Opinion
2002-04782
November 25, 2002.
December 23, 2002.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., Chelli Bush, the attorney for the plaintiffs, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (M. Garson, J.), dated May 8, 2002, which granted the motion of the nonparty-respondent, Frank J. Santo, P.C., the former attorney for the plaintiffs, to permanently stay its petition in the Supreme Court, Richmond County, inter alia, to resolve the issue of the charging lien of the nonparty-respondent, Frank J. Santo, P.C., in this action, and awarded the nonparty-respondent, Frank J. Santo, P.C., one-third of the net attorney's fee in this action.
Chelli Bush, Staten Island, N.Y. (Marvin Ben-Aron of counsel), nonparty-appellant pro se.
Frank J. Santo, P.C., Brooklyn, N.Y. (William R. Santo of counsel), nonparty-respondent pro se.
Before: MYRIAM J. ALTMAN, J.P., SONDRA MILLER, THOMAS A. ADAMS, BARRY A. COZIER, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is modified by deleting the provision thereof awarding Frank J. Santo, P.C., one-third of the net attorney's fee in this action; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a hearing in accordance herewith.
On the record before us, it cannot be determined whether the nonparty-respondent, Frank J. Santo, P.C. (hereinafter Santo), was discharged with or without cause by the plaintiffs in this action. Since Santo's right to a quantum meruit recovery, and to a charging lien under Judiciary Law § 475, are dependent on whether the termination of the attorney-client relationship was justified (see Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38), the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a hearing to determine this issue (see Shalom Toy v. Each Every One of Members of N.Y. Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn., 239 A.D.2d 196). In the event the Supreme Court determines that the plaintiffs' discharge of Santo was not justified by cause, it should make a factual finding of the reasonable value of Santo's services for which it was not previously compensated, if any.
However, the Supreme Court, Kings County, properly granted the motion to permanently stay the proceeding commenced in the Supreme Court, Richmond County, where the nonparty-appellant sought resolution of the counsel fee issue. The Supreme Court, Kings County, which is the venue of the action to recover damages for personal injuries, is the proper forum to determine the issue of counsel fees arising from the action (see generally Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., 73 N.Y.2d 454).
In light of this determination, we deem it unnecessary to reach the remainder of the nonparty-appellant's contentions.
ALTMAN, J.P., S. MILLER, ADAMS and COZIER, JJ., concur.