Opinion
D082562
04-30-2024
ARTURO CASTANARES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, Defendant and Appellant.
Mara W. Elliott, City Attorney, M. Travis Phelps, Assistant City Attorney and Catherine A. Richardson, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Appellant. Briggs Law, Cory J. Briggs and Nora Pasin for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. 37-2021-00023793-CU-MC-CTL Ronald F. Frazier, Judge. Affirmed.
Mara W. Elliott, City Attorney, M. Travis Phelps, Assistant City Attorney and Catherine A. Richardson, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Appellant.
Briggs Law, Cory J. Briggs and Nora Pasin for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CASTILLO, J.
City of San Diego appeals the trial court's April 2023 award of attorney fees to Arturo Castanares as the prevailing party in a California Public Records Act (CPRA) action. (Gov. Code, § 7920.000 et seq.) City claims the court abused its discretion by (1) awarding fees for work performed after the litigation's objectives were accomplished, (2) failing to sufficiently reduce Castanares' "unreasonably inflated" fee claim, and (3) awarding fees not supported by sufficient evidence. We resolve this matter by memorandum opinion and affirm. (See generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847.)
I.
In June 2022, the trial court entered judgment based on the parties' stipulation that City had violated the CPRA and Castanares was the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees. As agreed by the parties, Castanares filed an attorney fees motion. City opposed Castanares' fee motion. After hearing argument, the trial court issued a written order awarding in part Castanares' requested fees.
As to hourly rates, the court reduced the rate for one attorney from $750 to $600, finding the requested rate "excessive based on [the court's] familiarity with market rates . . ., its experience with counsel, and the facts of the case." The court found reasonable the requested associate attorney and paralegal rates of $325 and $150, respectively.
As to hours expended, the court reduced the hours for the fee motion from 20 to 12. It found the remaining hours "reasonable." Although it acknowledged City "made early efforts to resolve" the matter, the court concluded "both sides took conservative steps to preserve their respective claims/defenses" while "continu[ing] to negotiate settlement."
The trial court calculated the lodestar accordingly. The court found a multiplier "not justified," as "[f]actors like contingency and delay in payment are built into the high hourly rate" and "the importance of the lawsuit to the public" was "fairly modest" given the limited scope of the CPRA request.
II.
We review the trial court's order awarding attorney fees for abuse of discretion. (Valenti v. City of San Diego (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 218, 231.) A court abuses its discretion if its "decision exceeds the bounds of reason and results in a miscarriage of justice." (Mejia v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 151, 158.) We presume the court applied the law correctly and acted within its discretion absent the appellant's affirmative showing of error. (Ibid.) We review the correctness of the order "'as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of matters which were before the trial court for its consideration.'" (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.)
A.
First, City claims the record shows "Castanares obtained the objectives of the litigation, i.e., production of the [requested public record] and the City's admission Castanares was the prevailing party for purposes of recovering his attorney's fees," within two days of serving his complaint. We are unpersuaded.
The CPRA mandates an award of "reasonable" attorney fees to a prevailing requester unless the case is "clearly frivolous," in which case the court "shall award" costs and reasonable fees to the "public agency." (§ 7923.115, subd. (a) & (b).) Voluntarily providing public records, induced by a plaintiff's lawsuit, supports an attorney fee award on the rationale the lawsuit was a "'"catalyst"'" for defendant's response. (Sukumar v. City of San Diego (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 451, 421.)
In this case, City realized it had erroneously informed Castanares it had no responsive documents to his public records request after being served with the complaint on June 8, 2021. That same day, City voluntarily produced the document and contacted Castanares' attorney by phone and email to explore possible settlement. Two days later, City sent another email offering "to resolve th[e] case by stipulated judgment" that would "say[ ] the City failed to fully and completely comply with the CPRA" and inquired as to the amount of fees claimed to "determine whether the City agrees and can include a stipulated amount in the judgment or whether to have the court decide the amount on a motion."
