Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-1142-D
October 22, 2003
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court are Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Complaint In Forma Pauperis, and in the Alternative for More Definite Statement and Brief in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Complaint In Forma Pauperis, and in the Alternative for More Definite Statement, both filed July 7, 2003, and Plaintiff's Reply by Brief to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Brief Supporting Appendix Documents, both filed July 21, 2003. The preceding pleadings were referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the District Court's Order of Reference, filed July 8, 2003, for hearing, if necessary, and recommendation. Based on the pleadings and the applicable law, the Court is of the opinion that Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Complaint In Forma Pauperis, and in the Alternative for More Definite Statement should be GRANTED and this case DISMISSED without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lonnie Charles Chalmers ("Chalmers") filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Lon Johnston, Norman Cobb, and Larry Watson, faculty members of The University of Texas at Arlington ("UTA"). (Compl. at 3.) UTA is part of The University of Texas System and under the management and control of the board of regents of The University of Texas System; it is, therefore, an agency of executive branch of the state of Texas. See TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 65.02 and 68.02. Chalmers was studying to become a licensed social worker at UTA's School of Social Work. (Compl. at 3.) Chalmers complains that Defendants violated the rules and regulations of UTA regarding inquiries of scholastic dishonesty and prevented him from attending UTA's May 10, 2003 graduation ceremony. Id. at 2. Chalmers requests monetary damages, declaratory judgment, a restraining order, a trial, and a permanent injunction. Id. at 4.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss ("Mot.") under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Chalmers' claims for monetary relief are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that the entire Complaint fails to state a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief. (Mot. at 1-2.) Defendants also move for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and FED. R. Civ. P. 8, or in the alternative, for an order under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e) requiring Chalmers to provide a more definite statement of his claims. (Mot at 1-2.) Chalmers filed a response ("Resp."), arguing that he was denied due process when Defendants contacted him regarding an allegation of academic dishonesty in violation of the rules and regulations of UTA. (Resp. at 4-5.)
The Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST, amend. XI.
A. Dismissal Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
Defendants argue that Chalmers' claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). "[T]he motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Lewis v. City of Desoto, Texas, 2003 WL 292169, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2003) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)). "[D]ismissal of a claim on the basis of barebones pleadings is a 'precarious disposition with a high mortality rate.'" Id. (quoting Barber v. Motor Vessel "Blue Cat", 372 F.2d 626, 627 (5th Cir. 1967)). "The [district] court may dismiss a claim when it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Id. (quoting Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002) (Fitzwater, J.) (Rule 12(c) decision)). "In analyzing the complaint, [the court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim." Id. "Thus the court should not dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. Further, where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court is further guided by the general rule that allegations in a pro se complaint are construed more permissively. See Bannister v. Dal-Tile Intern., Inc., 2003 WL21145739, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2003). While pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a. pro se plaintiff still bears the burden "to plead specific facts and proper jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Martin v. United States Post Office, 752 F. Supp. 213, 218 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
Although Defendants alternatively move for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the "standard for determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted is the same whether under § 1915(e)(2)(B), § 1915A(b), or FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or (c)." Foreman v. Bowles, 2003 WL 21730136, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2003) (citing Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312-13 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the standards under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) are the same); Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002) (recognizing the standards are the same under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Rule 12(b)(6)), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 660 (2002)); Moore v. Carwell, 168 F.3d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1999) (same); Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the standards are the same under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A; Rule 12(b)(6); and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)).
B. Section 1983
Chalmers filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. (Compl. at 3.) Section 1983 provides a right of action against:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any right, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.42 U.S.C. § 1983. "To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A § 1983 suit against a government official in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the entity for whom the official works. See Greer v. Iran, 2003 WL 21467558, at *2 (E.D.La. June 23, 2003) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985), and Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996)). Chalmers' claims against Defendants arise out of their official actions as faculty members of UTA, and thus, are claims against Defendants in their official capacity. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Claims against Defendants in their official capacity are considered as claims against UTA and, because UTA is an agency of Texas, these claims are properly against Texas. See id.; see also Gaines v. Texas Tech University, 965 F. Supp. 886, 889 n. 4 (N.D. Tex. 1997) ("Suits against state officials in their official capacity are considered to be suits against the individual's office, and so are generally barred as suits against the state itself"). Defendants move to dismiss Chalmers' official capacity claims on grounds that they are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity Eleventh Amendment immunity bars a suit in federal court by a citizen of a state against his own state or against a state agency or department. See Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 376, 377-78 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 104). Eleventh Amendment immunity has a jurisdictional effect; it deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to hear a suit against a state. See Warnock v. Pecos County, Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 342 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Stokes v. Scott, 2000 WL 343185, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2000) (dismissing claim for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) as barred by the Eleventh Amendment). This immunity extends to suits for monetary damages against state officials in their official capacity. See Buckhannon Ed. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 609 n. 10 (2001) ("Only States and state officers acting in their official capacity are immune from suits for damages in federal court."). There is, however, an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity that was created by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which permits suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials for violations of federal or Constitutional law. Because Eleventh Amendment immunity has a different effect on Chalmers' requests for monetary damages or injunctive and declaratory relief, the Court addresses them separately.
1. Monetary Relief
Chalmers claims that he should recover money damages because Defendants allegedly sent him a letter regarding an allegation of scholastic dishonesty in violation of UTA's rules and regulations. (Compl. at 3-4.) Defendants argue that monetary damages are barred because the alleged violations were official state actions, and money damages for such actions are prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. (Mot. at 5.)
Eleventh Amendment immunity bars a § 1983 case against a state official in his official capacity for the recovery of monetary damages. Rogers v. Morales, 975 F. Supp. 856, 857 (N.D. Tex. 1997) ("The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution grants to the states the bar to a Civil Rights case when the lawsuit is brought against a state agency, or a state official in his official capacity for the recovery of monetary damages"). Consequently, Chalmers' request for monetary damages is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See id.; see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100.
2. Equitable Relief
Chalmers requests an "injuction [sic] (permenant) [sic] ordering defendant to correct actions," and "declaratory judegement [sic] on this issue." (Compl. at 4.) Defendants move for dismissal of these claims on grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity. (Mot. at 6.)
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims for prospective equitable relief based on alleged unconstitutional actions of state officials. See Aguilar v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123(1908)); see also Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing equitable relief under Eleventh Amendment). "In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a 'straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.'" Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quoting Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997)).
The Court has conducted a "straightforward inquiry into whether" Chalmers' Complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective. Throughout this inquiry, the Court was mindful of the general rule that allegations in a pro se complaint are construed more permissively. See Bannister, 2003 WL 21145739, at * 1. Chalmers requests equitable relief to allow him to attend UTA's May 10, 2003 graduation ceremony. The fact that Chalmers filed the Complaint in this action on May 23, 2003, thirteen days after the date for graduation, shows that Chalmers cannot receive equitable relief that would allow him to attend the May 10, 2003 graduation. Thus, Chalmers' request for equitable relief is not prospective, unless there are continuing, present adverse effects: "Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)). To obtain equitable relief for past wrongs, a plaintiff must demonstrate either continuing harm or a real and immediate threat of repeated injury in the future. Bauer v. Texas, 2003 WL 21752811, at *4 (5th Cir. July 30, 2003). The threat of future harm must be immediate and real. See Hill v. City of Houston, Tex., 764 F.2d 1156, 1161 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that "a plaintiff who 'repeatedly and steadfastly' asserted that he would continue to act in such a manner as to subject himself to future arrests" stated an immediate and real threat of harm allowing him to challenge to the criminal statute under which he would be arrested.").
Chalmers fails to allege any continuing, present adverse effects from Defendants' actions, Davis, 440 U.S. at 631, such as an ongoing refusal to allow him attend a future graduation. He only requests that he be allowed to attend the May 10, 2003 graduation ceremony. The Court cannot grant retrospective equitable relief in light of Texas's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998) ("Because respondent alleges only past infractions of EPCRA, and not a continuing violation or the likelihood of a future violation, injunctive relief will not redress its injury."). Thus, Chalmers' requests for equitable relief should be also dismissed. See Schmidt, 1999 WL 767448, at *1-2.
Because the Court finds that Chalmers' claims for equitable relief are not prospective in nature, the Court need not determine if Chalmers has alleged a violation of federal law by not being allowed to attend the May 10, 2003 graduation ceremony.
D. Dismissal Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)
Although Defendants move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), once a court finds that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies, the barred claims "can be dismissed only under Rule 12(b)(1) and not with prejudice." Warnock, 88 F.3d at 343; (remanding grant of summary judgment because "the proper course of action for the district court would have been to treat the motion for summary judgment on the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue as a motion for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."); see also United States v. Texas Tech University, 171 F.3d 279, 286 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1999) ("While the Supreme Court has left this question open, our court has repeatedly referred to the Eleventh Amendment's restriction in terms of subject matter jurisdiction."). Under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), the Court may sua sponte determine if it has subject matter jurisdiction and dismiss a claim for lack thereof. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), cited in Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1999) (raising the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte in the context of Eleventh Amendment immunity). Because Chalmers' claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; thus, his claims should be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See Warnock, 88 F.3d at 343; see also Texas Tech, 171 F.3d at 286 n. 9.
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Complaint In Forma Pauperis, and in the Alternative for More Definite Statement should be GRANTED and that Chalmers' Complaint be DISMISSED, without prejudice.
The Court has denied all of Chalmers' grounds for relief. Thus, the Court does not consider Defendants' alternative motions for dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 8 or for an order under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e) requiring Chalmers to provide a more definite statement of his claims. (Mot. at 3-4.)
SO RECOMMENDED
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of these findings and recommendation on all parties by mailing a copy to each of them. Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to these findings and recommendation must file and serve written objections within ten (10) days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendation to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusory or general objections. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendation within ten days after being served with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings, legal conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).