Opinion
No. 04-04-00836-CV
Delivered and Filed: November 9, 2005.
Appeal from the 408th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2004-CL-08301, Honorable Patrick J. Boone, Judge Presiding.
The Honorable Rebecca Simmons was the presiding judge of the 408th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas during the pendency of these proceedings. The Honorable Patrick J. Boone, presiding judge of the 57th Judicial District Court, however, presided over all matters at issue in this appeal.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Catherine STONE, Justice, Rebecca SIMMONS, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal arises from an order granting a motion for sanctions filed by Appellee Northside Independent School District ("Northside I.S.D."), and award of attorney fees against Appellant Judith Sanders-Castro. The underlying suit stems from Northside I.S.D.'s disciplinary action suspending L.C. from school related activities, including graduation ceremonies, after she acknowledged drinking alcohol in violation of the code of student conduct. Subsequently, Judith Sanders-Castro, mother of L.C. and a licensed attorney, obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) precluding Northside I.S.D. from interfering in L.C.'s participation in the graduation ceremonies. The trial court held a contempt of court hearing, on its own motion, regarding Sanders-Castro's actions in obtaining the TRO and on Northside I.S.D.'s motion for sanctions. The trial court granted Northside I.S.D.'s motion for sanctions. Sanders-Castro argues the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sanctions order and award pursuant to Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 11.161 of the Texas Education Code. We conclude that the trial court's order granting the motion for sanctions and award of attorney's fees was within its discretionary and statutory authority. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order and award of attorney's fees.
BACKGROUND
Sandra Day O'Connor High School held its graduation rehearsal on Thursday, May 27, 2004. At the rehearsal, Assistant Principal Grant Pruin learned that a student at the rehearsal was suspected of drinking alcohol. Pruin met with the student, L.C., who admitted she had been drinking. Pruin contacted L.C.'s father, Arturo Castro, to pick her up from the rehearsal. Pruin also provided Castro with a cell phone number should any questions arise regarding L.C.
The following day, Principal Larry Martin telephoned Castro at 10:30 a.m. and informed him L.C.'s appearance at the graduation rehearsal, while having consumed alcohol, was a violation of the Northside I.S.D.'s Code of Student Conduct. Consequently, Martin explained that L.C. would either be suspended until her hearing, possibly scheduled for June 1, 2004, or suspended for three days. While on suspension, Northside I.S.D.'s policy prevented L.C. from participating in school district activities, including the school's graduation ceremony taking place on May 29, 2004. Martin further provided Castro with the name and telephone number of Northside I.S.D's superintendent to whom Castro could appeal the decision. Judith Sanders-Castro, L.C.'s mother, was scheduled to meet with Martin later that day, but did not appear. Therefore, as of 4:30 p.m. on Friday, May 28th, L.C. remained suspended and not allowed to participate in the school's graduation ceremony.
Unbeknownst to Northside I.S.D. officials, shortly after Castro's conversation with school officials "a little bit before 1:00 o'clock on Friday, May the 28th," Sanders-Castro prepared an application for a TRO. At approximately 4:30 p.m., without making any attempt to provide notice to Northside I.S.D., Sanders-Castro presented her application to the district court clerk, Eddie Pichardo. It is disputed if Pichardo asked Sanders-Castro whether the TRO was standard, sought extraordinary relief, and maintained the status quo before presenting the application to the judge. The Honorable Pat Boone granted the order without discussing the application with Sanders-Castro. The TRO prevented Northside I.S.D. from "directly or indirectly interfering with [L.C.'s] participation in commencement exercises for Sandra Day O'Connor High School on May 29, 2004 or taking any other further disciplinary action" until further order of the trial court. Just three hours before commencement exercises were to begin, Northside I.S.D. received a telephone call informing them a TRO had been obtained, in effect, allowing L.C. to participate in the school's graduation ceremony. Northside I.S.D.'s attempts to contact Judge Boone were unsuccessful. Thus, Northside I.S.D. complied with the court's order and did not interfere in L.C.'s participation.
On June 2, 2004, a hearing was held before Judge Boone to review the TRO process of May 28, 2004. Following the hearing, Northside I.S.D filed its motion for sanctions on June 4, 2004. At the sanctions hearing on June 9, 2004, Judge Boone found that Sanders-Castro's lawsuit was groundless, frivolous, and brought in bad faith. Accordingly, Judge Boone granted Northside I.S.D.'s motion for sanctions and awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $4,018.00. Sanders-Castro nonsuited her case, and this appeal ensued.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's award of sanctions is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Herring v. Wellborn, 27 S.W.3d 132, 143 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied). The determination whether sanctions constitute an abuse of discretion, requires an examination of the entire record. Id. In reviewing a trial court's finding, under an abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Schlager v. Clements, 939 S.W.2d 183, 191 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied). Rather, review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion by either acting arbitrarily and unreasonably or misapplying the law to the established facts of the case. Id. (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985)) (indicating the test for abuse of discretion is "whether the court acted without reference to any guiding principles" or "whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable"). A trial court abuses its discretion in imposing sanctions if the order is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Monroe v. Grider, 884 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied). As such, an appellate court will view the conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court's judgment. Herring, 27 S.W.3d at 143.
CHAPTER 10 OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE
Sanders-Castro argues the trial court abused its discretion in assessing sanctions pursuant to Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The trial court found that Sanders-Castro's lawsuit was:
frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation; contained claims and other legal contentions not warranted by existing law or non-frivolous arguments for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; alleged facts which were misrepresented to the Court; and brought claims in bad faith.
Specifically, the court relied on the following facts: Sanders-Castro admitted the relief she sought was to have her daughter participate in commencement; Sanders-Castro admitted that the relief requested by the application was obtained as a result of the TRO and rendered the remainder of the lawsuit moot; Sanders-Castro misrepresented to the court that the application was being sought to maintain the status quo and that the application was standard and did not seek extraordinary relief; and Sanders-Castro failed to make a reasonable inquiry into whether Northside I.S.D. was represented by counsel in order to comply with the written requirements of Local Rule 6.C.
Local Rule 6.C States:
requests for temporary restraining orders must be presented to the Presiding Court for decision or for assignment to another judge. The attorney making the request shall state in writing that: (1) to the best of his knowledge the respondent is not represented by counsel, (2) he has tried and has been unable to contact opposing counsel about the application, (3) opposing counsel has been notified of the application and does not wish to be heard, or (4) notifying the respondent or his counsel would cause irreparable harm to the movant.
Bexar Cty. Civ. Dist. Ct. R. 6.C.
Sanders-Castro claims a good faith belief that a legitimate cause of action supported her claim, which only an ex parte TRO could rectify. Sanders-Castro stated that "[L.C.] was being denied rights and privileges that she has earned as a student . . . who completed her public education . . . without due process of law, in violation of her equal right." Moreover, she argues there was no evidence to show her pleadings were intended to harass Northside I.S.D., the pleadings did not have legal support, or that the pleadings misrepresented the facts.
Section 10.001(1) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that a person signing a motion or pleading certifies that "to the signatory's best knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry:" (1) the motion or pleading is not presented for an improper purpose, (2) each legal contention is warranted, (3) each factual contention is likely to have evidentiary support, and (4) each denial of a factual contention is warranted. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 10.001(1) (Vernon 2002). A court may impose sanctions for conduct violating Section 10.001. Id. § 10.002. To prevail under Section 10.002, there must be little or no basis for the claims, no grounds for legal arguments, misrepresentation of law or facts, or legal action that is sought in bad faith. See Herring, 27 S.W.3d at 143.
Notably, the purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo of the subject matter of the litigation until a preliminary hearing can be held on an application for a temporary injunction. Cannan v. Green Oaks Apts., Ltd., 758 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam). The Texas Supreme Court has defined status quo as the last, actual, peaceable, noncontested status that preceded the controversy. In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex. 2004). Although we do not comment on the actual status quo in this case, the trial court could have reasonably believed Sanders-Castro did not intend to maintain the status quo at the time she filed the application. Importantly, Sanders-Castro had numerous opportunities to state what her intent was at the time she filed the TRO application. However, Sanders-Castro was evasive and equivocal when directly asked by the trial court whether or not the TRO would have maintained the status quo. Drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving the conflicting evidence in favor of the trial court's ruling, it was within the trial court's discretion to conclude Sanders-Castro filed the TRO application not intending to maintain the status quo as the law requires. As a result, the trial court could have determined that the application for the TRO was brought in bad faith and for an improper purpose. See In re Estate of Davis v. Cook, 9 S.W.3d 288, 298 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (indicating that the party seeking sanctions must prove pleading party's subjective state of mind to show bad faith).
The trial court stated "I'm absolutely convinced and believe you when you tell [sic] me on June 2nd that you knew the status quo as of 1:30 on May 28th was that your daughter was not going to participate in the commencement."
