandler suffered from diminished mental capacity his entire life.
9. That the deceased Keith Chandler was an adult dependent who resided with his parents his entire life and relied on his father Rudolph Chandler to make decisions for him until he passed away in December of 2004.
10. That the deceased Keith Chandler never took the initiative to do anything on his own without first being instructed to do so.
11. Keith would only take instructions from his father, but Keith continued to live with his mother until she passed in December of 2007.
12. Prior to his Mother's passing Mrs. Chandler asked family members, neighbors, and friends to watch out for Keith because in her words, "he was not dealing with a full stack."
. . .
42. Keith never exercised his own judgment, but was always following instructions that someone gave him.
Next, Steve argues the circuit court committed error by permitting the appellees to voluntarily dismiss their above-referenced abuse of process claim against him because, at the time of the dismissal, he had filed a response to it. As to how this prejudiced him, Steve asserts:
The abuse of process counterclaim was a frivolous sham, and it's [sic] only purpose was to force Steve into filing excessive pleadings and responses thereto. Purpose designed solely to bully and intimidate Steve out of his cause of action and financially strap any attorney from continuing with the fight without requiring Plaintiff to pay an astronomical amount up front. Then to allow attorney [sic] to orally dismiss it a week before trial, is a deliberate abuse of discretion. Especially in light of the fact that, Defendants [sic] entire case stemmed on the fact that they claim Keith told them that his brother bullied him and always bossed him around. Steve should have been permitted to show the jury who the real bullies in the case have been.
To be clear, the jury was tasked with resolving whether Keith had testamentary capacity; and, if so, whether the appellees exerted undue influence upon Keith prior to or during the execution of his will. From the face of Steve's argument set forth above, it is unclear how introducing evidence regarding an ancillary claim that the appellees chose not to pursue—a claim Steve himself has characterized as frivolous—would have assisted the jury in resolving those issues. To the extent that the circuit court erred on this point, its error was harmless and not a basis for reversal.
Steve's next argument is that the circuit court committed prejudicial error by entering an order overruling a set of "objections" he filed of record shortly after many of the allegations in his complaint were stricken pursuant to CR 12.06. His objections reincorporated most, if not all, of the substance of a response he had previously filed in opposition to the appellee's motion to strike. From the face of the "objections" he filed and his argument on appeal, it appears Steve was and continues to be under the impression that, for the purpose of preserving error, it was necessary to file a document into the record, shortly after the circuit court entered its strike order, which once again memorialized why he disagreed with the circuit court's decision to strike part of his complaint. And, it appears Steve believes that when the circuit court thereafter entered an order overruling his "objections," the circuit court was attempting to erase his attempt at preserving error. In the words of his brief:
Despite recognizing that Steve's filed objections neither requested the Court to alter, amend, or vacate previous order, on August 9, 2012, the Court sua sponte, issued an additional Order for the sole purpose of Overruling Steve's filed Objection to preserve the record. One can only speculate that the purpose of the unsolicited Order was to keep the record clear for a speedy summary judgment.
What Steve has argued is not indicative of bias or error. It is a misapprehension of the civil rules and a misunderstanding of what occurred. No rule of procedure required Steve to file a second, post-judgment objection to having his complaint partially stricken. For the purpose of preserving error for appeal, it was enough that he filed a response to the appellees' motion to strike. Moreover, the order Steve perceived as the circuit court's attempt to erase his preservation of error was nothing of the sort, nor could it have had such an effect. As Steve's argument tends to indicate, the order was the result of the circuit court's understanding that Steve's "objections" were a post-judgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate its decision. The circuit court's order overruling his "objections" specifically stated as much. In overruling Steve's "objections," the court was not attempting to erase Steve's attempt at preserving error; it was informing him that it would not alter, amend, or vacate its prior ruling.
Steve's "objections" also referenced Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 103 and its requirements for making a "proffer of evidence." KRE 103 is not applicable to allegations stricken from a complaint. Allegations are not evidence, nor are stricken allegations the equivalent of excluded evidence.
Next, Steve argues the circuit court erroneously determined, in an order entered January 16, 2014, that the period allowed for discovery had expired. As to why, he acknowledges the circuit court had scheduled discovery to end on November 12, 2013, but he contends that discovery was continued indefinitely after he filed a Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 26A.020 petition to disqualify the circuit court judge on October 21, 2013.
A KRS 26A.020 petition has the operative effect of placing a case in abeyance. It deprives the circuit court of particular case jurisdiction until the Chief Justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court determines the merits of the petition; enforcement of any judgment entered by the circuit court during that period of time is suspended until the Chief Justice renders his or her decision. See Shafizadeh v. Shafizadeh, 444 S.W.3d 437, 443 (Ky. App. 2012). However, the Chief Justice rendered his decision denying Steve's petition on December 13, 2013. Any impediment the circuit court may have had in enforcing its scheduling order, owing to Steve's KRS 26A.020 petition, was removed as of that date. Accordingly, Steve has cited nothing indicative of error.
