Opinion
06-23-00073-CV
03-13-2024
CAMP RUSK FOUNDATION, INC., Appellant v. AMY STEWART WILLIAMS, Appellee
Date Submitted: February 7, 2024
On Appeal from the 62nd District Court Delta County, Texas Trial Court No. 11516
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles van Cleef Justice
Amy Stewart Williams filed declaratory-judgment and trespass-to-try-title actions against Camp Rusk Foundation, Inc., and sought a determination that she was the owner of an undivided one-half interest in certain real property in Delta County. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Amy.
On appeal, the Foundation asserts that (1) summary judgment based on Amy's declaratory-judgment action was erroneous, (2) Amy's exclusive remedy was a partition suit under Chapter 23A of the Texas Property Code, and (3) summary judgment was erroneous since the Foundation acquired good title to the property because it was a good-faith purchaser for value.
In its brief, the Foundation purports to have one issue, i.e., that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. In support of this issue, it sets forth three separate grounds, each of which it contends supports reversal. We construe these three grounds as separate issues.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
I. Background
The summary judgment evidence showed that this dispute involved a 93.523-acre tract of land and a 2.333-acre tract of land in Delta County (together the Property), both of which were part of a 108.18-acre tract of land devised by Christine L. Stewart to her children, Richard Robert Stewart, Linda Carol Stewart, and William Martin Stewart. Christine died on December 27, 2014, and her will devising the 108.18-acre tract of land to Richard, Linda, and William was admitted to probate on April 15, 2015. On June 16, 2016, William died intestate and left Amy as his sole heir. On August 16, 2016, Richard died intestate and left no spouse or children.
In separate warranty deeds with effective dates of February 1, 2020, Linda conveyed the 2.333-acre and the 93.523-acre tracts of land to Jon Gammon and wife, Barbara Gammon, with a reservation of a life estate for Linda's life. The Gammons then conveyed the 2.333-acre and the 93.523-acre tracts of land to the Foundation by separate warranty deeds, also with effective dates of February 1, 2020. The Foundation contested Amy's ownership interest and maintained that it owned the Property in fee simple because it was a good-faith purchaser.
When the Foundation refused to recognize Amy's interest in, and her right to possess, the Property, Amy filed declaratory-judgment and trespass-to-try-title actions against the Foundation and sought a determination that she owned an undivided one-half interest in the Property. Amy filed a motion for summary judgment on both of her claims. While the motion for summary judgment was pending, a judgment declaring heirship was entered in William's estate that determined Amy was the only child of William and his sole heir.
After a hearing, the trial court entered a final summary judgment that "[Amy] is the fee simple owner in title to an undivided one-half (½) interest in [the Property]." The trial court's judgment does not state the grounds of its ruling.
II. Standard of Review
A trial court's grant of a summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009); Hearne v. Riversource Life Ins. Co., 670 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2023, pet. denied). In our review, we "view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, crediting evidence favorable to the non-movant if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not." Erikson v. Renda, 590 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. 2019) (citing Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc., 289 S.W.3d at 848). When, as here, the party seeks a traditional summary judgment, the movant "bears the burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact exists and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc., 289 S.W.3d at 848 (citing Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c)). "When the trial court does not specify the grounds for its ruling, a summary judgment must be affirmed if any of the grounds on which judgment is sought are meritorious." Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013) (citing State v. Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars & No Cents in U.S. Currency ($90,235), 390 S.W.3d 289, 292 (Tex. 2013)).
The Foundation asserts that the trial court granted summary judgment only on Amy's declaratory-judgment action. It is true that, in its oral pronouncement at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court indicated that it would grant summary judgment on "just the dec action on the title." Nevertheless, the written judgment determined that Amy was the owner of "an undivided one-half interest (½) in [the Property]" in fee simple, without specifying the grounds for the judgment. In civil cases, "[w]hen there is an inconsistency between a written judgment and an oral pronouncement of judgment, the written judgment controls." In re E.W., 494 S.W.3d 287, 298 n.10 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (quoting In re M.L.S., No. 11-12-00042-CV, 2012 WL 2371042, at *1 (Tex. App.-Eastland June 21, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)).
III. The Trespass-to-Try-Title Summary Judgment Was Meritorious
The parties expend most of their briefs attacking or defending the propriety of the trial court granting a summary judgment based on Amy's declaratory-judgment action. However, as we have noted, Amy also asserted, and asked for, summary judgment on her trespass-to-try-title action. The Foundation acknowledges on appeal that Amy sought affirmative relief for trespass to try title and does not contend that there was insufficient summary judgment evidence to support a summary judgment for Amy on that ground. Rather, the Foundation posits two legal grounds that it asserts defeat the granting of a summary judgment based on Amy's trespass-to-try-title action.
A. The Foundation Was Not a Good-Faith Purchaser
In its third issue, the Foundation asserts that it acquired good title to the Property because it was a good-faith purchaser for value. This issue contains two sub-issues. First, the Foundation asserts that it "acquired [its] title from a bona fide purchaser [(i.e., the Gammons)] for value who acquired the real property from a person [(i.e., Linda)] who," it claims, "had the power to dispose of [the Property] by selling same." The Foundation points to a provision in Christine's will in support of its argument that Linda had the power to dispose of the Property. After devising the 108.18-acre tract of land to Richard, Linda, and William and devising certain personal property to Linda, that provision states, "I designate LINDA CAROL STEWART to determine how and when this real and personal property will be divided among my children." This statement, the Foundation conclusively contends, "thereby vest[ed] in [Linda] authority to sell [the Property]."
