Opinion
1:03CV89-C
April 2, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Having considered the pleadings, the parties' briefs, the arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, the Court will grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This dispute arises out of the shooting death of Plaintiff's decedent, Jerry Champion, on March 14, 2001 by a co-worker. Plaintiff filed this action on March 13, 2003 in the Superior Court of Cleveland County, North Carolina against PPG Industries Fiber Glass Products, Inc. ("PPG Fiber Glass") and PPG Industries, Inc. ("PPG Industries"). Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint that Defendants negligently failed properly to train and supervise their security personnel and that Defendants and their security personnel negligently failed to prevent Mr. Champion's assailant, Brandon Smith, from fatally shooting Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged further that Defendants' negligence proximately caused the wrongful death of Mr. Champion and that Defendants are liable for the wrongful death of Jerry Champion under the North Carolina Wrongful Death Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 28A-18-1 through 28A-18-8.
Defendants removed the action to this Court on April 16, 2003 on the basis of this Court's diversity jurisdiction. On October 14, 2003, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the North Carolina Worker's Compensation Act because the shooting of Mr. Champion occurred at his place of employment. Plaintiff filed a brief in response to Defendants' motion, to which Defendants filed a reply, and the Court subsequently conducted oral argument on the motion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As stated above, this case concerns the fatal shooting of Plaintiff's decedent. According to John Faulds, the human resources manager for Defendant PPG Fiber Glass, on March 14, 2001, the day of the shooting, Mr. Champion was employed as a chopper operator at the PPG Fiber Glass plant in Shelby, North Carolina. (Faulds Aff. attached to Def. Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 1-3). The events leading up to the shooting began on March 6, 2001 when Mr. Champion's assailant, Mr. Smith, also an employee at the plant, injured himself at work ( See Faulds Aff. ¶ 4; Exh. B attached to Def. Mot. Summ. J. ("Injury Rep.")). Shortly after he injured himself, Mr. Smith saw Nicholas Ranta, another employee, showed Mr. Ranta that he was bleeding, and told Mr. Ranta that he had fallen down the stairs and hit his head. (Ranta Dep. at 17-18). In a subsequent investigation of the incident, it was determined that Mr. Smith had not fallen down the stairs as claimed, but rather, had injured himself while improperly cleaning a piece of plant equipment. (Injury Rep.). As a result of this investigation, Mr. Smith was suspended for submitting a false report and for a safety violation. ( Id.)
On March 12, 2001, Mr. Smith returned to the plant to meet with managers concerning his explanation of his injury. (Faulds Aff. ¶ 4). At that time, according to Mr. Faulds, Mr. Smith's suspension was affirmed with a recommendation to terminate his employment for making a false report and for violating safety procedures. ( Id.) Mr. Smith responded by scheduling a final review with Jeff Gillette, the plant production superintendent, for March 15, 2001. (Faulds Aff. ¶ 5). Notes from the guard house logbook reflect that Mr. Smith was not to be permitted onto the premises again, except for his meeting with Mr. Gillette and that he should call first. (Exh. C attached to Def. Mot. Summ. J.).
On March 14, 2001, however, just before the "Z crew," on which both Mr. Smith and Mr. Champion worked, began its shift, Mr. Smith returned to the parking lot outside of the plant to talk with Mr. Ranta. (Ranta Dep. at 25; Faulds Aff. ¶ 3). Mr. Ranta testified in his deposition that Mr. Smith pleaded with him to "get [his] job back" by telling management that he had fallen down the stairs and cut his head. (Ranta Dep. at 25). According to Mr. Ranta, he responded that he was "not going to lie for [Mr. Smith] or anybody else to try to get [Mr. Smith's] job back because [he would] just lose [his] job." ( Id. at 25-26). Mr. Ranta testified in his deposition that Mr. Smith "kept arguing and arguing" with him, but he finally turned and began walking away, stating that he was running a little late and needed to go inside the building. ( Id. at 26). Mr. Ranta testified that as he walked toward the guardhouse, he heard gunshots fired and turned around to see Mr. Smith shooting at him. ( Id.) According to Mr. Ranta, he was shot twice before he was able to reach the guardhouse. ( Id.) Mr. Ranta testified that he heard approximately six or seven more gunshots. ( Id.) One of the gunshots hit Mr. Champion, who was approximately thirty-six feet inside the guardhouse gate and on the sidewalk leading to the front door of the plant. (Shade Aff. attached as Exh. 2 to Def. Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 3).
At his criminal trial, Mr. Smith acknowledged that he had shot at Mr. Ranta because he had been accused of lying about how he had been injured and needed "to redeem [himself] and [his] family." (Smith Trial Transcript attached as Exh. 4 to Def. Mot. Summ. J. at 22). Mr. Smith testified that at the time he was arrested, he did not know that he had shot Mr. Champion and assumed he was being arrested for having shot Mr. Ranta. ( Id. at 22). Mr. Smith testified further that he did not know Mr. Champion and that Mr. Champion had been hit by a stray bullet, not intended for him. ( Id. at 23).