While the City informally communicated its willingness to concede statutory liability and Castanares' entitlement to attorney fees during settlement negotiations, it maintained a contrary position in its responsive pleadings filed with the court. In its answer filed in early July 2021, City asserted numerous affirmative defenses and sought dismissal of the complaint and petition. City denied that Castanares was the prevailing party and also affirmatively sought recovery of its own attorney fees.
Days later, Castanares served an initial Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer (998 offer), followed by an amended 998 offer, seeking $7,500 in attorney fees and costs. City contends the offers were invalid, but it did not serve its own 998 offer to limit its exposure and potentially recover postoffer costs incurred by the City. (§ 998, subd. (c)(1).) Instead, City sent another informal settlement email, attempting to limit Castanares' attorney fees to $5,000.
In October 2021, Castanares' counsel threatened to move to compel discovery responses, prompting City to send Castanares' counsel a proposed amended answer withdrawing all affirmative defenses except that "[t]he action is moot and there is no justiciable controversy because the City responded to the Request." Castanares' counsel then informed City he intended to file an amended complaint and asked City to stipulate to its filing, which would allow City "to file an original answer to the amended pleading" instead of its proposed amended answer. But City did not stipulate, necessitating motion practice to amend the pleadings.
In May 2022, Castanares served City with another 998 offer. Although City eventually accepted this offer, it first answered the amended complaint, claiming the action was moot and frivolous and again affirmatively seeking recovery of its own fees. On June 10, 2022, the parties filed a stipulation for entry of the judgment. As the court aptly found, "both sides took conservative steps to preserve their respective claims/defenses" while "negotiat[ing] settlement." Thus, contrary to City's contention, all the litigation objectives rendering further litigation unnecessary were not achieved within days of Castanares serving his complaint.
B.
Second, City argues the trial court should have reduced Castanares' "unreasonably inflated" fees.
Although a trial court may reduce or deny a fee request that is unreasonably inflated (see Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635), reversal of a fee award on appeal is only appropriate "if the amount awarded is so large or small that it shocks the conscience and suggests that passion and prejudice influenced the determination." (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1134.) A "trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the services rendered by an attorney in" the judge's courtroom. (Vella v. Hudgins (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 515, 522 (Vella).) That trial judge's "judgment will not be disturbed on review unless it is clearly wrong." (Ibid.)
Such is not the case here. The trial court did not apply a multiplier, reduced the rate for one attorney "based on [the court's] familiarity with market rates . . ., its experience with counsel, and the facts of the case" and also reduced the hours awarded for Castanares' fee motion, and ultimately concluded the remaining claimed hours were reasonable. Given a "trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the services rendered by an attorney" (Vella, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 522), we conclude the trial court's award here is not clearly wrong.
City's reliance on Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437 (Meister) and Kinney v. City of Corona (2023) 99 Cal.App.5th 1 (Kinney) is misplaced. In Meister, the court of appeal concluded the trial court had discretion to deny fees incurred after the plaintiff declined an informal settlement offer based on its assessment of the reasonableness of the hours expended, noting that determination "is necessarily ad hoc and must be resolved on the particular circumstances of each case." (Meister, at pp. 449, 452.) But here, the trial court found the fees expended by Castanares were reasonably spent. And in Kinney, the attorney fee award was statutorily limited on appeal to the amount set forth in the defendant's 998 offer. (Kinney, at pp. 18-21.) Yet City chose not to serve Castanares with a 998 offer. Instead, City only emailed its willingness to stipulate to reasonable fees and costs to be determined by the court. On this record, the court did not abuse its discretion in not reducing the requested fees further.
C.
Finally, City argues the fee award is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
It is well established a trial court can decide an attorney fee request based on counsel's declarations as to the work performed and the trial court's own observations as to the request's reasonableness. (See Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698-699 (Syers).) Detailed time records are not required. (Ibid.)
