Opinion
J-A27023-17 No. 584 WDA 2017
01-30-2018
PATRICIA CARTER, AN ADULT INDIVIDUAL, CAROL BETH WILSON, AN ADULT INDIVIDUAL, JOHN ALLEN WILSON, AN ADULT INDIVIDUAL AND ELIZABETH WILSON, AN ADULT INDIVIDUAL Appellants v. RICHARD M. FANNING AND DEBRA J. FANNING, HUSBAND AND WIFE, JEFFREY J. DUTTON AND LISA A. DUTTON, HUSBAND AND WIFE, LARRY N. CERCIELLO AND KANDY S. CERCIELLO, HUSBAND AND WIFE v. RANGE RESOURCES-APPALACHIA, LLC
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order March 16, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
Civil Division at No(s): No. 2014-5859 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:
Patricia Carter, Carol Beth Wilson, John Allen Wilson, and Elizabeth Wilson (collectively "Appellants"), appeal from the order entered March 16, 2017. The order granted summary judgment in favor of Richard M. Fanning and Debra J. Fanning, husband and wife, Jeffrey J. Dutton and Lisa A. Dutton, husband and wife, and Larry N. Cerciello and Kandy S. Cerciello, husband and wife (collectively "Appellees"), and Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC ("Intervenor-Appellee" or "Range"). We affirm.
Range intervened as a current lessee of the oil and gas underlying the property.
As will be discussed in greater detail, the March 16, 2017 order disposed of all claims and all parties, and it made final an earlier order sustaining preliminary objections in favor of Appellees with respect to Count II of Appellants' Amended Complaint. Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1).
The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this matter as follows:
On September 24, 2014, [Appellants], filed a four (4) count complaint against individual [Appellees] Fanning, Dutton and Cerciello. The Complaint requested that the Court quiet [Appellees'] Fanning, Dutton and Cerciello's title either completely or by "one-half" in certain real property. The Complaint also sets forth claims of unjust enrichment and slander of title. [Appellants] contended that they succeeded to the title of Berdie Wilson, daughter of Hugh Hanna, a prior record owner of the Hanna Tract [or "the property"]. [Appellants] advanced that Hugh Hanna made a parol gift of the oil and gas estate to Berdie Wilson. On November 26, 2014[,] this court granted Range's petition to intervene as a party defendant.
On November 24, 2014, [Appellees] Fanning, Dutton and Cerciello filed preliminary objections. On December 3, 2014 Range filed separate preliminary objections. [Appellees] Fanning, Dutton and Cerciello alleged that the recorded "chain of title" from 1825 to 2014 does not indicate that a severance of oil and gas occurred. By virtue of three (3) separately recorded deeds and their record chain of title, [Appellees] Fanning, Dutton and Cerciello claim exclusive ownership of all right title and interest in the oil and gas [underlying] the Hanna Tract. (See Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 Fanning-Dutton Cerciello Preliminary Objections to the Original Complaint). [Intervenor-Appellee] Range filed
preliminary objections that included a demurrer and a claim of lack of specificity.
On May 7, 2015, this court issued an opinion and order sustaining [Appellees'] preliminary objections. The court did not dismiss the action. Instead, [Appellants] were given twenty (20) days to file an amended complaint.
On May 27, 2015[,] [Appellants] filed an Amended Complaint. In the Amended Complaint, [Appellants] reiterated their previous allegation that as the heirs of Berdie Wilson's Estate[,] they owned "100%" of the oil and gas underlying the Hanna Tract. Specifically, Carter and Wilson asserted that Hugh Hanna "gifted" the oil and gas estate to Berdie Wilson. (See Amended Complaint ¶[¶] 57 and 58). [Appellants] did not plead the existence of a writing that specifically provided for the gift. Instead, [Appellants] alleged that circumstantial evidence demonstrated the existence of a parol gift. (See Amended Complaint ¶[¶] 11-56)[.] In the alternative, [Appellants] alleged that the "Will of Hugh Hanna severed the surface of the farm and the coal of the Property (Hanna Tract) from the oil and gas." (See Amended Complaint ¶ 82) [Appellants] further alleged that the interests in the oil and gas passed "pursuant to the laws of intestacy." (See Amended Complaint ¶ 83) [.] On that basis, [Appellants] assert they are the heirs of Berdie Wilson and entitled to a one-half interest in the oil and gas lying beneath the Property. (See Amended Complaint, ¶[¶] 83-85). [Appellants] filed preliminary objections to the Amended Complaint.2
2 On June 12, 2015, [Appellees] Fanning, Dutton and Cerciello filed objections which raised a demurrer to all 4 counts of the Amended Complaint; sought a more specific pleading with regard to the time, date and place of the alleged parol gift of oil and gas interests and moved to strike all counts of the complaint. On June 16, 2015[,] [Intervenor-Appellee] Range filed 4 objections to the Amended Complaint. In each, Range asserted a demurrer to each of the counts of the Amended Complaint.
On December 31, 2015, this court issued a memorandum and order sustaining objections to Count II of [Appellants'] Amended Complaint and overruling all other objections.3 With regard to the dismissal of Count II of the Amended Complaint,
this court determined that [Appellants] insufficiently pleaded the severance of the oil and gas estate from the surface of the "Property." More specifically, this court sustained preliminary objections to Count II of the original complaint and Count II of the amended complaint because neither the Hugh Hanna Will nor the later Deed of Distribution contained a reservation of oil and gas for the Hanna Tract. In Count II, [Appellants] pleaded "in the alternative." (See Amended Complaint ¶ 80) [.] [Appellants] alleged that Hugh Hanna's Will did not specifically provide for the distribution of the oil and gas estate and contained no residuary clause. On that basis, [Appellant] advanced that the oil and gas estate passed by the laws of intestacy and they had succeeded to Berdie Wilson's one-half interest.
3 By Amended Order of January 6, 2016 this court confirmed that it did not grant [Appellants] further leave to amend their complaint.
Relying on the Dunham Rule and the decision of Butler v. Powers Estate ex.rel. [Warren], 65 A.3d 885, 896 ([Pa.] 2013)[, which reaffirmed the pronouncement in Dunham], this court could not overlook the significance of the absence of an oil and gas severance provision in the Deed of Distribution. Pursuant to the Dunham Rule, the express language of the Deed of Distribution showed that Berdie Wilson had conveyed her interests in her late father's estate to include any inheritable interest in the Hanna Tract without a reservation of the oil and gas estate. Thus, [Appellants] could not rest their claim upon the laws of intestacy but would have to prove that the rights to the oil and gas estate were transferred to Berdie Wilson prior to Hugh Hanna's death. Having previously afforded [Appellants] the opportunity to amend the original complaint for the same deficiency, this court found that a further amendment would not cure a "fatal defect" in [Appellants'] pleading of Count II.4
4 The parties when describing this court's decision have consistently restricted the ruling to a determination of the intent of Hugh Hanna's Will.
Such an interpretation is not entirely accurate. The following passages from this court's last opinion determining preliminary objections provided:
[Appellants] must plead that the intent of Hugh Hanna in executing his devise, and the intent of his heirs in executing the distribution, was to sever the oil and gas rights to the property. They have not pleaded such facts. Instead, they pleaded a pattern and practice of use over the land by Berdie Wilson and her heirs and assignees. They pleaded that the will and the deed of distribution did not provide for the distribution of oil and gas underlying the property, and this failure to address such a portion of Hugh Hanna's estate evidences an intention to sever these interests. The established case law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania does not permit this assumption to be made; instead it requires the opposite. Hugh Hanna's will and the Deed of Distribution demonstrate no intention to sever the oil and gas rights sufficient to overcome the Dunham Rule.
(See Memorandum Opinion 12/31/2015)
The parties conducted discovery with regard to Counts I, III and IV of the Amended Complaint. Those counts include an action to quiet title (Count I), a claim of unjust enrichment seeking the imposition of a constructive trust and an accounting (Count [III]), and an action seeking damages for slander of title (Count IV).
