Opinion
Submitted September 8, 1999
November 30, 1999
In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant Stanley Ginzig appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Garry, J.), dated November 13, 1998, as denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and the cross claim insofar as asserted against him.
Bilello Walisever, Woodbury, N.Y. (John A. Asta of counsel), for appellant.
Bruce S. Reznick, P.C., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Thomas Torto and Jason Levine of counsel), for plaintiffs-respondents.
David Kreisman Associates, White Plains, N.Y. (Alysia J. Endick of counsel), for defendant-respondent.
GUY JAMES MANGANO, P.J., DAVID S. RITTER, DANIEL W. JOY, LEO F. McGINITY, NANCY E. SMITH, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs payable by the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs, the motion is granted, the complaint and the cross claim are dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed.
On his motion for summary judgment, the defendant Stanley Ginzig established that his automobile had been fully stopped behind an automobile operated by the plaintiff Diane Campanella for about 30 seconds when it was struck in the rear by an automobile driven by the defendant James P. Moore, Jr., and propelled into the Campanella vehicle. Ginzig thereby provided a nonnegligent reason for striking the plaintiffs' automobile in the rear. As the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact, Ginzig was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him ( see, e.g., Marsella v. Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 A.D.2d 683).
Ginzig is also entitled to summary judgment dismissing the cross claim asserted against him by Moore. The unrebutted evidence that the Ginzig vehicle had been completely stopped for about 30 seconds before it was struck by the Moore vehicle was sufficient as a matter of law to place sole responsibility on Moore ( see, Johnson v. Phillips, 261 A.D.2d 269 [1st Dept., May 20, 1999]). Contrary to Moore's claim, the emergency doctrine is inapplicable to routine rear-end automobile collisions such as this ( see, Johnson v. Phillips, supra; Pappas v. Opitz, 262 A.D.2d 471 [2d Dept., June 14, 1999]; Sass v. Ambu Trans, 238 A.D.2d 570). In any event, the situation confronting Moore did not abrogate his obligation to maintain a reasonable distance from Ginzig's car ( see, Johnson v. Phillips, supra; Gage v. Raffensperger, 234 A.D.2d 751).
MANGANO, P.J., RITTER, JOY, McGINITY, and SMITH, JJ., concur.