Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. CV012519
BLEASE , Acting P. J.
Plaintiff Bonita K. Cassidy appeals from the judgment of nonsuit on her claims arising from a family dispute over possession of real property.
Plaintiff has represented herself at all stages of the proceedings in the trial court and on appeal.
The case arose when plaintiff’s father-in-law, Harry Cassidy, died and bequeathed his house (the property) to his daughter, Sharon Cassidy Gaiser. Sharon gave plaintiff’s husband, Patrick Cassidy and plaintiff (the Cassidys) “permission . . . to stay at my house.” A few months after the Cassidys moved into the house, Sharon disclaimed her interest in the property, which then went to her brother James under the terms of the will. About four months later, James entered the house while the Cassidys were temporarily away, packed up and removed all of their personal belongings, and left them written notice to stay off the property.
In the interests of clarity and brevity, we shall refer to the individual members of the Cassidy family by their given names.
The Cassidys filed suit against James and others for, inter alia, wrongful eviction, trespass, and trespass to chattel. In granting James’ motion for judgment of nonsuit, the court found Sharon had only given the Cassidys a nonpossessory license to stay on the property rather than a leasehold.
Plaintiff raises several claims of error on appeal, which take aim at the trial court’s finding that Sharon had only granted the Cassidys a license. Finding no error, we shall affirm the judgment.
Prior to filing their opening brief, Patrick passed away and we granted plaintiff’s request to substitute herself as successor in interest in place of Patrick. The title of this matter on appeal has also been changed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because this is an appeal from a motion for nonsuit granted at the close of the evidence, we set forth the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff and the undisputed facts. (Mejia v. Community Hospital of San Bernardino (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1458.)
A. The Cassidys’ Case
Harry Cassidy, father of Patrick, Timothy, James, and Sharon, died on January 19, 2000. Harry owned the property and house located at 35 West El Campo Boulevard in Stockton (the property) and by his will, left the property to Sharon.
The Cassidys arrived at the property on January 19th to attend the funeral at which time Sharon advised them the house was hers and that she wanted to get it cleaned up and sold and get “out of there right away.” At the time, Patrick was very ill and the Cassidys were homeless.
On January 25, 2000, the day of the wake, Sharon wrote a note giving the Cassidys permission to stay at the house. The note states, “I, Sharon Cassidy Gaiser give permission to Patrick and Bunny Cassidy to stay at my house at 35 W. El Campo. Anyone entering without their permission is subject to arrest for trespassing. Sharon Cassidy Gaiser.” She wrote the note because there was a great deal of animosity and friction between Patrick and his brother Timothy and Sharon wanted to prevent Timothy from using the police to throw the Cassidys off the premises.
It was Patrick’s understanding that he and plaintiff did not have to pay rent but were left with certain chores such as cleaning the house, changing the air filters, and repairing the walls where pictures had been hung. According to Patrick, they were given no time limit to complete these chores.
Two hours after Sharon left the wake, Timothy arrived with the police who ordered the Cassidys to leave the property. They returned to the property on February 12th but were again forced to leave on February 22 when Timothy obtained an injunction against them. Ten days later after the injunction was dissolved they again returned to the property.
It does not appear from the record that Timothy had any interest in or authority over the property.
On April 2, 2000, Sharon disclaimed her interest in the property and on June 15, 2000, a deed granting James title to the property was recorded. Two months later, on August 12, 2000, James went to the property while the Cassidys were away for the weekend and packed up and removed all of their belongings.
B. The Defense
Sharon never intended to accept the bequest of the property because she had promised her father she would turn it over to James. She only agreed to have the house placed in her name because James had a gambling problem. Shortly after her father’s death, she felt James was responsible enough to acquire title to the property, so she disclaimed her interest in it and James took title to the property under the will.
Sharon wrote the note giving the Cassidys permission to stay in her house in order to provide Patrick with a place to live while he was ill and to prevent the police from putting Patrick out on the street.
James went to the property on June 15th and changed the lock on the front door. He visited the property another five or six times between then and the beginning of August to get the property ready for sale and never saw the Cassidys on the property during those visits.