Here, the record contains such declarations as well as a billing statement detailing the work performed, time spent, and fees sought. In addition, the trial court found the "[f]actors like contingency and delay in payment are built into the high hourly rate" and "the importance of the lawsuit to the public" was "fairly modest" given the limited scope of the CPRA request.
The trial judge who presided over the matter is best suited to evaluate the reasonableness of the time counsel expended. (Syers, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 700; see also Vella, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 522.) We do not reweigh the evidence or the trial court's assessments of the attorney's declarations on appeal. (See Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1323.) The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding of reasonableness. There was no abuse of discretion.
III.
The order of the trial court is affirmed. Each party to bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
I CONCUR: RUBIN, J.
BUCHANAN, Acting P. J., Dissenting.
I see no reasonable basis in the record to support an award of fees to Castanares for the extra year he spent litigating this case after the City produced the requested document (the day his lawsuit was filed), admitted liability under the California Public Records Act (CPRA; Gov. Code, § 7923.100 et seq.), and offered to enter into a stipulated judgment in his favor with an award of reasonable attorney fees. Accordingly, I would find that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding fees for this year of needless litigation. (See Coalition for a Sustainable Future in Yucaipa v. City of Yucaipa (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 513, 519 ["a court abuses its discretion where no reasonable basis for the action is shown"].)
The settlement agreement Castanares finally agreed to in June 2022 was identical to the one the City offered him immediately after he filed his lawsuit in June 2021. As the party moving for statutory fees, it was Castanares's burden to establish that the fees he incurred were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. (See, e.g., Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247; McKenzie v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 695, 703.) Yet even in response to the City's argument on this issue, neither Castanares nor his attorney submitted any declaration or other evidence to explain why he continued to litigate the case for another year after the City first offered the terms of settlement he ultimately accepted.
The evidence submitted by the City on this issue is unrefuted. The declaration of deputy city attorney Catherine A. Richardson establishes that after the lawsuit was filed and the document produced, the City was always willing to enter into a stipulated judgment admitting liability with an award of reasonable attorney fees-either in a stipulated amount or an amount to be determined by the court. Richardson first made this offer to Castanares only two days after he filed the lawsuit. Yet she received no response from Castanares-other than an email from his counsel stating that he intended to file an amended complaint based on unspecified "new information."
The record does not support the majority's conclusion that the City took a "contrary position" when it filed its answer on July 8, 2021. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 4.) Richardson's declaration explained that (1) she filed the answer only to avoid a default because she had received no response to the City's settlement offer; and (2) she clearly communicated to Castanares that the City's settlement offer was still on the table. As described in the declaration, Richardson sent several emails to counsel for Castanares within weeks after filing the answer in which she reiterated that the City was still offering to enter into a stipulated judgment admitting CPRA liability, prevailing party status, and entitlement to fees and costs. The billing records submitted by Castanares confirm that he discussed the City's post-answer settlement offer with his counsel for 1.5 hours on July 23, 2021. Thus, the only evidence we have before us establishes that the City did not change its settlement position.
The clerk's entry of default against the City would have terminated its right to participate in the litigation, including by contesting the reasonableness of any fees request before the entry of a default judgment. (See Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 381, 385-386; Forbes v. Cameron Petroleums, Inc. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 257, 262263.)
Based on the City's repeated offers to stipulate to liability, both before and after filing its answer, it could not have been reasonable for Castanares to continue litigating the case just to defeat the affirmative defenses pled in the answer, as he suggests. The point of an affirmative defense is to defeat or reduce liability. If accepted, the City's offer to stipulate to liability with an award of fees and costs would have immediately disposed of the affirmative defenses without the need for any further litigation. (See Morris Cerullo World Evangelism v. Newport Harbor Office &Marina, LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1149, 1158 [affirmative defenses are limited in function to defeating plaintiff's recovery].) Castanares offers no sensible explanation why he needed to spend a year litigating affirmative defenses that could have been extinguished instantly by accepting the City's offer.
