WIDENER, Circuit Judge:
The Catawba Indian Tribe appeals from an order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of certain defendants as to a number of parcels of real estate on the ground that those defendants had established the adverse possession requirements of South Carolina. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate and remand in part.
This litigation began when the Tribe filed a complaint and motion to certify a defendant class on October 28, 1980. In the complaint, the Tribe seeks to be declared the owner of approximately 144,000 acres of land that was set aside for the Tribe's benefit in the 1760 Treaty of Pine Tree Hill and the 1763 Treaty of Augusta and to recover trespass damages for the period of its dispossession. The complaint names seventy-six individuals, companies and public entities as defendants and as representatives of a putative defendant class of more than 27,000 persons with an interest in any portion of the lands in question.
The volume and complexity of the records describing the parcels of land in this case has prompted us to develop a system of notation whereby the reader may discern what action we have taken with respect to each individual parcel as to which summary judgment was granted. We have attempted to devise a system that strikes a useful balance between simplicity and precision.
The district court's holdings in this case are collected in the form of five judgment orders. We refer to these judgment orders by the words "One," representing the first judgment order beginning at J.A. 848; "Two," representing the second judgment order beginning at J.A. 948; "Three," representing the third judgment order beginning at J.A. 960; "Amend.," representing the amended second judgment order beginning at J.A. 1012; and "Four," representing the fourth judgment order beginning at J.A. 1019. The first word in a reference under this column, then, refers the reader to the appropriate judgment order containing the parcel at issue.
Each judgment order is accompanied by exhibits which describe with particularity each parcel at issue and naming the defendant who claims that parcel. We reference these exhibits by using the same capital letters, beginning with A and proceeding alphabetically, as does each judgment order. The second letter in a reference in this column is the capital letter designating the exhibit in which the reference occurs.
The next number or entry in a reference represents the specific tract of land contained in a particular exhibit. Regrettably, the exhibits employed by the district court do not use a uniform notation to refer to a particular parcel of land. Accordingly, the last number or numbers in a reference represent our best judgment as to the most clear and concise way to identify a specific parcel. Where possible we have employed tax map numbers. Less often we have referred to numbered paragraphs in the exhibit. Only where necessary have we resorted to a more lengthy description of a parcel, such as by deed book and page number, dates and grantors, and the like.
The final number in a reference, in parentheses, is the Joint Appendix number where that reference may be found.
As an example, the reference One, C, (857) ¶ 1 ¶ 2 ¶ 3 ¶ 4 refers to the parcels found in paragraphs one through four of exhibit C to the first judgment order, appearing at J.A. p. 857.
In 1981, the defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion was based on the effect of the 1959 Catawba Division of Assets Act (Catawba Act), 25 U.S.C. §§ 931-938. The district court treated the motion to dismiss as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the case. The court held that the Catawba Act terminated the special relationship that the Tribe had had with the federal government and that the termination of the special federal status of the Tribe made state law apply to it and any claim it might have. Therefore, South Carolina's adverse possession statute began to run against the Tribe's claim on July 1, 1962, the date the Tribe's constitution was revoked pursuant to the Catawba Act. Because South Carolina Code § 15-3-340, the applicable South Carolina statute of limitations, requires actions to recover title or possession to be brought within ten years, the district court held that the Tribe's claims were filed eighteen years after the statute began to run and the claims were barred. The court, while noting that South Carolina does not allow a party to obtain title by adverse possession by "tacking" his period of possession to a predecessor's period of possession (unless the land passes by inheritance), held that South Carolina's non-tacking rule "is not relevant to the defendants' assertion that the plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations."
First a panel of this court and then the court sitting en banc reversed the district court and held that the state statute of limitations does not apply to the Tribe's claim. Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291, 1300 (4th Cir. 1983), adopted en banc, Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 740 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1984). Because this court held that the state statute of limitations does not apply, we did not reach the question of whether the district court had correctly applied the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court then reversed this court and held that the South Carolina statute of limitations does apply to the Tribe's claim. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 510-11, 106 S.Ct. 2039, 2046-47, 90 L.Ed.2d 490 (1986). The Court then remanded the case to this court for consideration of the district court's application of the South Carolina statute of limitations to the Tribe's claim. On remand from the Supreme Court, this court held that the Tribe is entitled to invoke the presumption of possession set forth in S.C. Code § 1567-220; that the Tribe's acknowledgement that it did not actually possess the land within the ten year period specified in S.C. Code § 15-3-340 is not a bar to its claim; and that South Carolina's disallowance of tacking means that the Tribe's claim is only barred as to those persons who held or whose predecessors held the property for ten years without tacking except by inheritance. We summarized our portion of the holding pertinent to the present matter as follows:
[S]ections 15-3-340 and 15-67-210 [of the South Carolina Code] bar the tribe's claim against each person who holds and possesses property that has been held and possessed adversely for 10 years after July 1, 1962, and before October 20, 1980, without tacking except by inheritance, in accordance with South Carolina's tacking doctrine. The statutes of limitations do not bar the tribe's claim against other persons. "Persons" includes joint tenants, tenants in common, partnerships, associations, and corporations.
The references to the designated sections of the foregoing opinion are largely self-explanatory. As for the references to section II of our opinion, which deals with several issues relating to the sufficiency of the allegations in the defendants' affidavits, we have devised a shorthand notation for purposes of identifying which specific aspect of section II addresses the relevant objection of the Tribe.
The Tribe has often raised more than one type of legal challenge to any given parcel. Because we have reviewed all such objections and found them to be without merit, the district court need not rehear those challenges on remand. In the interest of clarity we shall note, where applicable, the section of this opinion wherein any other challenge to such a parcel is considered and rejected.
See supra Appendix C n. 3.
Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 865 F.2d 1444, 1456 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906, 109 S.Ct. 3190, 105 L.Ed.2d 699 (1989). Therefore, on remand from this court, the district court was required to determine which claimants met the adverse possession requirements.
Forty-six of the named defendants filed a supplemental brief and affidavits in support of their summary judgment motion. The district court entered summary judgment in a series of orders with respect to certain properties for which summary judgment was sought. The court also dismissed twenty-nine defendants from the case as it determined that summary judgment had been granted as to all property in which they had an interest.
Summary Judgment Standard
Our review of summary judgments is de novo. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 118 (4th Cir. 1991). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a summary judgment motion, the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). However, when the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, summary judgment is appropriate. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356.
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2727 (1983). However, once the moving party has met its burden under Rule 56(c), the adverse party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). See also Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Genuineness means that the evidence must create fair doubt; wholly speculative assertions will not suffice. A trial, after all, is not an entitlement. It exists to resolve what reasonable minds would recognize as real factual disputes"). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial'" and summary judgment is appropriate. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356.
I. [10] South Carolina Adverse Possession Law
"[C]laim of title by adverse possession require[s] proof of actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous and exclusive possession by [the claimant], or by one or more persons through whom [the claimant] claim[s], for the full statutory period of ten years, without tacking of possession except by descent cast." Crotwell v. Whitney, 229 S.C. 213, 92 S.E.2d 473, 477 (1956); see S.C. Code § 15-3-340; S.C. Code § 15-67-210. "[T]he burden of proof of adverse possession is on the party relying thereon." Mullis v. Winchester, 237 S.C. 487, 118 S.E.2d 61, 63 (1961). In South Carolina, "[o]rdinarily, adverse possession is a question of fact for the jury and it becomes a question of law only when the evidence is undisputed and susceptible of but one inference." Gardner v. Mozingo, 293 S.C. 23, 358 S.E.2d 390, 392 (1987).
II. [12] Sufficiency of the Allegations in Claimants' Affidavits
The district court made the following rulings with respect to the sufficiency of the affidavits submitted in support of the claimants' motions for summary judgment:
A defendant whose uncontroverted affidavit states or shows that he (or his predecessor) has continuously occupied or possessed the property for ten years (without tacking except by inheritance), has treated the property as his own, paid taxes thereon, maintained the property and taken steps to protect it against trespassers or others who might seek to use it or assert any claim to it, has demonstrated adverse possession of the property.
A defendant whose uncontroverted affidavit states or shows that he (or his predecessor) continuously occupied or possessed property pursuant to color of title for ten years (without tacking except by inheritance) has demonstrated adverse possession of the property.
Mortgage documents are writings sufficient to constitute color of title for purposes of establishing adverse possession.
Timber growing or farming is sufficient occupation or possession of the property to establish adverse possession.
A deed to a husband serves as color of title for his wife if their marriage took place while Dower rights still attached to all lands of which a husband was seized during coverture.
The Tribe argues that the requirements set forth by the district court are insufficient because they do not require allegations of specific acts of possession. They argue that any affidavits which fail to set forth specific acts of possession are insufficient as a matter of law to meet the requirements of adverse possession.
We are of opinion that a claimant who produces affidavits or other sufficient documents establishing without contradiction in fact that he or a predecessor held the record title to the property, possessed, occupied, or held the property, paid taxes on the property, and took steps to protect the property from trespassers for the requisite ten-year period without tacking except by descent, has met his burden under Rule 56(c) of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, in those cases where the claimant has so met his burden, to avoid summary judgment, the Tribe, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
"As a general rule, the law presumes that the exclusive possession of land by one who is a stranger to the holder of the legal title is adverse." Mullis, 118 S.E.2d at 66. In this court's earlier decision, we determined that if the Tribe held Indian title to the property in question in 1962, then it held the legal title at that time. 865 F.2d 1444, 1451 (4th Cir. 1989). Therefore, applying the rule stated in Mullis, any person other than the Tribe who exclusively possessed the property would be a stranger to the holder of the legal title and would be presumed to be holding it adversely.
In addition, when "a person goes into possession of land under a deed from a third person which purports on its face to convey to him an absolute and exclusive title to the entire interest in the land, and such deed is spread upon the public records, this is notice to the world that he is claiming the entire and exclusive interest in the land, and his possession may be adverse to all the world from the time of its commencement." Sudduth v. Sumeral, 61 S.C. 276, 39 S.E. 534, 539 (1901). "The claimant's possession and its continuity will be sufficient if by his acts and conduct it is apparent to men of ordinary prudence that he is asserting and exercising ownership over the property; and for this purpose it is necessary to take into consideration the nature, character, and location of the property and the uses for which it is fitted or to which it has been put." Smith v. Southern Railway, 237 S.C. 597, 118 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1961) (quoting 1 Am.Jur. Adverse Possession § 149).
The Tribe has not met its burden in establishing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to many of the claimants. To survive the claimants' motions for summary judgment, the Tribe must establish that there is a genuine issue as to whether the claimants have satisfied South Carolina's adverse possession requirements. Once a claimant met his burden under Rule 56(c), the Tribe was required to come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
See supra Appendix C n. 3.
The Tribe argues that an averment of possession in an affidavit is insufficient to establish possession for summary judgment purposes. We disagree. Once a claimant stated in an affidavit sufficient facts to sustain a motion for summary judgment in his favor, the burden shifted to the Tribe to establish that there is a "material issue of fact." Affidavits by a claimant that he possessed the property or held and occupied the property as his own, paid taxes on it, and took steps to protect it from trespassers is sufficient to sustain a motion for summary judgment so long as the ten-year requirement is met and the statements were made on personal knowledge. Therefore, in order to avoid summary judgment when faced with such an affidavit, the Tribe was required, by affidavit or as otherwise provided for in Rule 56, to allege facts showing that there is a dispute as to whether a claimant did those things claimed in the affidavit. Absent such a showing, there is no "material issue of fact" and summary judgment was properly granted to the claimant.
Some of the claimants, by affidavit, identified the nature and use of the property they claimed as timber farming, timber growing, timberlands, or tree farm. The Tribe argues that these descriptions are insufficient to sustain a motion for summary judgment. Again, the Tribe has mistaken the summary judgment standard. The statements by the claimants are sufficient to meet the requirements of adverse possession. See Mullis, 118 S.E.2d at 66 (claimant who entered upon the land under color of title and occupied the land for his ordinary use in growing timber upon land and obtaining timber therefrom satisfied adverse possession requirements). Therefore, to avoid having summary judgment granted against them, the Tribe had the burden of disputing, by affidavit or otherwise, that the property was not used for timber farming and that any other acts alleged which would establish possession were not present.
Further, we are of opinion that averments that property was used for recreational or farming purposes are sufficient to establish possession for adverse possession purposes. See Mullis, 118 S.E.2d at 65 (acts of adverse possession "are only required to be exercised in such way and in such manner as is consistent with the use to which the lands may be put and the situation of the property. . . ."). Again, to avoid summary judgment the Tribe was required to controvert facts alleged in the claimants' affidavits.
In sum we find that those averments made in the affidavits are sufficient to satisfy the open, notorious, continuous, and hostile requirements. The only questions remaining are whether the affidavits sufficiently established that they were based on personal knowledge and whether they established that the ten-year period was met.
See supra Appendix C n. 3.
III. [23] No Personal Knowledge by Affiants
The Tribe argues that some of the affidavits are not based on personal knowledge and, as a consequence, are insufficient as a basis for summary judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides as follows:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify as to the matters therein.
To comply with Rule 56(e), there must be a showing that the statements made in the affidavits were made on personal knowledge. "The absence of an affirmative showing of personal knowledge of specific facts vitiates the sufficiency of the affidavits and, accordingly, summary disposition based thereon [is] improper." Antonio v. Barnes, 464 F.2d 584, 585 (4th Cir. 1972).
The Tribe asserts that some of the affidavits are insufficient because there has been no showing that the statements contained in them are based on personal knowledge. Some of these statements were made by individuals concerning use of the property by family members. We are of opinion that, in ordinary circumstances, and nothing else appearing, an individual can be presumed to have personal knowledge of the possession of land by a family member. Absent a specific showing by the Tribe that an individual did not have personal knowledge of the use of a tract of land by a family member, the statements concerning familial use of the property comply with Rule 56(e)'s personal knowledge requirement.
Therefore, we reject the Tribe's argument that the affidavits were not based on personal knowledge as to those statements concerning use of property by family members of the affiant.
The Tribe also attacks certain affidavits made by corporate officers on behalf of the corporation. We are of opinion that, ordinarily, officers would have personal knowledge of the acts of their corporations. Therefore, since the Tribe did not set forth facts, by affidavit or otherwise, that would show that the officers did not have personal knowledge, the personal knowledge requirement is satisfied as to those affidavits.
Two of the affidavits attacked as insufficient for lack of personal knowledge were made by one Alton G. Brown. In his first affidavit, dated May 22, 1989, Brown does not allege that his statements were made based on personal knowledge. However, this is remedied in his supplemental affidavit wherein he states, "During the entire period from 1962 to 1979, I was familiar with use and possession of the Spencer property referred to in my affidavit of May 22, 1989." Therefore, the combined affidavits were sufficient.
As to those affidavits set forth at Appendix C, we are of opinion that, while they do set forth sufficient facts to sustain a motion for summary judgment, on their face, they do not establish that the affiant's statements were based on personal knowledge. Therefore, we remand as to the claims based on those affidavits solely for the district court to determine whether the statements were made on the basis of personal knowledge.
While certain affidavits did not establish that they were based on personal knowledge, summary judgment was properly granted as to the property described therein as supplemental affidavits were filed that remedied the problem.
IV. [32] Tacking
The general rule in South Carolina, contrary to the rule in most jurisdictions, is that "even though there be privity by deed or devise between successive adverse occupants of land, the possession of such occupants cannot be tacked to make out title by adverse possession under the statute of limitations." D. Means, Survey of South Carolina Law: Property, 10 S.C.L.Q. 90 (1957). Tacking has been allowed in South Carolina in cases of intestate succession, but not when the disseisor conveys by deed. See Epperson v. Stansill, 64 S.C. 485, 42 S.E. 426 (1902). In the following passage, the Supreme Court of South Carolina explained its reasoning:
If possession of land is transmitted by the act of disseisor before the statutory bar is complete, the grantee of the disseisor cannot unite his possession with that of the disseisor in order to show adverse possession for the requisite period. But when the heir is in of his ancestor's possession, and makes no new entry, the possession of ancestor and heir may be united in making out the statutory period; the distinction being that, when possession is cast by operation of law from ancestor to heir in possession, there is no break in the continuity of possession, whereas, in the case of disseisor and grantee, there is a new entry and a break in the continuity of possession.
Epperson, 42 S.E. at 427 (citations omitted). Therefore, following that Court's reasoning, we are of opinion that South Carolina courts would allow tacking when a change in possession occurs by operation of law. It follows that when a transfer in possession occurs other than by operation of law, South Carolina courts would not allow tacking.
The district court in granting summary judgment allowed tacking in a number of situations. The Tribe argues that the court erroneously created new exceptions to South Carolina's no-tacking rule and, in other instances, erroneously applied the no-tacking rule. We take each instance in turn.
See supra Appendix C n. 3.
IV.A. [36] Corporate Merger
The district court allowed tacking in instances when a corporate merger occurred. There appears to be no South Carolina authority on this precise point. The Tribe relies on the following language from Epperson, 42 S.E. at 427, to support its argument that tacking should not be allowed in the merger context: "If possession of land is transmitted by the act of disseisor before the statutory bar is complete, the grantee of the disseisor cannot unite his possession with that of the disseisor in order to show adverse possession for the requisite period." The Tribe asserts that merger documents are similar to a deed and, therefore, break the period of possession, because they involve a voluntary act.
We are of opinion, however, that the same rationale used by the courts in allowing tacking between an ancestor and heir, that "when possession is cast by operation of law from ancestor to heir in possession, there is no break in the continuity of possession," Epperson, 42 S.E. at 427, would allow tacking in the context of a corporate merger. While it is true that merger is a voluntary act, the change in possession of the property occurs by operation of law. See S.C. Code § 33-11-106 ("When a merger takes effect . . . the title to all real estate and other property owned by each corporation party to the merger is vested in the surviving corporation without reversion or impairment. . . ."); S.C. 1962 Code § 12-20.6 (superseded) ("All property, real, personal and mixed . . . and all and every other interest, of or belonging to or due to each of the corporations so merged or consolidated, shall be taken and deemed to be transferred to and vested in such single corporation without further act or deed."); Official Comment to S.C. Code § 33-11-106 ("A merger is not a conveyance or transfer, and does not give rise to claims of reverter or impairment of title based on a prohibited conveyance or transfer."). Therefore, the district court did not err in allowing tacking in the context of a corporate merger.
IV.B. [39] Transfers from Parent to Subsidiary
On May 1, 1969, Duke Power Company deeded the perimeter lands surrounding the Lake Wylie hydroelectric project to its wholly-owned subsidiary corporation, Crescent Land and Timber Company. The district court granted Duke Power and Crescent's motion for summary judgment based on a ten year period of possession between July 2, 1964 and July 2, 1974. The court stated that Crescent was "a mere alter ego or instrumentality of Duke" Power and the deed did not interrupt continuous possession by Duke Power for adverse possession purposes. We are of opinion that this holding must be reconsidered in light of this opinion.
Of course, because summary judgment was not granted as to these parcels they do not appear in the district court's judgment orders. Accordingly, we refer to these parcels by their description in the materials supporting the respective defendant's motion for summary judgment. Each reference is to Joint Appendix page number and paragraph or tract number or description, as appropriate.
The ten year period was met only if the deed from Duke Power to Crescent had no effect on the running of the statute. The Tribe argues that the running of the statute was interrupted by the 1969 transfer.
In South Carolina, "[t]he mere ownership of the capital stock of one corporation by another does not create an identity of corporate interest between the two companies, or render the holding company the owner of the property of the other, or create the relationship of principal and agent, or representative, or alter ego between the two." Gordon v. Hollywood-Beaufort Package Corp., 213 S.C. 438, 49 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1948) (emphasis added).
Also in South Carolina, however, in an appropriate case and in furtherance of the ends of justice the corporate veil may be pierced. DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Company, 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976). Dewitt, incidentally, is a recent comprehensive exposition of South Carolina law with respect to the facets of alter ego which it discusses. Add to that the principle relied upon by the Tribe, that a piercing of the corporate veil generally will not be permitted for the benefit of the parent corporation or its stockholders, 18 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 46, which is in accord with 1 Fletcher Cyclopedia, Corporations (1990), p. 615, that a sole shareholder may not choose to ignore the corporate entity when it is convenient. With these principles in mind, it appears that Duke had acquired the perimeter property surrounding Lake Wylie some years prior to 1969 and prior to 1965. In 1965, the Federal Power Commission entered its Order 313 requiring power companies to provide recreational opportunities on properties surrounding their reservoirs. In 1969, Duke conveyed the perimeter lands surrounding Lake Wylie to its subsidiary, Crescent. Standing alone, this might seem to be a conveyance which would prevent tacking on the part of Duke. So far as its title to the perimeter land is concerned, an affidavit of an officer of Crescent, however, states facts which tend to show that Crescent may be the alter ego of Duke. On the other hand, the conveyance of the perimeter lands to Crescent may tend to show that Duke treated Crescent as a separate corporate entity and not as its alter ego, if, as the Tribe claims, the purpose of the conveyance was to avoid setting up recreational facilities as required by FPC Order 313. The district court found that Duke had not violated Order 313. It gave no reasons, but the affidavit of Crescent's attorney may tend to support that conclusion. Whether or not FPC Order 313 was violated, however, is not the end of the question. If the conveyance from Duke to Crescent enabled Duke to avoid compliance with Order 313, even though such avoidance may have been quite legitimate, that would be evidence which tends to show that Duke treated Crescent as a separate corporation and not as its alter ego. The district court also did not consider whether or not the rule we have cited from Fletcher, that a sole shareholder may not choose to ignore the corporate entity when it is convenient, has been violated.
In view of the facts we have stated and the authorities, we are of opinion that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Duke and Crescent with respect to the perimeter property. Its judgment in that respect is vacated and the case remanded for such further fact finding as may be appropriate.
The Tribe asserts that the district court erroneously held the six-year statute of limitations on actions for inverse condemnation applicable to Duke and Crescent's claim to the Lake Wylie Perimeter Property. We do not agree that the district court so ruled. In its amendment to the second judgment order the district court plainly held that the six-year statute applied to the Lake Wylie Dam Property and the Lake Wylie Basin Property. The order made no mention that the statute would apply to the Lake Wylie Perimeter Property and we do not read it as so holding.
IV.C. [45] Transfer between Subsidiary Corporations of Same Parent Corporation
[47] The same rules apply in this situation as apply to a transfer between a parent and subsidiary. If the transfer is found as a matter of fact and law to be to an alter ego, the tacking requirement will be complied with, otherwise it will not. The holding of the district court that the ten year period ran as to property claimed by Bowater, Inc., because the transfer between its subsidiaries East Highlands Company and Catawba Timber Company had the effect of stopping the running of the statute prior to the running of the ten-year period must be vacated and that transfer re-examined under the principles stated above in this opinion. IV.D. [48] Devise to Heirs
The district court held that "[a] devise to an heir of a testator does not interrupt possession." This ruling may be valid in some instances, but invalid in others, as the doctrine of worthier title may apply.
Under the doctrine of worthier title, a devise to the heirs of the testator was a nullity if the interest limited in their favor was identical to that which such heirs would have taken by descent if there had been no devise to them. The rule originated because the feudal incidents of relief, wardship, and marriage were preserved only if the new tenant of land acquired an interest by descent from the former tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Property § 30.2, Comment on Subsection (2). Because the reason for the rule, the preservation of feudal incidents, no longer exists, the doctrine as it applies to testamentary dispositions has been abolished by statute in several States, but not in South Carolina. See Restatement (Second) of Property § 30.2, Statutory Note.
South Carolina applied the doctrine of worthier title in the case of Seabrook v. Seabrook, 10 S.C.Eq. 495 (1859). The rule was there stated as follows, p. 503-504:
"It is undoubted law, that where a testator gives by his will the same estate to the same persons who would be entitled to take that estate by operation of law in case of an intestacy, the devise or legacy will be void, and the right of the party or parties entitled will be referred to the law of distributions and descents. If there be any variation between the disposition which the will, and which the law makes in such a case, either in regard to the persons who are to take, or to the quantity of the estate, the title will be referred to the will."
The court held that the devise to the heirs was void and as to the heir in question the testator died intestate.
Without attempting to go into all of the South Carolina cases touching the subject, we come to the case of Burnett v. Crawford, 50 S.C. 161, 27 S.E. 645 (1897) which is relied upon by the Tribe. That was a case in which an heir had sued the children of another heir for partition. The plaintiff heir had taken her estate by intestacy and the defendant children of the other heir had taken their interest by devise. The testator had entered into a purported settlement of rights in the property with the plaintiff heir some 9 years prior to the testator's death. During that 9 year period, the court considered, at least for the purposes of its opinion, that the testator held adversely to the plaintiff heir. Although the plaintiff brought suit 11 years after the settlement, the court refused to permit tacking of the 9 year period and the two year period although the devise was to the defendants. The Court stated at 27 S.E. p. 647:
"A devisee under a will does not take possession of the devise as heir, but rather as the grantee or purchaser of the testator."
It is that language the Tribe relies upon. But we note that almost immediately following that language, and indeed in the same paragraph, the following statement at p. 647-648:
"Under a properly framed request, appellant would have been entitled to have the jury instructed as to the right of a devisee claiming under a will to unite his possession with that of his testator so as to make out the statutory period of adverse possession."
While the first statement just quoted may seem to have abolished the doctrine of worthier title (as it applies to possession) by implication, the second statement just as surely provides the doctrine to have survived. We are of opinion that both statements may be reconciled by referring back to page 504 of Seabrook, which states that if there be any variation between the disposition made by the will and the law, either in regard to the persons who are to take or the quantity of the estate, the title will be referred to the will. While it is true that the testator in Burnett did devise the land in question to his children, the defendants, the terms of the will are not stated and we must suppose, in order to justify the correctness of the opinion and make it consistent with the other South Carolina cases, that the will involved, while it may have devised the land to the same heirs, did not give to them the same quantity of estate they would have received by virtue of intestacy or that the record does not show the quantity of estate. We are reassured in our view of Burnett by the subsequent case of Kilgore v. Kirkland, 69 S.C. 78, 48 S.E. 44 (1904). In Kilgore, the testator had received the property in question, apparently by deed, some 4 or 5 years before his death in 1850, at which time he devised the same to his children, share and share alike. The heirs continued in the testator's possession until the year 1858. On these facts, the South Carolina Court stated:
". . . while it is also true to that possession of a devisee cannot be united with that of the testator, to make out adverse possession for the statutory period (Burnett v. Crawford, 50 S.C. 161, 27 S.E. 645), nevertheless, when the heir is in of his ancestor's possession and makes no new entry, the possession of ancestor and heir may be united in making out the period necessary to quiet title."
