Summary
noting that "reasonably anticipated use is intertwined with the character and adequacy of warnings although an adequate warning will not always be dispositive of reasonably anticipated use"
Summary of this case from Scordill v. Louisville Ladder GroupOpinion
Civil Action No. 02-734, Section "A" (5)
September 6, 2002
MINUTE ENTRY
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 6) filed by defendant AJC Tools Equipment, Inc. Plaintiff, Grace Chambers, opposes the motion. The motion, set for hearing on August 14, 2002, is before the Court on the briefs without oral argument. Defendant has filed a supplemental memorandum in addition to two reply memoranda. Plaintiff has filed one reply. After considering the applicable law and the arguments made on behalf of both parties, for the reasons that follow the motion is DENIED.
Background
In May 2001, plaintiff, Grace Chambers ("Chambers"), was injured while working as a roofer. She fell from the roof of a house to the ground when the roof jacks, which form a platform upon which the roofer can stand, failed. She alleges that various defects in the roof jacks rendered them unreasonably dangerous. She brought this lawsuit in state court against defendant AJC Tools Equipment, Inc., ("AJC") the manufacturer of the jacks, pursuant to the Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA"), La.R.S. 9:2800.51, et seq. AJC removed the suit to this Court.
The Parties' Contentions
AJC moves for summary judgment asserting that it has no liability as a matter of law. AJC points out that Chambers read the explicit warnings regarding the weight limitations of the roof jacks yet deliberately disregarded those warnings by placing 200 pounds on the jacks in light of a 40 pound weight limitation. AJC asserts that in Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 1998), the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff's failure to adhere to explicit manufacturer's warnings was not a reasonably foreseeable use of a product under the LPLA. Thus, Chambers' use of the roof jacks at the time of her accident fell outside the "reasonably anticipated use" of the product thereby precluding any liability on the part of AJC under the LPLA.
The pertinent excerpts from Chambers' deposition are attached to AJC's motion.
In its supplemental memorandum, AJC asserts that Chambers misused the roof jacks by overlapping planks contrary to the clear warning against overlapping planks. Moreover, she appears to have violated applicable OSHA regulations by failing to use a fall arrest system while working on such a steep roof.
In opposition, Chambers argues that she did not overload the roof jacks in excess of what the warning label stated. According to her expert, Chambers did not place more than 152 pounds on a single roof jack at any given time. Thus, Chambers did not exceed the weight restriction on the warning label. Furthermore, even if Chambers had overloaded the jacks, her use of them was nevertheless a reasonably anticipated use of the product because the warning was not clear and direct when it came to weight restrictions.
Exhibit B to Chambers' opposition, Affidavit of A.J. McPhate. Chambers weighed 120 pounds at the time of the accident and a single package of shingles weighed 70 to 80 pounds. According to McPhate, when factoring in the roof's pitch there would not have been more than 152 pounds on any one jack at any given time.
In reply, AJC asserts that regardless of the clarity vel non of its warning, Chambers disregarded every warning on the label — the weight restriction, the proscription on overlapping boards, and the OHSA directive. Plaintiff specifically admitted in her deposition that she was familiar with the warnings, read the label, yet proceeded to work in violation of the warnings anyway. Leaving aside whether or not the weight warnings are ambiguous or confusing, Chambers appreciated the risk she was taking.
In reply, Chambers asserts that this issue is not whether she misused the product but rather whether she made a reasonably anticipated use of the product. Moreover, Chambers did nail the plank to the roof jacks, and that any lack of compliance with OSHA regulations, while perhaps relevant to victim fault, is not a basis for granting summary judgment.
Finally, AJC comes full circle back to its first argument: that Chamber's deposition, in which she admits that she was familiar with the warnings and why they were necessary, and the reasoning employed by the Fifth Circuit in the Kampen decision, mandate summary judgment in this case.
Discussion
1. Summary Judgment Standards
In determining whether a party is entitled to summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Littlefield v. Forney Indep. School Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911 (5th Cir. 1998); Tolson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 604, 608 (5th Cir. 1998)). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citingCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden, as an initial matter, of showing the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2548). If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied regardless of the nonmoving party's response. Id. 2. AJC's Motion
AJO contends that the Fifth Circuit's Kamoen decision controls and mandates a grant of summary judgment in its favor.
In Kampen, the Fifth Circuit noted that by adopting the reasonably anticipated use standard as part of the LPLA, the legislature intended to narrow the range of product uses for which a manufacturer would be held liable. Kampen, 157 F.3d at 309 (citing Delphen v. Department of Transp. Dev., 657 So.2d 328 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1995; Meyers v. American Seating Co., 637 So.2d 771 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1994)). Thus, as a threshold matter, in order to recover under the LPLA the injury at issue must have resulted from a reasonably anticipated use of the product. Id. at 314. However, the scope of the reasonably anticipated use standard remains imprecise. Id. at 310.
In Kampen, plaintiff sustained injuries when a factory-provided car jack failed and caused his automobile to fall on top of him. Plaintiff had ignored — actually did not bother to read — two express warnings admonishing that the user was never to get beneath the vehicle when supported only by the jack. Id. at 309. After discussing its decision in Lockart v. Kobe Steel Ltd., 989 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth Circuit noted that reasonably anticipated use is intertwined with the character and adequacy of warnings although an adequate warning will not always be dispositive of reasonably anticipated use. Kampen, 157 F.3d at 314. But a warning against product misuse is relevant to assessing what uses of a product a manufacturer should reasonably anticipate. Id. Because the warnings involved in Kampen specifically proscribed getting beneath the vehicle while in the elevated position, the Fifth Circuit concluded that plaintiff had not engaged in a reasonably anticipated use.
Turning to the instant case, it is beyond dispute that AJC's warnings are relevant in determining whether Chambers' use of the roof jacks was a reasonably anticipated use. Kampen at the very least dictates that result. This Court disagrees, however, with AJC's contention that theKampen decision mandates judgment as a matter of law in this case. This Court notes that AJC's warnings were not nearly as express or clear in proscribing the use at issue as the warnings in Kampen. In other words, the Court finds persuasive Chambers' contention that in light of the inexact nature of the AJC warnings, there remains an issue of fact as to whether Chambers did in fact violate the warnings. Such a key factual dispute was not present in Kampen and therefore that case cannot mandate judgment as a matter of law in this case. Nothing in the testimony contained in Chambers' deposition alters this legal result. Rather, in the instant case, the issues raised in by way of the instant motion, including any contributory negligence on Chambers' part, can best be sorted out by the jury at trial.
The warning label read in pertinent part: "Capacity of 4 ft. of platform space shall be one man per plus maximum of 40 lbs." Exh. 1, AJC's Supplemental Memorandum. The warning label therefore did not specifically and expressly preclude the weight that Chambers had on the jacks according to McPhate's report.
In fact, Chambers' deposition testimony demonstrates that she failed to understand exactly what the AJC warning sought to proscribe because she read the jacks as having a "40-pound weight capacity." Chambers deposition at 43.
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 6) filed by defendant AJC Tools Equipment, Inc. should be and is hereby DENIED.