Though not argued either in the trial court or his briefing on appeal, Castanares's counsel at oral argument finally acknowledged what the record otherwise reflects-that his true motive in continuing the litigation for another year was to obtain a finding or admission that the City's CPRA violation was intentional. Castanares's settlement offers under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 insisted on an admission by the City that its violation was intentional. His amended complaint also alleged that the City's violation was intentional. But Castanares has never explained what legal significance such a finding would have had under the CPRA or why it was reasonable for him to pursue such a goal as part of this litigation. As his counsel conceded at oral argument, "under the CPRA it wouldn't ultimately have mattered." Intentional conduct is not necessary to prove a CPRA violation and does not give rise to any greater remedies. (Gov. Code, § 7923.100 et seq.)
I refer to the statements of Castanares's counsel at oral argument on this issue only because he made no mention of his quest for a finding of intentional conduct in litigating the fees motion below or in his briefing on appeal. Even in describing his own amended complaint and section 998 offers, his briefs mentioned nothing about the allegations of intentional conduct.
Again for the first time at oral argument, counsel for Castanares suggested that (1) the stipulated judgment includes an "implicit" finding of intentional conduct because the amended complaint alleged that the City acted intentionally, and (2) this purported finding could have preclusive effect against the City in some other litigation. Counsel argued that the "legal effect" of this finding "will await another case" and specifically mentioned a possible case against the City under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code. But Castanares has cited no authority allowing recovery of fees incurred in pending litigation just to obtain a finding that may or may not be useful to him in some other litigation. To be recoverable, the fees must have been reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation in which the party has prevailed, not some hypothetical future litigation in which the prevailing party cannot yet be known. Services that have no effect in the pending litigation other than to prolong it cannot be deemed reasonably necessary to its conduct. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Turkanis & Price (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 332, 356.)
Both assertions are incorrect. Neither the stipulation nor the judgment includes any mention of intentional conduct. At most, a stipulated judgment admitting nothing more than liability merely constitutes an implied admission of the necessary elements of the plaintiff's claim. (See Landeros v. Pankey (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1172-1173; Code Civ. Proc., § 1911.) As noted, intentional conduct is not a necessary element of a CPRA violation. Nor did the stipulation or judgment state that the parties intended the judgment to have preclusive effect. Under California law on issue preclusion, "a stipulated judgment may be given preclusive effect only when the parties manifest an intent for it to do so." (Tennison v. California Victim Comp. & Government Claims Bd. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1176.) "A settlement which avoids trial generally does not constitute actually litigating any issues and thus prevents application of collateral estoppel." (Rice v. Crow (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 725, 736.) And the preclusive effect of a California judgment in a subsequent federal action would be determined by California law. (Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Education (1984) 465 U.S. 75, 81.)
We send the wrong message by affirming the fees award on this record. Although the City certainly should have complied with its obligation to produce the requested document without litigation, it acted responsibly by promptly admitting its error and providing the document to Castanares on the same day his lawsuit was served. Two days later, when the City offered to resolve the case by a stipulated judgment admitting liability, counsel for Castanares had expended only 2.4 hours on the case according to his own billing records. Yet Castanares ultimately recovered fees for over 20 times that amount.
Courts should not compel the taxpayers to fund private attorneys for conduct that unnecessarily prolongs litigation against a public entity after it has already offered to admit liability and either provided or offered all the relief requested in the complaint. Nor should the taxpayers be on the hook for fees incurred solely to develop some other new case against the public entity that may or may not prove to have merit. As far as I can discern, no court has ever authorized the recovery of fees incurred for such an extraneous purpose.
It is easy to predict that Castanares will follow up his victory here with a request for additional fees on appeal based on the majority's decision.
Those will very likely exceed the fees already awarded. Rather than compound the error, I would find that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Castanares the fees he incurred to prolong the matter from June 2021 to June 2022 without supplying any evidence that they were reasonably necessary to the conduct of this litigation.