In addition, according to the district court clerk he asked Sanders-Castro whether the application for the TRO: (1) was standard, which Sanders-Castro responded in the affirmative; (2) sought extraordinary relief, which Sanders-Castro stated no; and (3) maintained the status quo, which she replied that it did. While Sanders-Castro denied being asked these questions, the trial court concluded Sanders-Castro "misrepresented to the Court that the application for a temporary restraining order was being sought to maintain the status quo, that the application was not seeking extraordinary relief, and that it was a standard application. . . ." As the trier of fact, it was within the trial court's purview to disbelieve Sanders-Castro. Cumpian v. Pan American Exp., Inc., 147 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet. hist.). Moreover, viewing the conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the record supports the finding that Sanders-Castro misrepresented facts to the trial court.
Further, the record shows Sanders-Castro stated she was familiar with the Bexar County Civil District Court Rules regarding TROs and that she previously sought such orders. Yet, Sanders-Castro did not state in writing, as Local Rule 6.C requires, that to the best of her knowledge Northside I.S.D. was not represented by counsel nor, assuming she knew there was opposing counsel, that she had tried and had been unable to contact opposing counsel about the application or notifying Northside I.S.D. would cause irreparable harm. Bexar Cty. Civ. Dist. Ct. R. 6.C.
Sanders-Castro's good faith belief that she was alleging a legitimate cause of action which an ex parte TRO could only rectify lacks legal or factual support. While high school graduation may be an important occasion in a student's academic career, participation in such a school function does not rise to a protected constitutional property interest. See Williams v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 796 F.Supp. 251, 255 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (stating there is no constitutional right to receive a diploma at a specific graduation ceremony); see also Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 561 (Tex. 1985) (holding that "students do not possess a constitutionally protected interest in their participation in extracurricular activities"); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Paiz, 856 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ) (providing that students do not have an absolute right to participate in a graduation ceremony). As a result, without a constitutionally protected interest, Sanders-Castro's due process claims must fail. See Stamos, 695 S.W.2d at 561-62 (holding that without a constitutionally protected interest no violation of due process can result). In addition, the denial of a student's participation in graduation ceremonies does not amount to immediate and irreparable injury for purposes of injunctive relief. See Williams, 796 F. Supp. at 255; see also Paiz, 856 S.W.2d at 271 (decisions regarding the participation of students in graduation ceremonies is left to the province and wisdom of school officials and not the courts).
Accordingly, there is some evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Sanders-Castro's lawsuit was frivolous, brought in bad faith, misrepresented facts to the court, and lacked basis in law and fact. Therefore, in light of the supporting authority and evidence, we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions. See Herring, 27 S.W.3d at 143. Moreover, because the record supports the trial court's decision to impose sanctions pursuant to Chapter 10, we do not address the propriety of the sanctions imposed under Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure or Section 11.161 of the Texas Education Code. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.1. Appellants' point of error number two is overruled.
Sanders-Castro points to the inequity of sanctions in view of the Court's review of the application and entry of the TRO. Regardless of the trial court's unusual TRO procedure, we examine the actions of Sanders-Castro, and whether the trial court signed the TRO is irrelevant to that consideration.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
In her fourth issue, Sanders-Castro argues the trial court abused its discretion in assessing a sanction of $4,018.00 in attorney's fees because there was no evidence to justify the award. However, the record shows Northside I.S.D. submitted a sworn affidavit attached to its motion in support of an award of reasonable and necessary attorney's fees. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 10.004 (Vernon 2002) (providing that a "sanction may include — an order to pay to the other party the amount of reasonable expenses incurred by the other party because of the filing of the pleading or motion, including reasonable attorney's fees"); Knighton v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 856 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (stating that the "affidavit of the attorney representing a claimant constitutes expert testimony that will support an award of attorney's fees in a summary judgment proceeding"). Further, Northside I.S.D. offered and the trial court accepted the affidavit in lieu of testimony without any objection from opposing counsel or Sanders-Castro. Alternatively, "proof of the necessity or reasonableness of attorney's fees — is not required when the fees are assessed as sanctions." JHC Ventures, L.P. v. Fast Trucking, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 762, 778 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.). Instead, attorney's fees awarded as sanctions are within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. Having concluded that sanctions under Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code were proper, we overrule Sanders-Castro's point of error on the accompanying attorney's fees issue.
The order and award of attorney's fees of the trial court is affirmed.