Opinion
Civil Action No. 7:00-CV-121-R.
August 6, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Priscilla and Bobby Ray Cates (collectively the "Cates") have asserted claims against Matthew and Lamae Creamer (collectively the "Creamers") for negligence and against the Hertz Corporation ("Hertz") under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine or, alternatively, under Texas's negligent entrustment laws. Now before this Court is Hertz's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 3, 2001. For the reasons stated below, Hertz's Motion is GRANTED.
Hertz was seven days late in filing its Motion for Summary Judgment and the Cates have objected. Although June 26, 2001 was the deadline for joint submission of dispositive motions, the Cates have failed to establish that they have been prejudiced by Hertz's minimal tardiness. Therefore, the Cates' objection is overruled.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
On June 29, 1998 the Creamers rented a 1998 Ford Windstar from a Hertz agency in Panama City, Florida. This vehicle was registered and licensed in Florida. The Creamers told Philip Long ("Long"), the Hertz agent, that they were traveling from Panama City to Spearman, Texas and that they planned to make the twenty-four hour drive by alternating drivers through the night. Long checked Mrs. Creamer's driver's licence and credit card, but failed to check Mr. Creamer's driver's license. Moreover, he did not add Mr. Creamer as an authorized driver to the vehicle.
Long then spoke with Mr. Creamer about insurance coverage. The Creamers had an automobile liability policy with Allstate Insurance Company with coverage limits of $20,000 per person and $40,000 per accident. Long indicated that the Creamers may not be covered under their own policy and suggested Hertz's insurance coverage. The Creamers purchased loss damage waiver coverage, which protected the vehicle but did not offer liability coverage. Mrs. Creamer then initialed a provision waiving Hertz's primary liability protection and personal injury protection under Florida law.
The Creamers then loaded the van and began driving around noon. Mr. Creamer drove approximately eight hours from Panama City to the outskirts of New Orleans, Louisiana. Mrs. Creamer then drove through the night while Mr. Creamer slept in the front passenger seat. Mr. Creamer awoke near daybreak and realized the car was stopped on the side of the road and Mrs. Creamer was sleeping. He moved to the driver seat and resumed driving. At some point he fell asleep while driving and awoke as he hit the Cates' 1977 Chevrolet on U.S. Highway 81, about three miles south of Bowie, Texas. Mr. Cates was standing in front of the open front passenger door when the accident occurred and the impact projected him several feet into the roadway.
As a result of the accident, Mr. Cates sustained severe head injuries and is now unable to care for himself. He resides at a long-term care facility and Mrs. Cates has been appointed his guardian. Mr. Cates' medical expenses exceed $200,000 and he can no longer engage in employment as a result of his condition. The Cates have initiated the present lawsuit to recover for Mr. Cates' personal injuries. The Cates argue that Florida law should control this case. Hertz disagrees.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows summary judgment only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Melton v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Ass'n. of Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997). An issue is "material" if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. See Burgos v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1994). The court must decide all reasonable doubts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Walker v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988); Thombrough v. Columbus Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 640 (5th Cir. 1985). In addition, when both parties have submitted contradictory evidence, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmovant. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that "reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence," the motion must be denied. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on a claim upon which summary judgment is sought, the moving party may discharge its summary judgment burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See id. at 325. Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. Summary judgment will be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Choice of Law
In diversity cases, such as the matter presently before this Court, federal courts must apply the choice of law rules for the forum state. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Texas courts use the "most significant relationship test" as set out in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (the "Restatement") to evaluate choice of law in a tort case. Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979). Section 6 of the Restatement outlines the general principles that inform a choice of law determination. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws at § 6. Without a statutory directive, the factors relevant to the choice of applicable rule of law include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant polices of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. Id.
More specifically, section 145 addresses choice of law analysis in tort cases. Id. at § 145. In applying the principles of section 6 to a tort case, the Court should consider (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. Id. Courts should evaluate these contacts for their quality, addressing their relative importance with respect to each particular case, rather than for quantity. Gutierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 319.
Mr. Cates sustained personal injuries from a collision that occurred in Texas. Without legal authority, Cates urges this court to classify the place of injury as fortuitous, thereby minimizing the role this factor plays in the determination of choice of law. The argument, however, overlooks the fact that the Cates lived in Texas during the time period leading up to the accident. It is not fortuitous that Cates was injured in Texas because he lived in Texas and was very unlikely to have been injured in any other place. See Crisman v. Cooper Indus., 748 S.W.2d 273, 278-79 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988) (holding that Texas law cannot apply when a defective trailer was operated solely in Florida thereby allowing injuries to occur only in Florida).
Furthermore, the doctrine of fortuity generally applies only to aircraft injuries where the plaintiffs were on board the plane during the crash. In re: Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594, 615 (7th Cir. 1981). These plaintiffs do not include bystanders on the ground. Id. Even applying the airplane rationale to this case, Cates' argument fails because at the time of the crash he was effectively a bystander who became involved in the accident when the crash vehicle driven by Mr. Creamer collided with his car. Thus, in the absence of appropriate facts, the doctrine of fortuity will not be applied in this case. As a result, this first factor indicates that Texas law should govern this matter because the injury occurred in Texas.
