Summary
listing after suit was filed rendered case moot
Summary of this case from Biodiversity Legal Foundation v. BadgleyOpinion
No. C 99-3994 SBA.
November 27, 2000
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. [Doc #23-1] The parties have waived oral argument by stipulation, and the Court entered an Order of waiver on October 23, 2000. Having read and considered all the papers submitted by the parties, having considered the arguments advanced by the parties and being fully informed, the Court DENIES plaintiffs' Motion.
BACKGROUND
A. Facts
On or about April 30, 1997, Grey Hayes petitioned the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service") to emergency list the Ohlone tiger beetle as an endangered species. Dr. Hayes, a scientist at the University of California Santa Cruz and member of plaintiffs' organizations, explained that the Ohlone tiger beetle was a rare and imperiled insect inhabiting only a few acres in the Santa Cruz Mountains. Around August 1997, the Service initiated the listing process, which continued over two years. In late 1999 or early 2000, the Service listed the Ohlone tiger beetle as an endangered species. Defendants assert that the entire process endured for so long solely due to budget and staffing constraints. (Frazer Declaration in Support of Defendants' Opposition ¶ 2).
B. Procedural History
Frustrated by the prolonged process, on February 16, 1999, plaintiffs sent defendants notice of their intent to sue to force compliance with the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), 16 U.S.C. § 1533. On May 5, 1999, plaintiffs reiterated their intention. After receiving no response to either communication, plaintiffs filed suit in this Court on August 29, 1999.
After the Service listed the beetle, the parties stipulated to a dismissal of plaintiffs' claims as moot, and the Court entered an Order of Dismissal on March 14, 2000. On July 7, 2000, plaintiffs filed the present Motion claiming that, as prevailing parties to the litigation, they were entitled to attorney fees and costs.
ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
The ESA provides that a district court "may award costs of litigation . . . to any party, whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate." 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4). In deciding whether an attorney fee is appropriate, the court initially must consider whether the moving party is a prevailing party. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). A party need not obtain formal relief after frill litigation but, rather, may be considered to have prevailed when his or her rights are vindicated through a settlement, a stipulation to dismiss or a consent judgment; or if the suit has prompted the opposing party to take action to satisfy the demands. Sablan v. Dept. of Fin, of the Northern Marina Islands, 856 F.2d 1317, 1324 (9th Cir. 1988).
B. Application
In Sablan, the Ninth Circuit established that, in order to be "prevailing," the moving party must demonstrate a "clear, causal relationship between the litigation brought and the practical outcome realized"; put differently, the party must show that the lawsuit was a "catalyst that prompted the opposing party to take action." Sablan, 856 F.2d at 1324-25. In Sablan, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of attorney fees to a civil rights plaintiff. The district court had concluded that defendants adopted a policy of not terminating electric utility service without a hearing and notice only after plaintiff filed suit to force defendants to adopt such a policy. In affirming, the Ninth Circuit recognized that, "[w]hether a litigant has shown a sufficient causal relationship between the lawsuit and the practical outcome realized is a pragmatic factual inquiry for the district court." Id. 856 F.2d at 1325 (quoting Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 987, 989-90 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Here, the Court has conducted a pragmatic factual inquiry and finds that plaintiffs have not established a clear, causal relationship between their lawsuit and the listing of the Ohlone tiger beetle. The Service initiated the listing process two years before plaintiffs filed suit. Even after suit was filed, it took another seven months before the parties succeeded in dismissing the action. Moreover, Assistant Director Frazer declared under penalty of perjury that the entire process was guided solely by budgetary and staffing concerns. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence to discredit Frazer and only offer speculation that the suit "caused" the desired outcome. The Court finds that plaintiffs' lawsuit was not a catalyst to the listing of the Ohlone tiger beetle. Thus, they are not "prevailing parties" and are not entitled to attorney fees and costs.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs [Doc #23-1] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.