Following discovery, both [Intervenor-Appellee Range] and [Appellees] filed motions for summary judgment.5 [Appellees Fanning and Cerciello] asserted in their motion that "The paucity of evidence to support [Appellants'] claim is alarming." (See [Appellees'] Brief in Support p. 7) In summary, [Appellees] Fanning and Cerciello contend that no documentation or direct evidence supports [Appellants'] claim that Hugh Hanna prior to death, completed a parol inter vivos gift of oil and gas interests to Berdie Wilson. To the contrary, [Appellees] Fanning and Cerciello point out that the Property was encumbered by an oil and gas lease prior to Hugh Hanna's ownership. Identified as the "Gourley Lease," such lease was according to [Appellees]
Fanning and Cerciello subject to numerous assignments of record from 1889 to 1945. Such assignments did not include Berdie Wilson or her late husband Alex Wilson. [Appellees] Fanning and Cerciello charge that [Appellants'] claims are premised upon "unsupported inferences, conjecture and assumptions" that lack documentation memorializing, or the testimony of a living witness to the alleged oral gift. [Appellees] Fanning and Cerciello assert that the Statute of Frauds and the Pennsylvania Recording Act support the granting of summary judgment.
5 [Intervenor/Appellee Range] filed its motion on June 24, 2016. [Appellees] Fanning and Cerciello filed their motion for summary judgment on June 29, 2016. [Appellees] Jeffrey Dutton and Lisa Dutton did not file a motion for summary judgment. The Dutton[s] requested that counsel representing [Appellees] Fanning and Cerciello withdraw from representation of the Duttons who wished to proceed pro se. Such withdraw of counsel was granted on April 4, 2016.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/17, at 2-8.
In response, [Appellants] claim that "[t]he evidence garnered, when considered as a whole" demonstrates that Hugh Hanna made a gift of the oil and gas lying beneath the Hanna Tract to his daughter, Berdie Wilson. Specifically, [Appellants] allege that Berdie Wilson asserted dominion and control over the oil and gas during Hugh Hanna's lifetime. On that basis, [Appellants] proffer that "Berdie Wilson's actions with respect to the oil and gas underlying the Property evidenced her father's intention to make an immediate gift of the oil and gas to her." (See [Appellants'] Omnibus Brief p. 4)[.] Further, [Appellants] advance that the oil and gas lying beneath the property was not an asset of the estate of Hugh Hanna and was not "provided for" in Hugh Hanna's Will. ([Appellants'] Omnibus Brief p. 8)[.] [Appellants] claim they are the descendants of Berdie Wilson and have "100% ownership over" the oil and gas underlying the Property. [Appellants] assert that [Appellees'] summary judgment motions are nothing more than invitations for the court to weigh evidence. On this basis, [Appellants] contend that material issues of fact exist that a finder of fact at trial must determine.
The Dunham Rule provides that a reference to minerals in a reservation of rights in a private deed does not include oil and gas. Dunham & Shortt v. Kirkpatrick , 101 Pa. 36 (Pa. 1882).
On March 16, 2017, the trial court granted Appellees' motions for summary judgment, and dismissed Appellants' Amended Complaint with prejudice. The March 16, 2017 order made final all prior interlocutory orders including the December 31, 2015 order that sustained Appellees' preliminary objections to Count II in Appellants' Amended Complaint. The March 16, 2017 order disposed of all claims and all parties pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1), and on April 12, 2017, Appellants filed a timely appeal. Both Appellants and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellants raise the following issues for this Court's consideration:
1. Did the Trial Court err when it granted summary judgment, dismissing Appellants' Amended Complaint with prejudice, by usurping the factfinder role and weighing Appellants' evidence to find that Appellants could not establish a parol inter vivos gift from Dr. Hugh Hanna to his daughter, Berdie Wilson?Appellants' Brief at 5.
2. Did the Trial Court err when it sustained the preliminary objections in the nature of demurrer as to Count II of Appellants' Amended Complaint by finding that the oil and gas underlying the property was encompassed within the surface estate and was not severed by the Will of Dr. Hugh Hanna, when such conclusion was not supported by the plain language in the instrument itself, the testator's intent, or the circumstances surrounding its execution?
