Opinion
11-P-453
02-15-2012
MARYFRANCES CASSELL [FN1] v. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE BOARD OF DIRECTORS & others. [FN2]
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Maryfrances Cassell, was a member of the First Church of Christ, Scientist (church) for sixty-five years, until her excommunication on February 8, 2007. The individual defendants are current or former members of the church's board of directors (board). At issue here is the excommunication itself and the events surrounding it, which Cassell claims violated the church's charitable trust and various other internal rules and procedures. A judge of the Probate and Family Court dismissed Cassell's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and standing, and she now appeals. We affirm.
The excommunication stemmed from a theological dispute between the board and Cassell, who identifies as part of a 'restoration group' within the church. This factional group has challenged board efforts it finds objectionable, with emphasis on opposing the modernization of the church. As a result of these challenges, the board sent Cassell a letter terminating her church membership for 'working against the Cause of Christian Science.' She filed suit, seeking, among other things, her reinstatement and an injunction '[e]njoining the defendants to abide by all terms and conditions of Governing Documents, including the Deeds of Trust and Church Manual.'
The judge found that the Probate and Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute, citing the 'church autonomy' doctrine, as articulated in Callahan v. First Congregational Church of Haverhill, 441 Mass. 699, 708-709 (2004). In Callahan, the court found that State interference in most internal church affairs was barred by the free exercise clause of the United States Constitution and the provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution that deal with religion. Id. at 709. The church autonomy doctrine provides that both congregational and hierarchical churches 'are entitled to autonomy ' over church disputes touching on matters of doctrine, canon law, polity, discipline, and ministerial relationships." Id. at 708, quoting from Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 436 Mass. 574, 579 (2002). See Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 722-726 (1985).
Cassell contends that judicial interference is appropriate here, where the church's founder, Mary Baker Eddy, deliberately chose to create the church as a trust. As a result, the board consists of mere fiduciaries of that trust. In choosing such a legal entity, Cassell argues, Eddy was implicitly permitting judicial review of board decisions that conflict with the church's authorizing documents. This argument is flawed, however, because Eddy's deed of trust only covers a conveyance of land; it does not establish the judicial policing of church membership.
Additionally, excommunication is obviously a form of internal discipline covered by the church autonomy doctrine. While Cassell may feel that she was entitled to a hearing, this was an internal church matter into which the court may not stray, even to conduct a marginal review, as Cassell requests. A court must defer to a church in matters of ecclesiastical decision-making. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976).
Pursuant to Mass.R.A.P. 25, as appearing in 376 Mass. 949 (1979), an appellate court may order costs, including attorney's fees, paid to the appellees if it determines that an appeal is frivolous. 'An appeal is frivolous if, under settled law, the appellant has no 'reasonable expectation of a reversal." Worcester v. AME Realty Corp., 77 Mass. App. Ct. 64, 73 (2010), quoting from Avery v. Steele, 414 Mass. 450, 455 (1993).
We feel some sympathy for the plight of the parties. Nonetheless, it appears beyond dispute that the First Amendment forbids courts from interfering with a church's internal governance or with the excommunication of its members, which is the matter at issue here. Additionally, we note that the Supreme Judicial Court definitively stated the law of standing in Weaver v. Wood, 425 Mass. 270, 274-278 (1997). The rule was followed by this court and reiterated to this plaintiff in Cassell v. Christian Science Bd. of Directors, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 1119 (2006). Therefore, we hold that this appeal was frivolous and the defendants' request for attorney's fees is allowed.
3 Because we find that all of Cassell's claims were correctly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we need not address the issue of standing at length. Regardless, it is difficult to find fault with the observation of the judge below that for at least some of Cassell's claims, such matters are controlled, adversely to her, by G. L. c. 12, § 8, which grants exclusive authority over public charities, including religious organizations, to the Attorney General. See Weaver v. Wood, supra at 275-276.
--------
The defendants may, within fourteen days of the date of the rescript, file and serve a petition for attorney's fees incurred on appeal, supported by an affidavit detailing such fees in accordance with the procedure described in Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10-11 (2004). Cassell will have seven days thereafter to respond.
For the reasons stated, supra, as well as substantially those in the brief of the defendants, we affirm.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Kantrowitz, Trainor & Hanlon, JJ.),