Castillo v. ADT, LLC

Full title: RICARDO CASTILLO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated…

Court: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Jan 24, 2017

CIV. NO. 2:15-383 WBS DB (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2017)

Opinion

CIV. NO. 2:15-383 WBS DB

01-24-2017

RICARDO CASTILLO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ADT, LLC, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendant.

WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT AND APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS, AND INCENTIVE AWARD

Plaintiff Ricardo Castillo brought this class action against defendant, ADT, alleging that defendant failed to pay him and other class members for off-the-clock work, overtime, and business expenses in violation of California wage and hour laws. (Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") (Docket No. 42).) Before the court are plaintiff's Motions for final approval of class settlement, (Pl.'s Mot. for Final Approval of Settlement (Docket No. 51)), and approval of attorneys' fees, costs, and an incentive award, (Pl.'s Mot. for Attorneys' Fees (Docket No. 50)).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant provides electronic security, alarm, and home and business automation services throughout the United States. (SAC ¶ 10.) It operates some twenty locations in California, each of which employs "non-exempt High Volume Installers." (See id. ¶¶ 10, 23.)

Plaintiff, a non-exempt high volume installer, alleges that defendant violated various provisions of the California Labor Code by paying him and other high volume installers pursuant to a wage policy that fails to compensate them for off-the-clock work, such as traveling between customer sites and picking up supplies from warehouses. (Id. ¶ 17.) By underpaying them pursuant to such a policy, plaintiff alleges, defendant also under-calculates their overtime pay, which must be "at least one and one-half times [their] regular rate of pay" under California law. (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff also alleges that defendant failed to "reimburse [him and other installers] for necessary business expenses and provide compliant wage statements." (Id. ¶ 5.)

Plaintiff brought this action on behalf of himself and other high volume installers who were paid on a similar basis. (See id. ¶ 4.) The parties litigated this case for over a year before reaching a settlement on April 24, 2016 before mediator Alan Berkowitz. (Docket No. 44 at 3-4.)

After reaching settlement, the parties filed a motion for preliminary approval of settlement on September 30, 2016. (Id.) The court granted preliminary approval and provisionally certified the following class: "[A]ll non-exempt individuals employed by ADT in California as high volume installers who were paid for services performed at any time from April 18, 2013 to [November 1, 2016]." (Nov. 1, 2016 Order at 22 (Docket No. 48).) The court appointed plaintiff as class representative; Alan Harris and Priya Mohan of the firm of Harris & Ruble and David Harris of North Bay Law Group as class counsel; and Dahl Administration as claims administrator. (Id.)

The court also approved plaintiff's opt-in/opt-out form and notice of settlement, (id. at 15-16); directed the claims administrator to send notice of settlement to class members by November 21, 2016, (id. at 23); directed class members to file claims, objections, and opt-outs by January 5, 2017, (id.); directed plaintiff to file a motion for attorneys' fees by December 29, 2016, (id.); and directed the parties to file briefs in support of final approval of settlement by December 29, 2016, (id.). The final fairness hearing in this action took place on January 23, 2017 at 1:30 p.m.

After conducting the final fairness hearing and carefully considering the settlement terms, the court now addresses whether this action should receive final class certification, whether the proposed settlement should receive final approval, and whether plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees, costs, and an incentive award should be granted.

II. Discussion

The Ninth Circuit has declared that a strong judicial policy favors settlement of class actions. Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, where, as here, "the parties reach a settlement agreement prior to class certification, courts must peruse the proposed compromise to ratify both [1] the propriety of the certification and [2] the fairness of the settlement." Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003).

The first part of the inquiry requires the court to "pay 'undiluted, even heightened, attention' to class certification requirements" because, unlike in a fully litigated class action suit, the court "will lack the opportunity . . . to adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as they unfold." Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997); see Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).