3. Did the Trial Court err when it sustained the preliminary objections in the nature of demurrer as to Count II of Appellants' Amended Complaint by finding that the oil and gas underlying the property did not pass pursuant to the laws of intestacy when the oil and gas was not distributed as part of Dr. Hanna's Estate?
Appellants' first issue challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Our standard of review when evaluating a trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is well settled:
We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of review of a trial court's order granting or denying summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial court's order will be reversed only where it is established that the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.Hall v. CNX Gas Co., LLC , 137 A.3d 597, 601 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).
The trial court provided an exhaustive analysis and rationale supporting its order granting summary judgment. Trial Court Opinion and Order, 3/16/17, at 8-68. After review, we are satisfied that the trial court thoroughly addressed and correctly disposed of Appellants' first issue on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
The parties are directed to attach a copy of the March 16, 2017 opinion and order in the event of further proceedings.
In Appellants' next two issues, they assail the trial court's order sustaining Appellees' preliminary objections. Our standard of review for an order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer is as follows:
We note that while Appellants third issue concerns the laws of intestacy, Appellants' concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), never mentions intestacy. It is well settled that any issue not raised in a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement is deemed waived on appeal. Lazarski v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia , 926 A.2d 459, 464 (Pa. Super. 2007). However, to the extent that intestacy is fairly suggested by the tangential issues set forth in the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and in light of the fact that the trial court discussed intestacy in disposing of Appellees' preliminary objections, we will overlook this deficiency. --------
A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is properly granted where the contested pleading is legally insufficient. Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer require the court to resolve the issues solely on the basis of the pleadings; no testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may be considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by the demurrer. All material facts set forth in the pleading and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom must be admitted as true.
In determining whether the trial court properly sustained preliminary objections, the appellate court must examine the averments in the complaint, together with the documents and exhibits attached thereto, in order to evaluate the sufficiency of the facts averred. The impetus of our inquiry is to determine the legal sufficiency of the complaint and whether the pleading would permit recovery if ultimately proven. This Court will reverse the trial court's decision regarding preliminary objections
only where there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion. When sustaining the trial court's ruling will result in the denial of claim or a dismissal of suit, preliminary objections will be sustained only where the case is free and clear of doubt.Estate of Rothberg , 166 A.3d 378, 382 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
Thus, the question presented by the demurrer is whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, this doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling it.
Where the complaint fails to set forth a valid cause of action, a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is properly sustained. The complaint need not identify specific legal theories, but it must provide essential facts to support the claim. Assertions of legal rights and obligations in a complaint may be construed as conclusions of law, which have no place in a pleading.
As noted above, the trial court sustained Appellees' preliminary objections to Count II of Appellants' Amended Complaint. In Count II of their Amended Complaint, Appellants alleged, in relevant part, the following:
81. The Will of Hugh Hanna severed the "surface of the farm" and the coal of the Property from the oil and gas, but did not provide for the distribution of the oil and gas underlying the Property.
82. Because Hugh Hanna did not provide by specific bequest for distribution of the oil and gas underlying and being produced on the Property and because the Will did not contain a residuary clause, the oil and gas interest passed pursuant to the laws of intestacy.
83. Hugh Hanna's wife, Elizabeth Hanna, elected against the Will of Hugh Hanna. As a result, the sole intestate heirs of Hugh Hanna's estate were Howard T.E. Hanna and Berdie H. Wilson, son and daughter, respectively.
84. The entirety of the oil and gas underlying the Property was owned, in equal shares, by Howard T.E. Hanna and Berdie H. Wilson.
85. [Appellants] are the heirs of Berdie H. Wilson, and [Appellants] now own a one-half interest in the oil and gas underlying the Property.
86. Despite this, through their actions, [Appellees] have continued to assert right, title and ownership over oil and gas underlying the Property through the execution of various oil and gas leases, such that the [Appellants'] right, title and interest in the oil and gas underlying the Property has been clouded and the [Appellants] have been precluded from fully enjoying their rights.
