Opinion
Civ. No. 3:96-CV-3220-L.
April 4, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court are the following:
1. Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief of Defendant Kaufman County, Texas, filed April 9, 1997;
2. Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief of Defendant Robert Harris, filed April 10, 1997;
3. Response and Brief of Plaintiff Craig Campbell to Sheriff Robert Harris/Kaufman County's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 24, 1997;
4. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 23, 1997;
5. Defendant Robert Harris' Supplement to Motions for Summary Judgment, filed February 10, 2000;
6. Supplement to Brief of Plaintiff Craig Campbell to Sheriff Robert Harris/Kaufman County's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 10, 2000; and
7. Defendant Robert Harris' Second Supplement to Motions to Summary Judgment, filed February 25, 2000.
After careful consideration of the motions, response, reply, supplements, summary judgment record, and the applicable law, the court, for the reasons that follow, grants the motions for summary judgment of Defendants Harris and Kaufman County.
I. Procedural and Factual Background
Craig Campbell ("Plaintiff" or "Campbell") filed this civil rights action on December 2, 1996, against Robert Harris ("Defendant" or "Harris") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the common law of the state of Texas. Regarding his federal claims, Campbell contends (1) that he was falsely arrested on December 4, 1994, because Harris knew that no probable cause existed to arrest him and that no warrant for his arrest existed from the state of Kentucky, and (2) that he was illegally incarcerated until March 3, 1995. With respect to his state law claims, Campbell contends that he was falsely arrested, falsely imprisoned, and assaulted. Plaintiff sues Harris in his individual and official capacity.
Since Harris is also sued in his official capacity, Kaufman County is necessarily a party to the action because such official capacity lawsuits are treated as lawsuits against the governmental entity of which the individual is an agent, employee, official or representative. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1996).
Defendant Harris contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity regarding the federal claims asserted by Campbell because Campbell has not pleaded facts with the requisite specificity to show that he is liable to Plaintiff and because he (Harris) did not violate any clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known. Harris raises the defense of official immunity on the state claims asserted by Plaintiff. Defendant Kaufman County contends that Campbell was not injured as a result of any unconstitutional policy or custom of Kaufman County.
The court now sets forth the facts it relies on to decide the motions. As expected, many of the facts in this case are disputed; some are not in dispute. When the facts are in dispute or there are different versions of the facts, they are presented and viewed in the light most favorable to Campbell as the nonmovant. The court, however, does not consider a fact to be in dispute merely by a conclusory statement that it is disputed. Competent summary judgment evidence must show that it is disputed.
On December 4, 1994, Glen Wilburn was working as a deputy sheriff for Kaufman County, Texas. When he arrived at work that morning, he checked his box for any messages or memoranda. He found a warrant for the arrest of Craig Campbell in his box. Kaufman County deputy sheriffs Wilburn and Greg Parks arrested Campbell on December 4, 1994, shortly after 12:00 p.m. After his arrest, Campbell was taken to the Kaufman County Jail, where he remained until March 3, 1995. Campbell specifically states that he was not taken before a Justice of the Peace named Chambless on the day of his arrest or on December 5, 1994. According to Campbell, he was not taken before any judge or magistrate until "just before" March 3, 1995. Campbell was not shown a copy of the warrant on the day of his arrest, although he repeatedly asked to see a warrant justifying his arrest, and was not shown one until two or three days before he left the Kaufman County Jail on March 3, 1995. Campbell avers that the only time he went to court or before a judge was in March 1995. On that day, he told a judge that he would agree to go to Kentucky to face trial.
Both Sheriff Harris and Deputy Wilburn aver that the standard operating procedure with respect to the arraignment or presentation of prisoners at the Kaufman County Jail at the time of Plaintiffs arrest was that prisoners were brought before a judge by 9:00 a.m. or 10:00 a.m. each day, seven days a week. Harris has been sheriff of Kaufman County since June of 1985, and Wilburn was hired as deputy sheriff in February of 1994.
