Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-1268-BH
December 22, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER
Pursuant to the consent of the parties and the District Court's Order of Reassignment dated and filed December 12, 2003, this matter was transferred to this Court for the conduct of all further proceedings and entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Before the Court are Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Complaint In Forma Pauperis, And in the Alternative for a More Definite Statement, and Defendants' Brief in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Complaint In Forma Pauperis, And in the Alternative for a More Definite Statement, both filed September 23, 2003, and Plaintiff's Reply Brief to Support Plaintiff [sic] Claims for Relief, and Plaintiff's Reply Brief Supporting Exhibits/Appendix Documents, both filed September 26, 2003. Having reviewed the pleadings and the evidence submitted therewith, the Court finds that Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Complaint In Forma Pauperis, And in the Alternative for a More Definite Statement should be GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 6, 2003, Plaintiff Lonnie Charles Chalmers ("Chalmers"), proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint ("Compl.") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dr. Austin Lane, who is the Dean of Students at The University of Texas at Arlington ("UTA"), Dr. Donald Granvold, who is a professor and Associate Dean at UTA's School of Social Work, and Dr. Hector Diaz, who is a professor and coordinator at UTA's School of Social Work (collectively "Defendants"). (Compl. at 1-2.) UTA is part of The University of Texas System and under the management and control of the board of regents of The University of Texas System; it is, therefore, an agency of executive branch of the state of Texas. See TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 65.02 and 68.02. Chalmers was studying to become a licensed social worker at UTA's School of Social Work. (Compl. at 3.)
Chalmers complains that Defendants violated the rules and regulations of UTA regarding inquiries of scholastic dishonesty and prevented him from attaining his Master of Science in Social Work degree. See id. at 2-4. Specifically, Chalmers complains that Granvold and Diaz retaliated against him by changing his grades in their respective courses because Chalmers filed a previous lawsuit in this Court against other UTA faculty. (Compl. at 2, 4.) Chalmers also argues that he was denied due process by Lane because Lane failed to provide him with an administrative hearing within ten days after his grades were changed. (Compl. at 4.) Chalmers requests $50,000 in monetary damages, declaratory judgment, a restraining order, a trial, and a permanent injunction. Id. at 5.
Chalmers filed a lawsuit entitled Chalmers v. Johnston, 3:03-CV-1142-D, on May 23, 2003, alleging that UTA faculty members Lon Johnston, Norman Cobb, and Larry Watson impermissibly changed his grade in Johnston's class and prevented him from graduating on May 23, 2003. This Court recommended that the case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Eleventh Amendment immunity applied to all defendants. Before the District Court adopted the recommendation, Chalmers moved for voluntary dismissal, stating that his grade had been changed and defendants were not at fault regarding his inability to graduate. The District Court granted Chalmers' dismissal request and closed the case on October 30, 2003.
Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing that once Granvold and Diaz received allegations of Chalmers' commissions of academic dishonesty in their courses, they permissibly changed Chalmers' grades according to UTA's procedures pending final determination of the allegations. Defendants also argue that Lane notified Chalmers via e-mail on June 5, 2003, that a "hearing date would be 'scheduled for early July'" regarding the grade changes. (Mot. at 6.) Lane argues that Chalmers agreed to the setting of the hearing later than ten days after the grades were changed by never objecting to the hearing date proposed in the e-mail. Defendants further argue that Chalmers' due process claim is now moot because after Chalmers filed this suit, UTA held the July hearing, the hearing officer found Chalmers guilty of academic dishonesty, Chalmers' grades in Granvold's and Diaz's courses were changed to failing grades, and UTA suspended Chalmers for one academic year. (Mot. at 3.) Chalmers filed a response entitled "Reply," arguing that he was denied due process by Lane and that the Court should grant him relief that would reinstate his previous grades in Granvold's and Diaz's classes. (Resp. at 7, 14.) Defendants' motion to dismiss is now ripe for determination.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendants move to dismiss Chalmers' Complaint under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the claims for monetary relief are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that the entire Complaint fails to state a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief. (Mot. at 4-6.) Defendants also move for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and FED. R. CIV. P. 8, or in the alternative, for an order under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) requiring Chalmers to provide a more definite statement of his claims. (Mot at 1-2, 7-8.) A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XL.
Defendants move to dismiss Chalmers' claims as barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Although Defendants move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), once a court finds that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies, the barred claims "can be dismissed only under Rule 12(b)(1) and not with prejudice." Warnock v. Pecos County, Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 342-43 (5th Cir. 1996) (remanding grant of summary judgment because "the proper course of action for the district court would have been to treat the motion for summary judgment on the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue as a motion for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."); see also United States v. Texas Tech University, 171 F.3d 279, 286 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1999) ("While the Supreme Court has left this question open, our court has repeatedly referred to the Eleventh Amendment's restriction in terms of subject matter jurisdiction."); Stokes v. Scott, 2000 WL 343185, at * 1 (N.D. Tex. March 31, 2000) (dismissing claim for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) as barred by the Eleventh Amendment). Under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3), the Court may sua sponte determine if it has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to an Eleventh Amendment defense and dismiss a claim for lack thereof. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3), cited in Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1999) (raising the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte in the context of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
Eleventh Amendment immunity bars a suit in federal court by a citizen of a state against his own state or against a state agency or department. See Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 376, 377-78 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 (1984)). Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to suits for monetary damages against state officials in their official capacity. See Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 609 n. 10 (2001) ("Only States and state officers acting in their official capacity are immune from suits for damages in federal court."). There is, however, an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity that was created by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which permits a suit for prospective injunctive relief against state officials for violations of federal or Constitutional law. Because Eleventh Amendment immunity has a different effect on Chalmers' requests for monetary damages than injunctive and declaratory relief, the Court addresses them separately.
1. Monetary Relief
Chalmers claims that Granvold and Diaz changed his grades in their respective courses in retaliation for him filing a previous lawsuit against other UTA faculty members. (Compl. at 4.) Chalmers also alleges that Lane failed to follow UTA's regulations by providing him with a hearing within ten days of the grade changes. See id. at 3. For these alleged actions, Chalmers requests $50,000 in monetary damages. Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits the recovery of monetary damages for their official state actions. (Mot. at 4-5.)
Eleventh Amendment immunity bars § 1983 claims against a state official in his official capacity for the recovery of monetary damages. See Rogers v. Morales, 975 F. Supp. 856, 857 (N.D. Tex. 1997) ("The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution grants to the states the bar to a Civil Rights case when the lawsuit is brought against a state agency, or a state official in his official capacity for the recovery of monetary damages"); see also Gaines v. Texas Tech University, 965 F. Supp. 886, 889 n. 4 (N.D. Tex. 1997) ("Suits against state officials in their official capacity are considered to be suits against the individual's office, and so are generally barred as suits against the state itself"). Chalmers claims are against Defendants for their official state actions as faculty members and Dean of Students at UTA. Consequently, Chalmers' request for monetary damages against these Defendants is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Rogers, 975 F. Supp. at 857; Gaines, 965 F. Supp. at 889; see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Chalmers' monetary claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(h)(3). See Warnock, 88 F.3d at 342-43 (remanding grant of summary judgment because "the proper course of action for the district court would have been to treat the motion for summary judgment on the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue as a motion for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.")
2. Equitable Relief
Chalmers also requests an "injuction [sic] (permenant) [sic] ordering defendant to correct actions," and "declaratory judegement [sic] on this issue." (Compl. at 5.) Under Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, a federal court may not grant equitable relief against a state official with regard to the legality of past conduct. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985).
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims for prospective equitable relief based on alleged unconstitutional actions of state officials, however. See Aguilar v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)); see also Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing equitable relief under Eleventh Amendment), "In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a 'straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.'" Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quoting Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997)).
While conducting a "straightforward inquiry into whether" Chalmers' Complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective, the Court is mindful of the general rule that allegations in a pro se complaint are construed more permissively. See Bannister, 2003 WL 21145739, at *1.
a. Defendant Lane
Chalmers requests injunctive and declaratory relief to force Lane to provide him with a hearing within ten days of when his grades were changed on May 23, 2003. (Compl. at 3-4.) Chalmers first complained of the grade changes to Lane via e-mail on June 4, 2003. (Compl. at 4, Ex. D.) In a responsive e-mail, Lane notified Chalmers that a hearing would be scheduled in July. See id. Chalmers' request for equitable relief to force Lane to provide him with a hearing within ten days of May 23, 2003, is a request for retrospective relief, which is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979). Thus, Chalmers' injunctive and declaratory relief claims against Lane are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Aguilar, 160 F.3d at 1054. Defendants' motion to dismiss the equitable claims against Lane is granted, and those claims shall be dismissed. Because Chalmers' monetary claims against Lane have already been dismissed, and Chalmers' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are now dismissed, there are no remaining claims against Lane.
In his response, Chalmers states that UTA provided him with a hearing on July 16, 2003. (Resp. at 3.)
b. Defendants Granvold and Diaz
Chalmers alleges that Granvold and Diaz retaliated against him in violation of § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment and he requests that they reinstate his previous passing grades in their classes. This claim alleges an ongoing violation of § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment sufficient for the purposes of Exparte Young. See Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 376, 378 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that Ex parte Young "applies only to violations of federal or Constitutional law by those officials."). The request that Granvold and Diaz reinstate his grades is a request for prospective relief. Thus, because Chalmers alleges violations of federal and Constitutional law and requests prospective relief, his equitable claims against Granvold and Diaz are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Lipscomb v. Columbus Mun. Separate School Dist., 269 F.3d 494, 500-01 (5th Cir. 2001) (construing a request for declaratory relief as supporting injunctive relief in Ex parte Young context); see also Darlak v. Bobear, 814 F.2d 1055, 1061 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that allegations were sufficient to invoke Ex parte Young exception); Hason v. Medical Bd. of California, 279 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that claims under § 1983 to obtain a medical license were prospective and not barred by Eleventh Amendment). The Court may thus proceed to determine whether Chalmers has stated claims for permanent injunctive and declaratory relief against Granvold and Diaz.
B. Failure to State a Claim
Defendants argue that Chalmers' claims for permanent injunctive and declaratory relief should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). "[T]he motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Lewis v. City of DeSoto, Texas, 2003 WL 292169, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2003) ( quoting Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)). "[D]ismissal of a claim on the basis of barebones pleadings is a 'precarious disposition with a high mortality rate.'" Id. (quoting Barber v. Motor Vessel "Blue Cat", 372 F.2d 626, 627 (5th Cir. 1967)). "The [district] court may dismiss a claim when it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Id. (quoting Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002) (Fitzwater, J.) (Rule 12(c) decision)). "In analyzing the complaint, [the court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim." Id. "Thus the court should not dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. Although the Court must accept as true the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint, the Court does not accept as true conclusory allegations. See Associated Builders, Inc. v. Alabama Power Company, 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1974). Further, where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court is further guided by the general rule that allegations in a pro se complaint are construed more permissively. See Bannister v. Dai-Tile Intern., Inc., 2003 WL21145739, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2003). While pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a pro se plaintiff still bears the burden "to plead specific facts and proper jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Martin v. United States Post Office, 752 F. Supp. 213, 218 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
Although Defendants alternatively move for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the "standard for determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted is the same whether under § 1915(e)(2)(B), § 1915A(b), or FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) or (c)." Foreman v. Bowles, 2003 WL 21730136, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2003) (citing Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312-13 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the standards under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) are the same); Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002) (recognizing the standards are the same under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Rule 12(b)(6)), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 660 (2002)); Moore v. Carwell, 168 F.3d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1999) (same); Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the standards are the same under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A; Rule 12(b)(6); and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)).
1. Section 1983
Chalmers filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. (Compl. at 3.) Section 1983 provides a right of action against:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any right, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.42 U.S.C. § 1983. "To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A § 1983 suit against a government official in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the entity for whom the official works. See Greer v. Tran, 2003 WL 21467558, at *2 (E.D.La. June 23, 2003) ( citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985), and Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996)). Chalmers' claims against Defendants arise out of their official actions at UTA. Thus, they are claims against UTA. See id.
In § 1983 cases, the Court must first identify "the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 n. 5 (1998). hi this case, Chalmers alleges retaliation by Granvold and Diaz. (Compl. at 2-3.) The elements of a retaliation claim are the plaintiff's invocation of "a specific constitutional right," the defendant's intent to retaliate against the plaintiff for his or her exercise of that right, a retaliatory adverse act, and causation, i.e., "but for the retaliatory motive the complained of incident . . . would not have occurred." Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995) (in the context of a prisoner § 1983 action).
2. Legally Protected Activity
Defendants do not argue that Chalmers has failed to state the two elements for a claim under § 1983: (1) violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States by (2) a person acting under color of state law. Rather, they argue that Chalmers does not state a claim for retaliation because he does not allege that he engaged in "some form of legally protected activity." (Mot. at 5.) They also contend that Chalmers fails to allege that "Granvold and Diaz even had knowledge" of the other lawsuit, and that Chalmers fails to claim that Granvold and Diaz filed reports of academic dishonesty after the filing of the other lawsuit. See id. Finally, Defendants claim that Chalmers' claims for injunctive relief is moot. See id. at 7.
Defendants' argument that Chalmers does not allege that he engaged in "some form of legally protected activity" fails to support dismissal of this claim. Chalmers alleges that he filed a previous lawsuit against other UTA faculty members. (Compl. at 2, 4.) Construing Chalmers' Complaint liberally because he is pro se, Chalmers appears to allege that Granvold and Diaz retaliated against him in violation of his constitutional right of access to courts when he filed his previous lawsuit against other UTA faculty members. "It is beyond dispute that the right of access to the courts is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. The Supreme Court has found several constitutional bases for this right." Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 804 F.2d 953, 959 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Chambers v. Baltimore O.R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (right of access is a privilege and immunity secured under article IV of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment); California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (right of access is one aspect of First Amendment right of petition); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974) (right of access is founded in the Due Process Clause)). Further, "[s]everal federal circuit courts have held 'that state officials may not take retaliatory action against an individual designed . . . to punish him for having exercised his constitutional right to seek judicial relief. . . ." Id. (quoting Harrison v. Springdale Water Sewer Commission, 780 F.2d 1422, 1428 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing cases from the Eleventh, Seventh, Fifth, Third, and Tenth Circuits)). The Court cannot say that Chalmers could "prove no set of facts in support of his claim" that his filing of the previous lawsuit was the exercise of a "a specific constitutional right."