The second factor to evaluate is where the conduct causing the injury occurred. The Cates argue that their injuries are not their actual personal injuries, but rather their inability to adequately recover damages from the Creamers their for personal injuries. Then, without discussion, the Cates conclude that this injury occurred in Florida where the car was rented. This reliance is misplaced. The Cates have not sustained financial injuries but rather personal injuries for which they seek compensatory damages. The conduct leading to the personal injuries was Mr. Creamer falling asleep at the wheel and subsequently striking the Cates' car. This conduct occurred in Texas, not Florida, and therefore this second factor supports the application of Texas law.
However, even if the Court were to deem the injury to be financial in nature, the conduct causing it results from Texas law which precludes recovery under dangerous instrumentality laws.
The third factor for the Court to consider is the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties. The Cates are Texas residents. Hertz is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. The Cates assert that Hertz has subjected itself to Florida law by conducting business within the state. This argument neglects to consider that Hertz operates in many states, including Texas, and can therefore be subjected to the laws of a multitude of states. Furthermore, compensation of an injured plaintiff is primarily a concern of the state in which the plaintiff is domiciled. Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 2000 WL 1862923, *16 (Tex. 2000). Texas has the most direct interest in the Cates' recovery, and therefore, Texas law should govern such recovery. Id.
The final factor concerns the place where the relationship between the parties, if any, is centered. Section 145 indicates that this relationship is one between plaintiff and defendant.See Restatement at § 145. The Cates concede that they had no relationship with Hertz and therefore this factor should be moot. Nevertheless, without authority, the Cates argue that the relationship the Court should consider is that between the co-defendants. This relationship was indeed formed in Florida, but because this is not the type of relationship envisioned by the Restatement, this Court will not consider it further.
The three relevant factors of the significant relationship test uniformly suggest that Texas law be applied in this case. Texas has the most significant relationship to the case, and therefore, section 145 mandates application of Texas law.Accord Bartley v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 919 S.W.2d 747, 755-56 (Tex. 1996).
In determining under section 6 the law of the state controlling the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to the issue in tort, the only contact of importance is the Cates' residence in Texas and Hertz's incorporation in Delaware, its principal place of business in New Jersey, and its residence in a variety of states including Florida. See id. at 755. The Cates seek application of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine of Florida tort law to replace Texas' doctrine of negligent entrustment.
Texas implemented a system of proportional responsibility and recovery in causes of action based upon torts. Id. The purpose of this legislation was to make the Texas civil justice system fairer and more predictable by favorably affecting the affordability and availability of liability insurance, thereby promoting economic development in the state. See id. These policies would be frustrated if Florida's dangerous instrumentality law were imposed on the Texas system. The Cates have not suggested a Florida policy that would be advanced by the export of Florida's state tort laws.
Moreover, a decision to use Texas law allows the state to protect the litigation interests of its own residents. See Stutzman, 2000 WL 1862923 at * 16. Accordingly, under the guidance of sections 6 and 145, this Court will apply Texas law in this matter because Texas has the most significant relationship to the case.
C. Negligent Entrustment
Under Texas tort law, the Cates concede that their only cause of action against Hertz is for negligent entrustment. The elements of negligent entrustment are (1) entrustment of a vehicle by the owner, (2) to an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver, (3) that the owner knew or should have known to be unlicensed, (4) the driver was negligent on the occasion in question, and (5) the driver's negligence proximately caused the accident. Schneider v. Esperanza Transmission Co., 744 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Tex. 1988); Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1985) (overruled on other grounds). Knowledge of the driver's incompetency at the time of the entrustment is an essential element to establish negligence.Monreo v. Grider, 884 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994). Hertz disputes that the Windstar was entrusted to an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver.
The Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles report reveals that Mr. Creamer had a valid Florida driver's license at the time he rented the vehicle. Even if, as the Cates allege, Hertz failed to properly check the driver's license of Mr. Creamer, the license existed in good standing at the time of rental. Therefore, Hertz did not entrust the vehicle to an unlicensed driver. Thus, the Cates must proceed on the argument that Mr. Creamer was either an incompetent or reckless driver.
A prior accident or traffic violation does not create an inference or conclusion that a driver is incompetent or reckless. Id. In a scenario such as this where a party rents a vehicle from a clerk with whom he is not acquainted, a driver's license generally serves as the only possible test of competency. Since Mr. Creamer did not know the Hertz representative and he maintained a valid driver's license at the time of rental, the facts indicate that Mr. Creamer was competent at the time of rental.
The Cates argue that Mr. Creamer's admission of his intent to drive non-stop alternating with his wife between shifts of driving and sleeping indicated that they would be driving in a reckless manner. Texas courts have held that negligent entrustment does not exist when drivers rotate throughout a long distance trip, even when the party entrusting the vehicle saw the driver consuming alcohol soon before the trip. Rodriguez v. Sciano, 18 S.W.3d 725, 728 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000) (upholding summary judgment against the plaintiffs where the only facts supporting negligent entrustment were that the drivers drove in shifts). Under the circumstances of this case, where the Creamers, like the drivers in Rodriguez, simply planned to drive in shifts, there is no evidence that at the time of rental Mr. Creamer was a reckless driver. Because the Cates have presented insufficient evidence to show that Mr. Creamer was either unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless when he and Mrs. Creamer rented the Windstar, the Cates cannot establish this element of their negligent entrustment claim against Hertz. Therefore, the Cates are not able to establish a prima facie case of negligent entrustment and Hertz is entitled to summary judgment on the claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Hertz's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Cates' claims against Hertz are DISMISSED.