Opinion
No. 03-2479 Ma/P.
May 24, 2004
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
This diversity case involves Plaintiff Larry Carr's allegation that his employer, Defendant Northwest Airlines, Inc. ("Northwest"), discriminated against him in violation of Tennessee law. Before the court are two motions. First, on November 5, 2003, Carr filed a motion to issue certification order in which he requests that this court certify a question of law to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Northwest responded on November 24, 2003. Second, on December 30, 2003, Northwest filed a motion for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or for summary judgment. Carr responded on January 30, 2004, and Northwest replied on March 11, 2004. For the following reasons, Northwest's motion is GRANTED and this action is dismissed. The dismissal of the action renders Carr's motion for certification moot; that motion is therefore DENIED.
I. Jurisdiction and Venue
Carr is a citizen of Shelby County, Tennessee. (Compl. at 1.) He filed suit in the Circuit Court of Shelby County on May 15, 2003. (Notice of Removal at 1.) Northwest is a citizen of Minnesota and has its principal place of business in Minnesota. (Compl. at 2.) It removed the case to this court on June 26, 2003. The complaint seeks more than $75,000 in damages. (Compl. at 5.) Therefore, the requirements of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 are satisfied. Alternatively, Northwest contends that federal question jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action is preempted by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in the Western District of Tennessee.
II. Facts
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Northwest is an airline subject to the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). (Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Dismissal or Summ. J. at 1, "Material Facts in Support of Motion".) Carr is employed by Northwest as an Equipment Service Employee ("ESE") in Northwest's facility in Memphis, Tennessee. (Id.) The terms and conditions of Carr's employment with Northwest are governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") between Northwest and the International Association of Machinists ("Union"). (Id.) The CBA was in effect at all times relevant to this case. (Id. at 2.)
Carr agrees that his employment is governed by the CBA but argues that he has certain rights guaranteed by Tennessee law that are not encompassed within the CBA. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Material Facts Supp. the Mot. at 1.) That argument is addressed in the Analysis section.
On May 3, 2002, Carr suffered a minor back injury on the job. (Compl. at 2.) For treatment of the injury, Carr saw Dr. James C. Varner on May 9, 2002. (Id.) On May 15, 2002, Dr. Varner released Carr to work on regular duty with no restrictions. (Id. at 2-3.) On June 5, 2002, Carr was examined by Dr. David Zanick, who disagreed with Dr. Varner's assessment. Dr. Zanick wrote that:
Based upon his current back strain, [Carr] should limit his lifting to not more than 35 pounds. Based upon the fact that he has a total knee replacement and chronic lumbar degenerative disk disease, I believe that on a permanent basis, he should limit his lifting to no more than 35 pounds. He should limit walking to no more than two hours per day. He should avoid stair climbing. He should avoid kneeling and squatting. He should avoid sitting for more than one hour at a time.
(Def.'s Mot. for Dismissal or Summ. J. Ex. 3 Att. A.) On June 26, 2002, Dr. Owen B. Tabor, Sr., examined Carr and on that day released Carr to return to work with no restrictions. (Compl. at 3.) A later letter from Dr. Tabor states that he had treated Carr primarily for knee problems and had "not been involved in his back treatment and therefore [had] no opinion concerning that." (Def.'s Mot. for Dismissal or Summ. J. Ex. 3 Att. C.) Northwest placed Carr on an indefinite medical leave of absence without pay or benefits. (Compl. at 3.) A fourth doctor, David M. Brick, later examined Carr and determined that Carr was capable of performing ESE duties. (Compl. at 3-4.) On December 17, 2002, Carr returned to work. (Id. at 3.) Carr alleges that "to deny Plaintiff the right to return to his position which he was qualified to perform because he was regarded by the Defendant-Company as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity violates the Tennessee Handicap Act, T.C.A. § 8-50-103 ("THA"), and the Tennessee Human Rights Act, T.C.A. § 4-21-101 et seq. ("THRA")". (Id. at 4.) Although he eventually returned to work, Carr seeks lost pay and benefits, interest, attorney's fees, and compensatory damages for the alleged mental distress and loss of enjoyment of life he suffered "as a result of being denied the right to work." (Compl. at 4-5.)
Northwest contends that Carr's complaint is preempted by the RLA. One relevant inquiry in determining whether preemption applies is whether the complaint is governed by the CBA. The CBA contains provisions describing the essential job functions and duties of the ESE position. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Dismissal or Summ. J. at 2.) It also describes a grievance procedure for disputes involving interpretation of the CBA. (Id.) Carr filed three grievances in relation to the events giving rise to his complaint. (Id.) The first, filed June 26, 2002, states that "Grievant was unjustly and/or randomly selected to be sent for a fitness for duty examination. Grievant has been working for several months in full duty position with no problems. The company should have to have a reason or cause to send an employee for [a] fitness for duty [examination]." (Id. Ex. 1 Att. C.) In the grievance, Carr requests that he be returned to a "full duty position." (Id.) Carr's second grievance, filed October 23, 2002, asserts that Article 18 of the CBA, which addresses sick leave and occupational injury leave, had been violated. (Id. Att. D.) It states that "Grievant was sent for fitness for duty and disqualified from ESE position for past injuries, that the treating physicians have released him to return to work. Grievant feels he is being retaliated against because of past injuries and medical cost incurred by the Company." (Id.) It requests, as a resolution, that Northwest "return Grievant to work immediately, and make Grievant whole." (Id.) The third grievance, filed December 18, 2002, after Carr's employment was reinstated, sought back pay and return of accrued leave. (Id. Att. E.) Article 2, paragraph B of the CBA provides: "The Union agrees all employees covered by this Agreement shall be governed by Company rules, regulations, and orders issued by properly designated authorities of the Company which are not in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement. . . ." (Id. Ex. 2.)
Carr's immediate supervisor, Toya Batson, regularly sends employees for fitness for duty examinations pursuant to Article 2, paragraph B of the CBA and Rules 3 and 22 of Northwest's Rules of Conduct. (Id. Ex. 1 at ¶ 8.) Those rules state:
3. Fitness. You must be physically and mentally fit for the performance of the work to which you are assigned. Continued employment is dependent upon the maintenance of this qualification. You must cooperate fully in efforts by the Company to determine your fitness.
. . . .
22. Attendance.
c. SICK LEAVE AND OCCUPATIONAL INJURY LEAVE
(2) Prior to returning to work after an extended illness or injury, you may be required to furnish a certificate from a medical doctor stating that you are medically fit to resume your regular duties.
(Id. Ex. 3 Att. F.) The injury that began Carr's absence from work occurred while he was on Northwest premises during working hours. (Compl. at 2.) With the advice of Northwest's Labor Relations Department and other managers, Batson made the decision to keep Carr on leave of absence for medical reasons. (Id. Ex. 1, Ex. 3.) Northwest contends that the decision was made "pursuant to the CBA and the Rules of Conduct, and based on a series of conflicting medical reports from different doctors that failed to establish that Plaintiff was fit to return to work." (Id. at 3.) Carr disputes that the decision to keep him away from work was made "pursuant to the CBA and Rules of Conduct." (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Material Facts at 2.)
III. Defendant's Motion for Dismissal or for Summary Judgment
Northwest argues that Carr's complaint is preempted by the RLA or, alternatively, by the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law, that this court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and that the case should therefore be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Smith v. Hill, 182 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) (affirming district court's Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal of complaint that was preempted by RLA).
The RLA, which applies to the airline industry, "provid[es] a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes." Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248, 252 (1994) (citation omitted). Specifically, the RLA establishes a mandatory arbitral mechanism for "the prompt and orderly settlement" of two classes of disputes — "major disputes" and "minor disputes."See 45 U.S.C. § 151a. Major disputes "relate to the formation of collective bargaining agreements or efforts to secure them."Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 252 (citation and internal quotation omitted). Minor disputes "gro[w] out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions" and "involve controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation." Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 253 (citation omitted); see also Stephens v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 792 F.2d 576, 579-80 (6th Cir. 1986), amended, 811 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1986). A dispute is minor "if the disputed action of one of the parties can `arguably' be justified by the existing agreement or . . . if the contention that the labor contract sanctions the disputed action is not `obviously insubstantial' . . ." Local 1477 United Transp. Union v. Baker, 482 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1973).
When a minor dispute arises, the RLA provides initially for settlement through the contractually agreed-upon grievance procedures. 45 U.S.C. § 152; Stephens, 792 F.2d at 580. If the parties are unable to resolve minor disputes through contractual grievance procedures, they must submit to compulsory and binding arbitration by the National Railroad Adjustment Board ("NRAB") or a privately established arbitration panel. 45 U.S.C. § 153;Stephens, 792 F.2d at 580. The NRAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over minor disputes. Stephens, 792 F.2d at 580. Further,
[e]mployees' attempts to evade NRAB exclusive jurisdiction over minor disputes by recharacterizing their claims into state causes of action are scrutinized by the following test: If the action is based on a matrix of facts which are inextricably intertwined with the grievance machinery of the collective bargaining agreement and the RLA, exclusive jurisdiction of the NRAB preempts the action.Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, even if a plaintiff's claim is grounded on rights which stem from state law, the claim is preempted if it cannot be adjudicated without interpreting the CBA or if it can be "conclusively resolved" by interpreting the CBA. Brown v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 261-62). The RLA's jurisdiction is broad, and "no grievance that may fairly be said to stem from the collective bargaining agreement is excluded." Beard v. Carrollton R.R., 893 F.2d 117, 121 (6th Cir. 1989).
The question presented is whether Carr's THA and THRA claims "stem from" or are "inextricably intertwined" with the CBA. If so, the claims are preempted. To prove discrimination under the THA, Carr must show that he was qualified for his ESE position, that he was disabled, and that he suffered an adverse employment action because of that disability. Roberson v. Cendant Travel Servs., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 573, 583 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). His THRA claim is based on the same facts; Carr argues that the same conduct violated both statutes.
Northwest argues that Carr's claims are so related to interpreting the CBA that they are preempted. First, it argues that, to determine whether Carr was qualified to perform the functions of his position, one must consider the ESE job description in the CBA. Second, Northwest notes that Carr "was ordered to undergo examinations of his medical condition and took leave pursuant to employment rules explicitly incorporated into the workplace through the CBA." (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Resp. to Mot. to Issue Certification Order at 9.) Third, Northwest argues that the court must interpret the CBA's leave policy and Northwest's standards for requiring a medical evaluation after an injury. (Id.) Finally, Northwest notes that Carr filed grievances related to the delay in his return to work and that he was afforded relief when he was allowed to return to work on December 17, 2002. (Id.)
Given these facts, particularly the grievances Carr filed and the fact that determining whether Carr was capable of performing ESE duties requires referring to the ESE job description in the CBA, the court finds that Carr's THA and THRA claims are preempted because they are "inextricably intertwined" with the CBA. The second grievance filed by Carr is substantially similar to the complaint he filed in this case. In his second grievance, Carr stated that he had been disqualified from his ESE position because of "past injuries" and that the disqualification violated Article 18 of the CBA. In this litigation, he seeks to resolve whether the THA "prohibits an employer from screening out a worker who can perform the essential functions of his . . . position but who, because of prior surgeries, the employer regards as having a physical condition that poses a risk to his own health or safety." (Pl.'s Mot. to Issue Cert. Order at 3-4.) Carr's grievance reveals that he himself viewed the issue of his delay in return to work as one that involved violations of the CBA and that could be resolved by resorting to the CBA.
Additionally, Carr's claims in this case can be resolved only by reference to the job description for the ESE position found in the CBA. In O'Brien v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 972 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992), the plaintiff, O'Brien, alleged that the defendant had violated a Massachusetts law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability. The defendant had refused to hire him as a stevedore, claiming that O'Brien was incapable of performing the duties of the stevedore position. Id. at 2. The district court dismissed the complaint as preempted by the RLA. Id. at 3. The First Circuit affirmed, stating:
[A]ddressing the merits of O'Brien's claim of physical handicap discrimination would require us to assess O'Brien's fitness and ability to perform safely the functions of a stevedore. Yet an employee's fitness and ability are governed by the rules and procedures contained in the [CBA]. Rule 49 of the [CBA] sets forth the method by which an employee's physical fitness to perform his job is determined. . . . Perhaps the best indication that fitness and ability are the subject of the [CBA] is the very grievance that O'Brien brought under this [CBA] on the issue of his fitness and ability to be a stevedore. Chapter 151B requires a court to determine whether the plaintiff is a "qualified handicapped person," but this determination would be impossible to make without reference to the collective bargaining agreement.Id. at 5. Adjudicating the present case would require the court to determine whether Carr was qualified for the ESE position (which would require reference to the CBA) and to decide whether Northwest had properly analyzed the medical evidence before it. The Rules of Conduct, to which all Union members agreed in the CBA, provide for the submission of such medical evidence when an employee has been injured. Given these facts, Carr's claims "stem from" the CBA, and they cannot be resolved without interpreting portions of the CBA. Accordingly, the claims are preempted, Northwest's motion is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED. Because the claims are preempted, it is unnecessary to address Carr's motion to issue certification order, and that order is DENIED as moot.
So ORDERED.