Opinion
No. 11–P–1321.
2012-07-31
Dawn CAPUTO v. CITY OF HAVERHILL & another.
By the Court (RUBIN, BROWN & HANLON, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff Dawn Caputo appeals from a Superior Court summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the city of Haverhill (city) and Kerry Fitzgerald, on her claims for breach of contract, negligence, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Her complaint alleged that Fitzgerald, a member of the city's school committee, violated a confidentiality clause contained in a prior settlement agreement between Caputo and the city, when Fitzgerald sent an electronic mail message (e-mail) to other city school employees referring to Caputo, her prior dispute with the city, and the resulting litigation. Caputo also contends that the e-mail contained disparaging remarks about her that were prohibited by the agreement and damaged her reputation. We affirm.
Caputo was a track coach for the city's high school. After a dispute with the athletic director, Caputo's contract was not renewed. A story to that effect ran in the local newspaper; the school superintendent was quoted as stating that Caputo had received an unsatisfactory job evaluation. Caputo responded in the press, and issues surrounding the track team became the subject of several of the city's public school committee meetings.
In 2001, Caputo filed an action against the city, seeking damages for a variety of claims arising out of the employment dispute. That matter eventually was settled in 2005 by an agreement containing both confidentiality and nondisparagement clauses.
As noted by the motion judge, even before the controversy, as a track coach, Caputo had become a “well-known community figure.”
Background. In 2007, Fitzgerald sent an e-mail to other school committee members, the school superintendent, and the school committee's attorney reminding them that it was necessary to discuss personnel matters in executive session so as to avoid mentioning an employee's name during public meetings.
The confidentiality clause provides: “Both parties agree not to disclose any information regarding the existence or substance of [the settlement agreement], except to their immediate family members, their tax advisor, and/or an attorney ... or as may be required by law.”
The nondisparagement clause provides: “Each party agrees not to make any disparaging or defamatory statements, whether written or verbal, regarding any other party or any of the other parties' officers, directors, employees or agents.”
A local newspaper obtained Fitzgerald's e-mail and printed a story several days later, quoting parts of the e-mail and referring to the prior law suit. Based on the contents of Fitzgerald's e-mail, Caputo began this action more than a year later. After careful review of the record, including the motion judge's thoughtful findings, we are satisfied that summary judgment was properly granted.
The e-mail stated in part: “I want to tell you about a risk we take in discussing this in ... public. Before I was on the [school committee], ... Dawn Caputo's performance was discussed publicly by [school committee] members and the [school committee] was sued. It was not a lengthy discussion, it was just a mention that she ... did something that the former Athletic Director didn't like and the [high school] did ... not want to re-sign her contract (she was a coach). We lost that lawsuit ... and subsequent appeals. It cost the schools just $25,000 because our ... insurance covered the rest of the damages.” The e-mail continued with suggestions on how to avoid similar lawsuits in the future.
Breach of contract claim. On her breach of contract claim, Caputo alleges that the e-mail breached both the confidentiality and nondisparagement provisions of the agreement. As to confidentiality, Caputo concedes that the e-mail makes no disclosure of any information regarding the existence or substance of the agreement or the monies paid by the city; nor does it state the amount of monies paid Caputo as part of the settlement. The e-mail states only that Caputo sued the city and the city “lost that lawsuit.”
In any event, as the motion judge noted in his memorandum of decision and order, Fitzgerald sent the e-mail to other school committee members, the superintendent of schools, and the school committee's attorney, “all individuals who ... are, essentially, the ‘City.’ There can be no serious contention that the Confidentiality Provision was intended to prohibit the City from disclosing the Settlement Agreement to itself. Such an interpretation strains the bounds of credulity.” Moreover, Caputo understood the agreement to be a public record because “public funds” were used to pay the insurance claim deductible when the case was settled. The agreement does not fall under any statutory exemption that would prevent disclosure under mandatory fair information practices. See G.L. c. 4, § 7(26) (defining public records); G.L. c. 66A.
As to the argument that the e-mail violated the contract because it was disparaging, the statement that Caputo “did something that the former Athletic Director didn't like and the [high school] did ... not want to re-sign her contract” was true. Cf. Murphy v.. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass. 42, 64 (2007) (statements made about a plaintiff on a national television program were held to be disparaging or defamatory because the statements were not true). Further, Fitzgerald did not speak slightingly of Caputo in the e-mail. See Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 406 Mass. 7, 12 (1989) (defining “disparage”). In sum, as the e-mail did not violate either the confidentiality or the disparagement clauses of the settlement agreement, Caputo's breach of contract claim fails.
Negligence claim. To succeed on her negligence claim, Caputo was required to prove that the city owed her a duty of care and that she suffered a loss caused by the city's breach of that duty. See Nutt v. Florio, 75 Mass.App.Ct. 482, 485 (2009). She argues that the city owed her a duty “to keep certain personnel information private.” Reviewing the e-mail, it is apparent that it contained none of Caputo's private personnel information. Therefore no duty was breached.
In addition, as noted supra, there was no disclosure to anyone outside the city government. The motion judge noted, “There is no evidence suggesting Fitzgerald sent the [e]mail to the press or any other public entity.”
In his memorandum, the motion judge stated, “The only statements in the [e]mail relevant to Caputo are the following: her ‘performance was discussed publicly;’ she ‘sued[ ] the School Committee;’ she ‘did something ... the Athletic Director didn't like;’ and that, as a result, the High School ‘did not want to re-sign her [coaching] contract.’ “ All of this information was public knowledge because the circumstances surrounding Caputo's termination as head track coach were played out in articles in the local newspaper and public hearings held by the school committee.
Defamation. Caputo likewise fails to satisfy the required elements of her defamation claim. See Ravnikar v. Bogojavlensky, 438 Mass. 627, 629–630 (2003). Specifically, there is no evidence in the record showing that Caputo was subjected to “hatred, ridicule, [or] contempt” as a result of Fitzgerald's email or that it “injure[d][her] reputation in the community.” Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co., 351 Mass. 53, 55 (1966), quoting from Muchnick v. Post Publishing Co., 332 Mass. 304, 306 (1955). Like the motion judge, we do not see that the e-mail discredits Caputo.
In addition, the statements contained in the e-mail apparently were true. For that reason, a showing of actual malice was required and none is shown here. See White v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 442 Mass. 64, 66 n. 4 (2004). For both of these reasons, Caputo's defamation claim fails. See Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 159 n. 17 (2006) (appellate court may affirm grant of summary judgment on any ground apparent from the record).
We note Caputo subsequently was hired as an assistant principal in the same school system.
Invasion of privacy. Caputo's final claim of invasion of privacy is meritless for the same reasons that her breach of contract claim fails. The statements conveyed in Fitzgerald's e-mail contained no private personnel information; they simply refer to the dispute between Caputo and the high school athletic director, the subsequent nonrenewal of her coaching contract, and the resulting litigation—all facts that were public knowledge within the community. See Jones v. Taibbi, 400 Mass. 786, 801 (1987). In fact, Caputo herself aided in the public disclosure of the circumstances surrounding her 2001 termination, further diminishing her expectation of privacy; she made herself available to the press to answer questions and rebut information provided by the city. See Schlesinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 409 Mass. 514, 521 (1991); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D comment b (1977).
Taken together, the facts contained in the record before us do not present a “genuine issue as to any material fact” and amply support a grant of summary judgment in favor of both defendants. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Caputo, it is clear that the defendants are “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Nutt v. Florio, 75 Mass.App.Ct. at 485.
Judgment affirmed.