Sheriff Harris did not hear or know of Plaintiff until he was served with Plaintiffs lawsuit. Sheriff Harris did not arrest Plaintiff; did not personally participate in the book-in, arraignment, or extradition process of Plaintiff; and had no personal involvement with Plaintiff at any time during the relevant time period (from the date of Plaintiff's arrest on December 4, 1994, until he left the Kaufman County Jail on March 3. 1995).
On February 28, 1997, Harris filed Defendant's Motion to Require Plaintiff to File a Reply to Defendant's Assertion of Qualified Immunity. The magistrate judge ordered Plaintiff to file a reply and "enumerate the specific conduct of Defendant Harris on which Plaintiff predicates his claims for which Harris should be personally liable." See Order of March 19, 1997, at p. 2. Plaintiff filed his reply on April 4, 1997.
On January 27, 2000, the court held a hearing on Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. Upon an inquiry from the court, counsel for Plaintiff stated that his only objections to the warrant from Kentucky were that it was not properly authenticated and that no evidence in the record sufficiently indicated that the warrant was outstanding at the time Plaintiff was arrested. Plaintiffs counsel also stated that he would not have any basis to complain about Plaintiff's arrest if competent evidence showed the warrant to be authentic, valid and outstanding (active). Defendants supplemented the record in this case on February 10, 2000, and February 25, 2000. The supplements contain verifications that identify and authenticate the warrant in question and show it was "a valid, open and active warrant in December, 1994" for the arrest of Craig Campbell. Plaintiff has not objected to the supplemental evidence.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994). The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim. Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' motion. Id., Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed fact issues which are "irrelevant and unnecessary" will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
III. Analysis
A. Qualified Immunity
1. Specificity of Allegations
When a public official defendant in a § 1983 action has raised the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must plead facts with particularity before he may subject the public official to trial. Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1478 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 791-92 (5th Cir. 1986). This specificity of facts necessary in cases when qualified immunity has been asserted is referred to as the "heightened pleading" requirement, which requires a plaintiff to plead allegations of fact which focus specifically on the conduct of the individual who caused the plaintiffs injury. Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Wicks v. Mississippi State Employment Servs., 41 F.3d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1995)). The Fifth Circuit recently addressed the heightened pleading requirement and the district court's responsibility in such instances by stating:
First, the district court must insist that a plaintiff suing a public official under § 1983 file a short and plain statement of his complaint, a statement that rests on more than conclusions alone. Second, the court may, in its discretion, insist that a plaintiff file a reply tailored to an answer pleading the defense of qualified immunity. Vindicating the immunity doctrine will ordinarily require such a reply, and a district court's discretion not to do so is narrow indeed when greater detail might assist.Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433-34 (5th Cir. 1995). Using the Schultea standard, the court determines that Plaintiff's complaint is inadequate to overcome the qualified immunity defense of Sheriff Harris.
In this circuit, it is well-established that a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if his conduct causes the constitutional violation or if the supervisor was deliberately indifferent to the violation of a constitutional right. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454 n. 8 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 815 (1994) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)); see also Hinshaw v. Doffer, 785 F.2d 1260, 1263 (5th Cir. 1985); Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983). Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a sheriff can be held liable for his personal participation in the conduct in question but cannot be held liable on basis of vicarious liability).
Upon reviewing Plaintiffs Original Complaint ("Complaint") and Plaintiff's Brief and Reply to Defendant Harris' Claim of Qualified Immunity ("Reply"), filed April 4, 1997, Plaintiff wholly fails to set forth any factual basis to establish that Sheriff Harris had any personal involvement in his arrest, book-in, arraignment, or extradition, or that he (Harris) acted with deliberate indifference to any of his (Plaintiffs) rights. Plaintiffs Reply, which was ordered by the magistrate judge, contains nothing more factually than what is set forth in the Complaint, which has been ruled legally insufficient to overcome an assertion of qualified immunity. Plaintiff simply fails to state any specific facts that establish or indicate that Sheriff Harris had any personal involvement in any of the incidents that give rise to Plaintiffs claims as set forth in his Complaint.
