Opinion
Case Number 02-10286-BC.
June 11, 2003.
OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
This case had been referred to Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder for general case management. The matter is now before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that the defendants' motion to dismiss or alternative motion for summary judgment for failure to comply with the exhaustion requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), be denied. The defendants filed timely objections to the recommendation, and the Court has conducted a de novo review of the matter in light of the magistrate's report and the objections filed as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Because the Court finds that the plaintiff has complied with the exhaustion requirements of the PLRA, the Court will adopt the Report and Recommendation and deny the defendants' motion.
I.
The plaintiff, Steven Casarez, is currently incarcerated under the authority of the Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC") at the Cooper Street Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan. The plaintiff filed this pro se prisoner civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 15, 2002. The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that his serious medical needs were treated with deliberate indifference in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The plaintiff named Kathy Mars, a registered nurse, Resident Unit Officer S. Stoudamire, a correctional officer, and "R.N. Joyce," who, according to the plaintiff, is a nurse at the Cooper Street Facility, as defendants. The plaintiff also stated that he "names many John Jane doe's [sic] to be named and identified at a later date" as defendants.
On December 18, 2002, defendant Stoudamire filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) or in the alternative for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff has failed to comply with the exhaustion requirements of the PLRA because he did not attach to his complaint any grievance forms or other documentation indicating that he had exhausted his administrative remedies. On January 17, 2003, defendant Mars filed a motion seeking leave to join in defendant Stoudamire's motion. The Magistrate Judge entered an order on February 5, 2003 granting defendant Mars' motion for joinder. The plaintiff filed an answer to the defendants' motion. In his answer, the plaintiff alleges that he was unaware that he needed to attach any documentation to his complaint and that the form that was given to him did not instruct him to attach any documents. The plaintiff, therefore, attached documentation of his grievances against the defendants to his answer to the motion. The defendants replied and argued that grievance documentation must be submitted with the original complaint; failing that, the complaint should be dismissed. The defendants also argued that the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because the plaintiff only partially exhausted his administrative remedies.
In his Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge suggested that it was sufficient for the plaintiff to attach his grievance documentation to his answer to the defendant's motion and that the case should not be dismissed on such a technicality. The magistrate judge also suggested that the plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies. Therefore, the magistrate judge recommended that the defendants' motion to dismiss be denied.
In their objections to the report, the defendants argue that a prisoner's grievance documentation must be submitted with the original complaint and cannot be submitted as an attachment to any subsequent pleading. The defendants also argue that the plaintiff did not make "particularized averments" in his complaint that he exhausted his remedies and thus the complaint is subject to dismissal. Finally, the defendants argue that the plaintiff has only partially exhausted his administrative remedies because the dates in his complaint and the dates alleged in his grievances do not coincide and because the MDOC has no record that the plaintiff actually submitted a Step III appeal for defendant Mars. Because the plaintiff only partially exhausted his administrative remedies, the defendants contend that the entire complaint is subject to dismissal.
II.
Motions to dismiss are governed by Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." "The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to allow a defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even in everything alleged in the complaint is true." Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993). When deciding a motion under that Rule, "[t]he court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief." Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996). "A judge may not grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on a disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations." Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). "However, while liberal, this standard of review does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions." Ibid. "In practice, `a . . . complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.'" In re DeLorean, 991 F.2d at 1240 (emphasis in original) (quoting Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988)). See also Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987) (liberal Rule 12(b)(6) review is not afforded legal conclusions and unwarranted factual inferences); Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 823 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir.) (per curiam) (mere conclusions are not afforded liberal Rule 12(b)(6) review), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987).
A motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 56 presumes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). When the "record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party," there is no genuine issue of material fact. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 951 (6th Cir. 2000).
The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Mt. Lebanon Pers. Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Univeral, Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 2002). The party opposing the motion then may not "rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact" but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. If the non-moving party is unable to meet his or her burden of proof, summary judgment is clearly proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
The party who bears the burden of proof must present a jury question as to each element of the claim. Davis v. McCourt, 226 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2000). Failure to prove an essential element of a claim renders all other facts immaterial for summary judgment purposes. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889, 895 (6th Cir. 1991).
A pro se litigant's complaint is to be construed liberally, Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991); that is, it is held to a "less stringent standard" than those drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Such complaints, however, must plead facts sufficient to show a cognizable legal wrong has been committed from which plaintiff may be granted relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); In re DeLorean, 991 F.2d at 1240; Dekoven v. Bell, 140 F. Supp.2d 748, 752 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
Current federal law states that before any prisoner may file a civil rights suit challenging prison conditions, he must exhaust all internal administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A prisoner's failure to demonstrate exhaustion of internal remedies is grounds for automatic dismissal. See Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998). The internal administrative procedures must be followed even if they do not offer the precise relief that the prisoner seeks. See Booth v. Churner, 523 U.S. 731, 740 (2001). Dismissal without prejudice is required even if the time for filing the required grievance has expired. See Wright v. Morris, 111 F.3d 414, 417 n. 3 (6th Cir. 1997). A prisoner cannot abandon the grievance process before completion and then claim to have exhausted administrative remedies. Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 309 (6th Cir. 1999).
