Opinion
G050312
05-03-2017
DANNY CAVIC et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. THE MOLLOY LAW FIRM et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Danny Cavic, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Glen Broemer for Plaintiff and Appellant Nevada Atlantic Corporation. Thompson Coe & O'Meara, Stephen M. Caine, Frances M. O'Meara and Jenny L. Burke for Defendants and Respondents The Molloy Law Firm, P.C., Caroline Ann Conway Molloy and Lee Eugene Burrows. Lester & Cantrell, Mark S. Lester, David Cantrell and Matthew J. Kraus for Defendant and Respondent Michael Frederick Obrand. Manning & Kass Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, Fredric W. Trester, Steven J. Renick and Victor Rocha for Defendants and Respondents Richard Squar and Glenn M. Gelman & Associates.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2013-00654125) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Ronald L. Bauer, Judge. Affirmed. Danny Cavic, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Glen Broemer for Plaintiff and Appellant Nevada Atlantic Corporation. Thompson Coe & O'Meara, Stephen M. Caine, Frances M. O'Meara and Jenny L. Burke for Defendants and Respondents The Molloy Law Firm, P.C., Caroline Ann Conway Molloy and Lee Eugene Burrows. Lester & Cantrell, Mark S. Lester, David Cantrell and Matthew J. Kraus for Defendant and Respondent Michael Frederick Obrand. Manning & Kass Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, Fredric W. Trester, Steven J. Renick and Victor Rocha for Defendants and Respondents Richard Squar and Glenn M. Gelman & Associates.
* * *
Danny Cavic and Nevada Atlantic Corporation (collectively, Cavic) appeal from a judgment of dismissal after Cavic failed to post the security required of vexatious litigants (Code Civ. Proc., § 391.1; all further statutory references are to this code unless noted) to pursue the malpractice claims he initiated on his own behalf and as Nevada Atlantic's sole shareholder against a host of former attorneys and accountants. Cavic contends the trial court erred in requiring security for several reasons, including that his appeal in a related case necessarily stayed this litigation, attorneys as a policy matter should not be able to contend a former client is a vexatious litigant, the trial court erroneously denied his belated disqualification motion, and other reasons we discuss below. As we explain, these contentions are without merit and we therefore affirm the judgment.
I
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This appeal (hereafter Cavic VII) is among at least seven appeals and two writ petitions spawned when a Newport Beach restaurant tenant in which Cavic obtained an interest, Nevada Atlantic, failed to gain permission from its lessor, WREC Lido Venture, LLC (WREC Lido), to assign the lease to a third party in 2007. Cavic and the tenant sued WREC Lido for failing to approve the assignment, but this court's 2008 opinion (Cavic I) explained that the "'sole discretion'" standard and similar express language in the lease provision's assignment clause invested WREC Lido with the "'absolute right to withhold its consent for any reason whatsoever or for no reason.'" (Nevada Atlantic Corporation v. WREC Lido Venture, LLC (Dec. 2, 2008, G039825) [nonpub. opn.] (Cavic I).)
Cavic and Nevada Atlantic had filed and dismissed a lawsuit (Lawsuit #2) while Cavic I was pending, and then filed a new lawsuit (Lawsuit #3 or lease-breach lawsuit) alleging WREC Lido breached the lease on various grounds, including failure to maintain and advertise the property. But after protracted proceedings in which Cavic fired as many as nine attorneys, the trial court granted a nonsuit as to the tenant Nevada Atlantic for failure to prove damages and as to Cavic because, as a Nevada Atlantic shareholder (even a sole shareholder), he nevertheless was not a party to the lease with WREC Lido. In a 2012 opinion (Cavic II), we upheld the judgment entered following the nonsuit, noting that on appeal Cavic and Nevada Atlantic did "not challenge the reasons the court gave" for granting the nonsuit, but instead argued the trial court "should have allowed a new theory of damages to be considered by the jury." (Italics added.) As we explained, however, "[G]iven their total failure to provide any legal citations or reasoned analysis on whether there was error in failing to reopen the case-in-chief or whether the error was prejudicial, . . . the issue [was] waived." (Cavic v. WREC Lido Venture LLC (Aug. 7, 2012, G045611) [nonpub. opn.] (Cavic II).)
Meanwhile, Cavic already had returned to court in propria persona to file a new lawsuit (Lawsuit #4) that included allegations against WREC Lido's trial attorney for interfering with Cavic's damages expert in the breach lawsuit, but the trial court granted the attorney's anti-SLAPP motion. On appeal (Cavic III), we upheld the dismissal because "the entirety of the evidence" showed only brief e-mail communications between the attorney, the expert, and Cavic's attorney that reflected no "'design[] to induce a breach'" in Cavic's contractual relation with his valuation expert. (Cavic v. Green (Nov. 26, 2012, G046772) [nonpub. opn.] (Cavic III).) To the contrary, the e-mails arose in the course of activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute (i.e., arranging the expert's deposition), and Cavic's conclusory allegation of something more sinister fell well short of his burden to show a probability of prevailing on the merits. (Ibid.)
A "SLAPP" action is a "strategic lawsuit against public participation." (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57.) --------
Undeterred by his lack of success in failing to resist the WREC Lido attorney's anti-SLAPP motion, Cavic proceeded in the trial court against the remaining defendants in Lawsuit #4 (the malpractice lawsuit). He asserted accounting and legal malpractice claims, respectively, against: (1) the same valuation expert from Lawsuit #1 and the anti-SLAPP proceeding (Richard Squar), (2) one of Cavic's attorneys in the lease-breach lawsuit (Allan Liang), and (3) a host of other accountants and lawyers who formerly represented him. But Cavic also had been attempting to relitigate the lease-breach lawsuit (i.e., Lawsuit #3) through motions under that case number to set aside the underlying nonsuit in that case, which led the trial court in that matter to enter an order identifying Cavic as a vexatious litigant. Prompted by this turn of events, some of the litigants in the malpractice lawsuit, including Liang, Squar, and Squar's accounting firm (Gelman & Associates), similarly filed motions in Lawsuit #4 to require Cavic to post security under the vexatious litigant statute (§ 391.1). The trial court in Lawsuit #4 granted the motions, dismissed the malpractice claims against those defendants when Cavic failed to post the security, and Cavic immediately appealed (Cavic IV).
In Cavic IV, we upheld the trial court's orders finding Cavic was a vexatious litigant, granting the respective parties' motions to require security because he had not established the requisite probability of prevailing against them in the malpractice lawsuit, and dismissing his claims against those parties when Cavic failed to post the security. (Cavic v. Glenn M. Gelman & Associates (Nov. 26, 2014, G048510) [nonpub. opn.] (Cavic IV).)
Cavic's attempt to set aside the nonsuit in the earlier, underlying lease-breach case (Lawsuit #3) similarly devolved into disputes over the trial court's vexatious litigant finding in that matter. Cavic did not appeal the trial court's vexatious litigant ruling in that case, but instead later filed multiple motions to set aside the order, which the court denied, and Cavic appealed (Cavic V). As we observed in Cavic V, "[t]o vacate the [vexatious litigant] order after the time to appeal has passed, Cavic was required to show a material change of fact [and] that the ends of justice would be served by vacating the order," but we "found no sign" of either. (Cavic v. WREC Lido Venture, LLC (Jan. 15, 2016, G050967) [nonpub. opn.] (Cavic V).) A material change requires evidence the vexatious litigant has "'"mended his ways,"'" but Cavic continued to "ignore[] all but the evidence favorable to his theory," painting "an incomplete and self-serving picture of what transpired in his multiple lawsuits and motions." (Ibid.) Nor would justice be served where Cavic did not address the criteria for a successful motion to vacate, but instead "challenge[d] only the validity of the . . . order itself" and "simply reargue[d] the merits of his long ago dismissed legal actions." (Ibid.)
Returning the reader's attention briefly to Cavic IV, that appeal involved only the dismissal of the malpractice defendants who at that time had obtained an order requiring security based on Cavic's failure to show the requisite probability he would prevail against them, and Cavic's failure to post security as to those defendants. After our remittitur issued in Cavic IV, the malpractice lawsuit proceeded as to the remaining defendants named in that action, leading to five orders and entry of judgment that Cavic then appealed (Cavic VI). On appeal in Cavic VI, Cavic did not identify any errors in the underlying five orders he appealed or the entry of judgment, but instead utilized the appeal as a public call to Orange County voters to eliminate the alleged judicial corruption to which he attributed his litigation failures. (Cavic v. Schreiber (Apr. 3, 2017, G052681,) [nonpub. opn.] (Cavic VI).)
Here, Cavic VII now arises because during the pendency of Cavic's three separate appeals from Lawsuit #4 (i.e., Cavic III involving dismissal of defendant Green under the anti-SLAPP statute; Cavic IV involving the later dismissal of defendants Squar, Gelman, and Liang for Cavic's failure to post security, and similarly Cavic VI involving the subsequent dismissal of all remaining defendants in Lawsuit #4 for Cavic's failure to post security), Cavic filed a new lawsuit (Lawsuit #5).
Cavic admits that his claims in this lawsuit and the earlier Lawsuit #4 are "essentially the same." He justifies filing this new lawsuit while Lawsuit #4 was pending on appeal as "a 'better safe than sorry'" measure "in the event the court in the related case [i.e., Lawsuit #4] denied a [potential but unfiled] motion to amend [to] add[] parties and causes of action as untimely." Cavic acknowledges this lawsuit and Lawsuit #4 were based on the "Same Allegations," "Same Set of Facts," and "Same Legal Issues." He simply added a multitude of related claims and new defendants, now totaling more than 40 defendants, all of whom were attorneys, accountants, or law or accounting firms that formerly represented him at some stage in these various proceedings.
Like their predecessors before them, the defendants in Lawsuit #5 similarly sought and obtained Cavic's designation as a vexatious litigant, an order requiring him to post security and, when he failed to do so, dismissal of his claims against them. Cavic now appeals from those dismissals in Lawsuit #5.
II
DISCUSSION
Cavic challenges on several grounds the trial court's order requiring that he post security as a vexatious litigant, including that the court failed to provide a statement of decision for its ruling. Section 391.1 requires a party to post security in the amount of the defendant's anticipated litigation costs where "the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and . . . there is not a reasonable probability that he or she will prevail in the litigation against the moving defendant." As other courts have observed, "'The vexatious litigant statutes were enacted to require a person found a vexatious litigant to put up security for the reasonable expenses of a defendant who becomes the target of one of these obsessive and persistent litigants whose conduct can cause serious financial results to the unfortunate object of his attack.'" (Camerado Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 838, 842 (Camerado).)
Cavic complains that in the absence of a statement of decision he faces "the absurd burden of looking at all theories and facts that might support the lower court's decision." Cavic, however, points to nowhere in the record where he requested a statement of decision and there is no requirement that the trial court sua sponte provide one. To the contrary, "written findings of fact and conclusions of law shall not be required" absent a timely request, nor in any event are written findings necessary for pretrial matters or trial proceedings concluding in less than a day (§ 632.) Consequently, it has long been the rule that where "neither side requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, we must assume that the court found all the facts necessary to support the judgment." (Dairyman's Cooperative Creamery Assn. v. Leipold (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 184, 188-189; accord, Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58 [doctrine of implied findings].) Cavic's claim of error premised solely on the absence of a statement of decision therefore fails.