Plaintiff takes the position that his Complaint "adequately places Defendant Harris on notice of [his] claim and therefore there should be no need to . . . require [him] to plead further." Plaintiffs Reply at p. 1. Plaintiff cites Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), for the proposition that the court is required to accept as true all allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint. Plaintiff misconstrues Conley. While this is a correct statement of one of the principles enunciated in Conley, a liberal reading of Plaintiffs allegations, if taken as true, unearths no theory and no facts that would justify liability against Sheriff Harris on Plaintiffs federal claims. Since Plaintiff has set forth no specific facts to show Sheriff Harris' personal involvement or deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs constitutional rights, dismissal of the federal claims is proper because "it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. Accordingly, no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Sheriff Harris' defense of qualified immunity, and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs federal claims.
2. Determination of Whether Sheriff Harris is Entitled to Qualified Immunity
Plaintiff has not requested to amend his Complaint. Indeed, Plaintiff contends that his Complaint is sufficient and that he should not have to plead further. Plaintiff's Reply at p. 1. The court, therefore, concludes that Plaintiff has pleaded his best case. Since Plaintiff has had a fair opportunity to make his case against Sheriff Harris by stating facts to overcome the qualified immunity defense, he is not entitled to plead further, and his Complaint must be dismissed. See Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761 F.2d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1985).
Even if the court were to conclude that Plaintiffs Complaint meets the heightened pleading requirement and sets forth specific facts that would subject Sheriff Harris to liability, Plaintiffs federal claims fail because Sheriff Harris is qualifiedly immune from suit. Government officials who perform discretionary functions are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, which shields them from suit as well as liability for civil damages, if their conduct does not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A defendant official must affirmatively plead the defense of qualified immunity. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Sheriff Harris has pleaded this defense.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment that raises the defense of qualified immunity, the court must first decide "whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Conn v. Gabbert, 119 S.Ct. 1292, 1295 (1999) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1991)); see also Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 339 (5th Cir. 1999). The second prong of the test requires the court to make two separate inquiries: whether the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the event giving rise to the plaintiffs claim, and if so, whether the conduct of the defendant was objectively unreasonable. Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 860 (5th Cir. 1999). Although many cases continue to state that the determination of the qualified immunity issue requires the application of a bifurcated test, the analytical framework for resolving issues of qualified immunity necessarily requires, or may require, a three-step analysis. See Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d at 339; Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d at 860; Hare v. City of Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998); Eugene v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d 1299, 1305 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1191 (1996).
Whether a defendant acted within the scope of his authority performing a discretionary function and whether a reasonable official in his position would have deemed his conduct unconstitutional are not to be considered by the court unless each part of the three-step inquiry has been answered affirmatively on behalf of the plaintiff. Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d at 339. In other words, only after a plaintiff demonstrates the existence and violation of a clearly established constitutional or statutory right is the defendant required to show that he was performing a discretionary function and that a reasonable official would not have considered his actions to be unconstitutional at the time of the incident in question. Id. at 338.
A right is "clearly established" only when its contours are sufficiently clear that a reasonable public official would have realized or understood that his conduct violated the right in issue, not merely that the conduct was otherwise improper. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 429 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, the right must not only be clearly established in an abstract sense but in a more particularized sense so that it is apparent to the official that his actions [what he is doing] are unlawful in light of pre-existing law. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640; Stefanoff v. Hays County, 154 F.3d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 1998); and Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1997).
In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641, the Supreme Court refined the qualified immunity standard and held that the relevant question is whether a reasonable officer or public official could have believed that his conduct was lawful in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by him. If public officials or officers of "reasonable competence could disagree [on whether an action is legal], immunity should be recognized." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994)). Conversely, an official's conduct is not protected by qualified immunity if, in light of clearly established pre-existing law, it was apparent the conduct, when undertaken, would be a violation of the right at issue. Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d at 429. To preclude qualified immunity, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to establish that "the [specific] action in question has previously been held unlawful." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640. For an official, however, to surrender qualified immunity, "pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what the defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances." Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d at 882; Stefanoff v. Hays County, 154 F.3d at 525.
