Opinion
No. 61271-9-I.
January 20, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 06-2-09158-1, Ronald L. Castleberry, J., entered January 30, 2008.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Center Mobil Home Park filed this unlawful detainer action alleging that it had served Mary Morgan with three notices to comply with alleged rule violations during a 12-month period. After initially ruling in favor of Morgan, the trial court found that she had failed to comply with a court order to pay rent into the court registry and entered a writ of restitution in favor of the mobile home park. Because the record fails to support the court's imposition of a punitive contempt sanction, we reverse the writ of restitution and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
Starting in about 1999, Mary Morgan rented lot space 43 for her mobile home in the Center Mobile Home Park in Lynnwood (Center). Among other things, Center's rules and regulations allowed only vehicles that were currently licensed and in running condition and permitted parking only in driveways and other designated areas. The rules also authorized a $35 administrative fee for serving notice of rules violations.
Between March and May 2006, Center delivered to Morgan three notices to comply or vacate, alleging that she had repeatedly violated the rental agreement and Center regulations by keeping an unlicensed and inoperable car, failing to comply with parking regulations, and failing to pay the administrative fees for violation notices. The notices specified that under RCW 59.20.080(1)(h), the issuance of three notices within a 12-month period could result in the termination of Morgan's tenancy.
RCW 59.20.080(1)(h) permits a landlord to terminate a tenancy if "the landlord serves a tenant three fifteen-day notices within a twelve-month period to comply or vacate for failure to comply with the material terms of the rental agreement or park rules."
On June 3, 2006, Center notified Morgan that her tenancy had been terminated for failure to comply with the rules on three or more occasions during the past 12 months. On June 16, 2006, Center filed an unlawful detainer action, alleging that the court should terminate Morgan's tenancy under RCW 59.20.080(1)(h).
Following an August 15, 2006 hearing, a commissioner ordered entry of a writ of restitution. The superior court reversed the commissioner on revision and eventually scheduled trial for February 2, 2007.
When Morgan failed to appear on the scheduled trial date, the court entered the first of a series of continuances resulting primarily from Morgan's medical condition. As part of the order continuing the initial trial date, the trial court directed Morgan to pay all back and current rent through February 28, 2007, into the court registry. The court advised Morgan's counsel that it would enter a writ of restitution if Morgan did not make the payment within one week. In compliance with the court order, Morgan paid $3,900 into the court registry on February 9, 2007. Morgan paid an additional $1,540 on June 27, 2007.
Following trial on July 19, 2007, the court ruled in Morgan's favor, concluding that because Morgan had cured the violations, "curative language" in Center's notices to comply precluded termination of Morgan's tenancy under RCW 59.20.080(1)(h).
Center moved for reconsideration, arguing (1) that RCW 59.20.080(1)(h) authorized termination based solely on the service of three notices to comply, regardless of whether the tenant ultimately cured the violations; (2) the rental agreement permitted Center to terminate Morgan's tenancy based solely on her repeated violations of rules and regulations; and (3) that Morgan had failed to pay $1,105 in rent into the court registry, in violation of the court's order.
On November 30, 2007, the trial court granted Center's motion for reconsideration and entered a writ of restitution based on Morgan's failure to comply with the court order requiring payment of rent into the court registry. The court did not address Center's remaining arguments.
ANALYSIS
Morgan contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a writ of restitution because Center did not allege nonpayment of rent in its complaint and did not, in any event, comply with RCW 59.20.080(1)(b), the statutory requirements governing unlawful detainer based on nonpayment of rent. But the trial court in this case did not enter the writ of restitution based on Center's compliance with the unlawful detainer statute. Rather, the court found that Morgan had failed to comply with a court order and entered the writ as a sanction for contempt. Under the circumstances, the record does not support the trial court's decision.
Contempt of court includes the intentional disobedience of a court order. See RCW 7.21.010(1)(b); In re Pers. Restraint of King, 110 Wn.2d 793, 797, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988). The trial court has both statutory and inherent power to sanction a party's contemptuous behavior, and "[w]hether contempt is warranted in a particular case is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court." Id. at 798. But the court's authority to impose sanctions for contempt is a question of law that we review de novo. In re Dependency of A.K., 162 Wn.2d 632, 644, 174 P.3d 11 (2007); see also In re Marriage of Nielsen, 38 Wn. App. 586, 588, 687 P.2d 877 (1984).
Center contends that the trial court properly relied on its inherent power to sanction contempt. But the trial court may utilize its inherent power to sanction contempt "only if there is no applicable contempt statute or it makes a specific finding that statutory remedies are inadequate." In re Marriage of Farr, 87 Wn. App. 177, 187, 940 P.2d 679 (1997); see also Dependency of A.K., 162 Wn.2d at 647. The trial court in this case did not identify a specific statutory basis for its decision, and Center does not suggest any. Nor did the court make a finding that statutory remedies were inadequate. The record therefore does not support the court's exercise of its inherent power.
In addition, the record fails to provide adequate factual support for the trial court's contempt finding. The court found that Morgan "did not comply with the ongoing rent to be paid timely into the registry of the court." But the trial court did not find that Morgan had intentionally disobeyed the court order or make any findings about the circumstances surrounding her failure to pay the last three months rent into the court registry.
Nor does the record on appeal indicate precisely how Morgan was notified of the potential contempt sanction. At the time of the initial trial continuance in February 2007, the trial court apparently advised Morgan's counsel that the failure to pay all back and current rent into the court registry by February 9, 2007, would result in the entry of a writ of restitution. But Morgan fully complied with that order and made a second payment several months later. In its motion for reconsideration, Center advised the court only that Morgan had not paid the last three months rent into the court registry. Where, as here, the contemptuous behavior occurs outside the presence of the court, "due process requires that the offender be given notice, a reasonable time to prepare a defense, and a hearing." Nielsen, 38 Wn. App. at 589. The record does not establish that these requirements were met.
The sanction in this case was particularly harsh. After finding in favor of Morgan in the unlawful detainer action, the trial court essentially vacated that decision and entered judgment in favor of Center. The court did not provide Morgan with an opportunity to purge the contempt, rendering the sanction primarily punitive in nature. See State v. Heiner, 29 Wn. App. 193, 197, 627 P.2d 983 (1981); see also RCW 7. 21.010(2) (defining "punitive sanction" as "a sanction imposed to punish a past contempt of court for the purpose of upholding the authority of the court"). Nor did the court follow the procedures specified for punitive contempt sanctions in RCW 7.21.040.
Center contends that this court should affirm the writ of restitution on alternative grounds, relying primarily on the legal arguments that it raised in its motion for reconsideration. In particular, Center maintains that the trial court's finding that Morgan cured the violations is legally irrelevant because the plain language of RCW 59.20.080(1)(h) permits the landlord to terminate a tenancy based solely on the service of three notices to comply, regardless of whether the tenant ultimately cures the violation.
But the trial court's decision rested not only on the fact that Morgan cured the violations, but also on the presence of specific "curative language" in Center's notices. Because Center does not address or even challenge this determination, we decline to affirm the writ of restitution on the proposed alternative grounds.
In summary, the record on appeal does not provide an adequate legal or factual basis for the imposition of a punitive contempt sanction. The trial court therefore abused its discretion in entering the writ of restitution. We reverse the writ of restitution and remand for further proceedings. Because Morgan failed to comply with RAP 18.1(b), she is not entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. See Wilson Court, Ltd. v. Tony Maroni's, Inc., 134 Wn.2d 692, 710 n. 4, 952 P.2d 590 (1998).
Reversed and remanded.