Catoire v. Caprock Telecommunications Corp.

Full title: DOROTHY D. CATOIRE v. CAPROCK TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP., ET AL

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Date published: May 21, 2003

CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-3577, SECTION "J" (2) (E.D. La. May. 21, 2003)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-3577, SECTION "J" (2).

May 21, 2003.

ORDER AND REASONS

CARL J. BARBIER, United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendant Caprock Telecommunications Corporation's ("Caprock") Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second Supplemental and Amended Complaint (Rec. Doc. 44) which was set for a hearing on the briefs on April 30, 2003. Plaintiff Dorothy Catoire ("Catoire") has filed a memorandum in opposition (Rec. Doc. 45). Caprock has also filed a reply memorandum (Rec. Doc. 48). Upon consideration of the memoranda submitted by counsel, the supplemental and amended complaint, the record, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that Caprock's motion should be GRANTED.

Background ¹

1 The Court has previously detailed the factual background leading to the instant lawsuit. See Rec. Doc. 15, at 2-3. Thus, the Court will only detail the background relevant to Caprock's instant motion.

Catoire has filed suit against Defendants Caprock, Paul Dorfi, McLeod USA, Inc., and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. asserting causes of action for (1) gender and age discrimination in her employment termination, (2) hostile work environment, (3) failure to pay wages owed to her in a timely manner after her termination, and (4) spoliation of evidence in violation of various federal and Louisiana state laws. On December 26, 2002, Catoire supplemented and amended her complaint to add the claims for spoliation of evidence. See Rec. Doc. 40, at 7-8. Catoire's amended complaint alleges that "[d]espite the obvious relevance of the documents which show the sales results of the males with whom [Catoire] worked, Defendant Caprock failed to retain said records after having been served with a copy of [Catoire's] EEOC charge on or before September 5, 2000." Id. at 4, paragraph 16. Catoire contends that the records "would have shown that Defendant Caprock treated similarly situated male employees much more favorably than it treated [Catoire] under almost the exact same circumstances." Id. at 7, paragraph 30. In her amended complaint, Catoire asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) and 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14(a), as well as § 2262 of the Louisiana Human Rights Act, LA. R.S. § 51:2262, and article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code, for "negligently failing to keep and preserve the sales records regarding [Catoire's] male counterparts." Id. at 7-8, paragraph 31.

Caprock has filed the instant Rule 12(b)(6) motion seeking a dismissal of Catoire's spoliation of evidence claims. Caprock contends that there is no private cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) or 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 for spoliation of evidence. Furthermore, Caprock argues that Catoire's state law claim should be dismissed because she has failed to show Caprock had a duty under state law to preserve the alleged sales records of her male co-employees. Therefore, Caprock argues that Catoire's spoliation claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

In her opposition memorandum, Catoire does not appear to dispute Caprock's contention that no private cause of action exists under the federal laws cited in her amended complaint for spoliation of the alleged records. However, Catoire does contend that the statutory requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) and 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 create a duty on the part of Caprock that is sufficient for purposes of a cause of action under Louisiana tort law.²

2 In her opposition memorandum, Catoire failed to mention that La. R.S. § 51:2262 uses very similar language as that used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8. Thus, it would appear that under Catoire's line of analysis, § 51:2262 also creates a statutory duty to preserve evidence that would give rise to a tort claim under Louisiana law.

Discussion

I. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a district court must accept the facts of the complaint as true and resolve all ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency of the claim in favor of the plaintiff. Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). The complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears "beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. at 284-85 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102 (1957)). It is also stated in Fernandez-Montes that "conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss." Id. at 284.

II. Catoire's Spoliation of Evidence Claims

A. Spoliation Under Federal Law 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) requires employers covered by Title VII to make, keep, and preserve records "relevant to the determinations of whether unlawful employment practices have been or are being committed." Under 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14, a covered employer subject to a preexisting EEOC charge of discrimination must "preserve all personnel records relevant to the charge or action until final disposition of the charge or the action."³ "Personnel records" include "personnel or employment records relating to the aggrieved person and to all other employees holding positions similar to that held . . . by the aggrieved person." Id. Where a party is in violation of these statutory requirements, a federal district court has the authority, upon application of the EEOC, to issue an order requiring the party to comply. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c).

3 Catoire filed a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC on August 23, 2000. See Rec. Doc. 1, at 7. Catoire alleges that Caprock was served with a copy of the EEOC charge on or before September 5, 2000. See Rec. Doc. 40, at 4.

Caprock and Catoire appear to agree that these federal provisions do not provide a private cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) and 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 do create a duty on the part of Caprock to preserve "personnel records" relevant to the EEOC charge. However, the language of § 2000e-8(c) establishes that the EEOC, not a private plaintiff, has standing to enforce such a covered employer's duty. Thus, Catoire has failed to state a claim under federal law upon which relief can be granted. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

B. Spoliation Under Louisiana Law

Catoire asserts claims for spoliation of evidence on the grounds that Caprock negligently failed to preserve evidence as required by federal and state laws. Catoire has made no attempt to allege that Caprock intentionally destroyed evidence relevant to this litigation. In fact, the Court previously denied Catoire's request for an imposition of an "inference of fault" against Caprock under the doctrine of spoliation because there was no evidence of any intentional destruction of evidence. See Rec. Doc. 35, at 1-2. Therefore, a threshold issue is whether Catoire can assert a claim for negligent spoliation of evidence where the Court has already concluded that there is no basis for an evidentiary inference relating to the same alleged underlying conduct on the part of Caprock.

Louisiana courts have only recently begun to recognize a tort claim for spoliation of evidence. See Guillory v. Dillard's Dept. Store, Inc., 777 So.2d 1, 3 (La.App. 3d Cir. 2000). The concept of "spoliation of evidence" has its jurisprudential roots in the evidentiary theory of adverse presumption. Id. at 3-4. As defined in the evidentiary context, the concept of "`spoliation of evidence' refers to an intentional destruction of evidence for purpose of depriving opposing parties of its use." Pham v. Contico Int'l, Inc., 759 So.2d 880, 882 (La.App. 5th Cir. 2000); Kammerer v. Sewerage and Water Bd. of New Orleans, 633 So.2d 1357, 1358 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1994). Along those lines two Louisiana courts have held that a plaintiff asserting a state law tort claim for spoliation of evidence must allege that the defendant intentionally destroyed evidence. Burge v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office, 2000 WL 815879 at *3 (E.D. La. 2000); Pham, 759 So.2d at 884. Allegations of negligent conduct are insufficient. Pham, 759 So.2d at 884.

On the other hand, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals has indirectly recognized a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence under Louisiana tort law. Guillory, 777 So.2d at 4-5; Bethea v. Modern Biomedical Servs., Inc., 704 So.2d 1227, 1233 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1997). The Third Circuit has analogized the tort of spoliation of evidence with the tort of impairment of a civil claim. Guillory, 777 So.2d at 3. As the Third Circuit stated in Guillory, "both causes of action are premised on the right of a plaintiff to be free from interference in pursuing and/or proving his or her lawsuit." Id. at 4.

However, the Third Circuit in Guillory and Bethea only mentioned in passing that a claim for negligent spoliation might be possible. Id. at 4, Bethea, 704 So.2d at 1233. Neither case presented the issue before this Court in the instant case — whether a claim for negligent spoliation of evidence is cognizable where there is no allegation of intentional spoliation. In Bethea, the plaintiff asserted claims for both intentional and negligent spoliation of evidence. 704 So.2d at 1231. The Third Circuit in Bethea was faced with the issue of whether a claim for spoliation of evidence could be asserted absent a specific statutory or contractual duty to preserve evidence. Id. at 1233. In Guillory, the plaintiff also asserted claims for both intentional and negligent spoliation of evidence. 777 So.2d at 3. The Third Circuit granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to submit any evidence showing that the defendant owed a duty to preserve evidence or that the defendant "intentionally concealed [evidence] in order to prevent [it] from being used in future litigation." Id. at 4.

Furthermore, the Third Circuit has not addressed the inconsistency in requiring a finding of intentional destruction to create an adverse evidentiary inference, but in the same case allow an independent cause of action for spoliation of evidence where only negligent destruction exists. In the instant case, the Court has already denied Catoire's request for an evidentiary inference because there was no allegation of intentional destruction of evidence. Catoire subsequently amended her complaint approximately three weeks later to assert her negligent spoliation of evidence claims. It would be inconsistent of the Court to allow Catoire to assert claims for monetary and injunctive relief arising out of the same alleged underlying conduct on the part of Caprock that did not merit even an evidentiary inference. Therefore, the Court agrees with the rationale asserted by the courts in Burge and Pham and holds that a plaintiff must allege an intentional destruction of evidence to asset a cognizable claim for spoliation of evidence under Louisiana law. Since Catoire has failed to allege facts which show an intentional destruction of evidence upon the part of Caprock, her spoliation of evidence claims under Louisiana law must also be dismissed. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

Accordingly;

It is HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Caprock's Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second Supplemental and Amended Complaint (Rec. Doc. 44) is GRANTED.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Dorothy Catoire's spoliation of evidence claims arising under federal and state law are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.