A person arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant suffers no deprivation under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1979); Simons v. Clemons, 752 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir. 1985); Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, Texas, 950 F.2d 272, 280 (5th Cir. 1992). Since Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant, he has alleged no deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution. Simons, 752 F.2d at 1055. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege the deprivation of a constitutional right, and Sheriff Harris is therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs federal claims. B. County Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Moreover, even if Plaintiff arguably alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right and showed that the right was clearly established, his federal claims still fail because Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact that Harris' conduct was objectively unreasonable. Plaintiff has produced no competent summary judgment evidence showing that Harris's conduct was objectively unreasonable toward him in light of Harris not having any knowledge of Plaintiff's arrest, book-in, arraignment, or extradition. Harris did not even know of Plaintiff until he (Harris) was served with this lawsuit. Summary judgment is therefore also appropriate on this ground.
Although the court has held that Sheriff Harris is entitled to qualified immunity, the court also finds and holds that even without qualified immunity, Plaintiffs federal claims fail because he was arrested on a facially valid warrant, and such an arrest or extended incarceration gives rise to no claim under the Constitution. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 144.
Plaintiff's suit against Defendant Harris in his official capacity is treated as a claim against Kaufman County, the governmental entity of which Harris is an employee, representative or official. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Brooks v. George County, 84 F.3d 157, 165 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948 (1996). A governmental entity can be sued and subjected to monetary damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if its official policy or custom causes a person to be deprived of a federally protected right. Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A governmental entity cannot be liable for civil rights violations under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Id. See also Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1979). Official policy is defined as:
1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the [county] lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or
2. A persistent, widespread practice of [county] officials or employees which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents [county] policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the [county] or to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority.Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984); Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984). A plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the policy to the governmental entity itself, and show that his injury was incurred because of the application of that specific policy. Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985). A plaintiff must establish that the governmental entity through its deliberate conduct was the moving force behind the injury or harm suffered and must establish a direct causal link between the governmental entity's action and the deprivation of a federally protected right. Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. at 403-04.
Liability must rest on official policy, meaning the governmental entity's policy, and not the policy of an individual official. Bennett, 728 F.2d at 769. The official complained of must possess
[f]inal authority to establish [county] policy with respect to the action ordered. . . . The official must also be responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the [county] can be held liable. . . . [W]hether an official had final policymaking authority is a question of state law.Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-482 (1986). An employee, agency, or board of a governmental entity is not a policymaker unless the governmental entity, through its lawmakers, has delegated exclusive policymaking authority to that employee agency or board and cannot review the action or decision of the employee, agency or board. See St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988); Worsham v. City of Pasadena, 881 F.2d 1336, 1340-41 (5th Cir. 1989).
For purposes of Defendants' summary judgment motion, the court finds that Sheriff Harris is a policymaker because "[i]t has long been recognized that, in Texas, the county sheriff is the county's final policymaker in the area of law enforcement." Colle v. Brazos County Texas, 981 F.2d 237, 244 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Turner v. Upton County, 915 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1990)); see also Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 404 (5th Cir. 1980).
The court is not certain which policies of Kaufman County or Sheriff Harris that Plaintiff believes are constitutionally deficient, as Plaintiffs Complaint does not articulate his theory of county liability at all. Plaintiff adumbrates his theory against Kaufman County and Sheriff Harris in his official capacity for the first time in his response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. With respect to policy issues, Campbell states that he reasonably believes that discovery, which has yet to take place, will show that:
Harris and/or Kaufman County have not established any lawful procedures that would comply with either the Constitutional or Texas requirements regarding the use of out-of-state warrants.
. . .
[P]laintiff will be able to establish that the Sheriff and/or Kaufman County by policy deny everyone arrested in Kaufman County pursuant to a purported warrant from a tribunal located in a state other than Texas their constitutional and statutory rights and procedures.
[P]laintiff may well be able to establish that Kaufman County Sheriff's deputies and magistrates routinely create court `documents' to suit their needs when presented with a civil rights claim.
[T]he Sheriff and Kaufman County magistrates are totally ignorant of their obligations in relation to warrants from other states and the constitutional requirement for the duties of a magistrate when presented with a purported arrest warrant from another state.
Plaintiffs Response at pp. 2-4.