On August 12, 2000, James again went to the property and entered using his keys. The Cassidys were not there. The following day, he packed up all of their personal effects and placed them in storage. While going through the Cassidys’ belongings, James found marijuana, which prompted him to pack up the rest of the Cassidys’ belonging and write them a note dated August 21st telling them that they were no longer welcome on his property and to “keep out.” The note also informed them that he did not want his property turned into a drug house, that he had put their personal belongings in storage to protect the premises from drug seizure laws, and gave them the address and location of the storage facility where they could reclaim their property. He posted several copies of the note on the house.
The Cassidys filed an amended complaint against James and others seeking possession of the property, declaratory relief, and compensatory and punitive damages for wrongful eviction, abuse of process, trespass to land and to chattel, removal of a tenant’s personal property by a landlord (Civ. Code, § 789.3, subd. (b)), and civil conspiracy.
The complaint named James, Timothy, Sharon, and two others as defendants. Although no order of dismissal appears in the record, the matter proceeded to trial against James only.
Declaratory relief was sought to determine the validity and legal effect of Sharon’s disclaimer, James’ deed to the property, the validity of James’ waiver of right to disclaim his interest.
After presiding over a jury trial, Judge Thomasson granted James’ motion for nonsuit at the close of all the evidence. She subsequently denied the Cassidys’ motions to vacate the judgment of nonsuit and for a new trial. The Cassidys filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I.
Judicial Bias
Plaintiff contends her due process right to a trial before an impartial judge was violated because Judge Thomasson was disqualified by her prior involvement in this controversy when she was employed by the Stockton City Attorney’s office before becoming a judge. Defendant contends plaintiff forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in a timely manner. We agree with defendant.
A. Procedural Background
The Cassidys filed a motion for new trial in which they asserted various procedural irregularities (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. (1)), including Judge Thomasson’s failure to recuse herself pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(1). According to their supporting declaration, Judge Thomasson had a “closed mind and fixed opinion” against them, which she formed during her personal involvement in this controversy throughout 2000 while she was a Deputy City Attorney for the City of Stockton. They further declared that Judge Thomasson’s knowledge of the controversy was based upon her review of police reports in her capacity as a Deputy City Attorney when she evaluated the Cassidys’ December 3, 2000, request to obtain those police reports under the Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) and Information Practices Act. (Civ. Code, § 1798 et seq.) The Cassidys’ Public Records request was attached as Exhibit 1 to their motion for new trial. The request was specifically addressed to the attention of Deputy City Attorney Lauren P. Thomasson.
All further section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.
B. Analysis
If a judge who should disqualify himself or herself on grounds specified in section 170.1 refuses or fails to do so, any party may file a written verified statement objecting to a hearing or trial before the judge, setting forth the facts constituting the grounds for disqualification. (§ 170.3, subd. (c)(1).) “The statement must be presented at the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the ground for disqualification” and must be served on each party and personally served on the judge alleged to be disqualified. (Ibid., italics added.) The order determining the question of disqualification is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought by the parties to the proceeding. (§ 170.3, subd. (d); People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 335 [all litigants seeking to challenge denial of a statutory judicial disqualification motion are relegated to writ review].)
The Cassidys made no such request to disqualify Judge Thomasson. They merely asserted the basis for her disqualification as a ground for new trial. Moreover, even if we treat their declaration in support of their new trial motion as a verified statement requesting disqualification within the meaning of section 170.3, subdivision (c), that request fails because it was not brought within the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the ground for disqualification. (§ 170.3, subd. (c)(1).)
Plaintiff asserts she only learned of Judge Thomasson’s personal involvement in the underlying dispute as a Deputy City Attorney after the close of trial on January 26, 2006, when Timothy filed a request for judicial notice in a related case. The Cassidys’ Public Records request shows to the contrary, since it was sent to then City Attorney Lauren Thomasson on December 3, 2000. Because the Cassidys were aware of the asserted grounds for Judge Thomasson’s disqualification well in advance of trial, plaintiff has forfeited her statutory claim of disqualification.
The Cassidys’ fair trial claim, which was based on section 170.1, subdivision (a)(1), is also without merit. That provision states that a judge shall be disqualified if “[t]he judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings.” (Italics added.) A judge is deemed to have personal knowledge within the meaning of paragraph (A) if the judge is likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. (Id., subd. (a)(1)(B).) Here, the Cassidys did not assert facts showing Judge Thomasson had personal knowledge of the controversy. To the contrary, it only appears that her knowledge of the matter was based upon her review of police reports and requests for police reports sent to her by the Cassidys. As her knowledge was based on hearsay, she was not likely to be a material witness subject to disqualification under section 170.1, subdivision (a)(1).
Plaintiff has also forfeited her constitutional claim. It is true that section 170.3, subdivision (d) does not bar appeal from a final judgment on constitutional grounds of judicial bias. (People v. Brown, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 335.) Nevertheless, to give maximum effect to the Legislature's clear intent that disqualification challenges be subject to prompt review by writ, a party should seek to resolve such issues by statutory means and negligent failure to do so may constitute a forfeiture of her constitutional claim. (Roth v. Parker (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 542, 548.) This is particularly true in civil cases where “a constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity or it will be considered to be waived.” (Ibid.) As we have concluded, because the Cassidys were aware of the asserted ground for disqualification well in advance of trial, plaintiff has also forfeited her due process challenge of judicial bias.
II.
Motion for Nonsuit
Plaintiff contends the trial court made several errors when it granted defendant’s motion for nonsuit, namely reserving its ruling until the close of all the evidence, applying the wrong standard of review, and failing to rule on various evidentiary matters. Defendant contends the trial court properly granted his motion for nonsuit. We find the motion was properly granted.
A. The Motion
At the close of the Cassidys’ case, defendant moved for nonsuit on the ground the Cassidys had failed to present sufficient evidence to prove their claims. He argued that the creation of a tenancy was a predicate to all of the Cassidys’ claims while the evidence only established that Sharon had given them a license to stay at her house.
The trial court reserved its ruling until after defendant presented his case at which time it granted the motion. In so doing, the court found the question whether the Cassidys had a license to occupy or a tenancy to possess the property was a question of law to be determined by the court from the terms of the note and by its terms, the note merely granted them a license.
B. Analysis
We first consider whether the trial court applied the wrong test when it ruled on defendant’s motion and find it did not. A motion for nonsuit is essentially a demurrer to the evidence. ‘“A defendant is entitled to a nonsuit if the trial court determines that, as a matter of law, the evidence presented by plaintiff is insufficient to permit a jury to find in his favor.” [Citation.] In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court must not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of the witnesses. Instead, it must interpret all of the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff's case and most strongly against the defendant, and must resolve all presumptions, inferences, conflicts, and doubts in favor of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff's claim is not supported by substantial evidence, then the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, justifying the nonsuit.’ [Citation.]” (Mejia v. Community Hospital of San Bernardino, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1458.)
The pivotal question in the Cassidys’ case was and is whether Sharon granted them a lease or a license. Because their interest, if any, in the property arose from the terms of the note, that interest must be determined from the terms of the note and the context in which it arose, a determination that is a mixed question of law and fact. (Brown v. Green (1994) 8 Cal.4th 812, 834; FPI Development v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 391.) As we discuss in Part III, the facts establishing the circumstances giving rise to the note were undisputed. Therefore, because the problem of conflicting evidence did not present itself, the trial court properly decided it as a question of law.
Next, plaintiff takes issue with the timing of the trial court’s ruling. She contends it was error to rule on James’ motion for nonsuit after the defense rested its case. She is wrong. Under section 581c, subdivision (a), a motion for nonsuit may be made “[a]fter the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his or her evidence.” While traditionally, the motion is presented and ruled on at the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, nothing in the statute precludes the court from ruling on it at the close of all the evidence and case law has long held that it is proper to do so. (King v. Hercules Powder Co. (1918) 39 Cal.App. 223, 224.) Moreover, because the result would have been no different had defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of his own case (§ 630, subd. (a)), plaintiff has failed to show any prejudice from the timing of the court’s ruling. We therefore reject this point of error.