The Foundation cites to no authority in support of this contention and provides no further argument or analysis to support its contention. "A brief must provide citations or argument and analysis for the contentions and failure to do this can result in waiver." RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome, 569 S.W.3d 116, 126 (Tex. 2018) (citing Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(i), 38.2(a)(1); Ross v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex. 2015)). Further, "[t]his [C]ourt is not obliged to independently review the record, research the law, and make arguments on an appellant's behalf when [it] fails to do so." Kirby, Mathews & Walrath, PLLC v. Kuiper Law Firm, PLLC, No. 06-21-00040-CV, 2021 WL 4268291, at *6 n.8 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Sept. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (alteration in original) (quoting Tate v. Meisterwood Cmty. Improvement Ass'n, No. 01-19-00054-CV, 2020 WL 4689207, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 13, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)). As a result, the Foundation has waived this sub-issue.
In its second sub-issue, the Foundation asserts that it was a good-faith purchaser because the Gammons purchased the Property from Linda in reliance on Linda's affidavits, which did not include William's child, Amy. The Foundation relies on Section 201.053(a) of the Texas Estates Code.
Linda filed an affidavit of heirship regarding Richard in which she asserted that she was his only heir-at-law and did not identify Amy as his heir-at-law. She also apparently filed a verified application to determine heirship in William's estate in which she asserted that she was his only heir-at-law and did not identify Amy as his child and heir-at-law. As previously noted, a judgment declaring heirship entered in William's estate determined that Amy was the only child of William and his sole heir.
Section 201.053(a) provides:
(a) A person who purchases for valuable consideration any interest in property of the heirs of a decedent acquires good title to the interest that the person would have received, as purchaser, in the absence of a claim of the child described by Subdivision (1), if the person:
(1) in good faith relies on the declarations in an affidavit of heirship that does not include a child who at the time of the sale or contract of sale of the property:
(A) is not a presumed child of the decedent; and
(B) has not under a final court decree or judgment been found to be entitled to treatment under Section 201.052 as a child of the decedent; and
(2) is without knowledge of the claim of the child described by Subdivision (1).Tex. Est. Code Ann. § 201.053(a). The evidence showed that the Gammons purchased the Property from Linda, a purported heir of William, for valuable consideration. However, in order to acquire good title to the Property free of Amy's claim, the Foundation had to show that, at the time the Gammons purchased the Property, the Gammons, (1) in good faith, (2) relied on declarations in Linda's affidavit of heirship that did not include Amy and (3) that Amy was not a presumed heir of William.
The Foundation's summary judgment proof included the affidavit of Jon Gammon. In his affidavit, Jon attested that he and his wife purchased the Property from Linda on or about February 1, 2020, and attested that "[s]uch purchase was made in good faith." Jon's affidavit continued, "Linda Carol Martin represented to me that she was the sole owner of said real property." However, Jon did not attest that he relied on any declarations made by Linda in her affidavit of heirship nor did he refer to the affidavit of heirship. As a result, there is no summary judgment evidence that the Gammons relied on Linda's declarations in her affidavit of heirship.
Further, the summary judgment evidence established that Amy is William's presumed child. As applicable to this case, the Texas Family Code provides:
(a) A man is presumed to be the father of a child if:
(1) he is married to the mother of the child and the child is born during the marriage; [or]
. . . .
(4) he married the mother of the child after the birth of the child in apparent compliance with law, regardless of whether the marriage is or could be declared invalid, he voluntarily asserted his paternity of the child, and:
. . . .
(B) he is voluntarily named as the child's father on the child's birth certificate . . . .Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.204(a)(1), (4)(B); see Tex. Est. Code Ann. § 201.052(a)(1); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.201(b)(1). The summary judgment evidence included Amy's birth certificate, which showed that Amy was born on January 14, 1980, identified William as her father, and identified Janice Kay Watts as her mother's maiden name. The birth certificate was signed by Janice Kay Stewart as informant. The evidence also included a decree of divorce, dated May 10, 1982, that showed William and Janice Kay Stewart as the parties and Amy as the only child of the marriage. As a result, the evidence established that Amy was the presumed child of William either because William was married to Amy's mother when Amy was born or because he married her mother after her birth and was voluntarily named as her father on her birth certificate.
Therefore, because there was no evidence that the Gammons relied on the declarations in Linda's affidavit of heirship and because the evidence established that Amy was William's presumed child, neither the Gammons nor the Foundation, as their successor-in-interest, acquired good title to the Property free from Amy's claim under Section 201.053(a). For that reason, we overrule this sub-issue and the Foundation's third issue.
B. The Foundation's Chapter 23A Issue Was Waived
In its second issue, the Foundation asserts that the summary judgment was erroneous because Amy's exclusive remedy was under Chapter 23A of the Texas Property Code. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 23A.001-.013. The Foundation argues that, following the "Judgment Declaring Heirship[,] there [wa]s no issue for a trespass to try title action." Other than its general cite to Chapter 23A, the Foundation does not cite to any specific statute or any case authority supporting either its assertion that Chapter 23A was Amy's exclusive remedy or its bare assertion that there was no issue for a trespass-to-try-title action after Amy had been adjudged the only child and sole heir of William. The Foundation waived this issue because it did not provide citations or sufficient analysis in support of this issue. See RSL Funding, LLC, 569 S.W.3d at 126; Kirby, Mathews & Walrath, PLLC, 2021 WL 4268291, at *6 n.8. We overrule this issue.
C. Conclusion
Because the summary judgment evidence supports the trial court's summary judgment on Amy's trespass-to-try-title action and the Foundation's legal arguments challenging it are not meritorious, we find that the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment for Amy. Because this ground for the summary judgment was meritorious, we need not address the Foundation's first issue challenging the declaratory-judgment ground. See Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248.
IV. Disposition
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment.