Opinion
(2719)
On appeal by the defendants from the judgment rendered on the jury verdict for the plaintiffs in the negligence action here, held, on an examination of the evidence, that the case was sufficient for presentation to the jury and that the jury could reasonably have reached the conclusion it did reach.
Argued January 10, 1985
Decision released March 19, 1985
Action to recover for personal injuries sustained by the named plaintiff allegedly caused by the negligence of the defendants, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford and tried to the jury before Ripley, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs from which the defendants appealed to this court. No error.
John W. Lemega, with whom, on the brief, was Richard C. Tynan, for the appellants (defendants).
Neil F. Murphy, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
This action was brought on behalf of a minor child to recover for injuries to the child allegedly caused by the breaking of a glass panel in the back door of an apartment which the child's parents rented from the defendants. After a jury trial, a verdict was returned for the plaintiffs. The defendants have appealed from the judgment rendered on the verdict.
The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants' motion for a directed verdict and motion to set aside the verdict. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer a causal relationship between the defendants' alleged negligence and the minor child's injury.
Our review of the denial of both a motion for a directed verdict and a motion to set aside a verdict is limited. As to each, the evidence will be given the construction most favorable to support the verdict. State v. Ruiz, 171 Conn. 264, 275, 368 A.2d 222 (1976) (denial of motion for a directed verdict); Kalleher v. Orr, 183 Conn. 125, 126-27, 438 A.2d 843 (1981) (denial of motion to set aside a verdict). The trial court's ruling is entitled to great weight because of its familiarity with the facts and circumstances of the case. Neilson v. D'Angelo, 1 Conn. App. 239, 244, 471 A.2d 965, cert. dismissed, 193 Conn. 801, 474 A.2d 1259 (1984). In this case, our examination of the evidence leads us to conclude that the plaintiffs' case was sufficient to be presented to the jury; Buckley v. Lovallo, 2 Conn. App. 579, 584, 481 A.2d 1286 (1984); and that the jury could reasonably have decided as it did. Kalleher v. Orr, supra; LaFaive v. DiLoreto, 2 Conn. App. 58, 59-60, 476 A.2d 626 (1984).
The evidence included testimony that the plaintiffs had expressed concern to the defendants about the safety of the glass panel on several occasions; that the defendants retained control of the door and its component parts; that the glass panel was one-eighth of an inch thick and did not have a protective grill; and that, according to an expert witness, the glass panel presented a safety hazard.