In the second stage, the court holds a fairness hearing where the court entertains any class member's objections to (1) the treatment of this litigation as a class action and (2) the terms of the settlement. See Diaz v. Tr. Territory of Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a court is required to hold a hearing prior to final approval of a dismissal or compromise of class claims to "inquire into the terms and circumstances of any dismissal or compromise to ensure it is not collusive or prejudicial"). Following such a hearing, the court must reach a final determination as to whether the court should allow the parties to settle the class action pursuant to the agreed-upon terms. See Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 525 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

A. Class Certification

A class action will be certified only if it meets the four prerequisites identified in Rule 23(a) and fits within one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b). Although a district court has discretion in determining whether the moving party has satisfied each Rule 23 requirement, the court must conduct a rigorous inquiry before certifying a class. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979).

1. Rule 23(a) Requirements

Rule 23(a) restricts class actions to cases where:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In the court's Order granting preliminary approval of settlement, the court found that the putative class satisfied the Rule 23(a) requirements. Because the court is not aware of any facts that would alter its initial Rule 23(a) analysis, the court finds that the class definition proposed by plaintiff meets the requirements of Rule 23(a).

2. Rule 23(b) Requirements

An action that meets all of the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) may be certified as a class action only if it also satisfies the requirements of one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which provides that a class action may be maintained only if (1) "the court finds that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over questions affecting only individual members" and (2) "a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

In its Order granting preliminary approval of settlement, the court found that both prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3) were satisfied. The court is not aware of any facts that would alter this conclusion. Because the settlement class satisfies both Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3), the court will grant final class certification in this action.

3. Rule 23(c)(2) Notice Requirements

If the court certifies a class under Rule 23(b)(3), it "must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Rule 23(c)(2) governs both the form and content of a proposed notice. See Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D. 651, 658 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172-77 (1974)). Although that notice must be "reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the plaintiff class," actual notice is not required. Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).

The parties agreed that Dahl Administration would serve as claims administrator in this action. (Docket No. 44 at 9.)

Defendant identified and provided Dahl with the records of 427 class members on November 17, 2016. (Decl. of Kelly Kratz ("Kratz Decl.") ¶ 4 (Docket No. 54-1).) Dahl obtained the most current mailing addresses for each class member using the National Change of Address database maintained by the United States Postal Service ("USPS"). (Id. ¶ 5.) On November 21, 2016, Dahl mailed notice of settlement to the 427 class members via first class USPS mail.¹ (Id. ¶ 6.) Dahl sent a second notice on December 21, 2016 to the 285 class members who had not responded by that point. (Id. ¶ 7.)

1 Ten class notices were returned as undeliverable. (Kratz Decl. ¶ 8.) Dahl forwarded those notices to a professional search firm for tracing. (Id.) Plaintiff stated at the final fairness hearing that seven of the ten undeliverable notices were re-mailed pursuant to updated addresses. The remaining three notices did not have updated addresses and could not be re-sent. (Id.)

Of the 427 class members identified and sent notice, 287 filed timely claim forms. (Jan. 13, 2017 Decl. of Alan Harris ("Harris Decl. II") ¶ 3 (Docket No. 54).) Four class members filed late claim forms, which the parties have agreed to accept. (See id. ¶ 4; Jan. 19, 2017 Decl. of Alan Harris ("Harris Decl. III") at 2 (Docket No. 55).) Counting the late claim forms, the class settlement participation rate in this action was 68%. Seven class members² decided to opt out, and no class member objected to the settlement. (Harris Decl. II ¶ 5.)

2 The parties stated at the final fairness hearing that two of the seven opt-out members may decide to re-opt in.

The notice sent by Dahl explained the proceedings in this action; who comprised the settlement class; the claim form requirement and the binding effect of opting in; the procedure for opting out or objecting; when and where the final fairness hearing would be held; and how to contact class counsel should the class member have any questions or wish to request more information. (See Kratz Decl. Ex. A, Notice of Settlement.) The notice also explains that class members' individual settlement awards would be determined based on number of weeks worked during the class period, and that weeks worked during the Apiece rate' period would be compensated differently from weeks worked during the 'hourly rate' period.³ (See id. at 4-5.)