A motion for directed verdict is made after all the evidence is presented (§ 630, subd. (a)), but like a motion for nonsuit, it is in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence. The trial court applies the same test on a motion for directed verdict as it does when ruling on a motion for nonsuit, disregarding conflicting evidence and giving plaintiff’s evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled. (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630, fn. 5; Estate of Lances (1932) 216 Cal. 397, 400; 7 Witkin, Cal. Proc. (4th ed. 1997) Trial, §§ 430-431 pp. 491-493.)
Next plaintiff contends the trial court failed to rule on the admission of her exhibits, Plaintiffs’ Exhibits A through S. Not so. When the exhibits were proffered, defense counsel objected to their admission for lack of foundation and authentication, and because admission of the documents assumed facts not in evidence. The court sustained the objection and ruled that it would mark the exhibits as a package but was not admitting them at that time.
The record does not reflect the nature of these exhibits and on appeal, plaintiff fails to cite any authority, provide any reasoned argument as to why the trial court’s ruling was in error, or state how she was prejudiced by the ruling. Because we are unable to conduct review under these circumstances, plaintiff has forfeited her claim of error. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [failure to cite authority waives appellate review of issue].)
Last plaintiff contends that in her motions for new trial and to vacate the judgment, she detailed the irregularities in the trial court’s ruling granting the motion for nonsuit and asserts those matters are incorporated by reference into her opening brief while reiterating several of the points.
Plaintiff has forfeited the items that are merely incorporated by reference into her opening brief by failing to provide appropriate citations to the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); People v. Miller (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 728, 743 [failure to cite to the record waives the claim of error].) As to the remaining claims, which include the deficiencies in defendant’s motion for nonsuit and the trial court’s denial of her request to reopen her case, plaintiff has failed to provide any citation of authority or argument as to why the trial court’s rulings were prejudicial error. She has therefore forfeited these points of error as well. (People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793.)
III.
The Legal Effect of the Note
Plaintiff contends the trial court misinterpreted the note by determining it was a license rather than a tenancy at will. Although defendant has failed to address this contention, we have undertaken an independent examination of the record and find no error. (Mosher v. Johnson (1921) 51 Cal.App. 114, 116.)
The “judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 349, p. 394; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) We may not reverse the judgment in the absence of an affirmative showing of prejudicial error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.)
As stated, to prevail on all of their claims except the claim for trespass to chattel, the Cassidys had to prove that the note created a lease granting them a possessory interest in the property. As we show, they failed to meet their burden of proof.
An action for trespass to land may only be brought by one in actual or constructive possession of real property. (Williams v. Goodwin (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 496, 508.) Likewise, as discussed in Part IV, an action for forcible entry and detainer may only be brought by one in peaceable possession of the property. (§§ 1159 and 1160; Jordan v. Talbot (1961) 55 Cal.2d 597, 604.) The same is true of plaintiff’s statutory claim under Civil Code section 789.3, which prohibits a landlord from removing the tenant’s personal property from the premises, also requires proof of a landlord-tenant relationship. An action for trespass to chattel allows recovery for interferences with possession of personal property where the defendant’s interference caused some actual injury to the chattel or to the plaintiff’s rights in it. (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1352.) Plaintiff does not challenge the court’s ruling on this last claim and rightly so since there was no evidence that the Cassidys’ personalty was damaged.
A lease is an agreement that creates a landlord-tenant relationship in which the owner of the greater estate gives to the lessee, for consideration and a fixed term, exclusive possession of a lesser estate in his property. (Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. v. Bluvshtein (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 308, 316.) The payment of rent and transfer of use and possession of property are essential elements of a lease. (Ibid.) Although the term of the lease need not necessarily be specified, where the term of a tenancy for a dwelling house is not specified, it is presumed to have been for the time adopted for estimation of the rent so that the term of a tenancy at a monthly rate of rent is presumed to be for one month. (Civ. Code, § 1944.)
By contrast, a license merely confers a personal privilege to occupy the premises under the owner. (Von Goerlitz v. Turner (1944) 65 Cal.App.2d 425, 429.) It is a nonpossessory right that is revocable at any time at the will of the licensor and conveys no interest or estate in the land. (Ibid; Goetze v. Hanks (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 615, 617; 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Real Property, § 429, p. 500 and § 512, pp. 588-589.)