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that both PPG Industries and PPG Fiber Glass employed the decedent. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that at the time of Mr. Champion's death, he "was an employee of PPG Industries." (Compl. ¶ 5). Plaintiff alleged further that Defendants shared joint possession and control over the Shelby plant, including safety and security policies and procedures. ( Id. ¶ 7). Finally, relevant to this motion, Plaintiff alleged that both Defendants "hired and employed Brandon Smith." ( Id. ¶ 10).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The standard for summary judgment is familiar. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2514. However, once the movant has shown an absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence demonstrating that a triable issue of fact exists. See id., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554 (1986).
DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff's wrongful death action against them is precluded by the exclusivity provisions of North Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-1, et seq. These exclusivity provisions are set forth in two sections of the Act. Specifically, Section 97-9 of the Act requires every employer subject to the Act to secure workers' compensation benefits for its employees and provides that as long as the employer secures workers' compensation benefits for its employees, the employer "shall only be liable to any employee for personal injury or death by accident to the extent and manner" specified in the Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-9. Section 97-10.1 provides further that if a particular employer and employee have complied with the Act's requirements, "then the rights and remedies . . . granted [under the Act] to the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or personal representative shall exclude all other rights and remedies . . . as against the employer at common law or otherwise" as a result of the employee's injury or death. Id. § 97-10.1. These two provisions function to limit the amount of recovery available for work-related injury or death and to preclude an employee from seeking potentially larger damages awards in civil actions. See Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 338, 407 S.E.2d 222, 227 (1991). This exclusion of alternative remedies is balanced in the Act by other provisions which provide "for an injured employee's certain and sure recovery without having to prove employer negligence or face affirmative defenses." Id. Where an injury is compensable under the Act, then, exclusive jurisdiction lies in the North Carolina Industrial Commission, and a civil action based on negligence or even willful or wanton negligence cannot lie. See Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., 127 N.C. App. 33, 40, 487 S.E.2d 789, 793 (1997)
To be compensable under the Act, three requirements must be met: (1) the injury must have been caused by an accident; (2) the injury must have "arisen out of the employment; and (3) the injury must have been sustained "in the course of employment. See Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1977). With respect to the first requirement, it is well established that "[a]n assault may be an accident within the meaning of the . . . Act when it is unexpected and without design on the part of the employee who suffers from it." Gallimore, 292 N.C. at 402, 233 S.E.2d at 531; see also Shaw v. Smith Jennings, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 442, 445, 503 S.E.2d 113, 116 (1998). With respect to the second and third requirements, North Carolina courts recognize that while these requirements are distinct, they are also interrelated. See Culpepper v. Fairfield Sapphire Valley, 93 N.C. App. 242, 247-48, 377 S.E.2d 777, 781, aff'd, 325 N.C. 702, 386 S.E.2d 174 (1989). The "arising out of requirement refers to the origin of the injury or the causal connection of the injury to the employment, while the "in the course of requirement refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury occurred. See Gallimore, 292 N.C. at 402, 233 S.E.2d at 531; Pittman v. Twin City Laundry Cleaners, 61 N.C. App. 468, 471, 300 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1983). Stated generally, "if the employee's injury is `fairly traceable to the employment' or `any reasonable relationship to employment exists,' then it is compensable under the Act." Shaw, 130 N.C. App. at 445, 503 S.E.2d at 116.
In this case, Plaintiff does not dispute that the fatal shooting of Mr. Champion was an accident, as that term is defined for purposes of the Act, or that it occurred "in the course of his employment, as Mr. Champion was shot while walking on the employer's premises on his way into work. Plaintiff does, however, contest Defendants' assertion that the shooting "arose out of Mr. Champion's employment.
North Carolina courts have articulated the "arising out of employment requirement slightly differently in different cases. In general, however, North Carolina courts agree that in order for an assault to be compensable as "arising out of the victim's employment, either "a job-related motivation or some other causal relation[ship] between the job and the assault [must] exist." Wake County Hosp. Sys., 127 N.C. App. at 38, 487 S.E.2d at 792. Stated differently, "[f]or an accident to `arise out of the employment, it is necessary that the conditions or obligations of the employment put the employee in the position or at the place where the accident occurs." Pittman, 61 N.C. App. at 472, 300 S.E.2d at 902. The accident does not need to have been foreseen or expected, "but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence." Gallimore, 292 N.C. at 403, 233 S.E.2d at 532 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In applying these principles, North Carolina courts have distinguished between assaults in which there is some work-related connection and assaults motivated by personal animus entirely unrelated to work. Thus, for example, where a hospital employee was abducted by a co-worker from the employee parking lot, while carrying work materials, and assaulted and killed on an adjacent street, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the assault and murder arose out of the victim's employment, even though there was no evidence that the assailant and the victim knew each other or had had any employment-related interaction with each other. See Wake County Hosp. Sys., 127 N.C. App. at 39, 487 S.E.2d at 792; see also Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 248-50, 377 S.E.2d at 781-82 (sexual assault of resort waitress arose out of her employment where assault occurred after work hours on resort property when waitress stopped to assist patron on side of road). Similarly, in Pittman, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a fatal shooting that occurred at the place of business after business hours but while employees, who had been attending a holiday party, were finishing their duties arose out of the victim's employment, where the shooting was motivated by an employment-related argument between the assailant and a third party. Pittman, 61 N.C. App. at 473-74, 300 S.E.2d at 902-03. Although there was also evidence that the victim participated in the argument, the Pittman Court stated that the shooting was caused by a dispute between the assailant and the third party concerning whether the assailant previously had been fired by that third party. Id. Noting that "but for his employment [the victim] would not have been exposed to an equal risk of injury," the Pittman Court held that the shooting arose from the victim's employment. Id., 61 N.C. App. at 473, 300 S.E.2d at 903.
Where, however, the motive for an assault is "foreign to the employment relationship," North Carolina courts have held that the assault does not arise out of the victim's employment. Gallimore, 292 N.C. at 403, 233 S.E.2d at 532. Thus, in Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E.2d 350 (1972), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the fatal shootings of three employees did not arise out of the victims' employment, where the assailant, who was not an employee, came to the workplace and murdered his wife, a co-worker he believed she loved, and her supervisor because he believed that if the supervisor would terminate her employment, she would be forced to return to him. See id., 281 N.C. at 241, 188 S.E.2d at 355. Similarly, where a mall employee was kidnaped in the parking lot and subsequently killed by a person who was not employed at the mall but there to steal tape players from cars in the parking lot, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the assault did not arise out of the victim's employment because "[t]he risk of assault . . . was essentially one common to the neighborhood, not particular to the employment, and one which could happen to anyone who patronizes a shopping mall." Gallimore, 292 N.C. at 405, 233 S.E.2d at 533.
In this case, while the evidence is clear that Mr. Smith harbored no ill will toward Mr. Champion stemming from their common employment, there is no question but that the shooting was motivated by an employment dispute and it was Mr. Champion's obligations as an employee arriving for work that put him in the position to be shot on March 14, 2001. Although Plaintiff correctly notes that the victim in this case could have been a visitor or family member bringing dinner to an employee, the fact that the errant bullet could have struck a non-employee does not detract from the causal relationship between Mr. Smith's employment dispute and the shooting, nor from the significance of Mr. Champion's employment relationship to his vulnerability. The reality of our work environment today, in a culture in which weapons and images of violence surround us and in which instances of workplace violence have become far too common, is that employees are at a greater risk of becoming victims of violence by their very presence in the workplace. The victims of that violence will not always be persons with whom the assailant had a dispute or even intended to harm, but the fact of the victim's employment requiring his presence at the place of employment, particularly a manufacturing plant with multiple shifts and numerous employees, increases the risk that a fellow employee will grow disgruntled about an employment decision and do violence to his or her co-workers. In this case, Mr. Smith admitted that he intended to shoot Mr. Ranta, that he shot Mr. Ranta because he feared the termination of his employment and believed Mr. Ranta could prevent it, and that one of the bullets intended for Mr. Ranta, in fact, killed Mr. Champion. Regardless of whether Mr. Champion was the intended victim, the shooting in this case "was causally connected to the employment," Pittman, 61 N.C. App. at 474, 300 S.E.2d at 903, and as such, under the authority set forth above, the Court holds that it arose out of Mr. Champion's employment. As Plaintiff does not dispute that the assault was an "accident" for purposes of the Act or that it occurred "in the course of Mr. Champion's employment, the shooting is an accident compensable under the Act, and Plaintiff is not entitled to seek recovery under a theory of negligence in this Court.
In addition to arguing that the shooting did not arise out of Mr. Champion's employment with Defendants, Plaintiff also argues that summary judgment is not appropriate as to Defendant PPG Industries because Defendants have consistently asserted that PPG Industries was not Mr. Champion's employer and should be judicially estopped from asserting an employment relationship for purposes of taking advantage of the exclusivity of Mr. Champion's remedy under the Act. While Plaintiff is correct that PPG Industries has denied that it was Mr. Champion's employer and has stated consistently that PPG Fiber Glass was his employer, Plaintiff's argument ignores the fact that she does not assert any other basis of liability against PPG Industries, other than as Mr. Champion's employer. Each of Plaintiff's allegations in the Complaint asserting a duty on the part of PPG Industries to prevent the harm that befell Mr. Champion was a duty premised on an employment relationship. Accordingly, to the extent PPG Industries was not Mr. Champion's employer, summary judgment is still due to be granted because Plaintiff has neither alleged nor produced evidence suggesting any other basis for liability on the part of PPG Industries. To the extent that PPG Industries may properly be considered Mr. Champion's employer, summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiffs exclusive remedy, as set forth above, is in the Industrial Commission pursuant to the exclusivity provisions of the Act.
CONCLUSION
Because Defendants have produced undisputed evidence establishing that the fatal shooting of Mr. Champion arose out of his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff's sole remedy is that provided under the North Carolina Worker's Compensation Act, and a negligence claim in this Court is not cognizable. Although the Court recognizes that Plaintiff and her family have been the victims of a horrible and senseless tragedy, the Court nevertheless holds that Defendants' motion for summary judgment is due to be granted. Judgment in favor of Defendants will be entered contemporaneously herewith.