3 Pursuant to their settlement, the parties agree that the class period will be comprised of two sub-periods: (1) a 'piece rate' period, during which defendant allegedly paid class members pursuant to a piece rate system; and (2) an 'hourly rate' period, during which defendant allegedly paid class members pursuant to an hourly rate system. (Dec. 29, 2016 Decl. of Alan Harris ("Harris Decl. I") Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement at 8-9 (Docket No. 53-1).) Ninety percent of class funds will go towards compensating weeks worked during the Apiece rate' period, and ten percent of class funds will go towards compensating weeks worked during the 'hourly rate' period. (Id.) The implication of this split is that defendant's 'piece rate' system undercompensated class members more severely than its 'hourly rate' system did. (See Harris Decl. I ¶ 10 ("The plan of allocation was negotiated in such a way as to fairly allocate the recovery among Class Members in accordance with Plaintiff's theories of potential damages as well as the relative strengths and weaknesses of the claims . . . .") (Docket No. 53).) The court finds no reason to doubt the fairness of this allocation.

The court is satisfied that the parties' notice plan was "best notice that [was] practicable under the circumstances," and that the content of their notice satisfied Rule 23(c)(2)(B). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); see also Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Notice is satisfactory if it generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard." (citation omitted)).

B. Rule 23(e): Fairness, Adequacy, and Reasonableness of Proposed Settlement

Having determined class treatment to be warranted and notice to be adequate, the court must now determine whether the terms of the parties' settlement are fair, adequate, and reasonable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. This process requires the court to "balance a number of factors," including:

the strength of the plaintiff's case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. But see In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) ("The factors in a court's fairness assessment will naturally vary from case to case.").

1. Strength of Plaintiff's Case

An important consideration is the strength of plaintiff's case balanced against the amount offered in the settlement. DIRECTV, 221 F.R.D. at 526. The district court, however, is not required to reach any ultimate conclusions on the merits of the case, "for it is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wastefulness and expensive litigation that induce consensual settlements." Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City & Cnty. of SF, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 2004).

The terms of the parties' settlement compare favorably to the uncertainties of plaintiff's case. If the parties had not settled, defendant would have opposed plaintiff's request for class certification, contested the merits of his claims at summary judgment and/or trial, and appealed any adverse judgment the court issued. (See Pl.'s Mot. for Final Approval of Settlement at 14.) In doing so, defendant would have asserted some twenty-three defenses against plaintiff's claims, such as failure to exhaust administrative remedies, failure to mitigate damages, time bar under various statutes of limitations, and inaccuracy of various allegations made in plaintiff's second amended Complaint. (See Answer at 6-10 (Docket No. 31).) These defenses, defendant contends, "present serious threats to the claims of Plaintiff and the other Class Members." (Pl.'s Mot. for Final Approval of Settlement at 14.)

Even if plaintiff succeeded on the merits of his claims, he may have faced difficulty recovering statutory damages and civil penalties from defendant in light of recent cases from courts in this circuit holding that such damages and penalties cannot be "stack[ed]" on top of each other. See Smith v . Lux Retail N . Am . , Inc ., No. C 13-01579 WHA, 2013 WL 2932243, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2013).

In light of the uncertainties plaintiff would have faced had he not settled this case, the court finds that the proposed settlement, which will provide an average recovery totaling in the thousands of dollars to participating class members, is a fair resolution of the claims brought in this case.

2. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

As explained above, plaintiff would have faced risk with respect to defendant's defenses and recovering damages had he not settled this case. Defendant's representation that it would have opposed class certification, contested the merits of this case at summary judgment and/or trial, and appealed any adverse judgment, would have resulted in "several more years" of litigation, at the end of which "any damage/penalty [recovered by plaintiff and the class may] be dwarfed by the fees and costs expended to obtain it." (Pl.'s Mot. for Final Approval of Settlement at 15-16.) Accordingly, the risks, expense, and duration of further litigation in this matter weigh in favor of approving the settlement. See Nat'l Rural Telecommunications Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2004) ("[U]nless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and approval are preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain results.").

3. Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Throughout Trial

Though defendant has agreed to class certification for purposes of this settlement, it "intends to vigorously oppose class certification" should this case proceed on the merits. (Pl.'s Mot. for Final Approval of Settlement at 15.) Based on plaintiff's allegations, it appears that class certification may be warranted in this case. (See SAC ¶ 4 (alleging that defendant "pays employees an impermissibly low overtime rate" "as a matter of company policy").) However, plaintiff acknowledges that there is nevertheless "risk that class-wide status may be denied" should this case proceed on the merits and defendant contest class certification. (Pl.'s Mot. for Final Approval of Settlement at 15-16.) Because "class certification is not guaranteed," Morales v. Conopco, Inc., No. 2:13-2213 WBS EFB, 2016 WL 6094504, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2016), this factor weighs in favor of approving the settlement.

4. Amount Offered in Settlement

"In assessing the consideration obtained by the class members in a class action settlement, it is the complete package taken as a whole, rather than the individual component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness." Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303 F.R.D. 356, 370 (E.D. Cal. 2014). In determining whether a settlement agreement is substantively fair to the class, the court must balance the value of expected recovery against the value of the settlement offer. See In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007). This inquiry may involve consideration of the uncertainty class members would face if the case were litigated to trial. See Ontiveros, 303 F.R.D. at 370-71.

The gross settlement amount in this case is $1,060,000. (Dec. 29, 2016 Decl. of Alan Harris ("Harris Decl. I") Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement ¶ 2.21 (Docket No. 53-1).) The parties have agreed to distribute that amount as follows: (1) class counsel will receive a fee of $349,800, equal to 33% of the gross settlement amount, (id. ¶ 5.1); (2) plaintiff will receive an incentive award of $5,000, (id. ¶ 5.3); (3) $14,080 will go towards litigation costs, (Harris Decl. III at 2-3); (4) $3,750 will be paid to the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency in satisfaction of defendant's alleged penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, (Settlement Agreement ¶ 5.6); (5) $7,971 will be paid to Dahl Administration, (see Pl.'s Proposed Order ¶ 11 (Docket No. 51-1)); and (6) the remaining amount--$679,399--will be distributed to the settlement class based on number of weeks worked during the class period, (see Settlement Agreement ¶ 4.2). The entire settlement amount is non-reversionary. (Harris Decl. II ¶ 7.)

Each of the 291 class members who submitted claim forms will receive a settlement payment based on the number of weeks he or she worked for defendant during the class period. (See id . ¶ 6.) The average recovery per participating class member will be approximately $2,334.70. Plaintiff notes that the settlement amount represents "33% of the maximum possible recovery," (Pl.'s Mot. for Final Approval of Settlement at 16), which is "well within a reasonable range . . . [for] class action settlements," Rodriguez v . W . Pub . Corp ., No. CV 05-3222 R (MCX), 2007 WL 2827379, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2007), rev'd on other grounds in Rodriguez v . W . Publ'g Corp ., 563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009).

In light of the risks and expense of further litigation in this matter, the court finds the settlement amount to be fair and adequate.

5. Extent of Discovery and State of Proceedings

A settlement that occurs in an advanced stage of the proceedings indicates that the parties carefully investigated the claims before reaching a resolution. Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., Civ. No. 07-1895 WBS DAD, 2008 WL 4891201, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2008). Here, the parties litigated this action for over a year before settling it. (Docket No. 44 at 3-4.) They reached settlement only after engaging in "voluminous" discovery, "diligent[]" investigation, motion practice, assessment of the "risks of further litigation," and two "lengthy" mediation sessions at which "they each aggressively advocated for their respective positions." (Id. at 2-3, 15.) Accordingly, the extent of discovery and state of proceedings in this action weigh in favor of approving the parties' settlement.