Thus, the test for determining “‘whether an agreement for the use of real estate is a license or a lease is whether the contract gives exclusive possession of the premises against all the world, including the owner, in which case it is a lease, or whether it merely confers a privilege to occupy under the owner, in which case it is a license, and this is a question of law arising out of the construction of the instrument.’" (Kaiser Co. v. Reid (1947) 30 Cal.2d 610, 619, quoting Von Goerlitz v. Turner, supra, 65 Cal.App.2d at p. 429, italics added.)
It is apparent from the purpose and wording of the note, the lack of any consideration or fixed term, and the familial relationship between the parties to the note, that Sharon merely granted her homeless brother Patrick and his wife a license to stay at her house while he recuperated from his illness and until the house was sold. (Von Goerlitz v. Turner, supra, 65 Cal.App.2d at p. 429.) The purpose of the note was merely to provide the Cassidys with evidence of permission to be on the property. The temporary short term nature of the Cassidys’ interest is supported by plaintiff’s own testimony that when she and Patrick arrived for the funeral, Sharon advised them that she wanted to get the property cleaned up and sold so they could get “out of there right away.”
Every executory contract requires consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1550; Rest.2d. Contracts, § 71, et seq.)
Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that because the note stated that “anyone entering without their permission is subject to arrest for trespassing”, it gave them exclusive possession of the premises against “anyone”, creating a tenancy at will. We disagree.
A tenancy at will is created when the tenant enters and occupies real property with the owner’s permission under an invalid parole contract or lease and is revocable at the will of either party. (Covina Manor, Inc. v. Hatch (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d Supp. 790, 792-793; 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Real Property, § 507, pp. 584-585.) Since plaintiffs did not enter the property under an invalid parole agreement, they were not tenants at will.
Nor does the sentence making “[a]nyone entering without their permission is subject to arrest for trespassing” transform a permissive use into a possessory interest. A written instrument must be construed as a whole, giving meaning to each of its parts if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other. (Civ. Code, § 1641.) The factual context in which an agreement was reached is also relevant to establish its meaning unless the words themselves are susceptible to only one interpretation. (Civ. Code, § 1647; Nish Noroian Farms v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 726, 735.)
Citing Civil Code section 1649, plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by excluding a letter by William Rupert, Patrick’s attorney in fact, which explained Patrick’s understanding of the note. Section 1649 states that “[i]f the terms of a promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of making it, that the promisee understood it." Assuming the letter was relevant on the question of intent (Civ. Code, § 1649; Bunnett v. Regents of University of California (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 843, 854), it was inadmissible hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200.)
Thus, we must read the above quoted sentence referring to “anyone entering” in light of the words “I, Sharon Cassidy Gaiser give permission to Patrick and Bunny Cassidy to stay at my house.” These later words express a clear intent to grant only a license to use the house as a temporary lodging. Any ambiguity created by the use of the words “anyone entering” in juxtaposition to the words “permission to stay” is dispelled by the undisputed evidence that Sharon inserted the “anyone entering” language solely to prevent the police from removing the Cassidys from the residence at Timothy’s request.
Plaintiff also relies on dicta from Pacific Coast etc. Land Bank v. Jones (1939) 14 Cal.2d 8, where the court cited Jones v. Shay (1875) 50 Cal. 508, for the principle that a “mere permissible occupancy where no rent is reserved and no term is agreed upon gives rise to a tenancy-at-will.” Shay is inapposite because there the court found the plaintiff had a possessory interest in real property where he was allowed to live on his brother-in-law’s property in exchange for taking care of the property.
Here, under the terms of the note, the Cassidys were not required to pay rent or other consideration and there was no evidence they paid any. Because plaintiff does not contend the so-called “occupancy agreement” was supported by consideration, we find the trial court properly construed the note and concluded it gave the Cassidys a mere license to stay on the property.
IV.
A Licensee Does Not Have The Right To Maintain an Action for Forcible Entry and Detainer
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting nonsuit on the mistaken belief the public policy against self-help evictions codified in the unlawful detainer statutes only protects occupants who have a traditional landlord-tenant relationship. Although defendant failed to file a response to this contention, we have considered plaintiff’s argument and find the trial court was not mistaken.
Section 1161 defines unlawful detainer as the holding over by a “tenant of real property.” A tenant is defined to “include[] any person who hires real property” except transient occupants of hotels or motels. The purpose of the notice requirement in an action for unlawful detainer is to give the tenant in actual possession the opportunity to retain possession by paying the rent and avoiding forfeiture of the lease. (Fifth & Broadway Partnership v. Kimny, Inc. (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 195, 202.) Thus, it is well established that the existence of a “conventional relationship of landlord and tenant” is the “sin qua non to maintenance of an unlawful detainer action.” (Cavanaugh v. High (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 714, 716; Klein v. Loeffler (1929) 96 Cal.App. 383, 385; Steinback v. Krone (1868) 36 Cal. 303, 309.)
The same is true in an action for forcible entry and detainer (§§ 1159, 1160), which “‘is a summary proceeding to recover possession of premises forcibly or unlawfully detained. The inquiry in such cases is confined to the actual peaceable possession of the plaintiff and the unlawful or forcible ouster or detention by defendant . . . .’” (Jordan v. Talbot (1961) 55 Cal.2d 597, 604.) Thus, relief for forcible eviction may properly be denied to one who did not have possession of the property at the time of the complained of entry. (Id. at p. 605; Goldstein v. Webster (1908) 7 Cal.App. 705, 707-709.)
According to plaintiff, section 1161, subdivision (1), applies to one who became an occupant as an employee, servant, or licensee. We have no quarrel with this statement. Nevertheless, it does not undercut the long established requirement that an action for unlawful detainer applies only to a tenant in possession of the premises. (Cavanaugh v. High, supra, 182 Cal.App.2d at p. 716; Steinback v. Krone, supra, 36 Cal. at p. 309; see Chan v. Antepenko (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d Supp. 21 [unlawful detainer provision applies to licensee whose right to live on the property was part of his or her compensation paid by agreement of the parties].) Since the Cassidys were not agents, servants, employees, or licensees whose right to occupy the property was a matter of compensation, they were not tenants within the meaning of the unlawful detainer statutes.
An employee who has the right to live on his employer’s property as part of his compensation cannot be evicted by force but only by legal process. (Eichhorn v. De La Cantera (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 50, 56.)
For these reasons, the trial court properly concluded that a licensee who was not a tenant in possession of the premises at the time of the complained of entry is not entitled to relief under those statutes.
V.
Forfeited Claims of Error
Plaintiff raises three remaining claims in summary fashion. She asserts that (1) the trial court’s failure to determine the validity of James’ “void” deed and Sharon’s ineffective disclaimer under Probate Code section 285 was prejudicial error, (2) the trial court erred by denying the Cassidys’s request to conform to proof, and (3) the trial court failed to give the Cassidys any relief based upon matters stated in their post-judgment motions.
Probate Code section 285, subdivision (a) provides that “[a] disclaimer may not be made after the beneficiary has accepted the interest sought to be disclaimed.” Subdivision (b) lists the actions taken by a beneficiary before filing a disclaimer that are deemed an acceptance, including when “[t]he beneficiary, or someone acting on behalf of the beneficiary, makes a voluntary assignment, conveyance, encumbrance, pledge, or transfer of the interest or part thereof, or contracts to do so . . . .”
Both parties have utterly failed to provide this court with any assistance on these, as well as many of the other points of error raised by plaintiff. As to these last asserted points, James has failed to enter any response, again shirking his duty as respondent, while plaintiff has failed to provide any reasoned argument or citation to the record or to legal authority to support her assertion of errors. Her failure to do so forfeits her assertion of errors. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 14(a)(1)(B) and (C); People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793 [failure to cite authority forfeits appellate review]; Miller v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 728, 743 [failure to cite to the record forfeits the claim of error].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)
We concur: DAVIS , J., ROBIE , J.
Plaintiff contends Sharon accepted her interest in the property when she granted them a leasehold. She does not claim that the grant of a license operates as an acceptance. Because we have found they were granted a license rather than a leasehold, her reliance on Probate Code section 285 has no merit.