87. [Appellees] have no right, title or ownership to [Appellants'] one-half interest [in the] oil and gas underlying the Property.
88. [Appellants] are the rightful and legal owners of a one-half interest in the oil and gas underlying the Property and are therefore entitled to quiet enjoyment of their rights.
89. Accordingly, [Appellants] request this Court quiet title to the one-half interest of the oil and gas underlying the Property in favor of [Appellants] and against [Appellees] and for any and all additional relief this Court deems just and proper.
WHEREFORE, [Appellants] respectfully demand that this Honorable Court quiet title to the oil and gas underlying the Property, and award judgment in their favor and against [Appellees] as follows:
I. Quieting Title to a one-half ownership interest in the oil and gas underlying the Property against [Appellees] and all persons claiming under [Appellees];
II. For a decree to declare and adjudge [Appellants] own in fee simple the one-half (50%) ownership in the oil and gas underlying the Property and that [Appellees] have no estate, right, title, lien or interest in or to said property or any part thereof;
III. For decree to permanently bar [Appellees] and persons claiming under [Appellees] from asserting any estate right, title, lien or interest in or to the one-half interest of oil and gas underlying the Property adverse to [Appellants];Appellants' Amended Complaint, 5/27/15, at ¶¶ 81-89.
IV. For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper, including attorney's fees and costs.
While the trial court's conclusions with respect to its rationale for sustaining Appellees' preliminary objections are referenced in the March 16, 2017 opinion adopted above, the trial court previously provided a thorough explanation in its December 31, 2015 opinion following the filing of Appellants' Amended Complaint:
Count II of the Amended Complaint alleges [Appellants] own a 50% interest in the property resulting from the laws of intestacy and an election Elizabeth Hanna took against the will of Hugh Hanna. [Appellants] claim that Hugh Hanna, by continually referring to the "surface" of his property in his will, "severed" the surface of the property from the oil and gas lying underneath. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 31, 32. Elizabeth Hanna's election to take against the will resulted in an Orphans' Court deed of distribution which did not include these allegedly severed oil and gas interests. As a result, [Appellants] claim they pass through the laws of intestacy in part to [Appellants]. Amended Complaint ¶ 36.
While the argument flows logically, the Court addressed this logic in its previous order on preliminary objections:
[Appellants'] argument has a certain logical force. ... [O]il and natural gas generally exist in a subterranean realm. Therefore, the conveyance of the surface of property without any further description would by necessary implication appear to exclude a conveyance of oil and natural gas. However, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once
aptly observed, "The life of the law has not been logic. It has been experience."
May 7, 2015 Opinion and Order
Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, a conveyance of "all surface and right of soil" has been interpreted to include gas and oil rights where no specific exception or reservation severed such rights. Yuscavage v. Hamlin, 391 Pa. 13, 15-16, 137 A.2d 242, 243-244 (1958). "The situs of the gas and the methods utilized to extract gas do not support a deviation ... "from the principle, known as the Dunham Rule. Such has been a rule of property law "long acquiesced in" within the Commonwealth. Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex. rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885, 891-892, and 899 (Pa. 2013).
The following portion of the Majority Opinion written by Justice Baer in Butler informs us that:
The Dunham Rule is clear, dating back to Gibson [v. Tyson, 5 Watts 34 (Pa. 1836)], that the common, layperson understanding of what is and is not a mineral is the only acceptable construction of a private deed. Notwithstanding different interpretations proffered by other jurisdictions, the rule in Pennsylvania is that natural gas and oil simply are not minerals because they are not of a metallic nature, as the common person would understand minerals. Gibson, 5 Watts at 41-42; see also Dunham, 101 Pa. at 44. The Highland [v. Commonwealth, 161 A.2d 390 (Pa. 1960)] decision made clear that the party advocating for the inclusion of natural gas within the deed reservation (here [a]ppellees) bears the burden of pleading and proving by clear and convincing evidence that the intent of the parties who executed the reservation was to include natural gas. 161 A.2d at 398-99. Critically, however, such intention may only be shown through parol evidence that indicates the intent of the parties at the time the deed was executed—in this case, 1881. Id. (emphasis added)
Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 620 Pa. 1, 22-23, 65 A.3d 885, 898 (2013).
[Appellants] must plead that the intent of Hugh Hanna in executing his devise, and the intent of his heirs in executing the distribution, was to sever the oil and gas rights to the property. They have not pleaded such facts. Instead, they pleaded a pattern and practice of use over the land by Berdie Wilson and her heirs and assignees. They pleaded that the will and the deed of distribution did not provide for the distribution of oil and gas underlying the property, and this failure to address such a portion of Hugh Hanna's estate evidences an intention to sever these interests. The established case law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania does not permit this assumption to be made; instead it requires the opposite. Hugh Hanna's will and the Deed of Distribution demonstrate no intention to sever the oil and gas rights sufficient to overcome the Dunham Rule.
A demurrer does not admit the truth of averments in a complaint that conflict with exhibits. Where any inconsistency exists between the allegations of a complaint and a written instrument ... the latter will prevail. See Framlau v. County of Delaware, 223 Pa. Super. 272, 299 A.2d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 1972).
In an era where the Dunham rule necessarily included oil and gas in the "surface" of a property, Hugh Hanna referred to his property's surface to distinguish it from the coal interests he bequeathed to his grandchildren. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 33, Exhibit E.
"The general principles regulating the titles to upper and lower estates in the earth's crust are pretty well settled by our own cases. The ownership of the surface carries with it, if there be no obstacle to the application of the general rule, title downward to the center of the earth and upward indefinitely." See Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v, Hughes, 183 Pa. 66, 691 38 A. 568,569 (1897) (emphasis added). "It is true that ... severance (of oil and gas rights or the mineral estate) is generally made by deed or other conveyance, and that until so made the title to the land is regarded as an entirety, including minerals as well as the surface." See Hyde v. Rainey, 223 Pa. 540, 545, 82 a. 781, 783 (1912) (emphasis added). The Dunham rule has been "unwavering in its clarity
that, absent the terms "oil" or "natural gas" being included within a reservation for mineral rights within a private deed, oil or natural gas simply are not encompassed within the reservation without clear and convincing parol evidence produced by the proponent of the reservation to the contrary." Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 620 Pa. 1, 19-20, 65 A.3d 885, 896 (2013).
[Appellants] allege that the property had existing oil and gas wells that may have been producing oil and gas at the time of Hugh Hanna's death. ¶ 41. They further allege that documents prepared before and after Hugh Hanna's death indicate that the parties assessed the value of the "surface" of the property below that of what would be appropriate to include oil and gas. ¶¶ 42-45. [Appellants] argue under Count II that this indicates that a severance of the oil and gas was likely. However, Exhibit G demonstrates that Berdie Wilson signed and executed a distribution that conveyed to her no interest in the surface of the property at issue. This is fatal to [Appellants'] attempt to rebut the Dunham Rule's presumption.1
1 A demurrer does not admit the truth of averments in a complaint that conflict with exhibits. Where any inconsistency exists between the allegations of a complaint and a written instrument ... the latter will prevail. See Framlau v. County of Delaware, 223 Pa. Super. 272, 299 A.2d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 1972).
Trial Court Opinion, 12/31/15, at 10-15.
Interpreted in this light, the will of Hugh Hanna and the Deed of Distribution indicate an intent to include the oil and gas rights to the property. The Court must defer to the experience of case law. [Appellees'] and Intervenor's preliminary objections to Count II of the Amended Complaint are sustained.
We agree with the trial court's conclusions. Appellants' arguments ignore the reality that the only reservation of mineral rights was for coal; absent a separate reservation, the remaining subsurface rights remained with the surface rights in the property. The property, which included the oil and gas rights, was conveyed to Appellees' predecessors in interest, and Appellants received no interest in the property. As such, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the trial court sustaining Appellees' preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. Accordingly, we affirm the final order entered in this matter on March 16, 2017.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 1/30/2018
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