Summary
setting $50 per hour as the compensable rate for clerical work in an action to recovery attorneys' fees
Summary of this case from Turner v. Oxford Management Services, Inc.Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-509 Section "C" (2)
May 1, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiffs move the Court for an award of attorneys' fees and costs. Defendants, hereinafter referred to as the State, oppose Plaintiffs' motion. For the reasons explained herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs' motion and awards attorneys' fees and costs as specified below.
I. FACTS
The governor issued an executive order, MJF 99-5, and the State promulgated a regulation, HB 1925, and amended a statute, La. R.S. 40:5, all of which Plaintiffs argued could deny the full protection of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to medical facilities in which abortions are performed. Plaintiffs contended that the order, the regulation, and the amended statute authorized inspections of abortion clinics by State health officials without the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs moved this Court for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of the order, the regulation, and the amended statute. The Court partially granted Plaintiffs' requested relief and thereby enjoined the State from conducting the inspections ostensibly allowed under the various State mandates. See Rec. Doc. 24. Thereafter, the State and Plaintiffs reached a settlement resolving that any inspections of medical facilities performing abortions would comply with the full protections of the Fourth Amendment. The settlement, however, left open the issue of attorneys' fees and costs. The parties are now before the Court to resolve that open issue.
Plaintiffs challenged state action, i.e., the order, regulation, and statute, as unconstitutional under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, attorney's fees are available under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b), which provides in part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section . . . 1983 [and other various civil rights statutes], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . .
II. ANALYSIS
A. Prevailing Party
On any motion for attorney's fees in a civil rights case, a court must determine whether the moving party was the "prevailing party" in the suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b). The United States Supreme Court has held that "`[t]he touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.'" Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111, 113 S.Ct. 566, 573, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School District, 489 U.S. 782, 792-93, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1494, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989)).
In Farrar, the Supreme Court explained the concept of "prevailing party" as follows:
[T]o qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim. The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought, or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement. Whatever relief the plaintiff secures must directly benefit him at the time of the judgment or settlement. Otherwise, the judgment or settlement cannot be said to affect the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff. Only under these circumstances can civil rights litigation effect the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties and thereby transform the plaintiff into a prevailing party. In short a plaintiff "prevails" when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff506 U.S. at 111-112, 113 S.Ct. at 573 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In the instant case, the State takes the position that Plaintiffs did not prevail since no health inspections absent consent or a warrant took place or would have ever occurred. This is the same "good intentions" defense that was raised in response to the motion for TRO and preliminary injunction. However, neither the language of the original executive order, nor its amendment, nor the subsequently enacted statutes, restricted the application of those state mandates in a manner consistent with Fourth Amendment constitutional requirements. Instead of requiring probable cause, for example, the language of amended La. R.S. 40:5 authorized state officials to conduct safety inspections when they received a complaint that "shows appropriate and sufficient grounds" to indicate a code violation or health hazard. As this Court found in partially granting the TRO/preliminary injunction, the language in those mandates could be construed to authorize searches absent consent or a warrant issued by a court of law and therefore permit unconstitutional searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court therefore enjoined the State from conducting such inspections absent those requirements. Apparently, the settlement subsequently reached embodies the same commitment to refrain from searches without the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
This was the relief that Plaintiffs sought, and it was entirely achieved. Whether the State would have conducted constitutionally illegal searches had Plaintiffs not filed this suit to enjoin them is open to speculation. What is not open to speculation is that the language of the executive orders and the statutes could have been interpreted to allow them to do so. That is why they were enjoined.
Accordingly, because Plaintiffs achieved the relief they sought through settlement and affected a material alteration of their legal relationship with the State by insuring that the State mandates could not be used to permit unconstitutional searches, the Court finds that Plaintiffs did in fact prevail in this lawsuit and are thus entitled to attorney's fees.