48 S.E. at 46.
Thus our construction of Burnett follows Kilgore's construction of Burnett, and we think the doctrine of worthier title is extant in South Carolina. We note that Professor Means agrees with our conclusion that tacking should be permitted under the doctrine of worthier title in such cases, although he arrives at his construction of Burnett by his view that the problem was not properly presented to the South Carolina Court. Survey of South Carolina Law, 10 S.C.L.Q. 90, n. 4 (1957). We are further of opinion that Seabrook should not be held by us to have been overruled by implication. Overruling by implication is not favored. See Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 1921, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 343 at 345-346, 70 S.Ct. 724, 736 at 737-738, 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950) (Justice Jackson concurring). And in diversity cases also that is the rule in this circuit. See Walk v. Baltimore Ohio Railroad, 847 F.2d 1100, 1108 (4th Cir. 1988)
Thus, this aspect of the case must be remanded with instructions to apply the doctrine of worthier title if the claimant heir took as devisee and with the same quantity of estate he would have taken if an heir. If all those requirements are met tacking should be permitted in such cases.
IV.E. [59] Change in the Identity of a Trustee
The Tribe argues that the district court erred in holding that a change in the identity of a trustee does not interrupt the running of the ten-year statute. We are of opinion the district court correctly held that the appointment of a successor trustee upon the death of the former trustee does not interrupt the running of the statute of limitations. It is a fundamental rule of trust law that a trust will not fail for want of a trustee. Leaphart v. Harmon, 186 S.C. 362, 195 S.E. 628, 629 (1938). Therefore, we hold that, by operation of law, possession is cast from the former trustee to his successor.
IV.F. [61] Change in Beneficiary of Trust
The Tribe argues that the transfer of a beneficial interest in a trust interrupts the ten-year period. We find no merit to this contention. The property is held adversely by the trust through the trustee. A change in the beneficial ownership has no effect on the running of the statute as there is no new entry onto the property.
V. [63] William O. Nisbet Property (602.5 and 53 acre tracts)
The Tribe also asserts that a question of fact exists as to the exclusivity and continuity of the possession of William O. Nisbet. Its claim is based on the fact that members of the Catawba Tribe have at times entered the 602.5 and 53 acre tracts owned by Nisbet for the purpose of collecting clay. Mesdames Wade and Campbell submitted affidavits stating that they were never denied access to the property to dig in the clay holes. Nisbet does not dispute that this activity has taken place. However, Nisbet's affidavit shows that he allowed members of the Tribe on to Nisbet's property for access to the clay. He claimed the property as his own and nothing done by the Tribe members amounted to an ouster of Nisbet's possession. Therefore, Nisbet's possession was exclusive and continuous. We agree with the district court's holding that "[a]dverse possession is not interrupted by entry of the owner unless there is also ouster of the claimant." "Actual possession, once taken, will continue, though the party taking such possession should not continue to rest with his foot upon the soil, until he be disseised, or until he do some act which amounts to a voluntary abandonment of the possession." Smith v. Southern Railway, 237 S.C. 597, 118 S.E.2d 440, 442 (1961).
It is true that the affidavits of Mesdames Wade and Campbell state that members of the Tribe had gone on the property for years, and the Wade affidavit states that such members of the Tribe did not ask permission or notify the Nisbets of their entry. We leave aside for the moment the fact that the Wade affidavit probably shows on its face it is not on personal knowledge as respects other members of the Tribe, but we do not leave aside the fact that it does not show that Nisbet had any knowledge of such entry. Even if the Wade affidavit is construed most favorably to the Tribe, it does not show any ouster of Nisbet under Smith, especially because it does not show that Nisbet knew of any unauthorized entry onto his property.
The Tribe's point is without merit.
VI. [67] Adverse Possession Co-Tenancies
The Tribe takes issue with the district court's ruling that "[t]he adverse possession of one co-tenant establishes the adverse possession of his co-tenants." We find no error.
In South Carolina, it is presumed that "the possession of one tenant in common is the possession of all." See Woods v. Bivens, 292 S.C. 76, 354 S.E.2d 909, 911 (1987). The operation of the rule that the possession of one co-tenant is the possession of all only ceases if "such possession becomes adverse to the co-owners of the possessor." 354 S.E.2d at 911. Therefore, a co-tenant who satisfies the adverse possession requirements does so for all of the co-tenants so long as he does not claim to be holding adversely to his cotenants. In Terwilliger v. Marion, 222 S.C. 185, 72 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1952), the Supreme Court of South Carolina recognized that a co-tenant can establish adverse possession for both herself and her cotenant. That being so, we are of opinion that a change in identity of co-tenants has no effect on establishing adverse possession so long as one co-tenant possesses the property for the requisite period. Therefore, we find no merit to the Tribe's contention that the transfer of title as to one cotenant interrupted the running of the adverse possession statute.
As an additional argument, the Tribe claims that a transfer by deed from a disseisor's executors to a devisee interrupts the running of the adverse possession statute and therefore certain percentage interests in property claimed by the Nisbet family were not held for the requisite period. Also the Tribe argues that the creation or termination of a trust interrupts the 10 year period. We do not reach these issues as our holding that one co-tenant can establish adverse possession for all co-tenants allows the Nisbets and other claimants to establish adverse possession as to their entire holding by establishing that one co-tenant held the property for the requisite period. For example, it appears that the Nisbet trust held an undivided interest for the entire requisite 10 year period.
VII. [70] Effect of Non-Residency of Claimants
The district court ruled that "[t]he non-residence of a defendant claiming adverse possession does not toll the statutory period." The Tribe argues that the ten year adverse possession period was tolled against certain defendants because they may have been outside of South Carolina for more than one year. S.C. Code § 15-3-30 provides that if a defendant is out of state for more than one year when or after a cause of action accrues, the statute of limitations is tolled until his return to the state. See Dandy v. American Laundry Machinery Inc., 301 S.C. 24, 389 S.E.2d 866, 868 (1990).
We are of opinion that this tolling statute is not applicable to adverse possession claims. "[T]he purpose of the tolling statute is to remedy the problem of locating a nonresident defendant before expiration of the statute of limitations." 389 S.E.2d at 868. Recently, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has indicated that the tolling statute is inapplicable when the statute's purpose is not fulfilled. See Dandy, 389 S.E.2d at 868 (§ 15-3-30 does not apply to a foreign corporation with a registered agent in South Carolina because there is no problem in locating the nonresident defendant before expiration of the statute of limitations). In so doing, the court appears to have rejected the reasoning used in two prior cases that relied on the plain language of the statute. See Cutino v. Ramsey, 285 S.C. 74, 328 S.E.2d 72 (1985) (tolling statute applies to an out-of-state defendant even when service can be effected by substitute service on the Chief Highway Commissioner); Harris v. Dunlap, 285 S.C. 226, 328 S.E.2d 908 (1985) (amenability to personal service under the long-arm statute does not render the tolling statute inapplicable). The Dandy case makes clear that the current test in South Carolina for determining the applicability of the tolling statute is whether the problem of locating an out-of-state defendant prior to the running of the statute of limitations is present. In the instant case, South Carolina's separate comprehensive statutory scheme for the recovery of real property obviates the need for a tolling statute against out-of-state defendants in adverse possession cases. See S.C. Code, Title 15 Civil Remedies and Procedures, Chapter 67 — Recovery of Real Property. Specifically, S.C. Code § 15-67-30 authorizes summons and service by publication on parties outside of the State in actions "to determine adverse claims." Therefore, the problem that the tolling statute addresses, the difficulty in locating an out-of-state defendant before expiration of the statute of limitations, is not present as there is no need to locate the out-of-state defendant in an adverse possession case. In sum, we follow South Carolina's rule, as stated in Dandy, that the tolling statute is inapplicable in cases in which the problem that the statute was meant to address is not present and hold the tolling statute for out of state defendants to be inapplicable to adverse possession claims.
VIII. [73] Dismissal of Certain Claimants
The Tribe alleges that the district court erroneously dismissed certain parties from the case. The district court dismissed twenty-nine claimants, holding that answers to interrogatories on file established that those claimants were entitled to have all parcels claimed by them dismissed from the action. The Tribe argues that, in fact, no answers to interrogatories were filed with the district court. The claimants argue that the information contained in the interrogatory answers was presented to the district court in summary form in briefs, memoranda, and appendices and the Tribe did not object to the use of this information in this form. We are of opinion the district court did not err in relying on these summaries in its dismissal orders as the Tribe did not dispute their accuracy.