6. Experience and Views of Counsel

"When approving class action settlements, the court must give considerable weight to class counsel's opinions due to counsel's familiarity with the litigation and [their] previous experience with class action lawsuits." Murillo v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., Civ. No. 2:08-1974 WBS GGH, 2010 WL 2889728, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2010). Here, plaintiff has provided evidence that class counsel have "substantial experience in prosecuting class actions, including wage-and-hour matters." (Pl.'s Mot. for Final Approval of Settlement at 16; see also Harris Decl. I ¶¶ 13-16.) Class counsel is "of the opinion that the Settlement Agreement [in this action] represents a good compromise for the Class, given the inherent risks, hazards, and expenses of carrying the Action through trial." (Pl.'s Mot. for Final Approval of Settlement at 16-17.) The court gives "considerable weight to class counsel's opinions due to counsel's familiarity with the litigation and [their] previous experience with class action lawsuits." Alberto, 2008 WL 4891201, at *10. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approving the settlement.

7. Presence of Government Participant

No government entity participated in this matter. This factor, therefore, is irrelevant to the court's analysis.

8. Reaction of Class Members to the Proposed Settlement

"[T]he absence of a large number of objections to a proposed class action settlement raises a strong presumption that the terms of a proposed class settlement action are favorable to the class members." DIRECTV, 221 F.R.D. at 529. Here, notice of settlement was sent to 427 class members and no class member objected. (Harris Decl. II ¶ 5.) Only seven members⁴ opted out. (Id.) This factor weighs in favor of approving the settlement.

4 See supra note 2.

9. Conclusion

Having considered the foregoing factors, the court finds the parties' settlement to be fair, adequate, and reasonable under Rule 23(e).

C. Attorney's Fees

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) provides that "[i]n a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties' agreement." If a class action settlement includes an award of attorney's fees, that award must be evaluated in the overall context of the settlement. Knisley v. Network Assocs., 312 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002); Monterrubio v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 291 F.R.D. 443, 455 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (England, J.). The court "ha[s] an independent obligation to ensure that the award, like the settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the parties have already agreed to an amount." Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 941.

The Ninth Circuit has approved two methods of assigning attorneys' fees in class settlements: percentage-of-recovery and lodestar. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002). The court has discretion in common fund cases, such as here, to choose either method. Id. It may also use one as a "cross-check[]" upon the other. See Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 944.

Class counsel in this case request $349,000 in attorneys' fees, and $14,080 in litigation costs. (Pl.'s Mot. for Attorneys' Fees at 1; Harris Decl. III at 2-3.) Defendant has agreed not to oppose either request. (Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 5.1-5.2.) The attorneys' fees requested by counsel constitute 33% of the gross settlement amount, and is slightly below the lodestar figure of $370,245, which counsel calculated based on 706 hours expended in this case times rates of $650 for partners, $350 for associates, and $150 for paralegals.⁵ (Pl.'s Mot. for Attorneys' Fees at 11, 20.) Counsel submitted detailed invoices justifying the number of hours worked and litigation costs incurred. (See Docket No. 50-1 Exs. 1-3, Invoices; Harris Decl. I Ex. 2, Invoices (Docket No. 53-2); Harris Decl. III.)

5 The rates are the same as those the court approved in Garnett v. ADT, LLC, No. CV 2:14-02851 WBS AC, 2016 WL 3538354, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2016), which involved the same defendant and similar claims. --------

While the attorneys' fees requested is above the 25% "benchmark" set by the Ninth Circuit for "common fund" settlements, see Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), courts in this circuit have approved fees that exceeded that "benchmark" in many cases, see Bond v. Ferguson Enterprises, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-1662 OWW MJS, 2011 WL 2648879, at *9 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2011) ("[T]he exact percentage [of attorneys' fees] varies depending on the facts of the case, and in most common fund cases, the award exceeds [the 25%] benchmark."). A fees award amounting to "33 1/3% of the total settlement value" is considered "acceptable." Id. The fact that the requested fees in this case are below the lodestar figure further supports granting approval. See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050 ("[T]he lode star . . . provides a check on the reasonableness of the percentage award.").

In light of the risks counsel incurred by taking this case on a contingency basis, the nearly two years they spent litigating this case, and the reasonable result they obtained for class members, the court finds the requested fees to be reasonable. The court also finds the requested litigation costs to be reasonable in light of the invoices counsel have submitted with their Motion. Accordingly, the court will approve counsel's requested fees and costs.

D. Incentive Payment to Plaintiff

"Incentive awards are fairly typical in class action cases." Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958. "[They] are intended to compensated class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general." Id. at 958-59. Courts in this circuit have found awards of $5,000 to be reasonable. Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc., Civ. No. 08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) (citing In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 463 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Here, plaintiff requests an incentive award of $5,000. (Pl.'s Mot. for Attorneys' Fees at 21.) In justifying the award, plaintiff represents that he "expended considerable time conferring with Class Counsel and their investigators" regarding this case, "provid[ed] factual background and support" to counsel, and "analyz[ed] ADT provided data" to assist counsel. (Id. at 21-22.) Plaintiff also notes that he "travelled to San Francisco to participate in the [parties'] two mediation sessions." (Id.) Finally, plaintiff states that he "undertook the financial risk that, in the event of a judgment in favor of ADT in this action, he could have been personally responsible for any costs awarded in favor of ADT." (Id.) In light of the efforts plaintiff put in to and the risks he incurred in bringing this action, the court finds his requested incentive award to be reasonable, and will approve the award.

III. Conclusion

Based on the above, the court grants final class certification in this action and finds the parties' settlement to be fair, reasonable, and adequate. Consummation of the settlement in accordance with the terms and provisions of the parties' settlement agreement is approved. The settlement agreement shall be binding upon all class members who did not timely opt out of this action.

The court also finds plaintiff's request of $349,800 in attorneys' fees, $14,080 in litigation costs, and $5,000 in incentive award to be reasonable, and grants final approval with respect to those payments.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's Motions for class certification, final approval of class settlement, and attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive award be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:

(1) Solely for the purpose of this settlement, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the court hereby certifies the following class: All non-exempt individuals employed by ADT in California as high volume installers who were paid for services performed at any time from April 18, 2013 to November 1, 2016.

(2) The court appoints plaintiff Ricardo Castillo as class representative and finds that he meets the requirements of Rule 23.

(3) The court appoints Alan Harris and Priya Mohan of the firm of Harris & Ruble and David Harris of North Bay Law Group as class counsel and finds that they meet the requirements of Rule 23.

(4) The court finds that the notice plan described in the parties' settlement agreement (Docket No. 53-1) was the best notice practicable under the circumstances and satisfies the requirements of due process and Rule 23. That plan is approved and adopted. The notice of settlement sent to the class (Docket No. 52 Ex. A) complies with Rule 23(c)(2) and 23(e), and is approved and adopted.

(5) The court finds that the parties and their counsel took appropriate efforts to locate and inform all class members of the settlement. Given that no class member filed an objection to the settlement, the court finds

that no additional notice to the class is necessary.

(6) As of the date of the entry of this Order, plaintiff and all class members who have not timely opted out of this settlement hereby do and shall be deemed to have fully, finally, and forever released, settled, compromised, relinquished, and discharged defendant of and from any and all settled claims, pursuant to the release provisions stated in the parties' settlement agreement.

(7) Plaintiff's counsel are entitled to attorneys' fees in the amount of $349,800, and litigation costs in the amount of $14,080.

(8) Plaintiff Castillo is entitled to receive an incentive award in the amount of $5,000.

(9) Dahl Administration is entitled to administration costs in the amount of $7,971.

(10) $3,750 from the gross settlement amount shall be paid to the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency in satisfaction of defendant's alleged penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act.

(11) The remaining settlement funds shall be paid to participating class members in accordance with the terms of the parties' settlement agreement.

(12) This action is dismissed with prejudice. However, without affecting the finality of this Order, the court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of the settlement agreement with respect to all parties in

this action and their counsel of record.

The clerk is instructed to enter judgment accordingly. Dated: January 24, 2017

/s/_________

WILLIAM B. SHUBB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE