Opinion
No. CIV 00-0036 JC/RLP
October 3, 2001
Counsel for Plaintiff: Nancy L. Simmons, Esq., Albuquerque, New Mexico Tara Ford, Esq., Albuquerque, New Mexico Karen J. Meyers, Esq., Aguilar Law Offices, P. C., Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Counsel for Defendants, William F. Riordan, Esq., Riordan Associates Albuquerque, New Mexico Patrick J. Rogers, Esq., Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris Sisk, P. A., Albuquerque, New Mexico.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER came on for consideration of Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees and Memorandum in Support Thereof, filed June 8, 2001 (Doc. 75), and Plaintiffs Motion for Relief as to Count I Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) and For Entry of Judgment Pursuant to the Courts Ruling on June 1, 2000, filed June 5, 2001 (Doc. 72). The Court has reviewed the motions, the memoranda and exhibits submitted by the parties, and the relevant authorities.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs motions are not well taken and will be denied.
I. Background
Plaintiff Mariarosario Castellanos is the natural mother of Pablo and Pedro Castellanos, identical twins diagnosed with autism. As Medicaid recipients, the boys obtained their medical services from Defendant Cimarron Health Plan (d/b/a Cimarron Salud). Defendant Cimarron entered into a contract with Defendant New Mexico Human Services Department (HSD) to furnish necessary medical services for eligible Medicaid recipients such as the Plaintiffs. In turn, Defendant HSD was responsible for providing a state-wide managed care system for Medicaid recipients.
In 1999, Ms. Castellanos claimed that the mental health providers involved in her sons treatments determined that the long-term treatment goal was a residential setting that specialized in treating autism. In order to receive such treatment for her children, Ms. Castellanos needed to make a formal request with Defendant Cimarron. Ms. Castellanos sought the assistance of an advocacy group called Parents of Behaviorally Different Children (PBDC) to assist with her request to Defendant Cimarron.
On September 10, 1999, PBDC advocates sent a letter on behalf of Ms. Castellanos to Aspen Behavioral Health (Aspen) requesting placement of her sons in an out-of-state residential facility.
Aspen, a subcontractor and agent of Defendant Cimarron, denied the request. Plaintiff formally appealed the denial of services in a letter dated September 22, 1999, and Aspen subsequently denied the appeal. On October 5, 1999, Plaintiff sought an expedited appeal by way of Defendant Cimarrons grievance process. An Appeals Specialist for Defendant Cimarron ruled against Plaintiff in a letter dated October 11, 1999.
On January 10, 2000, Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants for declaratory and injunctive relief claiming: (1) failure to provide medically necessary services as required by the Medicaid Act (Count I); (2) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Count II); (3) failure to comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count III); and (4) violations of the Procedural Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count IV). See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 16-19, filed January 10, 2000 (Doc. 1). In addition, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and for a preliminary injunction asking the Court to prevent the denial of medically necessary services to Pablo and Pedro. See Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support, filed January 10, 2000 (Doc. 2). A TRO hearing was held on January 12, 2000, and later subsumed into a preliminary injunction hearing on January 21 and 24, 2000. During the hearing, one of the issues the Court addressed was Plaintiffs decision not to pursue the fair hearing procedures before Defendant HSD. The Court advised Plaintiff to seek administrative review before Defendant HSD but did not issue an order to this effect.
See Exhibit A, attached to Defendant Cimarron Health Plan, Inc.'s Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees, filed June 8, 2001 (Doc. 76).
Rather, the Court ordered the denial of Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support, finding that Plaintiff failed to establish an irreparable injury. See Order, filed January 26, 2000 (Doc. 15).
Plaintiff chose to pursue the fair hearing procedures before Defendant HSD, and a hearing was held on March 1, 2000, before Ross Becker, Acting Director of the Medical Assistance Division.
On April 12, 2000, Mr. Becker entered a Hearing Decision reversing Defendant Cimarrons denial of Plaintiffs request for placement at a residential treatment facility. In the months to follow, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants ignored the clear import of the administrative decision and delayed the placement of Pablo and Pedro in a residential treatment facility. However, Defendants maintain that they worked diligently to comply with the hearing decision.
On June 1, 2000, the Court held a status conference. Plaintiff claims that the Court ordered Defendants to take all steps necessary to immediately place Pedro at the Brown School and Pablo at the Children's Psychiatric Hospital. The Defendants deny that such an order was ever issued by the Court.
On February 8, 2001 , the parties submitted a joint status letter to the Court. The parties concurred on the following information: (1) Pedro was receiving residential care at the Brown School and Pablo was a patient at the Children's Psychiatric Hospital; (2) the expenses for the residential treatment of both children were covered by the New Mexico Medicaid fee for service, and Defendant Cimarron was no longer involved; and (3) there were no pending requests for medical treatment other than the care which was being covered. Plaintiff went on to assert the following without the concurrence of Defendants: (1) Counts I and II against Defendant Cimarron were moot because of recent changes in federal regulations independent of this lawsuit, and (2) the relief sought under Counts I and II against Defendant HSD had been provided. Counts III and IV remained in dispute.
On March 22, 2001 , the Court entered Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. 69). Based upon the joint status letter, the Court found that the claims raised in Counts I and II were moot, and ordered that Defendant Robin Ottens Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Stay Proceedings be granted with respect to Counts I and II. The Court went on to determine that Plaintiff failed to produce evidence to show that she was denied the opportunity to participate in the administrative medical decision of the children because of the alleged defective notices in Spanish. Finally, the Court determined that the Spanish notices did not pose any due process problems for the Plaintiff as she proceeded through the administrative hearings. Accordingly, the Court ordered that Defendant Ottens Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Deficient Notice Claims be granted with respect to Counts III and IV.
Plaintiff now moves the Court for an order declaring that Plaintiff was the prevailing party on Counts I and II for purposes of recovering attorneys fees. See Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees and Memorandum in Support Thereof, (Pl's Motion for Atty's Fees) filed June 8, 2001 (Doc. 75).
In addition, Plaintiff moves the Court for an order setting aside the ruling on Count I and for the entry of an order on Count I setting forth the Courts oral statement at the status conference on June 1, 2000.
II. Analysis
A. Motion to Strike Exhibit A from Defendant
Ottens Response Brief New Mexico District Court Local Rule 10.5 states that exhibits cannot exceed fifty pages.
Clearly, nine and a half pages, whether single, double or triple columns does not merit a detailed analysis of whether it exceeds the stated page limit. Therefore, Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Exhibit A to Defendant Ottens Response and Memorandum in Support is denied.
B. Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees
Traditionally, in the United States, parties to a lawsuit are required to pay their own attorneys fees, regardless of the outcome. Characteristically, this rule became known as the American Rule. See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). To diminish the harshness of this rule, Congress has enacted numerous statutes that allow the court to award attorneys fees to the prevailing party. Such statutes include the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 42 § 12101 et seq.
In the present case, Plaintiff is seeking attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 12205. In both statutes, the plaintiff must be a prevailing party in order for attorneys fees to be awarded.
Prevailing party is defined as [a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (7th ed. 1999). The legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 enunciates Congress intent that the prevailing party only be awarded its attorneys fees if the party prevailed on the merits of at least some of its claims. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980). The Supreme Court held that a nominal award is sufficient for a party to be deemed a prevailing party, so long as the award is based on the merits of the cause of action. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992). Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled that settlement agreements enforced via consent decrees also allow for attorneys fees. See Maher v.
Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129-130 (1980). Accordingly, only enforceable judgments on the merits and consent decrees establish the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties necessary to permit an award of attorneys fees. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home v. West Virginia Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 121 S.Ct. 1835, 1840 ( 2001 ) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff initially claimed that the Courts question/comment during the status conference on June 1, 2000, led to Defendant Cimmarons approval of placement of Pedro in the Brown School.
The primary question at issue was the Courts query, I think they [Pedro and Pablo] are going to the Brown School, aren't they?
See Pl's Motion for Atty's Fee's (Doc. 75). Plaintiff argued that due to the timing of Pedros placement in the Brown School (June 2, 2000), the Courts comment was the catalyst to her sons entry, and therefore she was the prevailing party. In this initial argument, Plaintiff claimed that under the catalyst theory nothing further was required to consider her the prevailing party in order to obtain attorneys fees.
1. Catalyst Theory Under the catalyst theory, and as adopted by the 10th Circuit, attorneys fees are awarded even when there was no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties. In Foremaster v. City of St. George, the court awarded attorneys fees to a civil rights plaintiff solely as the result of defendants voluntary actions aiding in an improvement in plaintiffs conditions. See 882 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1989). Under the catalyst theory, therefore, plaintiffs do not have to point to a judicial order in their favor to be awarded attorneys fees.
2. The Catalyst Theory Overturned In a recent Supreme Court decision, the Court overturned the catalyst theory holding that it is not a permissible theory for awarding attorneys fees. See Buckhannon, 121 S.Ct. at 1840. In the decision, the Court reviewed attorneys fees provisions in two statutes: the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Although these were the only two statutes at issue, the plain language of the Opinion does not limit the Courts ruling to those two statutes, as the opening lines specifically speak to the [n]umerous federal statutes that Congress has enacted that include attorneys fees provisions. Buckhannon, 121 S.Ct. at 1838. Moreover, the Court also specifically points to other statutes that have attorneys fees provisions, further indicating the Courts intention that its ruling is not limited to the statutes at issue. Id. at 1839 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court reasoned that a defendants voluntary conduct is not a sufficient basis for awarding attorneys fees, as it lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change. Id. at 1840. To be awarded attorneys fees, therefore, a judicially sanctioned alteration in the legal relationship between the parties must occur. Id. The Supreme Court went on to write that it can see no reason why federal courts should award attorneys fees to plaintiffs who by simply filing a nonfrivolous but nonetheless potentially meritless lawsuit . . . ha[ve] reached the sought after destination without obtaining any judicial relief. Id. at 1841 (citations omitted). The Court today, therefore, finds that the catalyst theory is no longer applicable.
3. Plaintiffs Argument Upon the Supreme Courts decision in Buckhannon, Plaintiff then claimed that the Courts question at the status conference amounted to a judicial edict that mandated Defendants to place Pedro at the Brown School. See Plaintiffs Reply to Responses Submitted By Defendants, at 1, filed June 8, 2001 (Doc. 78). Yet, as the Third Circuit held in Snow Machines, Inc. v. Hedco, Inc., [t]he operative act of the judge is the order. Even a formal published opinion, to say nothing of a bench opinion and even less of a comment at a conference, is a statement of reasons for the order; it does not supplant the order. 838 F.2d 718, 727 (3rd Cir. 1988). For a courts comments to be binding and enforceable, they must constitute a judicially sanctioned change in the parties legal relationship. Buchkannon, 121 S.Ct. at 1840. The oral comment made by the Court at the status conference was neither intended to bind nor direct the Defendant. It was a mere question and nothing more. The Court thus finds that the comment in dispute at the status conference on June 1 did not lead to a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties under the ruling in Buckhannon such that attorneys fees would be justified under either 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or 12205.
C. Rule 60(b)(6) Motion
Plaintiff further urges the Court for Rule 60(b)(6) relief setting aside the Courts Order granting Defendants Motion to Dismiss Count I. Plaintiff also seeks entry of a written order on Count I setting forth the Courts oral ruling and directives . . . as rendered at the status conference of June 1, 2000. Pls Memorandum in Support of its 60(b)(6) Motion, at 1, filed June 5, 2001 (Doc. # 73). Plaintiffs motion is not well taken and is denied.
In pertinent part, FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) states:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
A Rule 60(b) motion is granted on the sound discretion of the court. See Caribou Four Corners, Inc. v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 443 F.2d 796, 799 (10th Cir. 1971). Such motion gives the court a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case. Pierce v. Cook Co., 518 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079. Relief, however, under Rule 60(b)(6) should only be granted under extraordinary circumstances. See Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill Hodges Trucking, Co., 909 F.2d 1437, 1440 (10th Cir. 1990).
Extraordinary circumstances include when, after entry of judgment, events not contemplated by the parties or the court render enforcement of the judgment inequitable. See e.g., Zimmerman v. Quinn, 744 F.2d 81, 82-83 (10th Cir. 1984) (upholding 60(b)(6) modification of stipulated judgment to allow a party to escape tax liability for a one year period when both parties expected the money to be transferred within sixty days and it was not transferred for eighteen months); State v. Gledhill (In Re Gledhill), 76 F.3d 1070, 1081 (10th Cir. 1996) (court upholding bankruptcy courts grant of a 60(b)(6) motion due to circumstances of the case changing significantly since the judgment.). In the present case, the Plaintiff argues that the holding in Buckhannon is the event not contemplated by the parties or the Court. See Pls Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief from Judgment on Count I, at 8, filed June 5, 2001 (Doc. 73). The problem with this argument, however, is that regardless of whether the Court followed Buckhannon or applied the catalyst theory, Plaintiff still would not be accorded prevailing party status, for the Court finds that the question at the status conference had no bearing on Pedros entry into the Brown School.