We are of opinion, however, that as to those parties that moved for summary judgment as to certain parcels that were not released by the summary judgment orders, the district court erred in dismissing them from the action. Those parties are listed in Appendix H.
The Tribe argues that John S. Simpson moved for summary judgment as to certain parcels that were not released by the judgment orders. A review of the record indicates that summary judgment was, in fact, granted as to all parcels claimed by John S. Simpson. The Tribe's confusion stems from an apparent typographical error — Tax Map Number 600-11-02-005 became Tax Map Number 600-11-02-035 in the judgment order.
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
APPENDICES A THROUGH H
APPENDIX A
Defendant Portion of Judgment Order Describing Parcel APPENDIX B
Defendant Portion of Judgment Order Section of this Describing Parcel Opinion Addressing Objections Date of Conveyance Book Page Three, B, (969)
Date of Conveyance Book Page Tax Map Numbers Date of Conveyance Book Page Three, E, (973) III, n. 5 (All tracts below) Tax Map Numbers 629-06-02-015 II (dates) II (cont.) 627-22-02-021
Date of Conveyance Book Page Date of Conveyance Book Page Date of Conveyance Book Page Date of Deed Recordation Date Book/Page Defendant Portion of Judgment Order Section of this Describing Parcel Opinion Addressing Objections Date of Deed Recordation Date Book/Page Date of Conveyance Book Page Date of Conveyance Book Page Date of Conveyance Book Page Date of Conveyance Book Page Defendant Portion of Judgment Order Section of this Describing Parcel[1] Opinion Addressing Objections Tax Map Number Tax Map or Parcel Date of Conveyance Book Page Book Page Date of Record Tax Map Code Defendant Portion of Judgment Order Section of this Describing Parcel Opinion Addressing Objections Date of Conveyance Book Page Tax Parcel Number Date of Conveyance Book Page Title of Corresponding Notation Section of Tribe's Opening Brief APPENDIX C
Section of this Opinion Rejecting Other Challenges to Defendant Parcel Listed Parcel APPENDIX D
Section of this Opinion Rejecting Other Challenges Defendant Parcel to Listed Parcel Date of Deed Recordation Date Book/Page APPENDIX E
Section of this Opinion Rejecting Other Challenges to Defendant Parcel Listed Parcel APPENDIX F
Section of this Opinion Rejecting Other Challenges to Defendant Parcel Listed Parcel APPENDIX G
Section of this Opinion Rejecting Other Challenges to Defendant Parcel Listed Parcel APPENDIX H
Parcels Remaining Defendant in this Case Without necessarily implying any criticism of the attorneys for the Tribe or for the defendants, a glance at the style of this case and a reference to our various opinions herein shows the more than complicated position in which the parties and the court find ourselves. Many of the defendants own multiple tracts of land and the decision of the district court appealed from is contained in large part in four judgment orders accompanied by multiple exhibits. Perhaps because the Tribe was confined, at least in part, by rules as to numbers of pages, the content of its brief on appeal generally stated its complaints in the most general terms as to parties and tracts affected, while the brief itself may have specifically stated the nature of the legal error claimed. The reply brief of the defendants in many cases picked up and argued the specific legal issues presented leaving their general application as to parties and parcels of land to an interpretation of the district court's orders and the briefs. While we think with reasonable certainty that the attorneys quite understand the parties and the property affected by the briefs, only a causal inspection will reveal that in most cases such is not shown by a reading of the briefs without minute references to the appendix and in some cases to parts of the record not included in the appendix. For example, on page 41 of the Tribe's brief, in part B, 2, c. "Tree Farms" the objection is "A number of claims identified the nature and use of the property claimed by them as tree farm, timber farming, timber growing or timber lands." The brief then lists 18 appendix references without giving names of defendants or properties affected. To this, the defendants respond on page 21 of their brief by identifying the property of only two defendants with particularity. Much the same can be said of the Tribe's contentions on page 43, part d. with reference to "Farming or Recreational or Social Purpose." While the defendants response on page 28 is in more detail than the response mentioned for tree farming, nevertheless, it does not identify all of the property as to which the Tribe's claim is made. We could go on and on, some better and some worse, but these two examples are enough to show why the mechanical construction of our opinion, for the most part, speaks in general terms, and shows its application in most cases by way of appendices. That was the only practical means we could devise within any kind of reasonable page limitation to show what we had decided and how our decision applied to a particular defendant or piece of property. We must all remember that this opinion concerns the title to real estate and well may end up being recorded in the real estate records of the State. We should say without rancor that the briefs we have had in this case do not commend themselves as models of form. We have, however, addressed each question of law raised by the Tribe. For these reasons, we have included as a part of this opinion and the decision in this case appendices A through H, which will show the parties affected, precisely where to find the properties affected, and the parts of our decision affecting the same, including our disposition of the questions. The defendants' unopposed motion for summary affirmance is hereby GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED as to the following parcels of land. 1. Hoechst Celanese One, A, (856); Deed dated 10/1/86; Deed Book 922, page 195, York County; except property described on page 2, paragraph 9 of the deed: Deed from Celriver Recreation Assoc. to Celanese Corp. dated 6/2/78 recorded in York County Clerk's Office, Deed Book 572, page 377, on 6/5/78 and property described on page 2, paragraph 10 of the deed: Deed from David Int'l, Inc., to Celanese Corp. dated 6/11/85 recorded in York County Clerk's Office, Deed Book 825, page 160 on 6/26/85. 2. Wachovia Bank One, B, ¶ (i), (855); Deed dated 10/30/50, and Trust Company Deed book 164, page 320 York County, SC 3. Heritage Village One, C, ¶ 4, (857); Deed dated 8/1/85, Deed Book F-6, page 2544 One, C, ¶ 10, (858-59); Deed dated 11/30/81; Deed Book 648, page 311 and Deed dated 1/27/84; Deed Book 741, page 332; One, C, ¶ 11, (859); Deed dated 9/30/82; Deed Book 678, page 230; One, C, ¶ 13, (859); Deed dated 5/2/85, Deed Book 816, page 105 4. T.W. Hutchison One, J, (866); TMS No. 664-00-00-020; Deed dated 6/20/63; Deed Book 313, page 383 5. Francis M. Mack, One, K, (867); Deed dated 11/23/76, Deed Book 540, Jr. page 16; Deed dated 11/15/50, Deed Book 165, page 491; and Deed dated 1/24/85, Deed Book 804, page 157 6. John S. Simpson One, L, (868); Deed dated 11/2/50; Deed Book 165, page 23 7. Thomas Brown One, M, (869); File No. 14644 Probate Court York Snodgrass, Jr. County and File No. 15772; Probate Court York County 8. City of Rock Hill One, O, (871); Deed dated 9/5/86; Deed Book 906, South Carolina page 293 The judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED as to the following parcels of land. 1. Wachovia Bank One, B, ¶ (ii), (855) VI (All and Trust Company tracts[*]) Deed dated 10/30/1950 Deed Book 164, page 320 Three, A, (968) ¶ 1.a. — Deed dated 6/20/57 Deed Book 240, page 182 ¶ 1.b. — Deed dated 6/21/57 Deed Book 240, page 179 ¶ 1.c. — Deed dated 12/12/63 Deed Book I, page 203 ¶ 2.a. — Deed dated 4/20/66 II (poss.) ¶ 3-275 acres, York County VII ¶ 4-680 acres, York County VII [*] An objection was raised as to all tracts in the judgment order and summary judgment is affirmed as to all tracts unless they are specifically mentioned in Appendices C-H. 2. Heritage Village One, C, (857) ? 250 522 VII 12/1/83 733 95 n. 5 (Glover) 812 356 n. 5 7/5/84 772 356 III n. 5 11/15/78 585 18 III 8/10/84 773 39 III 6/15/84 771 188 n. 5 9/16/75 528 226 III 4/29/81 631 555 n. 5 1/15/85 803 202 III n. 5 4/25/78 569 939 III 2/15/85 804 99 III n. 5 12/12/77 C-6 5365 II (poss.) 2/84 756 83 III VII 1/6/78 562 914 II (dates) 1/78 C-6 5482 III 1/78 C-6 5483 VII 8/31/83 718 318 II (cont.) III 3. Herald Publishing One, D, (860) Company Tract C — Deed dated 5/12/77; Deed Book 548, page 49 Tracts A, B F — Deed dated 6/26/86; Deed Book 896, page 286 Tract E — Deed dated 5/20/81; Deed Book 631, page 957 Tract D — Deed dated 6/26/86; Deed Book 896, page 286 Three, C, (970) II (poss.) Tracts L K — Deed dated III 10/31/85; Deed Book 849, page 500 4. C.H. Albright Three, D, (971-972) III, n. 5 (All tracts below) 600-02-03-061 II (dates) II (cont.) 600-02-02-064 II (dates) II (cont.) 598-19-03-016 II (dates) II (cont.) 598-19-03-015 II (cont.) 627-07-04-025 II (dates) II (cont.) 600-20-01-010 II (dates) II (cont.) 600-21-03-036 II (dates) II (cont.) 600-21-01-018 II (dates) II (cont.) 600-21-02-011 II (dates) II (cont.) 600-21-02-010 II (dates) II (cont.) 627-02-02-006 II (dates) II (cont.) 620-00-00-005 II (tree fm.) II (dates) 620-00-00-007 II (tree fm.) II (dates) 620-00-00-008 II (tree fm.) II (dates) 627-22-02-021 II (poss.) VI 5. Ned M. Albright One, F, (862) 2/13/56 221 447 2/17/78 565 930 3/21/80 611 528 5/17/79 594 256 6. David G. One, G, (863) Anderson 8/24/85 838 208 7/8/85 827 350 IV-E VI VII 7. John Wesley One, H, (864) Anderson, III 7/8/85 827 350 IV-E VI 8/24/85 838 208 Three, I, (977) n. 10 Tax Map 604-06-01-028 III II (dates) 8. F.S. Barnes, Jr. One, I, (865) Deed dated 1/28/57 III Deed Book 235, page 415 Three, J, (978) III (All tracts below) 536-00-00-038 II (farm) II (dates) 597-00-00-019 II (tree) II (dates) 639-00-00-022 II (poss.) II (dates) 639-00-00-025 II (farm) II (dates) 639-00-00-030 II (farm) II (dates) 639-00-00-031 II (farm) II (dates) 639-00-00-032 II (farm) II (dates) 627-10-02-029 II (dates) 627-12-01-001 II (dates) 9. Marshall E. One, N, (870) Walker 3/6/69 387 393 10/12/56 202 307 9/26/69 383 307 Three, P, (985-986) III, n. 5 (All tracts[*]) 624-00-00-016 II (tree) II (dates) 624-00-00-011 II (tree) II (dates) 677-00-00-026 II (tree) II (dates) 624-00-00-012 II (tree) II (dates) 621-00-00-042 II (tree) II (dates) 622-00-00-014 II (tree) II (dates) 674-00-00-003 II (tree) II (dates) 675-00-00-064 II (tree) II (dates) 675-00-00-065 II (tree) II (dates) 752-00-00-031 II (tree) II (dates) 675-00-00-062 II (tree) II (dates) 624-00-00-014 II (tree) II (dates) 678-00-00-017 II (tree) II (dates) 678-00-00-011 II (poss.) II (dates) 622-00-00-007 II (dates) 622-00-00-013 II (dates) 624-00-00-015 II (dates) 692-00-00-046 II (dates) 598-05-02-010 II (dates) 677-00-00-019 II (dates) 674-00-00-006 624-00-00-010 10. Duke Power One, P, (872-900) II, n. 5 (All Company tracts[*]) York County, South Carolina 5/11/100 6/13/00 19/621-633 09/01/25 12/05/25 65/48 09/01/25 12/05/25 65/53 12/19/27 12/21/27 65/303 05/10/32 06/01/32 74/540 06/27/36 08/05/36 87/138 09/08/24 09/17/24 61/283 06/05/24 06/07/24 61/68 03/19/26 04/09/26 2-P/19 (Plat Book) 05/21/30 05/28/30 74/231 05/18/25 12/24/25 65/61 09/03/24 09/17/24 54/623 09/24/24 10/01/24 54/623 09/08/24 09/17/24 54/617 09/23/24 10/01/24 54/622 09/01/25 02/05/25 65/53 06/27/36 08/05/36 87/138 12/24/03 01/23/05 24/637-38 12/30/03 01/23/05 24/636-37 12/23/03 01/23/05 24/635-36 12/26/03 01/23/05 24/634 01/02/04 01/23/05 24/632-33 12/23/03 01/23/05 24/631-32 01/26/04 01/23/05 24/630-31 01/28/04 01/23/05 24/628-29 04/12/04 01/23/05 24/627-28 01/16/04 01/23/05 24/621-22 12/23/03 01/23/05 24/625-26 12/21/03 01/23/05 24/622-23 12/21/03 01/23/05 24/626-27 12/21/03 01/23/05 24/620-21 03/11/04 01/23/05 24/624-25 03/31/04 01/23/05 24/623-24 01/27/04 01/23/05 24/638-39 02/25/05 05/16/05 25/56-57 04/01/04 06/03/05 25/86 07/27/05 07/31/05 25/142 01/30/09 02/01/09 29/455-56 04/11/14 06/06/14 39/614 04/15/16 06/06/14 39/613 03/16/16 03/28/16 44/137 03/16/16 03/28/16 44/138 03/17/16 03/28/16 44/138 03/20/16 03/28/16 44/139 03/17/16 03/28/16 44/139 03/17/16 03/25/16 44/140 03/17/16 03/28/16 44/140 03/17/16 03/28/16 44/141 03/17/16 03/25/16 44/141 03/16/16 03/28/16 44/142 03/16/16 03/28/16 44/142 03/17/16 03/28/16 44/143 03/28/16 04/04/16 44/144 03/29/16 04/04/16 44/144 03/29/16 04/04/16 44/145 03/22/16 04/12/16 44/152 03/29/16 07/28/16 44/166 01/06/04 01/23/05 24/641-42 01/14/04 01/23/05 24/642-43 01/06/04 01/23/05 24/646-47 01/19/04 01/23/05 24/645-46 03/01/04 01/23/05 24/643-44 01/19/04 01/23/05 24/644-45 01/19/04 01/23/05 24/647-48 01/11/04 01/23/05 24/649 07/19/16 07/22/26 44/165 08/08/16 08/14/16 44/172 09/15/25 01/01/25 65/14 09/03/30 10/18/30 74/277 03/30/34 04/03/34 79/184 09/20/38 09/21/38 92/599 03/01/40 03/12/40 98/252 09/26/50 10/12/50 163/384 04/22/53 04/30/53 193/75 03/08/04 01/23/05 24/664 03/08/04 01/23/05 24/665-66 03/07/04 01/23/05 24/659-60 03/25/04 01/23/05 24/663-64 03/08/04 01/23/05 24/660-61 03/08/04 01/23/05 24/662-63 07/19/04 01/23/05 24/639-40 03/10/04 01/23/05 24/650-51 03/11/04 01/23/05 24/650-51 03/11/04 01/23/05 24/658-59 03/07/04 01/23/05 24/651-52 03/10/04 01/23/05 24/653-54 03/08/04 01/23/05 24/654-55 03/15/04 01/23/05 24/652-53 03/11/04 01/23/05 24/656-57 03/07/04 01/23/05 24/655-56 03/07/04 01/23/05 24/657-58 09/01/05 08/24/06 26/370 07/02/07 07/13/07 27/577 03/20/07 09/13/07 27/671 03/20/07 09/13/07 27/673 03/20/07 09/13/07 27/672 05/24/17 06/04/17 44/315 05/22/17 06/05/17 44/313 05/27/17 06/05/17 44/312 05/22/17 06/05/17 44/313 05/24/17 06/05/17 44/313 05/24/17 06/13/17 44/318 06/08/17 06/13/17 44/318 06/14/17 06/19/17 44/320-21 05/26/17 06/05/17 44/315 06/15/17 06/15/17 44/318-19 06/15/17 06/15/17 44/319 06/25/17 07/12/17 44/324-25 01/04/05 01/23/05 24/640-41 01/05/05 05/16/05 25/58 01/18/05 05/16/05 25/59 03/15/06 05/01/06 25/767 09/19/05 05/01/06 25/771-772 06/08/05 05/01/06 26/768-769 03/15/06 05/01/06 25/779-780 06/13/05 05/01/06 25/770-771 09/19/05 05/01/06 25/772-773 09/24/05 05/01/06 25/769-770 02/13/06 05/01/06 25/768 03/15/06 05/01/06 25/773-774 06/05/05 06/28/06 26/186 09/01/05 08/24/06 26/370 06/13/07 06/17/07 27/546-547 09/02/07 10/25/07 27/710-711 06/14/05 05/01/06 25/776-77 10/20/05 05/01/06 25/774-75 10/21/05 05/01/06 25/775-76 09/01/05 08/24/06 26/359 09/01/05 08/24/06 26/369 08/02/05 08/24/06 36/372 09/08/05 08/24/06 26/376 08/21/05 08/24/06 26/375 03/29/06 08/02/06 26/251 07/30/06 08/02/06 26/253 07/05/06 08/02/06 26/255 03/31/06 08/02/06 26/254 06/19/06 08/02/06 26/256 04/06/06 08/02/06 26/257 05/07/06 08/02/06 26/259 05/07/06 08/02/06 26/260 03/29/06 08/02/06 26/258 07/05/06 08/02/06 26/262 04/04/06 08/02/06 26/261 03/28/06 28/02/26 36/263 03/28/06 08/02/26 26/264 03/28/06 08/02/06 26/265 07/05/06 08/02/06 26/267 07/05/06 08/02/06 26/268 03/29/06 08/02/06 26/266 05/08/06 08/02/06 26/269 07/05/06 08/02/06 26/270 05/07/06 08/02/06 26/272 03/31/06 08/02/06 26/275 04/04/06 08/02/06 26/276 04/03/06 08/02/06 26/278 03/29/06 08/02/06 26/278 06/19/06 08/02/06 26/280 01/25/07 01/28/07 27/135-36 07/04/06 01/28/07 27/133-35 08/30/06 01/28/07 27/148-149 09/05/06 01/28/07 27/149-50 08/16/06 01/28/07 27/141-42 08/16/06 01/28/07 27/131-32 08/30/06 01/28/07 27/127-128 01/25/07 01/28/07 27/132 12/21/06 01/28/07 27/153 11/12/06 06/17/07 27/545-46 01/17/07 06/17/07 27/555-556 09/07/06 06/19/07 27/562 05/29/07 08/28/07 27/636 03/27/06 11/15/07 27/771-72 01/15/09 01/26/09 29/446 01/26/09 02/01/09 29/456-459 02/11/09 02/22/09 29/484 04/05/09 04/29/09 29/530 04/16/09 05/05/09 29/535-56 01/07/09 06/16/09 29/594 11/29/09 01/18/10 29/791-793 01/05/17 01/09/17 44/249 01/03/17 01/09/17 44/250 01/06/17 01/09/17 44/250 01/03/17 01/09/17 44/250-51 01/02/17 01/09/17 44/251 01/06/17 01/09/17 44/245-46 01/06/17 01/09/17 44/244 01/04/17 01/09/17 44/247 01/06/17 01/09/17 44/246 01/06/17 01/09/17 44/245 01/03/17 01/09/17 44/247-48 01/02/17 01/09/17 44/246 01/03/17 01/09/17 44/249 01/04/17 01/09/17 44/247 01/01/17 01/09/17 44/248 01/02/17 01/09/17 44/244 01/08/17 01/09/17 44/243 01/03/17 01/09/17 44/244-45 01/04/17 01/09/17 44/247 01/09/17 01/17/17 44/257 01/10/17 01/17/17 44/258 01/11/17 01/17/17 44/258 01/09/17 01/17/17 44/258 01/13/17 01/17/17 44/257 01/19/17 01/23/17 44/261 01/17/17 01/23/17 44/261 01/16/17 01/23/17 44/261 01/23/17 01/30/17 44/264 01/23/17 01/30/17 44/264 01/23/17 01/30/17 44/264 01/29/17 02/06/17 44/267 01/29/17 02/06/17 44/267-68 02/09/17 02/16/17 44/272-73 02/09/17 02/16/17 44/273 02/10/17 02/16/17 44/273 03/14/17 03/20/17 44/287 03/16/17 03/20/17 44/284 03/19/17 03/20/17 44/285 03/20/17 03/20/17 44/286 03/16/17 03/20/17 44/286 03/13/17 03/20/17 44/2854 02/09/17 03/20/17 44/286 03/29/17 04/02/17 44/292 03/29/17 04/10/17 44/296 05/22/17 06/05/17 44/311 05/22/17 06/05/17 44/311 05/23/17 06/15/17 44/312 05/24/17 06/05/17 44/315 05/13/17 06/15/17 44/319 06/19/17 06/22/17 44/321 06/28/17 06/29/17 44/322 09/19/17 09/25/17 44/341 09/11/17 09/25/17 44/341 10/10/17 10/18/17 44/348 02/27/17 06/17/07 27/550 09/04/06 01/28/07 27/146-47 05/03/07 06/17/07 27/547-48 02/27/07 06/17/07 27/554-55 10/20/06 06/17/07 27/544-45 02/25/07 06/17/07 27/543-44 02/25/07 06/17/07 27/542-43 05/18/07 06/17/07 27/556 01/18/07 02/27/07 27/338-339 01/12/17 01/23/17 44/262 07/20/17 07/31/17 44/331 04/21/17 04/27/17 44/303 04/23/17 05/09/17 44/305 04/04/17 06/22/17 44/322 03/30/23 04/04/23 54/298 03/28/23 04/04/23 54/297 04/05/23 04/10/23 54/303 04/04/23 04/10/23 54/303 04/04/23 04/10/23 54/304 03/07/23 04/10/23 54/305 04/07/23 04/10/23 54/304 04/05/23 04/17/23 54/308 04/12/23 04/17/23 54/314 04/05/23 04/19/23 54/314 04/19/23 04/24/23 54/317 04/20/23 04/24/23 54/319-20 04/21/23 04/24/23 54/315 04/21/23 04/24/23 54/316 04/20/23 04/24/23 54/319 04/11/23 04/24/23 54/316 04/20/23 04/24/23 54/318 04/19/23 04/24/23 54/317 04/19/23 04/24/23 54/318 04/20/23 04/24/23 54/319 04/12/23 05/01/23 54/324 04/25/23 05/01/23 54/326 05/24/23 06/01/23 54/347 04/26/23 05/01/23 54/325 04/26/23 05/01/23 54/323 04/04/23 05/01/23 54/327 04/26/23 05/01/23 54/323 04/27/23 05/01/23 54/325 04/27/23 05/01/23 54/324 05/05/23 05/08/23 54/328 05/12/23 05/16/23 54/334 05/04/23 05/16/23 54/333 05/12/23 05/23/23 54/338 05/25/23 05/29/23 54/342 05/24/23 05/29/23 54/346 05/25/23 05/29/23 54/344 05/23/23 05/29/23 54/344 05/24/23 05/29/23 54/345 05/24/23 05/29/23 54/345 05/29/23 06/06/23 54/354 05/26/23 06/06/23 54/351 04/21/23 06/06/23 54/352 05/04/23 06/06/23 54/351 05/04/23 06/06/23 54/353 05/04/23 06/06/23 54/353 05/04/23 06/13/23 54/363 05/04/12 06/13/23 54/361 06/01/23 06/19/23 54/364 06/04/23 06/19/23 54/363 05/04/23 07/06/23 54/373 05/25/23 01/15/24 54/460 01/28/36 01/28/26 79/603 09/24/24 09/24/24 54/620 09/30/24 10/07/24 54/632 09/30/24 10/07/24 54/633 10/02/24 10/07/24 54/633 10/03/24 10/07/24 54/634 10/04/24 10/07/24 54/631 10/04/24 10/07/24 54/631 10/04/24 10/07/24 54/634 10/01/24 10/14/24 54/644 10/01/24 10/07/24 54/632 10/31/24 11/11/24 54/661 11/07/24 11/11/24 54/662 12/05/24 12/09/24 54/671 12/10/24 12/24/24 54/680 12/30/24 01/01/25 54/684 12/30/24 01/01/25 54/684 12/19/25 12/22/25 65/57 02/11/26 02/16/26 65/87 06/13/26 07/02/26 65/130 06/13/26 07/02/26 65/130 05/12/59 07/01/59 264/531 06/30/59 07/14/59 265/207 06/29/59 07/14/59 265/203 02/18/25 02/20/25 54/722 10/15/29 10/22/29 74/149 11/08/29 11/12/29 74/156 12/11/33 12/27/33 79/165 12/01/31 01/16/32 74/479 09/28/34 09/29/34 79/242 10/22/34 10/24/34 79/296 05/23/44 09/26/44 114/48 05/25/44 09/26/44 114/47 10/25/44 10/31/44 114/71 09/14/50 10/19/50 163/493 09/27/50 10/19/50 163/494 07/30/52 08/07/52 184/219 09/27/55 09/30/55 18/408 03/13/58 03/27/58 249/232 12/03/57 03/27/58 249/234 03/11/58 03/27/58 249/236 01/29/58 03/27/58 249/238 02/20/58 03/27/58 249/240 03/21/58 03/27/58 249/242 02/25/58 03/27/58 249/244 12/11/57 03/27/58 249/246 12/03/57 03/27/58 249/248 03/19/58 03/27/58 249/250 02/19/58 03/27/58 249/252 05/09/58 06/10/58 251/360-61 05/15/58 06/10/58 251/362-63 05/09/58 06/10/58 251/364-65 05/05/58 06/24/58 252/22 02/17/59 03/03/59 260/220 09/16/58 09/23/58 255/96 07/01/59 08/13/59 266/112 06/26/59 08/13/59 266/142 06/26/59 08/13/59 266/132 06/29/59 08/13/59 266/118 06/29/59 08/13/59 266/120 06/26/59 08/13/59 266/122 07/07/59 08/13/59 266/124 07/02/59 08/13/59 266/126 06/29/59 08/13/59 266/134 07/01/59 08/13/59 166/114 08/05/59 08/13/59 266/144 08/18/59 08/24/59 266/285 07/01/59 08/13/59 266/116 06/26/59 08/13/59 266/128 07/02/59 08/13/59 266/136 07/02/59 08/13/59 266/138 07/26/60 07/28/60 276/547 05/17/65 05/17/65 337/234 05/17/65 05/17/65 337/240 05/17/65 05/20/65 337/320 05/17/65 05/20/65 337/323 05/26/65 06/02/65 338/28 06/02/65 06/24/65 338/480 05/20/65 06/24/65 338/492 07/01/65 07/06/65 339/157 07/01/65 07/06/65 339/163 07/16/65 07/20/65 339/484 07/29/65 08/03/65 340/232 07/06/65 08/09/65 340/349 09/20/65 10/01/64 342/208 01/04/65 01/14/65 332/431 02/04/65 02/11/65 333/468 06/29/65 07/01/65 339/327 06/29/65 07/14/65 339/343 06/29/65 07/14/65 339/340 06/29/65 07/14/65 339/336 06/29/65 09/25/65 342/95 10/09/65 10/13/65 342/449 09/29/66 10/17/66 356/267 08/13/57 09/03/57 243/247 08/12/57 09/03/57 243/249 08/12/57 09/03/57 242/251 08/12/57 09/03/57 243/253 08/16/57 09/03/57 243/255 08/08/57 09/03/57 243/257 09/04/57 09/06/57 243/318 09/04/57 09/06/57 243/320 02/02/59 03/26/59 261/149 02/17/59 03/26/59 261/153 12/01/67 12/01/67 370/482 01/25/68 02/01/68 372/437 02/07/68 03/07/68 374/9 02/08/68 03/07/68 374/13 09/28/67 10/13/67 369/48 02/12/67 12/18/67 371/265 12/13/67 12/18/67 371/2707 11/16/67 11/29/67 370/427 10/10/67 10/13/67 369/51 11/29/67 01/23/68 372/281 11/08/67 11/29/67 370/415 12/28/67 01/05/68 372/14 02/13/68 02/15/68 373/100 02/15/68 02/21/68 373/230 02/13/68 02/15/68 373/98 04/03/69 04/08/69 388/231 04/07/38 04/15/38 87/569 04/11/38 04/15/38 87/571 03/23/38 04/15/38 87/573 04/09/38 04/15/38 87/571 04/09/38 04/15/38 87/568 04/09/38 04/15/38 87/573 03/24/38 03/25/38 87/552 04/11/38 04/15/38 87/568 05/12/38 05/13/38 87/600 04/09/38 04/15/38 87/572 04/12/38 05/29/38 87/592 04/09/38 04/15/38 87/570 04/20/38 04/22/38 87/583 03/18/38 04/23/38 87/584 11/13/66 12/15/66 358/183 05/17/67 01/24/68 372/310 05/26/67 06/07/67 363/569 05/26/67 06/07/67 363/572 12/13/66 12/15/66 358/180 02/10/59 03/26/59 261/151 03/27/68 04/09/68 375/362 03/27/68 05/01/68 376/298 09/04/68 09/05/68 381/82 03/28/59 04/01/59 261/306 03/27/68 04/29/68 376/242 02/12/68 02/12/68 373/15 02/08/68 02/12/68 373/18 02/13/68 02/20/68 373/168 03/15/68 03/16/68 374/291 03/14/68 03/16/68 374/294 03/25/68 03/26/68 374/584 04/01/68 04/04/68 375/227 03/27/68 04/04/68 375/230 03/28/68 04/04/68 375/233 03/29/68 04/04/68 375/236 03/21/68 04/04/68 375/240 03/29/68 04/04/68 375/244 04/09/68 04/10/68 375/370 04/12/68 04/13/68 375/435 04/12/68 04/13/68 375/438 04/09/68 04/18/68 375/534 04/09/68 04/18/68 375/538 04/20/68 04/23/68 376/81 04/15/68 04/23/68 376/84 04/26/68 04/30/68 376/253 05/06/68 05/07/68 376/461 05/15/68 05/16/68 377/21 05/13/68 05/16/68 377/18 05/23/68 05/24/68 377/248 06/17/68 06/20/68 378/285 07/11/68 07/17/68 379/215 07/05/68 07/17/68 379/218 10/24/68 10/28/68 383/33 12/28/68 01/07/69 385/258 03/11/69 03/13/69 387/282 07/07/69 07/18/69 392/153 06/14/69 07/18/69 392/156 07/09/69 07/18/69 392/160 08/05/69 08/06/69 393/32 08/06/69 08/29/69 393/494 09/18/69 09/23/69 394/411 09/18/69 09/23/69 394/415 10/07/69 10/22/69 395/407 11/07/69 11/10/69 396/102 11/24/69 12/06/69 397/154 11/24/69 12/08/69 397/149 01/26/70 02/02/70 398/449 01/28/70 02/02/70 398/455 01/28/70 02/02/70 398/452 04/23/68 02/02/70 398/459 10/14/68 02/16/73 Judgment Roll No. 36800/ Box 939 04/04/70 04/14/70 401/209 07/30/69 08/18/69 393/245 02/14/71 02/23/71 98/476 07/29/70 02/23/71 98/477 01/21/29 02/21/30 74/159 Lancaster County, South Carolina 05/13/54 05/19/54 J4/29 07/20/55 08/02/55 MA/? 12/21/37 12/22/37 I-3/63 12/21/37 12/22/37 I-3/64 01/04/38 01/04/38 I-3/88 01/04/38 01/04/38 I-3/91 01/03/38 01/04/38 I-3/85 01/03/38 01/04/38 I-3/84 06/01/38 06/06/38 I-3/180 04/15/38 04/15/38 I-3/156 05/01/38 ? ? 01/03/38 01/04/38 I-3/81-82 01/04/38 01/04/38 I-3/90 03/15/38 05/11/38 15/551 06/03/38 07/25/38 I-3/195-96 04/01/38 07/20/38 I-3/193-94 01/04/38 01/14/38 I-3/86-87 03/10/38 03/25/38 I-3/139-40 01/11/38 01/12/38 I-3/102 01/12/38 01/12/38 I-3/104 01/04/38 01/04/38 I-3/89 01/03/38 01/04/38 I-3/83 01/11/38 01/12/38 I-3/101 04/05/38 04/13/38 I-3/155 01/26/38 01/26/38 I-3/116-17 07/06/67 ? ? 05/13/68 05/16/68 Z-5/245 05/03/68 05/17/68 Z-5/255 05/23/68 05/28/68 Z-5/335 05/25/68 05/28/68 Z-5/338 05/27/68 05/28/68 Z-5/336 05/27/68 05/28/68 Z-5/339 05/28/68 06/06/68 Z-5/391 05/25/68 07/09/68 Z-5/527 07/03/68 07/09/68 Z-5/523 06/11/68 07/09/68 Z-5/526 07/03/68 07/09/68 Z-5/524 07/31/68 08/13/68 Z-5/673 07/15/68 09/18/69 Z-5/2591 10/26/68 11/13/68 Z-5/1056 06/11/68 12/23/68 Z-5/1204 02/10/69 02/20/69 Z-5/1470 02/20/69 04/15/69 Z-5/1745 12/04/68 07/17/69 Z-5/2268 06/10/69 07/17/69 Z-5/2269 08/08/69 08/26/69 Z-5/2585 10/07/69 10/20/69 Z-5/2749 09/22/69 10/22/69 Z-5/2753 11/20/69 11/25/69 Z-5/2919 11/21/69 12/06/69 Z-5/2967 02/24/70 03/02/70 A-6/304 03/03/70 03/05/70 A-6/326 05/05/70 05/18/70 A-6/642 Chester County, South Carolina 01/04/17 01/09/17 167/64 02/13/34 02/13/34 269/215 02/13/34 02/19/34 269/217 02/06/34 02/19/34 269/218 02/12/34 02/19/34 269/218 01/30/34 02/21/34 269/219 02/21/34 02/23/34 269/221 03/07/34 02/31/34 269/228 07/31/34 09/17/34 269/259 09/21/49 10/21/49 357/200 11/26/53 12/10/53 375/141 01/28/54 02/11/54 379/91 10/07/53 03/12/54 375/199 10/18/51 12/21/51 D-4/302 02/22/68 04/30/68 Z-5/143 York County, South Carolina 09/28/68 10/15/68 382/321 07/03/68 07/05/68 378/548 07/08/15 07/12/15 43/327 07/25/60 07/28/60 276/550 03/28/59 04/01/59 261/302 04/15/69 04/16/69 388/369 10/11/24 10/14/24 54/641 07/27/23 01/15/24 59/311 10/11/24 10/14/24 54/640 05/02/67 05/12/67 363/45 11/22/66 12/01/66 357/505 11/19/29 11/27/29 74/159 10/23/67 10/25/67 369/308 01/13/69 01/17/69 385/403 11/16/67 11/20/67 370/260 07/13/68 08/13/68 380/217 04/12/65 04/20/65 336/168 03/27/68 04/29/68 376/239 01/03/36 01/29/36 86/135 08/13/66 08/23/66 354/355 01/31/56 02/10/56 223/394 10/16/41 10/21/41 98/516 01/31/56 02/10/56 223/399 11/19/29 11/26/29 74/158 04/06/68 04/08/68 375/343 06/15/68 06/17/68 378/194 02/16/68 02/19/68 373/152 03/07/68 03/07/68 374/1 02/13/68 02/15/68 373/88 12/16/67 12/18/67 371/273 Summary judgment is affirmed as to the following tracts for that portion of the land that is below 570 feet above mean sea level: 05/28/26 08/30/26 65/146 07/08/24 07/12/24 61/145 12/09/24 12/18/24 62/178 09/17/24 10/03/24 62/3 09/08/24 09/17/24 61/283 07/29/25 08/13/25 64/132 09/22/24 10/01/24 54/628 07/08/24 07/10/24 61/134 09/24/24 10/01/24 54/623 11/17/24 11/19/24 62/104 05/03/28 05/11/28 71/251 03/19/09 01/07/10 29/778-80 09/17/24 10/03/24 61/314 11/25/24 12/04/24 62/144 06/14/04 08/13/04 24/187-88 12/16/25 01/15/26 66/166 10/14/24 10/18/24 62/36 03/17/25 03/24/25 63/128 07/31/24 08/09/24 61/183 07/24/25 08/05/25 64/137 12/30/10 01/02/11 32/56 07/31/24 08/09/24 54/599 08/08/24 08/16/24 61/208 09/10/24 09/17/24 54/616 06/04/24 06/07/24 61/69 07/08/24 07/12/24 61/143 03/31/24 04/02/24 60/243 03/29/24 04/02/24 60/244 03/19/09 01/07/10 29/773-76 03/19/09 01/07/10 29/776-78 05/11/00 06/13/00 19/621-33 05/10/32 06/01/32 74/540 12/19/27 12/21/27 65/303 09/01/25 12/05/25 65/48 Amend., A B, (1015-1018) III (all tracts below) York County, South Carolina 05/11/00 06/13/00 19/621-633 09/01/25 12/05/25 65/48 09/01/25 12/05/25 65/53 12/19/27 12/21/27 65/303 05/10/32 06/01/32 74/540 08/05/36 08/05/36 87/138 05/28/26 08/30/26 65/146 07/08/24 07/12/24 61/145 12/09/24 12/18/24 62/178 09/17/24 10/03/24 62/3 09/08/24 09/17/24 61/283 07/29/25 08/13/25 64/132 09/22/24 10/01/24 54/628 07/08/24 07/10/24 61/134 09/24/24 10/01/24 54/623 11/17/24 11/19/24 62/104 05/03/28 05/11/28 71/251 03/19/09 01/07/10 29/778-80 09/17/24 10/03/24 61/314 11/25/24 12/04/24 62/144 06/14/04 08/13/04 24/187-88 12/16/25 01/15/26 66/166 10/14/24 10/18/24 62/36 03/17/25 03/24/25 63/128 06/05/24 06/07/24 61/68 07/31/24 08/09/24 61/183 09/08/24 09/17/24 61/283 07/24/25 08/05/25 64/137 12/30/10 01/02/11 32/56 07/31/24 08/09/24 54/599 08/08/24 08/16/24 61/208 09/10/24 09/17/24 54/616 06/04/24 06/07/24 61/69 03/19/26 04/09/26 2-P/19 Plat Book 07/08/24 07/12/24 61/143 03/31/24 04/02/24 60/243 03/29/24 04/02/24 60/244 03/19/09 01/07/10 29/773-76 03/19/09 01/07/10 29/776-78 05/11/00 06/13/00 19/621-33 05/10/32 06/01/32 74/540 12/19/27 12/21/27 65/303 09/01/25 12/05/25 65/48 05/21/30 05/28/30 74/231 05/18/25 12/24/25 65/61 09/03/24 09/17/24 54/623 09/24/24 10/01/24 54/623 09/08/24 09/17/24 54/617 09/23/24 10/01/24 54/622 09/01/25 12/05/25 65/53 06/27/36 08/05/36 87/138 11. Crescent Resources One, Q, (901) III, n. 5 (All Inc. tracts[*]) Land conveyed to Crescent by D.M. Creech and Margaret F. Creech by deed dated December 29, 1983, and recorded in the Office of the Clerk of the Court for York County, South Carolina, on December 29, 1983, in Deed Book 736 at page 298. Two, B, (957-958) IV-A, III, n. 5] (All tracts[*]) 03/27/70 03/27/70 400/466 05/22/70 05/22/70 402/527 03/27/70 03/27/70 400/463 03/27/70 03/27/70 400/470 03/27/70 03/27/70 400/468 05/22/70 05/27/70 402/521 05/14/70 05/18/70 402/309 06/03/70 06/09/70 403/259 05/22/70 05/27/70 402/524 06/03/70 08/10/70 405/369 12. State of South One, R, (902-905) III (All Carolina tracts[*]) 06/02/1893 M13 1 06/31/05 25 157 12/30/1893 134 385 02/01/07 27 208 04/24/1897 20 655 03/05/29 73 153 02/??/29 65 548 02/??/29 65 546 02/25/29 73 155 06/03/19 50 6 10/06/20 48 189 10/04/20 53 205 04/15/19 50 4 07/06/20 53 17 02/19/41 103 198 06/04/30 76 455 06/04/30 76 457 02/26/29 73 154 07/02/20 48 736 11/15/20 ? ? 09/24/10 37 97 08/21/19 50 5 07/20/20 52 13 02/19/41 103 199 03/16/56 231 444 08/31/26 68 19 10/02/19 48 344 08/16/19 44 662 07/01/19 49 369 05/14/20 ? ? 06/24/20 53 99 07/29/20 44 716 04/24/1897 20 653 02/20/06 26 172 07/12/06 26 649 01/31/06 25 595 02/23/06 26 174 01/20/22 56 155 01/11/26 66 181 01/11/26 65 73 02/22/22 56 128 07/01/07 28 186 03/12/19 44 569 11/27/05 26 173 04/24/1897 20 651 08/07/61 289 314 08/31/18 47 132 07/29/18 47 210 05/17/19 44 636 06/02/19 44 621 05/17/61 286 453 08/23/29 75 161 12/28/12 40 321 12/06/12 40 302 12/06/12 36 624 12/16/12 36 622 09/29/25 64 209 12/31/25 66 133 07/29/20 53 123 12/12/18 47 258 01/12/20 51 122 12/18/18 47 256 02/20/63 308 507 08/17/48 140 88 10/28/30 77 131 12/23/11 38 389 12/19/11 38 390 08/02/65 340 220 03/04/10 35 331 12/28/15 45 41 11/14/1893 M13 112 05/27/32 81 18 10/01/62 305 453 09/27/62 305 457 04/26/63 311 553 13. Southern Railway One, S, (906-916) III, n. 5 (All Company tracts[*]) 9/22/1848 P 450 10/02/1848 O 366 09/23/1848 O 367 09/23/1848 O 367 03/01/1899 18 575 05/05/1853 Q 143 10/11/48 129 335 09/26/1848 O 365 09/22/1848 O 364 Deed from Dr. William Moore to C S C.P. Railroad dated April 25, 1949 11/21/02 22 541 11/21/02 22 541 Memorandum of Agreement Town of Fort Mill dated 07/17/24 03/01/40 98 228 Ordinance from the Town of Fort Mill dated 03/06/40 03/01/40 98 228 Agreement Deed Book 129 at page 335 dated 10/11/48 Deed dated 9/21/56 from Springs Foundation, Inc. Deed from Dr. William Moore dated 4/25/1849 Deed from J.L. Moore dated 7/24/1854 Deed from William E. White dated 02/07/1856 and recorded in Deed Book R at page 37 09/20/1848 O 460 06/13/01 21 736 04/8/20 44 783 1/15/1917 44 266 09/12/46 114 396 5/18/46 124 177 Deed from Eli Biggers dated 12/22/1847 Condemnation Proceeding Robert Miller Spring term 1853 Deed from James Moore by J.C. Moore dated 12/22/1848 Jane McNair and Jane Henry dated 12/22/1847 9/20/1848 O 459 9/19/1848 O 460 Deed from James Workman dated 12/22/1847 Deed from J.C. Moore dated 12/12/1848 9/20/1848 O 463 Deed P 450 dated 10/21/1851 Deed 23 at page 68 dated 5/26/1903 Deed 39 at Page 71 dated 12/19/1911 Deed Q at Page 251 dated 2/14/53 Deed 100 at Page 233 dated 6/30/43 Deed 19 at page 472 dated 3/26/1900 Deed 22 at page 473 dated 11/24/1902 Deed 35 at page 563 dated 3/10/1911 Deed 35 at page 567 dated 3/10/1911 Agreement with Catawba Lumber Company dated 2/9/18 Deed from Victoria Cotton Mills dated 6/1/1916 11/21/1918 44 523 Deed 100 at page 233 dated 6/30/43 Deed 176 at page 334 dated 10/16/51 Deed from James Workman dated 12/22/1847 9/19/1848 and 9/1/1848 O 462 9/18/1848 O 459 9/5/1848 O 575 7/22/65 341 446 9/5/1848 O 461 9/16/1848 O 463 Deed GG at page 495 dated 7/4/1849 4/4/1850 GG 614 7/12/1849 GG 49G 5/10/1887 E-6 706 Deed E-6 at page 712-3 dated 6/16/1887 Deed E-6 page 708-9/10 dated 6/16/1887 6/16/1887 E-6 712-3 9/7/1888 F-7 712-13 6/15/1887 E-6 716 6/1/1887 E-6 712-3 6/11/1887 E-6 710-11 2/25/1900 29 514 6/15/1887 E-6 714 8/20/1918 44 479 11/1/1961 293 258 6/15/1887 E-6 714 10/1889 J-10 735 9/21/1888 F-7 673 9/21/1888 E-7 675 Deed from F.H. Barber dated 3/30/1906, Deed E-6, page 6 98-1 dated 5/9/1887 5/8/1888 J-10 725-6 9/21/1888 F-7 676 9/21/1883 F-7 688 5/10/1890 E-6 692-3 5/1887 E-6 695 2/1/1886 J-10 723 5/9/1887 E-6 694 1880 E-6 686 Condemnation involving property of W.H. Cowan dated 7/5/1889 Condemnation involving property of Mr. R.B. Cowan dated 2/10/1888 Property of R.M. Cowan judgment dated 11/21/1889 Condemnation R.H. Cowan 11/11/1889 5/21/1887 E-6 704 9/4/1906 26 443 Condemnation involving property of W.I. Steele dated 4/30/1889 9/10/1913 39 398 Condemnation involving property of Samuel L. Fewell dated 2/11/1888, Judgment Roll 1710 10/30/1911 44 194 9/10/1913 39 398 Condemnation involving property of Mrs. Margaret S. Kimbrell dated 4/30/1888, Judgment Roll 1753 1/23/1904 23 550-3 1/25/1904 23 550-3 Condemnation proceeding involving property of Larry W. White dated 5/18/1888, Judgment roll 1750 Condemnation involving property of A.H. White, James S. White, Mary E. White, A.H. White and Mrs. A.R. Witherspoon dated 1/24/1888, Judgment rolls 1752 and 1751 10/18/1901 29 666 Condemnation involving property of Isabella Wilson October term 1920 10/18/09 29 666 Condemnation involving the property of J.S. White, et al. dated 1/24/1885, Judgment Roll 1751 Ordinance City of Rock Hill, Minute Book 425 dated 8/20/45 3/25/09 29 602 3/25/1908 29 259 Condemnation involving the property of Fewell, Judgment Roll 1900 Deed from A.D. Holler dated 5/24/1896 Condemnation involving property of Isabella H. Wilson, Executrix, October term 1920 Deed from A.D. Holler dated 3/22/1890 2/13/1905 24 732 Condemnation of property of Samuel A. Fewell dated 2/11/1888, Judgment roll 1720 Condemnation of property of W.A. Fewell dated 7/22/1887, Judgment roll 1716 Condemnation involving property of Robert Morrison, Judgment roll 1884 4/11/1887 E-6 700-1 4/11/1887 E-6 790-791 4/11/1887 E-6 758-9 4/9/1887 F-7 17 Condemnation of property of J.A. Rainey dated 4/16/1889, Judgment roll 1905 4/11/1887 E-6 770-1 9/22/1887 F-7 673 4/11/1887 E-6 798 9/22/1913 39 386 6/2/1888 F-7 565-6-7 3/26/1888 J-10 727 9/10/1901 21 466-7 10/5/1901 23 792-3 Deed from Yorkville Cotton Oil Co. dated 10/22/1915 8/4/11 38 169 3/26/1888 E-J-10 727 8/4/1911 38 189 6/23/1911 38 17 11/25/1907 38 779 7/24/1894 24 7 Condemnation of property of William C. Latimer dated 8/31/1887, Judgment roll 1717 Resolution Town Council of Yorkville dated 6/16/1887 4/11/1887 E-6 798 4/11/1887 E-6 770-1 4/9/1887 F-7 50 5/26/1887 F-7 1 6/2/1888 F-7 567-68 4/9/1887 F-7 52 4/9/1887 F-7 15 Condemnation involving property of A. Avery dated 6/18/1888, Judgment roll 1787 6/28/1887 F-7 337 7/4/1887 J-10 722 Condemnation involving property of D.S. Thornbury dated 6/18/1888, Judgment roll 1788 6/26/1867 F-7 339 6/24/1887 E-6 721 7/25/1887 F-7 335 6/21/1887 E-6 749 7/25/1887 F-7 335 6/7/1887 E-6 751 7/16/1887 E-6 756-57 5/10/1887 E-6 698 8/29/1887 F-7 334 8/29/1887 F-7 334 6/27/1887 F-7 563 6/1887 F-7 562 5/21/1887 E-6 706-7-8 Condemnation of property of B.D. Wheeler dated 8/25/1887, Judgment roll 1715 4/13/1887 E-6 788-9 5/27/1887 F-7 7 4/13/1887 E-6 788-9 4/12/1887 E-6 794-5 4/13/1887 E-6 788-9 4/12/1887 E-6 792 4/4/1887 F-7 25 3/8/1889 G-8 657 Decree involving property of Mrs. Eudora Plexico, et al dated 2/3/34 4/4/1887 F-7 25 3/8/1889 G-8 657 4/12/1887 F-7 3 3/4/1887 E-6 768-9 3/4/1887 E-6 766-7 3/4/1887 F-7 27 3/4/1887 F-7 13 3/4/1887 F-7 48 3/4/1887 F-7 13 6/27/56 230 280 3/4/1887 F-7 13 3/4/1887 F-7 11 4/12/1887 F-7 32 3/2/1887 F-7 498 5/3/1887 F-7 30 3/2/1887 E-6 764-5 5/6/1887 E-6 772-3 5/6/1887 E-6 772-3 5/6/1887 F-7 34 5/3/1887 F-7 30 3/1/1887 E-6 760-1 3/1/1887 E-6 778-9 4/7/1877 F-7 5 3/1/1887 E-6 796-7 3/1/1887 E-6 774-5 9/21/1889 G-8 655 3/4/1887 F-7 19-20 3/1/1887 E-6 786-7 9/21/1889 G-8 655 3/2/1887 F-7 46 3/1/1887 E-6 780-1 7/1/1890 71 613 8/10/1907 6 20 11/9/1887 Q 70 11/14/1877 Y 17 11/14/1896 U 138 6/12/1875 A-1 164 3/2/1887 Q 70 11/14/1871 Y 12 4/29/1910 37 57 2/15/1891 P 299 1/17/09 74 680 12/12/1854 Q 551 1/12/1903 72 549 10/30/09 23 163 7/17/1891 A-11 73 7/24/1891 A-11 34 8/5/1896 17 762 4/14/1904 33 393 4/10/1907 29 683 Agreement Victor Cotton Oil Co. 4/18/1902 8/30/1907 22 307 5/19/1903 77 23 5/25/1903 29 377 Agreement Beverly Mfg. Co. dated 10/15/1903 12/8/1906 66 87 12/4/1902 22 790 Deed from M.J. Brown dated 9/1/1903 Deed from B.M. Smith, et al. dated 11/14/1901 6/23/1901 96 470 7/8/1901 90 467 4/26/02 7 297 4/8/1902 7 279 4/21/1902 7 279 4/17/09 29 3 Agreement Hawthorne Spinning Mills 1/29/1906 Agreement Clover Cotton Mills 7/10/1909 Agreement W.D. Reynolds 11/15/1916 Deed 27-656 dated 9/17/1907 Deed 36-525 dated 2/20/1912 1/27/1899 16 234 4/26/1942 100 63 14. Bowater, Inc. One, T, (917-919) III (All tracts[*]) 547-00-00-045 II (farm) 6/22/62 300 146 6/22/62 300 144 6/22/62 100 142 8/30/56 231 63 10/17/56 232 443 8/31/56 231 108 8/29/56 231 85 8/29/56 231 87 9/1/56 231 111 8/23/56 232 129 11/2/56 233 124 8/23/56 233 122 8/29/56 231 60 8/29/56 231 66 8/29/56 231 73 8/29/56 231 76 8/29/56 231 79 8/29/56 231 82 8/29/56 231 54 8/29/56 231 51 8/27/56 231 60 6/20/56 233 102 8/9/56 233 112 8/18/56 233 114 8/31/56 233 120 9/7/56 233 117 8/29/56 232 293 10/13/5 232 296 8/31/56 231 120 Three, V, (995) III (All tracts[*]) 9/20/60 279 44 II (dates) 9/1/60 278 158 II (dates) 11/14/61 294 61 II (dates) 8/1/85 838 205 n. 10 II (tree) VI 10/9/61 291 340 II (tree) 10/6/86 ? ? II (tree) 10/25/65 343 311 II (tree) 9/16/69 394 284 II (tree) 4/11/59 V4 221 II (tree) 12/21/84 798 276 II (tree) 2/14/86 904 111 II (tree) 7/31/86 898 7 II (tree) 8/86 899 296 II (tree) 15. Nisbet Properties One, U, (920) n. 5, n. 10, III, VII (All tracts[*]) 22-00-01.00 IV-E, F II (tree) VI 13-0-100.00 IV-F II (tree) VI 19-00-01.00 II (tree) 19 VI 16. John M. Spratt, One, V, (921) III (All Jr. tracts below) Tract 1 n. 5 (Tax Map 20-01-22-12) Tract 2 (922) (Tax Map 708-17; 21-01-21-02 and 20-06-01-50) Tract 3, (924) (Part of Tax Map 708-17) Tract 4, (925) (Part of Tax Map 708-17) Tract 5, (925-926) (Part of Tax Map 708-17) Tract 7, (927-930) (Part of Tax Map 708-17) Tract 8, (930) (Part of Tax Map 708-17) Tract 9, (930-931) (Part of Tax Map 708-17) Tract 10, (931-932) (Part of Tax Map 708-17) Tract 11, (932-933) (Part of Tax Map 708-17) Tract 12, (933) (Part of Tax Map 708-17) Tract 13, (933-934) (Part of Tax Map 708-17) Tract 14, (934-935) (Tax Map 661-14) Tract 15, (935-936) (Tax Map No. 708-18) Tract 16, (936) (Tax Map 661-00-00-014) Tract 17, (936-937) (Tax Map 020-02-01-006) 17. Hiram Hutchison, One, W. (938-940) III, n. 5 Jr. (All tracts[*]) Parcel 1 — Tax Map 664-00-00-012 Parcel 2 — Tax Map 664-00-00-011 Parcel 3 — Tax Map 627-18-04-003 18. J. Max Hinson One, X, (941-946) III (All tracts below) Tract 3 — Tax Map 20-1.00 Tract 5 —; Tax Map 707-1 II (poss.) Tract 10 — Tax Map 659-232 Tract 23 — Tax Map 740-1 Tract 25 — Tax Map 20-4-34-4 Three, W. (998) III, n. 5 (All tracts below) (All tracts in York County, except Tract 4, which is in Lancaster County) Tract 1 — Deed Book 132, page 26 Tract 2 — Deed Book 165, page 183 Tract 4 — Deed Book X-5, page 494 II (poss.) Tract 6 — Deed Book 358, page 480 II (poss.) Tract 8 — Deed Book 248, page 97 Tract 9 — Deed Book 220, page 128 II (cont.) Tract 11 — Deed Book 182, page 26 II (cont.) Tract 12 — Deed Book 353, page 346 II (cont.) Tract 13 — Deed Book 337, page 532 II (poss.) Tract 14 — Deed Book 242, page 454 II (cont.) Tract 15 — Deed Book 286, page 398 II (cont.) Tract 16 — Deed Book 270, page 485 II (cont.), n. 5 Tract 17 — Deed Book 259, page 447 II (cont.), n. 5 Tract 18 — Deed Book 217, page 361 II (cont.), n. 5 Tract 19 — Deed Book 205, page 96 II (cont.), n. 5 19. Arnold F. One, Y, (947) III (All Marshall tracts below) Deed dated 1/18/66 recorded in Deed Book 222, page 152 on 1/28/66, York County Deed dated 3/30/51 recorded in Deed Book 169, page 303 on 4/3/51; and deed dated 8/18/51 recorded __/21/51 in Deed Book 174, page 166 Deed dated 4/13/54 recorded in Deed Book 203, page 184 20. Ashe Farms Three, F, (974) III, n. 5 (All tracts[*]) Tax Map 14-25 II (dates) Tax Map 15-2.0 II (dates) Tax Map 15.33 II (dates) Tax Map 24-1.0 II (dates) Tax Map 25N-OA-2.0 II (dates) Tax Map 25-10 II (dates) Tax Map 25-10.01 II (dates) Tax Map 764.5 II (dates) Tax Map 15-20 II (dates) II (cont.) 21. Hugh White Three, H, (976) Tax Map 705-00-00-001 22. T.W. Hutchison Three, K, (979-980) III, n. 5 (All tracts below) 664-01-03-008 II (poss.) 664-01-06-014 II (poss.) 664-01-06-019 II (poss.) 664-01-06-018 II (poss.) 664-01-06-017 II (poss.) 664-01-06-007 II (poss.) 664-01-06-008 II (poss.) 664-01-06-023 II (poss.) 664-01-06-016 II (poss.) 664-01-06-015 II (poss.) 664-01-03-002 II (poss.) 664-01-02-003 II (poss.) 664-01-04-002 II (poss.) 664-01-06-024 II (poss.) 664-01-06-013 II (poss.) 664-00-00-022 II (poss.) II (dates) 634-07-01-021 II (poss.) II (dates) 664-00-00-019 II (dates) 664-01-02-002 627-14-02-002 664-06-06-025 II (dates) 664-00-00-021 II (dates) 23. Robert A. Fewell Three, L, (981) III (All tracts[*]) Tax Map 617-00-00-026 Tax Map 616-00-00-032 Tax Map 680-00-00-022 Tax Map 608-00-00-024 24. Francis M. Mack Three, M, (982) III (All tracts[*]) 774-00-00-005 II (tree) II (farm) II (dates) 020-06-06-016 25. John S. Simpson Three, N. (983) n. 5, n. 10, II (poss.), III, VI (All tracts[*]) Tax Map 600-07-06-001 Tax Map 600-11-02-035 Tax Map 600-17-02-012 Tax Map 627-17-02-018 Tax Map 627-17-02-016 26. Robert T. Three, O. (984) III, n. 5 (All Simpson tracts[*]) 627-17-02-019 n. 10 II (poss.) VI 600-06-10-029 II (poss.) 600-07-05-001 n. 10 II (poss.) VI 600-11-02-035 n. 10 VI 627-17-01-012 n. 10 II (poss.) VI 627-17-02-018 n. 10 II (poss.) VI 627-17-02-016 n. 10 II (poss.) VI 27. City of Rock Hill Three, Q, (987-989) III, II South Carolina (concl.) (All tracts[*]) Tax Map or Parcel 627-18-3-4 IV-A 589-1-1-14 IV-G 628-9-5-5 n. 10 VI VII 628-9-5-6 n. 10 VI 628-17-3-10 n. 10 VI 628-4-1-2 n. 10 VI 627-19-1-25 (W. White) VII 627-19-1-25 (H. White) VII 627-19-1-25 (Biggers) VII 627-19-1-25 (LaFar) VII 627-19-1-25 (Albright) VII 627-19-1-25 (Roddey) VII 627-18-4-11 13 627-19-1-23 627-18-1-9 630-10-03-010 627-18-4-6 630-10-3-14 630-10-4-6 630-10-4-5 630-10-4-4 596-7-2-2 630-10-3-12 630-10-03-008 630-10-3-13 630-10-4-7 630-10-4-3 630-10-01-002 628-4-1-1 627-19-1-23 (Friedheim) 627-19-1-23 (Johnston) 589-1-1-21 627-18-3-12 627-17-4-10 626-7-1-2 667-1-1-4 589-1-1-4 627-18-2-1 589-26-1-1 589-26-2-1 2 667-1-1-6 28. Elizabeth Ardrey Three, R. (990-991) II (tree), Grimball II (farm), III (All tracts[*]) 743-00-00-003 709-00-00-025 709-00-00-023 709-00-00-020 709-00-00-019 709-00-00-018 020-01-01-020 29. John M. Belk Three, S, (992) II (tree fm.) 963 acres described in II (farm) Deed Book 53, page 403 II (dates) dated 5/12/47; recorded III 6/21/47 30. Annie F. Harris Three, T, (993) III Tax Map 742-00-00-002 31. William Oliver Three, U, (994) III Nisbet Tax Map 22-2 V 32. Springs Mills, Three, X, (1000-1003) II (sp. Inc. pc.), III (All tracts[*]) 12/31/31 74 503 9/20/41 105 106 4/5/65 335 431 6/16/88 1033 16 1/30/75 507 1 3/1/84 747 170 10/20/65 343 540 6/4/70 406 505 4/14/83 700 14 1/22/81 626 499 9/29/41 105 196 3/15/74 481 62 9/30/66 357 172 6/20/50 159 290 9/27/41 105 198 33. Property Owned by the Close Family Three, Y, (1004-1007) II (sp. pc.) III (All tracts[*]) Property which has been identified by deed book and page is as follows: 271 147 1/26/60 308 125 2/01/63 362 341 5/01/67 383 81 10/29/68 462 483 5/14/73 521 45 10/14/75 527 467 3/16/76 561 607 12/16/77 570 874 5/10/78 576 231 8/10/78 585 703 1/03/79 601 876 9/07/79 614 262 5/21/80 Property which has been described by tax map code is as follows: 020 0101 004 020 0102 001 020 0404 001 020 0406 010 020 0406 011 020 0408 022 020 0408 023 020 0408 024 020 0408 025 020 0408 026 020 0408 027 020 0408 028 020 0408 029 020 0408 030 020 0408 031 020 0408 032 020 0419 002 020 0419 013 020 0419 014 020 0420 002 020 0424 014 020 0429 001 020 0429 025 020 0429 026 020 0429 070 020 0435 062 020 0504 008 020 0901 003 655 0000 001 655 0000 003 655 0000 031 657 0000 001 706 0000 001 706 0000 012 710 0000 002 710 0000 005 710 0000 006 712 0000 001 713 0000 059 713 0000 103 713 0000 164 713 0000 165 713 0000 181 713 0000 191 713 0000 200 713 0000 214 713 0000 215 713 0000 216 714 0000 001 715 0000 001 717 0000 016 730 0000 001 730 0000 002 730 0000 006 732 0000 001 732 0000 002 734 0000 006 34. Elliott S. Close Three, Y, (1006) Tax Map 642-05 II Tax Map 642-034 II (tree) II (farm) II (poss.) Tax Map 642-035 II (tree) II (farm) II (poss.) 35. Archie B. Carroll Three, Z, (1008) III, VII (All tracts[*]) 3/30/82 660 84 II (poss.) III (Tax Map 745-00-00-001) 1/28/52 759 122 (65 ft. access right of way) 36. W.R. Simpson Three, AA, (1009) III (All tracts[*]) 600-07-05-001 n. 10 II (poss.) VI 600-11-02-035 n. 10 VI 600-01-01-012 n. 10 VI 627-17-02-018 n. 10 II (poss.) VI 627-17-02-016 n. 10 II (poss.) 772-00-00-001 II (date) 772-00-00-002 II (date) 37. C S National Three, BB, (1010) II (concl.), III (All Bank tracts[*]) 659-227 719-15 20-6-1-47 653-13 627-20-2-3 626-141, 158, 159, 176, 177 178 736-092 546-65 598-10-01-001 662-3-1-30 662-3-1-31 38. Mary A. and W.T. Three, CC, (1011) III (All McCorkle tracts[*]) Tax Map 0013-00-037-00 Tax Map 0013-00-0037-00 39. Springs Industries, Four, A, (1024-1029) II (sp. pc.), III (All Inc. tracts[*]) 12/31/31 74 503 (Tax Map 020 04 04 010) 9/29/41 105 196 7/12/66 353 327 4/24/70 402 404 7/29/70 408 450 8/25/70 406 500 8/27/70 406 503 (Tax Map 020 01 23 013) 12/31/31 74 503 (Tax Map Nos. 02 06 01 52, 02 06 01 53, 02 06 07 34) 1929 73 177 1929 73 178 1929 (Cutter) 65 559 1929 (Seital) 65 559 1934 79 231 1935 79 481 1938 94 267 1938 94 277 1938 94 279 1938 92 303 1938 92 318 1940 101 13 1940 102 83 1943 111 263 1943 111 264 1943 111 261 1943 111 262 1937 91 147 1937 91 148 1944 115 214 1945 116 276 1945 116 277 1945 116 275 1945 116 305 1945 117 1 1945 117 162 1950 159 290 1955 211 311 1960 274 42 1948 141 85 1953 191 95 Tax Map 598 04 01 001 Tax Map 598 04 02 001 Tax Map 598 11 01 001 Tax Map 598 22 01 001 Tax Map 627 20 01 005 II (concl.) "Conclusory Averments of Possession" II (sp. pc.) "Possession of Specific Parcels Not Shown" II (tree) "Tree Farms" II (farm) "Farming and Recreational or Social Purposes" II (poss.) "No Actual Possession or Entry" II (dates) "Dates of Use" II (cont.) "Continuity of Possession" The judgment of the district court is VACATED and the cause REMANDED for further action not inconsistent with section III of this opinion as to the following parcels of land. The affidavits supporting the defendants' motions for summary judgment as to these parcels set forth insufficient evidence that the statements therein are based on the personal knowledge of the affiant. 1. Arnold F. One, Y, 4, ¶ (947) Property Marshall described in deed dated Jan. 9, 1959 and recorded Jan. 17, 1959, in deed book 258 at page 484, York County. 2. C.H. Albright Three, D, ¶ 3 (972) 620-00-00-005 620-00-00-008 3. Ned M. Albright Three, E, ¶¶ 1, 3-8 (973) n. 5 (all) 548-00-00-070 627-22-02-029 II (dates) II (cont.) 593-02-01-002 598-02-01-002 II (dates) II (cont.) 627-22-02-028 II (dates) 625-12-03-004 II (dates) II (cont.) 600-06-07-006 II (dates) II (cont.) 623-00-00-006 II (tree) II (dates) 623-02-01-005 4. David G. Three, G (975) Anderson 627-22-02-029 II (dates) II (cont.) 598-02-01-001 II (dates) II (cont.) 598-02-01-002 II (dates) II (cont.) 627-22-02-028 II (dates) 625-12-03-004 II (dates) II (cont.) 600-06-07-006 II (dates) II (cont.) 604-03-01-011 II (dates) 670-00-00-134 n. 10 5. F.S. Barnes, Three, J (978) II (dates) Jr. 639-00-00-095 6. J. Max Hinson Three, W (998-999) Tract No. 20, York County II (poss.) deed book 986, p. 339 n. 5 Tract No. 21, York County n. 5 deed book 969, p. 200 II (poss.) II (dates) Tract No. 22, York County n. 5 deed book 540, p. 129 II (poss.) II (dates) Tract No. 24, York County deed book 488, p. 98 II (dates) II (cont.) Tract No. 26, York County deed book 644, p. 72 Tract No. 28, York County deed book II (dates) 529, p. 561 Tract No. 30, York County deed book II (poss.) 467, p. 466 The judgment of the district court is VACATED and the cause REMANDED for further action not inconsistent with section IV.B. of this opinion as to the following parcels. 1. Duke Power Co. Two, A, (954-956) Summary judgment is vacated and remanded as to the following tracts for that portion of the land that is above 570 feet above mean sea level: 05/28/26 08/30/26 65/146 07/08/24 07/12/24 61/145 12/09/24 12/18/24 62/178 09/17/24 10/03/24 62/3 09/08/24 09/17/24 61/283 07/29/25 08/13/25 64/132 09/22/24 10/01/24 54/628 07/28/24 07/10/24 61/134 09/24/24 10/01/24 54/623 11/17/24 11/19/24 62/104 05/03/28 05/11/28 71/251 03/19/09 01/07/10 29/778/80 09/17/24 10/03/24 61/314 11/25/24 12/04/24 62/144 06/??/04 08/13/04 24/187-88 12/16/25 01/15/26 66?/166 10/14/24 10/18/24 62/36 03/17/25 03/24/25 63/128 06/05/24 06/07/24 61/61 07/31/24 08/09/24 61/183 07/24/25 08/05/25 64/137 12/30/10 01/02/11 32/56 07/31/24 08/09/24 54/599 08/08/24 08/16/24 61/208 09/10/24 09/17/24 54/616 06/04/24 06/07/24 61/69 07/08/24 07/12/24 61/143 03/31/24 04/02/24 60/243 03/29/24 04/02/24 60/244 03/19/09 01/07/10 29/773-76 03/19/09 01/07/10 29/776-78 05/11/00 06/13/00 19/621-33 05/10/32 06/01/32 74/540 12/19/27 12/21/27 65/303 19/01/25 12/05/25 65/48 05/01/69 12/22/69 397/361 09/04/68 09/19/68 381/379 06/29/70 06/30/70 404/23 09/07/71 09/07/71 425/37 08/10/71 12/30/71 430/506 04/27/64 342/415 08/01/63 08/02/63 314/392 The following properties were transferred by Crescent Land and Timber Corporation (Crescent) to various grantees between July 1, 1972, and July 2, 1974: Date of Deed Recordation Date Book/Page 03/05/73 03/09/73 458/232 12/11/73 02/28/74 479/347 05/28/74 07/04/74 486/113 02/01/73 02/02/73 456/60 12/11/73 01/28/74 477/575 2. C.H. Albright One, E, (861) Deed dated 1/21/79; Deed Book 589, page 536 3. T.W. Hutchison Three, K, ¶ 24 (980) Tax Map Number 548-00-00-038 III, n. 5 The judgment of the district court is VACATED and the cause REMANDED for further action not inconsistent with section IV.C. of this opinion as to the following parcels. 1. Bowater Corp. Three, V, (996) ¶ 8 (278 acres III ± conveyed to East Highlands Co. by deed recorded in York County Deed Book 394 at page 281) The judgment of the district court is VACATED and the cause REMANDED for further action not inconsistent with section IV.D. of this opinion as to the following parcels. 1. John M. Spratt, One, V, Tract No. 6 (926) (Tax III, n. 5 Jr. Map No. 661-2) The judgment of the district court is VACATED and the cause REMANDED for further action not inconsistent with footnote 7 of this opinion as to the following parcels. 1. Close Family Three, Y, (1004), parcel with II (sp. pc.) Southern Appliances, Inc. III as grantor, recorded in deed book 418 at page 382, dated 5/12/71. Three, Y, (1004), parcel II (sp. pc.) with Paul Gibson as grantor, III recorded in deed book 481 at page 65, dated 3/21/74. Three, Y, (1006), parcels identified by tax map numbers: 710 0000 003 II (sp. pc.) III 732 0000 003 II (sp. pc.) III 730 0000 009 II (sp. pc.) III 731 0000 002 II (sp. pc.) III 710 0000 004 II (sp. pc.) III The judgment of the district court is VACATED pursuant to footnote 7 of this opinion as to the following parcel. 1. Close Family Three, Y, (1004), parcel II (sp. pc.) with Curt Siefart as grantor, III recorded in deed book 448 at page 38, dated 9/20/72. The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for further action not inconsistent with section VIII of this opinion. The following defendants were erroneously dismissed in that they claim certain parcels not released by the judgment orders. 1. J. Max Hinson J.A. 641, Exhibit A, Tract numbers 27, 29 2. William O. Nisbet J.A. 778, 53 acre tract 3. Ashe Farms J.A. 494 ¶ 2 J.A. 776 ¶¶ 5 through 8 J.A. 777 ¶ 2 4. C.H. Albright J.A. 731 ¶ 7