To demonstrate exhaustion of his administrative remedies, the Sixth Circuit requires that an inmate attach to his complaint copies of his filed grievances as proof of exhaustion. Brown, 139 F.3d at 1104. Failure to provide this affirmative showing of exhaustion justifies dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. See Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of prisoner-plaintiff's claims for failure to attach proof of exhaustion to his complaint, even though it appeared that the prisoner had in fact exhausted his administrative remedies). Where the prisoner has failed to attach the proper grievance forms to his complaint, this Circuit requires the Court to dismiss the prisoner's complaint on its own initiative. Brown, 139 F.3d at 1104.
The Magistrate Judge correctly explained that the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) has a multi-step grievance process in place. Each step has a time limit that can be waived with good cause, including a transfer to a different facility. First, within two business days, the prisoner must attempt verbally to resolve the dispute with those involved. If that fails, the inmate then must submit a Step I grievance within five days. The prison staff is required to respond within fifteen days. If the inmate is dissatisfied with the response, he may request a Step II appeal form within five days, and then has five additional days to submit it. If an inmate is dissatisfied with the result at Step II, he has ten business days to appeal to Step III, which concludes the grievance process. See generally MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130.
In this case, the plaintiff completed a "form" complaint for prisoners filing an action under Section 1983 in the Eastern District of Michigan. Although the plaintiff did not attach any documentation to his complaint showing that he had exhausted the grievance process of the MDOC, the plaintiff did answer "yes" in response to the form complaint's question, "Did you present the facts relating to your complaint in the state prisoner grievance procedure?", and responded to the form complaint's next question, "What steps did you take?", by answering, "I have exhausted state remedies." The plaintiff contends that the form complaint's instructions were unclear as to whether he should attach documentation that showed he exhausted his state remedies.
The grievance documentation submitted with the plaintiff's answer to the defendants' motion to dismiss shows that the plaintiff filed a separate Step I grievances against each of the defendants in this case wherein he raised the claims at issue in this lawsuit. In his grievance against defendant Mars, Grievance Identifier #SMT 01-07-00998-12d1, the plaintiff alleges that on July 16, 2001, Mars failed to refill the plaintiff's prescription for Lamictal, a medication for seizures. Prison officials responded to the grievance and informed the plaintiff that they would speak with defendant Mars about the alleged incident. In his grievance against defendant Stoudamire, Grievance Identifier #JCS 02-04-0517-17i, the plaintiff alleges that on April 16, 2002, Stoudamire refused to call health services after the plaintiff complained that he was suffering from a "massive" headache. Prison officials responded to this grievance and told the plaintiff that defendant Stoudamire followed proper prison procedures. In his grievance against defendant Joyce, Grievance Identifier #02-06-00761-12e4, the plaintiff alleges that on May 31, 2002, Joyce refused to give the plaintiff his medication for his headaches. Prison officials responded and told the plaintiff that they had informed Joyce that she should give the plaintiff his medication for headaches as needed.
With regard to the grievance submitted against defendants Stoudamire and Joyce, the documentation submitted with the plaintiff's answer shows that the plaintiff completed each step in the MDOC grievance process, including the receipt of Step III responses from the MDOC. However, with regard to his grievance against defendant Mars, the plaintiff has only provided documentation that shows he completed a Step III appeal; there is no indication that the MDOC responded to this appeal, or that they received the appeal in the first place. The plaintiff claims that he submitted a Step III appeal, but never received a response from the MDOC.
The defendants argue that a prisoner's grievance documentation must be submitted with the original complaint and that allowing the plaintiff to submit grievance documentation after the complaint has been filed would contradict the Sixth Circuit's holding in Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2002). In Baxter, a pro se Tennessee prisoner appealed the district court's judgment dismissing sua sponte his Section 1983 complaint. The district court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff failed to allege that he had exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the PLRA. Baxter argued on appeal that he did exhaust and that it was error for the district court not to grant him leave to amend his complaint to allege exhaustion. The court explained that
[i]n Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102 (6th Cir. 1998), we required that a prisoner bringing such an action specifically allege in his complaint that he had exhausted all administrative remedies. Id. at 1104. We also required that the plaintiff attach to his complaint the disposition(s) of his available administrative remedies. Ibid. Explaining our rule in a later case, we noted that the heightened pleading standard permits federal courts to determine whether the claim can be decided on the merits, without inefficiently expending judicial resources on evidentiary hearings and responsive pleadings.Id. at 488. The court further explained that the heightened pleading standard of the PLRA "established an unique procedure under which the court, not the parties, is required to evaluate whether a claim on which relief may be granted is stated." Id. at 490. The court held that Baxter was not entitled to amend his complaint to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies. Ibid.
Although the holding in Baxter does emphasize the need for prisoner plaintiffs to attach documentation of the exhaustion of their administrative remedies to their complaints, the case does not stand for the proposition that plaintiffs who do not attach documentation to their original complaints are forever barred from providing such documentation in future pleadings, as the defendants contend. Rather, the Baxter court, in stating that a prisoner should attach documentation to the complaint, was only emphasizing that a federal court must have evidence that a prisoner has or has not exhausted his administrative remedies readily available so that the court can perform its screening responsibilities under the PLRA and determine whether the prisoner's complaint can be decided on the merits or must be summarily dismissed. As the Baxter court stated, without evidence that the prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies, the prisoner would be able, through ambiguous pleadings, to avoid dismissal. Ibid.
Unlike the plaintiff in Baxter, the plaintiff here specifically alleged that he had exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the PLRA. The plaintiff's complaint did not employ the artifice of ambiguous pleading to cover up a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Instead, when the defendants answered the complaint by filing a motion to dismiss arguing that the failure of the plaintiff to attach his grievance documentation is a ground for dismissal, the plaintiff supplemented the clear allegations in his complaint by providing the Court with his grievance documentation and offered an explanation for why he did not attach the documents to his original complaint. The Court agrees with the magistrate judge that under the circumstances of this case, it was sufficient for the plaintiff to attach documents to his answer to the motion rather than to his complaint.
Furthermore, that documentation demonstrates that the plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies in this case. The plaintiff completed each step in the MDOC grievance process for defendants Stoudamire and Joyce, and, although the plaintiff did not receive a Step III response from the MDOC for defendant Mars, it appears that a Step III appeal was submitted. The failure of the Department of Corrections to respond to that appeal does not deem the administrative remedy unexhausted. See Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002) (administrative remedies are deemed exhausted even if prison officials fail to respond to inmate grievances); see also Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001); Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1998). At the very least, whether the plaintiff exhausted his remedies against defendant Mars is a material fact in dispute that precludes summary judgment.
The remaining contentions of the defendants are unavailing. The defendants argue that the plaintiff did not allege in his complaint through "particularized averments" that he exhausted his administrative remedies. In Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2000), the court stated that
a prisoner must plead his claims with specificity and show that they have been exhausted by attaching a copy of the applicable administrative dispositions to the complaint or, in the absence of written documentation, describe with specificity the administrative proceeding and its outcome. The reason for the requirement to show with specificity both the claims presented and the fact of exhaustion is so that the district court may intelligently decide if the issues raised can be decided on the merits.Id. at 642. Thus, "[i]n the absence of particularized averments concerning exhaustion showing the nature of the administrative proceeding and its outcome, the action must be dismissed." Ibid. In this case, although it is true that the plaintiff did not make "particularized averments" in his complaint as to the manner in which he exhausted his administrative remedies, this Court nonetheless is able to "intelligently decide" the issues contained in the plaintiff's complaint from the facts alleged therein together with the plaintiff's response to the motion. The defendants also argue that the case is subject to dismissal because the plaintiff has only "partially" exhausted his administrative remedies, pointing out that there is some discrepancy between the dates of the incidents alleged in the complaint and the dates indicated in the grievances submitted by the plaintiff. As a result, the defendants argue that the grievances submitted do not necessarily coincide with the claims alleged in the lawsuit and, therefore, the plaintiff has only partially exhausted his administrative remedies. The defendants also maintain that the failure to exhaust the administrative remedies for one defendant is grounds to dismiss the entire complaint. See Smith v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 300 F.3d 721, 723 (6th Cir. 2002) ("When a prisoner fails to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a civil rights complaint in federal court, or only partially exhausts administrative remedies, dismissal of the complaint is appropriate."). In this case, there are some discrepancies between the dates in the complaint and the dates in the grievances. For example, the plaintiff states in his complaint that defendant Mars denied him "adequate and proper medical care" on July 31, 2001, while the grievance filed by the plaintiff against defendant Mars lists July 17, 2001 as the date Mars failed to refill his prescription for Lamictal. Moreover, the plaintiff states in his complaint that defendant Stoudamire "[made] a decision not to call health care when [a] medical condition [was] reported to [him]", but does not give a date when this alleged incident occurred, while the grievance filed by the plaintiff against defendant Stoudamire states that Stoudamire refused to call health care and gives the date of the alleged incident as April 16, 2002. The Court, however, agrees with the magistrate judge and finds that the substance of the factual allegations against defendants Mars and Stoudamire are described in the complaint with sufficient particularity to enable the Court to identify with the grievances submitted. Consequently, the incorrect dates or omission of dates do not rise to the level of barring this pro se litigant's claim. See Jourdan, 951 F.2d at 110. The Court finds that the plaintiff has complied with the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA and, therefore, this case is not subject to dismissal.
III.
The plaintiff has provided sufficient proof that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Therefore, the defendants' motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment must be denied.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED.
It is further ORDERED that the defendants' motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment [dkt #9] is DENIED.
The reference order remains in effect, and the Magistrate Judge shall conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the order for full case management [dkt #18] previously filed.