Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0069-12T4
11-04-2013
CHAI CENTER FOR LIVING JUDAISM, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TOWNSHIP OF MILLBURN, Defendant-Appellant.
Nowell Amoroso Klein Bierman, P.A., attorneys for appellant (John R. Lloyd and Anthony Marchese, of counsel and on the brief). Blau & Blau, attorneys for respondent (Robert D. Blau, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Reisner and Carroll.
On appeal from Tax Court of New Jersey, Docket Nos. 008543-2010, 007005-2011.
Nowell Amoroso Klein Bierman, P.A., attorneys for appellant (John R. Lloyd and Anthony Marchese, of counsel and on the brief).
Blau & Blau, attorneys for respondent (Robert D. Blau, on the brief). PER CURIAM
In this appeal, defendant Township of Millburn appeals from a July 19, 2012 order of the Tax Court, granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Chai Center for Living Judaism (the Center). The Tax Court granted the Center a property tax exemption for the tax years 2010 and 2011 pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6. That provision allows an exemption for property which is owned by a corporation "organized exclusively for religious purposes," N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, and used exclusively for the organization's non-profit religious and charitable purposes (the "religious-purpose" exemption). See Hunterdon Med. Ctr v. Twp. of Readington, 195 N.J. 549, 561 (2008). We affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Mala Narayanan, in her written opinion dated July 19, 2012.
The Center applied for a parsonage exemption for tax year 2010. See N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6 (granting an exemption for "the buildings, not exceeding two, actually occupied as a parsonage by the officiating clergymen of any religious corporation of this State, . . ."); Mesivta Ohr Torah of Lakewood v. Twp. of Lakewood, 24 N.J. Tax 314, 329 (2008). The parsonage exemption is derivative of the religious-purpose exemption. Mesivta, supra, 24 N.J. Tax at 329. The Center applied for a 2011 exemption based on the property's uses as a parsonage and for prayer services. The Township denied each application without giving any reasons for the denial. The Center appealed to the Tax Court. Noting the Township's failure to state reasons for the denials, the Tax Court judge permitted the Center to assert a religious-purpose exemption, rather than a parsonage exemption, for both tax years. She found the undisputed material facts entitled the Center to the religious-purpose exemption.
Because Judge Narayanan's decision is so thorough, and because the Township's appellate arguments are clearly without merit, this appeal requires little discussion. The history of the litigation and the undisputed facts are set forth at length in Judge Narayanan's opinion and need not be repeated here in detail. Briefly, the tax appeal is related to an ongoing zoning dispute over the use of the property -- a three-story house in Millburn -- as a synagogue.
The Center's rabbi previously owned the property, and in the zoning lawsuit he claimed that he was using it as his principal residence, although religious services were also held there. Whether he, in fact, previously resided in the house is irrelevant to this tax appeal. In 2009, after that zoning litigation was settled, the rabbi deeded the property to the Center. Thereafter, the Center and the Township became involved in additional zoning litigation, because houses of worship are only a conditionally permitted use in the zone.
In the tax appeal, the rabbi attested that he slept at the premises on Friday nights after conducting Sabbath services, and on major Jewish holidays, because automobile travel on those days would violate the tenets of his religion. However, on the record before the Tax Court, there was absolutely no factual dispute that the Center was a non-profit religious corporation and that the property was being used as a synagogue.
On an appeal from a summary judgment motion, we review the record de novo, employing the same legal standard used by the trial court. W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229, 237-38 (2012). Like the trial court, we decide whether there are material facts in dispute and, if not, whether the undisputed facts, viewed most favorably to the non-moving party, nonetheless entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Ibid.; Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). Having reviewed the record using that legal standard, we find no error in the Tax Court's decision to grant summary judgment. The Township's appellate arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion here, beyond the following comment. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
A religious organization's entitlement to a tax exemption for its house of worship does not depend on whether the property is being used in a manner that complies with the local zoning ordinance. See Soc'y of the Holy Child Jesus v. City of Summit, 418 N.J. Super. 365, 386 (App. Div. 2011). "[I]f the taxpayer complies with the requirements of the Statute [N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6], it is entitled to the exemption from real property taxes even if the use of the property does not comply with the municipal zoning ordinance." Id. at 368. Consequently, the Tax Court was not the proper forum in which to pursue the Township's continuing zoning dispute with the Center. On the undisputed factual record, the Center was entitled to a religious-purpose tax exemption under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION