Opinion
No. 4-05-00519-CR
Delivered and Filed: April 5, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the 379th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2004-CR-2396, Honorable Pat Priest, Judge Presiding. Affirmed
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice, Rebecca SIMMONS, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles Campbell pled nolo contendere to possession of a controlled substance. Campbell appeals the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress. Because the issues in this appeal involve the application of well-settled principles of law, we affirm the trial court's judgment in this memorandum opinion. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); Perez v. State, 103 S.W.3d 466, 468 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and we afford almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts that the record supports, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of the witnesses' credibility and demeanor. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 88-89; Perez, 103 S.W.3d at 468. The court's application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 88-89; Perez, 103 S.W.3d at 468. Campbell contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress because the arresting officer presented no evidence of probable cause for his arrest. Probable cause exists where the police have reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe a particular person has committed or is committing an offense. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87. Probable cause requires more than mere suspicion but far less evidence than that needed to support a conviction or even that needed to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Officer Jimmy Castillo was on patrol when he saw Campbell in his car stopped in the right lane of traffic, holding a conversation with two pedestrians. Campbell was impeding traffic, causing at least one vehicle to move into the left lane to pass him. Officer Castillo circled the block and began traveling in the opposite direction from Campbell. Campbell proceeded southbound on the street but then stopped, reversed in his lane, and again spoke with the two individuals. Officer Castillo made a u-turn and drove directly behind Campbell. The pedestrians walked away, and Campbell began to travel southbound. Campbell's vehicle jumped the curb onto the sidewalk and swerved back into the right lane, then into the left lane traveling southbound. Officer Castillo activated his light to initiate a stop. Officer Castillo observed that Campbell had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and smelled of intoxicants. Campbell had to use his vehicle to support him as he walked toward Officer Castillo. Officer Castillo placed Campbell under arrest. Officer Castillo admitted that he did not ask Campbell to perform any field sobriety tests before arresting him. Officer Castillo conducted a search incident to the arrest and discovered heroin in Campbell's left jacket pocket. Based on Officer Castillo's personal observations, he had probable cause to arrest Campbell for impeding traffic, driving on the sidewalk, and driving while intoxicated. See Beverly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (noting probable cause may be based upon officer's personal observations); Green v. State, 773 S.W.2d 816, 817-18 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1989, no pet.) (finding probable cause to arrest based on officer's observation that appellant was impeding traffic); Grim v. State, 656 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no pet.) (holding initial arrest lawful where officer testified that he stopped appellant for driving on the sidewalk); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 545.363, 545.422 (Vernon 1999). Accordingly, Campbell's issue is overruled, and the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Although the motion to suppress also challenged the reasonableness of the stop, Campbell does not challenge the reasonableness of the stop on appeal.