Summary
holding that assertion of personal jurisdiction over non-resident individual who acted as power of attorney was appropriate when he transacted business to withdraw funds from joint bank account
Summary of this case from Sullivan v. BunnellOpinion
January 11, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Coppola, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action alleging, inter alia, that the appellant Stephen S. Lefrak used a power of attorney to withdraw all the moneys on deposit in a joint account she had maintained in a New York bank with Lefrak's late father, Israel Lefrak. The appellant was served with the summons and complaint in St. Louis, Missouri. Thereafter, he moved to dismiss the complaint insofar as it is asserted against him for lack of personal jurisdiction. In his affidavit, the appellant, a Missouri resident, acknowledged that he called the New York bank from Missouri and inquired as to the procedure for closing the account and withdrawing the funds. He stated further that he mailed letters to the bank, enclosing the bankbook and the power of attorney. Thereafter, he received the money on deposit by check in Missouri. The court denied his motion. We affirm.
CPLR 302 (a) (1) provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary who in person or through an agent "transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state". "It is a 'single act statute' and proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, even though the appellant never enters New York, so long as the [appellant's] activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted" (Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 467; see also, Reiner Co. v Schwartz, 41 N.Y.2d 648, 651-652). Whether an appellant has engaged in sufficient purposeful activity to confer jurisdiction in New York requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances (see, Cooperstein v. Pan-Oceanic Mar., 124 A.D.2d 632; Aero-Bocker Knitting Mills v. Allied Fabrics Corp., 54 A.D.2d 647). Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we find that the appellant's conduct represented purposeful activity in New York sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over him (see, Matter of Casey, 145 A.D.2d 632; V.R.W., Inc. v. Weiss, 118 A.D.2d 567; Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin v. Thompson, 78 A.D.2d 795; Bankers Trust Co. v. Santos O. Suarez V., 526 F. Supp. 1262).
In light of our determination, it is unnecessary to consider whether the court also properly invoked personal jurisdiction based upon CPLR 302 (a) (3) (i). Mangano, P.J., Thompson, Bracken and Lawrence, JJ., concur.