Exhibit 21 confirms that the Brown School anticipated a vacancy for June 1 and another for June 9, 2000. See Pls Motion for Atty's Fee's, exhibit 21. The Courts question, therefore, did not bring about a voluntary change in the Defendants conduct such that Plaintiff would be a prevailing party even under the catalyst theory. Thus the ruling in Buckhannon, although unanticipated by Plaintiff, does not render the judgment inequitable.
Extraordinary relief is appropriate when circumstances are so unusual or compelling or when it offends justice to deny such relief. See Pelican Prod. Corp. v. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff cites Pierce v. Cook Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975) in support of her theory that the Court may grant Rule 60(b) relief due to a change in relevant case law. See Pls Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief from Judgment on Count I at 6 (Doc. 73). The present case and Pierce, however, vary greatly in their facts and circumstances necessitating the different holdings. In Pierce, the court granted a Rule 60(b)(6) motion due to the long-standing rule articulated in Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938), that in diversity jurisdiction cases federal court rulings should be substantially similar to state court litigation arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. See Pierce, 518 F.2d at 723. Yet, in Pierce, such similarity did not occur. The court, therefore, held that the divergence constituted an extraordinary situation compelling Rule 60(b)(6) relief. Id. at 724. In the present case, Plaintiffs sole basis for Rule 60(b)(6) relief is the overturning of the catalyst theory under Buckhannon. Yet, as discussed infra., a change in law is not a sufficient basis for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
Plaintiffs theory that the ruling in Buckhannon constitutes a change in the law, and therefore its retroactive application to this case would be inequitable, is not well founded in this jurisdiction. See Pls Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief from Judgment on Count I at 2. Although the Circuits vary regarding whether a change in the law should be the basis for a 60(b) motion, the Tenth Circuit follows the rule articulated in Collins v. City of Wichita, holding that [a] change in the law or in the judicial review of an established rule of law is not such an extraordinary circumstance which justifies such [60(b)(6)] relief. 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1958). Notably, even those circuits that hold that trial courts may review the impact of a change in law after judgment is entered stop short of allowing all such judgments to be reviewed. [S]omething more than a mere change in law is necessary to provide the grounds for Rule 60(b)(6) relief. Ritter v. Smith, 811 F.2d 1398, 1401, reh'g denied, 817 F.2d 761 (11th Cir. 1987), and cert. denied 483 U.S. 1010 (1987). Plaintiffs claim that a retroactive application of Buckhannon to her case would be inequitable is thus not well founded. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request for an order setting aside the Courts ruling on Count I is denied.
Finally, Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order reflecting its oral comment at the June 1, 2000 status conference. The Court, however, sees no basis for memorializing into an order a mere question it asked at the status conference. The question was not a judicial edict, a judicial directive nor a judicial ruling; it was simply a non-binding question by the Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Exhibit A. The Court also denies Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees. The Court finds that the catalyst theory is no longer good law. Therefore, under Buckannon, Plaintiff is not a prevailing party, as there was no material alteration in the parties legal status upon a certain question the Court asked at the status conference. Furthermore, Plaintiffs Motion for Relief as to Count I is also not well taken by the Court, as there is no extraordinary situation justifying Rule 60( b)(6) relief. Finally, the Court finds no justification for entering a written order reflecting its oral statement at the status conference. If everything a court said or asked became the basis for a ruling, our legal system would be immersed in an even greater judicial morass than the one we have today.
Wherefore,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Mariaosario Castellanos Motion to Strike Exhibit A, filed July 5, 2001 (Doc. # 82) is denied.
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Mariaosario Castellanos Motion For Attorneys Fees, filed May 1, 2001 (Doc. 75) is denied.
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Mariaosario Castellanos Motion for Relief as to Count I
Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) and for Entry of Judgment, filed June 5, 2001 (Doc. 72), is denied.