B. Determination of Fees Due
The State stated in its opposition memorandum that it does not challenge Plaintiffs' requested hourly billing rates, representations of counsels' level of expertise and experience in the field, or Plaintiffs stated costs in general. See Defs' Mem. Opp., at 1. However, the State does challenge three specific aspects of Plaintiffs' requested relief: (1) that fees for calls between Plaintiffs' New York and New Orleans counsel should only be billed once rather than by both attorneys; (2) that billing in standard increments for calls that took considerably less time should be reduced accordingly; and (3) that billing at standard rates for counsel filing court documents is inappropriate where runners or other staff could have easily accomplished the same.
1. Calls Between Co-Counsel
In another case, this Court previously addressed the argument that fees should be reduced for calls between co-counsel. See Feinberg v. Hibernia Corp., 966 F. Supp. 442, 448 (E.D. La. 1997). The Court refused to reduce the frill billing by each attorney and observed that "[c]onsultation and "sound-boarding' among attorneys is valuable to effective litigation . . ." Id. The Court finds the same reasoning applies here. Furthermore, there has been no representation that the phone calls were excessive. Therefore, the Court will not reduce the fees requested by Plaintiffs for calls between co-counsel.
2. Standard Billing Increments
In Roubideaux v. Cox, 601 F. Supp. 174 (D.S.D. 1985), the court found that "[d]efendants' detailed objections to each time entry of plaintiffs counsel, in some cases going so far as to demand that a request for twelve minutes work be reduced to two minutes, is nothing more than carping." Id. at 176. This Court similarly rejects the State's request to reduce standard billing increments in this case. Furthermore, the Local Rule on attorney's fees awards, LR 54.2, provides no requirement regarding billing increments. Law firms routinely bill in standard increments, most often six minutes (tenths of hours), ten minutes (sixths of hours), or fifteen minutes (quarters of hours). It would be inappropriate judicial micro-management to mandate billing practices by reducing a private firm's properly and adequately documented attorney's fees from the standard billing increment employed. by the firm. Accordingly, the Court will not reduce the standard billing increments as urged by the State.
3. Filing Fees
Unlike the State's other two arguments, the Court does find merit in the State's contention that Plaintiffs should not recover full attorney billing rates for filing court documents when runners or other staff could have easily accomplished the same. "`It is appropriate to distinguish between legal work, in the strict sense, and investigation, clerical work, compilation of facts and statistics and other work which can often be accomplished by non-lawyers but which a lawyer may do because he has no other help available. Such non-legal work may command a lesser rate.'" Cruz v. Hauch, 762 F.2d 1230, 1235 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974)).
The State requests that the Court reduce the billing rates for 4.75 hours claimed by Plaintiffs for court filings. of that time however, 1.25 hours was spent filing TROs and/or preliminary injunctions, 0.75 hours on February 19, 1999 and 0.50 hours on July 16, 1999. It is common practice in this courthouse for attorneys to file TROs and preliminary injunctions in person so that the attorneys can speak with chambers staff and generally be available to set hearing on these requests for expedited extraordinary relief as soon as possible. Therefore, the Court finds that the 1.25 hours billed at full attorney billing rates for filing TROs/preliminary injunctions should not be reduced. However, the Court does find it proper to reduce the other 3.50 hours billed for court filing from the full attorney billing rate of $250 per hour to a reasonable clerical rate of $50 per hour. Accordingly, the Court reduces the overall claim for attorneys' fees and costs by $875.
4. Other Claimed Fees Not Objected To
The Court finds all the other fees and costs claimed by Plaintiffs to be reasonable, compensable and fully and adequately documented. Accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion to award those fees and costs to Plaintiffs.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court awards Plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $52,631.36, which represents the $53,506.36 claimed by Plaintiffs less the $875 by which the Court reduced the claim.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Rec. Doc. 34) is hereby GRANTED IN PART. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants owe Plaintiffs $52,631.36 in attorneys' fees and costs.