The court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff's allegations, even if accepted as true. None of these allegations establishes that Plaintiffs prolonged stay at the Kaufman County Jail was the result of a policy or custom of Sheriff Harris or Kaufman County. The evidence necessarily establishes that Sheriff Harris had procedures in place to ensure that prisoners were brought daily before a magistrate. That Plaintiff was not establishes, at best, the failure to take him before a magistrate was an isolated incident based on failure of a subordinate to execute or implement an existing policy or practice. That Plaintiff remained in jail for an extended period of time in no way establishes that Kaufman County had a policy of keeping out-of-state prisoners in its jail without lawful authority. The competent summary judgment evidence does not establish, or even indicate, that Plaintiff's situation was more than an isolated incident. In any event, the summary judgment record is totally devoid of any evidence that Sheriff Harris was deliberately indifferent to the rights of out-of-state prisoners such as Plaintiff; that he encouraged, condoned, or authorized his deputies to arrest persons without lawful authority; that he encouraged, condoned, or authorized his deputies to hold persons in jail without lawful authority; that he encouraged, condoned, or authorized Kaufman County personnel to create false documents; or that he was deliberately indifferent with respect to the training of his deputies. That Plaintiff stayed in jail well beyond what he should have does not establish, or raise a genuine issue of material fact, that a policy or custom caused a constitutional deprivation, that is, that Sheriff Harris made a conscious or deliberate choice to disregard the rights of out-of-state prisoners held in the Kaufman County Jail.
Even if Plaintiff were to adequately set forth an unconstitutional policy, his claim fails as a matter of law because the court has found that there is no underlying constitutional violation. When there is no underlying constitutional violation, the policy becomes irrelevant and is "quite beside the point." Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986); see also Saenz v. Heldenfels Bros., Inc., 183 F.3d 389, 392-3 (5th Cir. 1999). The court has ruled that Plaintiffs arrest was lawful and did not violate the Constitution. If a person suffers no constitutional injury at the hands of the municipal officer, the alleged unconstitutional policy could not have been the cause of any harm to that person.
C. State Law Claims of Plaintiff
Plaintiff also sues under state law for the common law torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery. For the reasons that follow, the court believes that these claims should be dismissed.
First, with respect to the false arrest claim, the court has held that Plaintiffs arrest was pursuant to lawful authority, that is, a facially valid warrant of arrest. A person arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant cannot maintain a claim for false arrest.
Second, with respect to the claim of assault and battery, Plaintiff sets forth no facts whatsoever to suggest even remotely that Sheriff Harris assaulted or threatened to assault him, or allowed one of his deputies to assault or threaten him. The court assumes that the phrase "assault and battery" inadvertently was supercopied from another case of Plaintiffs counsel. In any event, other than a passing reference in Plaintiff's Complaint, "assault and battery" is not mentioned in any of Plaintiff's pleadings. In the Joint Status Report filed by the parties on August 6, 1997, Plaintiff refers only to false arrest and illegal incarceration (false imprisonment) under federal and state law. Plaintiff never mentions "assault and battery" in his response and brief to Defendants' summary judgment motions, which was filed April 24, 1997; never mentions it in his reply and brief to Sheriff Harris' claim of qualified immunity, which was filed April 4, 1997; and never mentions it in his supplement to his response to Defendants' summary judgment motion which was filed February 10, 2000. For these reasons, the court considers Plaintiff to have abandoned his assault and battery claim and finds that it is no longer before the court.
Finally, there is the issue of false imprisonment. At the hearing on January 27, 2000, the court directed the parties to supplement their pleadings and to address in particular two cases which the court believed could be dispositive of the issue of false imprisonment: Brown v. Byer, 870 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1989) and Doe v. Angelina County, Tex., 733 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. Tex. 1990). Defendants' supplement discussed and analyzed these cases in substantial detail. Plaintiff's supplement made only a passing reference to Brown and Angelina County, which speaks volumes.
Plaintiff also cites 18 U.S.C. § 3182 for the proposition that an out-of-state prisoner had to be released thirty days after his arrest. The statute simply says that if an agent from the requesting state does not appear within 30 days of the prisoner's arrest, the prisoner may be discharged.
The court finds it unnecessary to undertake an extensive or exacting legal analysis regarding the false imprisonment claim, as it finds Angelina County and Brown to be illustrative and dispositive. Simply put, Sheriff Harris cannot be liable in his official capacity for false imprisonment under Texas law, see Angelina County, 733 F. Supp. at 259, or in his individual capacity under the facts of this case. A sheriff cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of subordinates or deputies unless he ratifies the wrongful acts of the subordinates or deputies. Brown, 870 F.2d at 980. The record is totally devoid of any evidence that Harris ratified wrongful acts, if any, of his deputies or subordinates. Moreover, even though Tex. Local. Gov. Code Ann. § 351.041 requires a sheriff to incarcerate only those individuals whom he has authority to imprison, the Fifth Circuit makes it clear that "[a] sheriff may satisfy this duty by adopting reasonable internal procedures to ensure that only those persons are incarcerated for whom the sheriff, or the deputy to whom he delegated such responsibilities, has a good faith belief based upon objective circumstances that he possesses valid legal authority to imprison." Brown, 870 F.2d at 980.
In this case, the evidence establishes that as part of Sheriff Harris' internal procedures, prisoners were taken daily before a magistrate by 9:00 a.m. or 10:00 a.m. That a deputy may have failed to do this with respect to Plaintiff does not make Sheriff Harris liable unless he ratified the acts of his deputy. No evidence in the record even suggests that Sheriff Harris knew that Plaintiff was not taken before a magistrate until shortly before he was taken to Kentucky, or that no authority existed to incarcerate Plaintiff.
The court finds that, based upon the facts of this case, Harris incurs no liability for Plaintiff's extended stay in the Kaufman County Jail. This is not to say that Plaintiff did not stay in jail longer than he should have. He may or may not have stayed longer than legally permissible; however, nothing in the record establishes that Sheriff Harris was the cause of this extended stay. Perhaps, someone dropped the ball, but it was not Sheriff Harris. Accordingly, Sheriff Harris is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff's false imprisonment claims. IV. Plaintiff's Request for Continuance under Rule 56(f)
Defendant Harris initially moved for dismissal on the basis of official immunity; however, the parties have had the opportunity to supplement the false imprisonment claim. Whether the court's dismissal is based on the merits rather than official immunity is of no moment because the result is the same.
Plaintiff appears to request a continuance under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). Defendants oppose the request because they contend that it does not meet the criteria of Rule 56(f). Defendants object to Plaintiffs declaration because it does not provide any reason why Plaintiff cannot provide facts through an affidavit to justify his opposition to the motions for summary judgment. Defendants also object to the declaration of Douglas R. Larson, Plaintiff's counsel, because he is not a party to this action. Defendants also object to the declaration of Mr. Larson because it is not clear whether he has personal knowledge of the matters stated within the declaration.
The court agrees with Defendants' objections, except the objection that Mr. Larson cannot provide a declaration or affidavit. A close reading of Mr. Larson's declaration, however, reveals that Mr. Larson's declaration is based on his subjective believe and speculation as opposed to his personal knowledge. In that regard, the declaration is inadequate.
The court also notes that Plaintiff's counsel's statement that "Plaintiff has been prohibited by law from taking any discovery in this cause" is incorrect and reflects a misreading of the magistrate judge's order of March 19, 1997. The magistrate judge only granted a stay of discovery "relative to the issue of [Harris'] personal liability." See Order of March 17, 1997 at p. 2. Nothing in the order stays discovery regarding Harris in his official capacity or Kaufman County. The court raised this matter and brought it to the attention of the parties at the hearing on January 27, 2000; thus, the parties have been on notice for more than sixty days that discovery could proceed on policy and custom issues. The court notes that no request for a continuance has been filed by Plaintiff or any request to supplement the summary judgment record with evidence of an unconstitutional policy of Sheriff Harris or Kaufman County. Plaintiff has had ample opportunity, almost three years, to conduct discovery regarding the policies and customs of Sheriff Harris and Kaufman County. For this reason and the failure to comply with Rule 56(f), Plaintiffs request for continuance is denied.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning Plaintiff's federal or state claims, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the motions for summary judgment of Defendants Harris and Kaufman County are granted, and this action is dismissed with prejudice. Judgment will be issued by separate document.
It is so ordered this 31 st day of March, 2000.