Steve argues the circuit court erred in excluding from trial what he characterizes as evidence of undue influence exerted upon Keith after Keith executed his will, and events that occurred after Keith executed his will which, in Steve's view, were suspicious. This evidence includes: (1) information indicating that Keith's naked body was discovered in his basement on July 9, 2011, approximately four days after he died, and that there were loaded firearms in Keith's house at the time; (2) information indicating that, due to decomposition and embalming, the cause of Keith's death remains unknown; (3) Steve's perception of and supposition regarding the appellees' behavior on or after the date Keith's body was discovered; and (4) Steve's testimony that he and Keith did not have a contentious relationship after the date Keith executed his will, and that Randy Fish and William Robinson voiced no objection when he planned Keith's funeral in 2011.
However, suspicion, speculation, and conjecture is not evidence. O'Bryan v. Cave, 202 S.W.3d 585, 588 (Ky. 2006). And even if this information amounted to something more than that, Steve does not explain why any of what he has described would have been relevant to a claim of undue influence; nor do we view the circuit court's exclusion of this information on the basis of relevance as error. In the context of a will dispute alleging undue influence, relevant evidence supports a reasonable inference that undue influence was exerted upon a testator prior to or during the execution of the will. Rothwell v. Singleton, 257 S.W.3d 121, 124-25 (Ky. App. 2008).
Next, Steve takes issue with the circuit court's decision to exclude what he characterizes as "nearly a thousand posts made by Randy, online on various hunting websites under the name RJPOUTDOORS." But, these internet posts are not of record. The circuit court also prohibited Steve from adducing them at trial as part of a discovery sanction because, despite the circuit court's holding that this information was discoverable, Steve refused to produce it to the appellees. It is unnecessary to discuss this point further because Steve cites no authority to support the circuit court acted improperly in this regard.
Throughout a substantial portion of his brief, Steve also argues the evidence adduced at trial and during his cross-examination of the appellees compellingly demonstrated the appellees exerted undue influence upon Keith prior to the execution of his will, which resulted in an unnatural disposition of his property. In other words, he is apparently making an argument based upon the sufficiency of the evidence produced at trial.
This type of argument is properly raised and preserved through a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Steel Techs., Inc. v. Congleton, 234 S.W.3d 920, 931 (Ky. 2007). Moreover, a motion for a JNOV must, in turn, be predicated on a directed verdict motion made at the close of all the proof and prior to the entry of judgment. Id. at 926. Steve did not preserve any argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence by moving for a directed verdict and JNOV. Consequently, this cannot serve as a basis for reversal.
Steve's next argument concerns whether Keith had the mental capacity to execute a will. Steve begins by correctly summarizing the requisite criteria set forth in Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Ky. 1998): "To validly execute a will, a testator must: (1) know the natural objects of her bounty; (2) know her obligations to them; (3) know the character and value of her estate; and (4) dispose of her estate according to her own fixed purpose." (Internal citations omitted). Steve further states:
It is undisputed that Keith could probably have met the minimum standards set out in the first three prongs. However, Steve and all of his witnesses adamantly dispute the fact that Keith could have met the fourth prong, which required that Keith disposed of his estate according to HIS own fixed purpose.
Accordingly, Steve's argument is limited to the fourth of the above-stated elements. Steve adds:
[T]he Defendants' evidence pertaining to mental capacity all boiled down to Keith had a job in a factory that he worked for 15 years. Keith graduated from high school and trade school, and he had a driver's licenses [sic]. There was absolutely zero evidence presented by either side of Keith ever making a rational decision on his own, that didn't involve one of his parents, Steve, or one of the defendants.
If Steve is arguing the evidence adduced at trial compelled the conclusion that Keith could not have disposed of his estate according to his own fixed purpose, his argument is unpreserved. As noted, he did not move for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Conversely, if Steve has based his argument upon the circuit court's decision to exclude evidence from trial, it is his burden on appeal to demonstrate: (1) the substance of the excluded evidence; (2) that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding it; and (3) that there was a substantial possibility the jury would have reached a different verdict if the evidence had not been excluded. See Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 103; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000) (explaining the standard to reviewing a trial court's ruling admitting or excluding evidence is abuse of discretion, and the test is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles); see also Hart v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 481, 483-84 (Ky. 2003).
In relevant part, KRE 103 provides:
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected; and
. . .
(2) Offer of proof. If the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked.
In this respect, Steve has prevented this Court from reviewing much of the substance of what he complains was excluded from trial. Within the 35 pages this Court allotted him for his brief, he attempts to relate the substance of what was excluded in large part by citing allegations in his complaint and six depositions that were not included with the appellate record. Allegations are not evidence, and depositions that are not filed with the appellate record cannot be considered. See Educ. Training Sys., Inc. v. Monroe Guar. Ins. Co., 129 S.W.3d 850, 853 (Ky. App. 2003) ("Pleadings are not evidence."); see also Lowe v. Taylor, 172 Ky. 275, 189 S.W. 204, 205 (1916), explaining:
Steve attempted to append an "exhibit" to his brief consisting of 29 more pages of argument and citations. We granted a motion from the appellees to strike this exhibit. --------
[W]here the evidence heard by the lower court is not brought up on the appeal, the appellate court will presume that it supports the judgment rendered in the court below, and . . . in the absence of any part of the evidence, this court will not, on appeal, consider any question relating to the testimony offered or introduced on the trial.
Issues of preservation aside, Steve also provides no basis for concluding the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding what he urges should have been admitted at trial. From what can be gleaned from his brief, the nature of what Steve wished to adduce at trial was as follows:
• Testimony to the effect that despite serving as the executor of their mother's estate and filing a final settlement of her estate in September 2008, Keith did not distribute articles of her personal property according to their mother's will;
• Keith's high school transcripts indicating Keith achieved B's and C's during his last two years before graduation, but was enrolled in a number of special education math and reading classes;
• Testimony indicating that after the factory where Keith had been employed for about 15 years shut down in 2008 and Keith was subsequently laid off, Keith often did not pick up his mail, would not pay bills or purchase groceries despite having the money to do so, and lived for long periods of time without water or electricity until Steve paid to have those services restored;
• Bank records indicating the last time Keith visited the lockbox where he kept his will was June 2008;
• A durable power of attorney Mary Katherine executed on September 19, 2007, authorizing both Keith and Steve, rather than only Keith, to act as her attorney in fact in all matters;
• General information from various sources about autism and Asperger Syndrome;
• Lay opinion testimony from one of Keith's relatives, Glen Newcomb, to the effect that Keith underwent a drastic personality change after the date Keith executed his will. Newcomb's testimony was based upon his recollection of his conversations with Keith's and Steve's mother, rather than his own personal observations.
Boiled down, Steve sought to introduce this evidence because, in his view, it was probative of the state of Keith's mental condition before and after October 23, 2006, the date Keith executed his will.
The circuit court's reason for excluding this information, as stated in a pretrial order granting a motion in limine filed by the appellees, was that it either touched upon events too remote in time to be relevant to the issue of Keith's testamentary capacity; would have called for the jury to engage in speculation or conjecture; or was simply inadmissible hearsay. We agree.
To be sure, a trial court may properly admit circumstantial evidence of a testator's mental state a reasonable length of time before and after the testator executes a will, so long as it has a reasonable tendency to indicate what the testator's mental state was during the execution of the will. Pardue v. Pardue, 312 Ky. 370, 227 S.W.2d 403, 405 (1950). In Pardue, for instance, a trial court reviewed evidence of a testator's capacity two years before and a few weeks after August 9, 1943, the date the testator executed his will. Two years prior, the testator had begun suffering from uremic poisoning due to kidney issues. Id. at 404. The testator's doctor testified that uremic poisoning had affected the testator's mind; based upon the doctor's examination of the testator in September 1943, he concluded the testator had lacked testamentary capacity at that time. Id. Lay witnesses also testified that the testator's condition had progressively worsened from March 1943 until his death on December 10, 1943. Id.
Nevertheless, as explained by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 455:
In Kentucky there is a strong presumption in favor of a testator possessing adequate testamentary capacity. This presumption can only be rebutted by the strongest showing of incapacity. Williams v. Vollman, Ky.App., 738 S.W.2d 849 (1987); Taylor v. Kennedy, Ky .App., 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1985). Testamentary capacity is only relevant at the time of execution of a will. New v. Creamer, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 918 (1955).
. . .
[T]he privilege of the citizens of the Commonwealth to draft wills to dispose of their property is zealously guarded by the courts and will not be disturbed based on remote or speculative evidence. American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Penner, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 751 (1969). The degree of mental capacity required to make a will is minimal. Nance v. Veazey, Ky., 312 S.W.2d 350, 354 (1958). The minimum level of mental capacity required to make a will is less than that necessary to make a deed, Creason v. Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 69 (1965), or a contract. Warnick v. Childers, Ky., 282 S.W.2d 608 (1955).
Here, what Steve complains was excluded involved remote events that occurred several years before or at least two years after Keith executed his will. The information about autism or Asperger Syndrome had no evidentiary value because Keith was never diagnosed with either disorder; no expert testified he had either disorder; and we are aware of no broad rule providing that persons afflicted with either disorder are incapable of having testamentary capacity, much less incapable of having a fixed purpose of their own.
Moreover, as Steve describes it in his brief, Glen Newcomb's lay testimony about Keith's mental state was not based upon his own personal observations. It was therefore inadmissible. See McDonald's Ex'r v. Transylvania Univ., Lexington, 274 Ky. 168, 118 S.W.2d 171, 175 (1937) ("A layman may testify to a thing within his knowledge concerning apparent conditions of another, but he may not express his opinion, since he cannot diagnose disease or give expert evidence with reference thereto." (quotations and citation omitted)). In short, even if Steve had preserved an argument with respect to the circuit court's decision to exclude his evidence of mental incapacity, he has failed to demonstrate the circuit court's decision was unsupported by sound legal principles and thus represented an abuse of discretion.
Having reviewed the breadth of Steve's arguments, we find no error or other reason that would justify setting aside the jury verdict in favor of the appellees. We therefore AFFIRM.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Kayce R. Powell
Hopkinsville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Steven D. Downey
Bowling Green, Kentucky