Next, Cavic objects that the security requirement should not apply to a person who has been designated as a vexatious litigant but later obtains counsel, as here. We observed in Cavic IV, however, that "established law squarely rejects Cavic's claim." (Cavic v. Gelman, supra, slip opn. at p. 7.) As the Camerado court explained, the vexatious litigant statute applies "to persons currently represented by counsel whose conduct was vexatious when they represented themselves in the past." (Camerado, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 842.) The trial court reasonably could conclude Cavic fell within this definition of a vexatious litigant under section 391, subdivision (b)(4).
That section applies when the person "[h]as previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by any state or federal court of record in any action or proceeding based upon the same or substantially similar facts, transaction, or occurrence." (§ 391, subd. (b)(4).) As noted, a trial court's order to furnish security turns not only on whether "the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant," but also requires that the court determine "there is not a reasonable probability that he or she will prevail in the litigation." (§ 391.1.) Obtaining counsel presumably will help the plaintiff avoid the latter determination if there is merit in his or her claims. But because Cavic had been declared a vexatious litigant in Lawsuits #3 and #4, the mere fact he later obtained counsel did not prevent the court from considering whether a bond was appropriate. To hold otherwise would, as Camerado aptly observed, "permit a vexatious litigant to avoid the protection afforded potential targets simply by obtaining counsel." (Camerado, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 842.)
Cavic also claims without any citation to authority that as "a policy matter" attorneys and law firms "should be prohibited from claiming" in a malpractice suit that a former client is a vexatious litigant. But the Legislature provided no such limitation in enacting protection against vexatious litigants, defining an eligible defendant as any "person (including [a] corporation, association, partnership and firm or governmental entity) against whom a litigation is brought or maintained or sought to be brought or maintained." (§ 391, subd. (e).)
The flaw in Cavic's argument is that he continues to assume he bears no responsibility for his designation as a vexatious litigant in Lawsuits #3 and #4, which led to the similar finding in this case because he "[had] been previously declared to be a vexatious litigant." (§ 391, subd. (b)(4).) Cavic asserts he was "judged a vexatious litigant despite the fact that he never represented himself in the prior actions" (original italics).
A simple review of our prior opinions shows that claim is patently false. To the contrary, Cavic represented himself in Lawsuit #3 in the interim periods between when he fired one attorney, continued to prosecute the action, and hired the next, and similarly when he made repeated attacks on the judgment and unsuccessful attempts to set aside the vexatious litigant finding in that case. The vexatious litigant statutes apply to "any civil action or proceeding . . . commenced [or] maintained . . . in any state or federal court." (§ 391, subd. (a), italics added.) Moreover, Cavic proceeded in propria persona when he filed his malpractice causes of action in Lawsuit #4. There, the trial court found he was a vexatious litigant and that he failed to establish the requisite likelihood of success in proving malpractice. For instance, Cavic had alleged that his attorneys should have found a novel way to avoid — or should have recommended malpractice against prior attorneys for failing to avoid — the clear terms of the anti-assignment lease provision in Cavic I. He seeks in this case to transmute his same basic malpractice claims in Lawsuit #4 into a new lawsuit under a new case number.
But the trial court reasonably could reject as unfounded Cavic's attempt to lay the blame for his designation as a vexatious litigant in Lawsuits #3 and #4 on the actions of his attorneys, rather than on his own conduct in instituting or maintaining those actions. Consequently, there is no basis for his policy claim that his vexatious litigant designation improperly insulated the defendants from legitimate malpractice claims. As our Supreme Court has explained, "The grant of a section 391.1 motion does not preclude a trial; it merely requires a plaintiff to post security." (Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 786 (Moran).)
Cavic next claims the trial court misapprehended the reasonable probability standard in determining he did not have a reasonable probability of prevailing on his malpractice claims. Section 391.2 provides that at the hearing on a motion to require security, "the court shall consider any evidence, written or oral, by witnesses or affidavit, as may be material to the ground for the motion." (Italics added.) "If, after hearing the evidence upon the motion, the court determines that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and that there is no reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail," the court shall require security. (§ 391.3, italics added.) As Moran explained, this language directing the trial court to hear, consider, and make a determination on the evidence presented vests the court with an "evaluative function" and authority to "weigh the evidence" in reaching its own conclusion whether there is a reasonable probability the litigant will prevail on his or her claims. (Moran, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 786.)
Without any record citation, Cavic suggests the trial court erred by equating the "reasonable probability" standard with a mere "probability" that the plaintiff will prevail. Again without any record citation, Cavic then further suggests that this amounted to "essentially requiring a plaintiff to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence whenever a vexatious litigant motion is brought." Without citing authority or any attempt at reasoned argument, Cavic then simply asserts, "This cannot be correct." This point is forfeited for the simple reason that "conclusory claims of error will fail." (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) "We are not bound to develop appellants' arguments for them" (In re Marriage of Falcone (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830); rather he or she "must affirmatively demonstrate error through reasoned argument, citation to the appellate record, and discussion of legal authority." (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655, 685.)
In any event, Cavic's claim is wholly without merit. The fine distinction he attempts to draw between a "reasonable probability" and a "probability" of prevailing is unavailing. Because as Sir Edward Coke observed, "Reason is the life of the law," certainly a "reasonable" chance at prevailing is implied in a "probability" of prevailing. If that were not the case, moreover, a standard allowing for an unreasonable probability of success, or even a bare probability of success, would only inure to Cavic's benefit, so we fail to grasp his claim. Additionally, without explanation, it appears Cavic somehow deduces the preponderance of the evidence standard from use of the word "probability," but they are not synonymous. The "reasonable probability" implicit in the requisite probability of prevailing "does not mean more likely than not," but rather "a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility. [Citations.]" (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715.)
At bottom, the standard on a vexatious litigant motion reduces to the sound discretion vested in the trial court. "A court exercises its discretion in determining whether a person is a vexatious litigant. [Citation.] We uphold the court's ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] On appeal, we presume the order declaring a vexatious litigant is correct and imply findings necessary to support the judgment." (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 219.) "Likewise, a court's decision that a vexatious litigant does not have a reasonable chance of success in the action is based on an evaluative judgment in which the court weighs the evidence." (Golin v. Allenby (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 616, 636.) We must presume the court knew and understood the matter was committed to its discretion (Evid. Code, § 664; see, e.g., People v. Sangani (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1138), and it is the appellant's burden to demonstrate error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566 (Denham).) As we explain, Cavic fails to meet his burden in challenging the trial court's conclusion he lacked a reasonable probability of prevailing on his claims against any of the defendants.
Cavic fails to meet his burden on appeal to demonstrate error for the simple reason that he does not state in his appellate brief his particular claims of malpractice or liability against the vast majority of the defendants he sued. Accordingly, it is impossible to meaningfully evaluate whether he had any reasonable probability of prevailing against those defendants. "Issues do not have a life of their own" (Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99), but instead must be spelled out clearly. A court has no obligation to decipher a party's vague or merely hinted claims, nor to construct a cogent narrative as substitute counsel for the appellant, nor to scour the record for a potential theory for reversal, nor to develop or provide analysis or independently research issues on the appellant's behalf. The standard of review is entirely to the contrary. (Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 566.)
Indeed, compounding his error, of the six individual defendants Cavic does identify by name and briefly discuss in the cursory "Evidence of Malpractice" portion of his appellate opening brief, he already had named all six of those individuals as defendants in Lawsuit #4. Those defendants are: Jerome Stark, Gary Schreiber, Allan Liang, Richard Squar, Todd Green, and Bradford Calvin. Under the doctrine of implied findings, it was well within the trial court's discretion to conclude Cavic had no reasonable probability of prevailing against those defendants in this lawsuit based on the fundamental bar against claim splitting.
Simply put, "an entire claim cannot be divided and made the basis of several suits." (Phillips v. Western Pac. R.R. Co. (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 441, 444 (Phillips).) "The rule against splitting has been set forth in numerous cases" (ibid.), and here it is particularly apt because Cavic acknowledges this lawsuit and Lawsuit #4 were based on the "Same Allegations," "Same Set of Facts," and "Same Legal Issues." This is the very essence of claim splitting into separate lawsuits. "The California Supreme Court has held that the rule against splitting is based on two principles . . . . : (1) The defendant should be protected against vexatious litigation; and (2) it is against public policy to permit litigants to consume the time of the courts by relitigating matters already judicially determined, or by asserting claims which properly should have been settled in some prior action." (Ibid.)
Lawsuit #4 had not been finally determined at the time Cavic filed this lawsuit. Indeed, as noted in the procedural history above, Lawsuit #4 spawned three separate appeals: Cavic III regarding the trial court's dismissal under the anti-SLAPP statute of Cavic's claims against defendant Green; Cavic IV involving the court's dismissal of Cavic's claims against Squar, Gelman, and Liang for failure to post the requisite vexatious litigant security as to those defendants; and Cavic VI involving the trial court's dismissal of Cavic's claims against Stark and all the remaining defendants for Cavic's failure to post security. Relying on the general stay under section 916 of trial court proceedings during the pendency of an appeal, Cavic argues that his appeals in Lawsuit #4 should have precluded the trial court in this case from ruling on the defendant's vexatious litigant motions and then dismissing this lawsuit (i.e., Lawsuit #5) when he failed to post security.
The claim borders on the frivolous. It would turn the bar against claim splitting on its head and allow a vexatious litigant to propagate a Hydra's head of harassing and duplicative new lawsuits upon each appeal of an earlier suit. Cavic admits in his brief that his claims in this lawsuit and the earlier Lawsuit #4 are "essentially the same." He justifies filing this new lawsuit while Lawsuit #4 was pending on appeal as "a 'better safe than sorry'" measure "in the event the court in the related case [i.e., Lawsuit #4] denied a [potential but unfiled] motion to amend [to] add[] parties and causes of action as untimely."
But this is precisely the rationale for precluding claim splitting: to avoid subjecting defendants to vexatious litigation of claims properly belonging in a prior action. (Phillips, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d at p. 444.) It is also the rationale for the vexatious litigant statutes. (Camerado, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 842.) The stay authorized under section 916 has no application here; it is a shield to safeguard the appellate court's jurisdiction during the pendency of an appeal (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180), not a sword for a vexatious litigant to multiply his claims in a new lawsuit. Because Cavic fails to meet his burden to establish the trial court erred in finding he had no reasonable probability of success on his claims in this lawsuit, his appellate challenge is without merit.
Cavic's claim the trial court erred in denying his disqualification motion (§ 170.6) is similarly without merit. Cavic actually filed the motion three times, first on the day after the initial hearing on the defendants' motion for security, and twice more within the next 10 days. The trial court denied the motion each time, noting it was untimely, and in third instance observed, "It is perhaps evidence of a warped sense of humor that this court sees irony in the filing by the plaintiff, who has been declared a vexatious litigant, of three similar unsuccessful peremptory challenges within the space of ten days. (The third is now denied.)"
Cavic does not dispute that his motions were untimely in this case. (See § 170.6, subd. (a)(2) [motion must be filed 5 days before hearing].) But he seizes on the fact that he disqualified the same trial judge during pretrial proceedings in Lawsuit #1, his original action against WREC Lido in 2007 for failing to approve Nevada Atlantic's lease assignment. That, however, was a different action under a different case number involving different causes of action. A party may disqualify a judge in one action, and acquiesce to the judge hearing another matter, even if the two cases involve closely related issues. (Nissan Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 150, 155.) Collateral estoppel does not apply to judicial disqualification in a later separate action or proceeding. (Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 190, fn. 6.) Failure to timely file a peremptory challenge forfeits the issue. (Briggs v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 312, 318.) Consequently, there is no merit in Cavic's challenge to the trial court's ruling denying his disqualification motion.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal.
ARONSON, J. WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. MOORE, J.