3. Prior Knowledge
Defendants further argue that Chalmers does not allege that they had knowledge of the prior lawsuit. (Mot. at 5.) Chalmers alleges that Granvold and Diaz are retaliating against him "for complaining and filing federal suit against employees in the school of social work." (Compl. at 2.) He also alleges that Granvold and Diaz based their grade reductions on papers produced by someone other than Chalmers. See id. at 2-3. In the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to Chalmers. See Coates v. Heartland Wireless Communications, Inc., 26 F. Supp.2d 910, 914 (N.D. Tex. 1998). Viewing Chalmers' allegations in the light most favorable to him, these allegations implicitly allege knowledge of the other lawsuit by Granvold and Diaz, In light of these allegations, the Court does not find that Chalmers could "prove no set of facts in support of his claim" that Granvold and Diaz had knowledge of the other lawsuit. See Lewis, 2003 WL 292169, at *2.
Defendants also argue that Chalmers' retaliation claim should be dismissed because he has not alleged that Granvold and Diaz submitted reports of academic dishonesty after Chalmers filed the previous suit. (Mot. at 5.) The Court does not find that Chalmers could "prove no set of facts in support of his claim" of retaliation. See Lewis, 2003 WL 292169, at *2.
4. Mootness
Finally, Defendants argue that Chalmers fails to state a claim for injunctive relief because that claim is moot. (Mot. at 7.) Defendants cite Chalmers' allegations in the "Current Harm" section of his Complaint and contend that because UTA "suspended [Chalmers] academically for a full year as a result of the completed inquiry into academic dishonesty," Chalmers' injunctive relief claim is moot. See id. In the "Current Harm" section of Chalmers' Complaint, he alleges that Defendants continue to violate UTA's regulations and that he is unable to obtain his Master of Science in Social Work degree because of Defendants' violations. (Compl. at 4.) Based on these allegations, Chalmers seeks injunctive relief to force Granvold and Diaz to stop violating UTA's regulations and reinstate his passing grades. As noted above, this is a request for prospective relief which is not mooted by Chalmers' temporary suspension. Accordingly, the Court does not find that Chalmers could "prove no set of facts in support of his claim" of retaliation. See Lewis, 2003 WL 292169, at *2.
Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Chalmers' injunctive and declaratory claims for retaliation against Granvold and Diaz is denied.
D. More Definite Statement Under Rule 12(e)
Alternatively, Defendants move for dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 8 or for an order under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) requiring Chalmers to provide a more definite statement of his claims. (Mot. at 7-8.) "Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint will be deemed inadequate only if it fails to (1) provide notice of circumstances which give rise to the claim, or (2) set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of the claim or permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist." Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1999). "If a complaint is ambiguous or does not contain sufficient information to allow a responsive pleading to be framed, the proper remedy is a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e)." Id. (citing 5 WRIGHT MILLER, FED. PRACTICE PROCEDURE CIVIL § 1356 at 590-591).
Defendants argue that Chalmers' Complaint is vague and ambiguous because it fails to specify "what rights have been deprived, by what acts, by which Defendant(s), and in what manner he is entitled to the rights he alleges were deprived." (Mot. at 8.) Although Chalmers states claims for retaliation against Granvold and Diaz, the Court may still order that he provide more clarification of these claims. See Sargent v. Riley, 2003 WL 30418, at *2-4 (E.D.La. Jan. 3, 2003) (denying Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss pro se plaintiff's § 1983 claims, but granting motion to require plaintiff to replead them under Rule 12(e)). Thus, Chalmers, who is proceeding pro se, shall be permitted an opportunity to provide a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) and replead only his claims for retaliation against Granvold and Diaz in the context of injunctive and declaratory relief, because his request for monetary relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Addams-More v. Moore, 1997 WL 472501, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 1997) (dismissing some claims as barred by Eleventh Amendment and allowing pro se plaintiff an opportunity to replead other claims).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Complaint In Forma Pauperis, And in the Alternative for a More Definite Statement should be GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, and that Chalmers' claims for monetary for monetary relief and all claims against Defendant Austin Lane are hereby DISMISSED. Additionally, Chalmers is hereby ORDERED to file with this Court, on or before January 30, 2004, a more definite statement of his claims for retaliation against Granvold and Diaz in the context of his requests for injunctive and declaratory relief.
SO ORDERED