Opinion
IP 1:30-CV-0180-SEB-VSS.
June 25, 2003.
ORDER
On February 7, 2003, Plaintiff, James Campbell, filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin "the Defendants' present policy of public strip searches and public cavity searches [in violation of the Fourth Amendment] for individuals who are cited for certain actions but who are not taken in for processing due to jail overcrowding." Pl.'s Br. in Support of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. p. 2. An evidentiary hearing was conducted at Plaintiff's request on March 19, 2003, and continued on April 2, 2003. On May 30, 2003, we granted Plaintiff's request for an extension of time to file for class determination pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(c)(1) and Local Rule 23.1(b), giving him until July 30, 2003, to make such a filing.
In Plaintiff's post-hearing briefs, he modified the proposed injunction to read as follows: to enjoin "the policy and/or practice of the Indianapolis Police Department and its officers from conducting public strip searches, public modified strip searches and/or visual cavity searches unless a weapon or immediately apparent contraband is discerned during a pat down or observed being secreted by the person." Pl.'s Post-Hearing Br. p. 1.
In order to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction in the absence of a class action, Plaintiff must demonstrate, among other factors, that he personally has no remedy at law and will suffer irreparable harm if preliminary relief is denied.Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg. Auth., 63 F.3d 581, 585 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating the prerequisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction); see also McKenzie v. City of Chicago, 118 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 310 n. 1 (1976)) ("Because a class has not been certified, the only interests at stake are those of the named plaintiff's."). Therefore, Plaintiff's entitlement to the injunction requested depends on whether he personally is likely to lack an adequate remedy at law and to suffer future injury from Defendants' use of strip searches.
Plaintiff's claim that he was illegally strip searched or cavity searched by Defendants on June 14, 2002, gives him standing to seek damages against the individual officers and perhaps against the City of Indianapolis, which would be an adequate legal remedy. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983). In addition, Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to establish a real and immediate threat of future injury justifying injunctive relief to him on an individualized basis, i.e., that Defendants would again arrest him for possession of marijuana or for any other offense necessitating a public "thorough body search." See id. at 102 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)) ("[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.")
Statistically unsupported assertions that Plaintiff, as a black male, is more likely to be suspected of wrongdoing, arrested, and subsequently searched do not demonstrate a "real and immediate" threat of harm to Plaintiff, especially in light of the fact that, to the best of our knowledge, Plaintiff has not presented evidence that he had been stopped and arrested prior to the June 14 incident or that he has been stopped and arrested since the June 14 incident.
On April 18, 2002, the Executive Committee of the Marion County Superior Court directed "all Law Enforcement agencies within Marion County to issue summons in lieu of arrest for [certain enumerated] crimes" including possession of marijuana. In addition, Indianapolis Police Department General Order 18.02 instructs "[a]ny officer making an arrest . . . [to] make an immediate and thorough body search" of the person arrested. A May 1, 2002 Police/Prosecutor Update Addendum interpreted the April 18, 2002 directive and General Order 18.02 together to allow law enforcement personnel to "perform searches incident to detention for an arrestable offense so long as probable cause exists to make the arrest." Because the suspects detained and issued a summons in lieu of arrest are not taken to the lock-up, an officer's search of their persons would be, in some sense, public.
Accordingly, we deny the motion for preliminary injunction as to Plaintiff and hold in abeyance any ruling on the motion as to the putative class until a time after July 30, 2003, assuming a request for injunctive relief is advanced in that context.
It is so ORDERED.