Opinion
No. 3:04-CV-2166-L.
March 9, 2006
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and the order of the District Court dated January 9, 2006, in implementation thereof, came on to be considered Defendant Doug Dretke's Second Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, as evidenced by his signature thereto, are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:
Type of Case: This is a civil rights complaint brought by a former state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").Parties: Plaintiff is a former prisoner who was incarcerated in the Dallas County Jail and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division ("TDCJ-CID") at all times pertinent to this lawsuit. Defendant is the director of the TDCJ-CID. Procedural History of the Case: Plaintiff Lee Edwin Caldwell ("Caldwell" or "Plaintiff") filed this action on October 5, 2004, naming numerous defendants, including Defendant Doug Dretke. On April 5, 2005, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff filed a response on May 12, 2005. The Magistrate Judge filed a recommendation on May 23, 2005, which recommended dismissal of Caldwell's claims against Defendant unless Caldwell filed an amended complaint in compliance with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). On June 10, 2005, Plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. However, on August 15, 2005, Caldwell filed an amended complaint. On September 7, 2005, the District Court filed its judgment denying Defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice because Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in accordance with the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. On January 4, 2006, Defendant filed a second motion to dismiss. Plaintiff did not file a response.
Statement of Case: In his amended complaint, Caldwell argues that during his incarceration at both county and state correctional facilities he was denied adequate medical care and was denied rights secured to him under Title II of the ADA. He brings his claims against Defendant in his official capacity as director of the TDCJ-CID and requests monetary relief.
Caldwell states that he suffered from the following ailments while incarcerated at various TDCJ-CID facilities: (1) presence of blood in his urine; (2) diabetes; (3) "digestive" problems; (4) open sores, visible infections and gangrene; (5) arthritis in both feet; (6) fainting episodes; (7) hypothermia; (8) episodes of nausea; and (9) sight and hearing problems.
Caldwell does not allege that he was completely denied medical care for the aforementioned conditions, instead, he avers that staff members at various TDCJ-CID units failed to properly diagnose his numerous ailments and afforded him inappropriate care for the conditions that they did diagnose. Plaintiff states that the staff treated the presence of blood in his urine with "excessive UA's," treated his "emerging" diabetes and "digestive problems" by giving him "more insulin and pills," and responded to his fainting episodes by giving him orange juice to revive him. He also alleges that he was forced to sleep in feces and roach-infested cells and was denied pain medications, a medical work release, diabetic footwear, a cell pass so that he could rest during the day, a bottom bunk, and dental cleaning. Finally, Caldwell alleges that he was forced to work in ill-sized steel toe boots in a position that required standing, was required to sleep in an upper bunk, and was fed a "dangerously inappropriate diet."
Defendant argues that dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims is proper because: (1) the claims are barred under the Eleventh Amendment, (2) the claims are time-barred to the extent that they relate to events that arose prior to October 5, 2002, (3) Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, (5) Defendant does not exercise authority over medical treatment of prisoners, (6) Plaintiff failed to state a constitutional claim under § 1983, and (7) Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Regarding Plaintiff's claims under Title II of the ADA, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to state a proper claim for constitutional relief under Title II. Finally, Defendant argues that this court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims and, in the alternative, that Plaintiff's claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act are without merit.
Defendant's reliance on the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (" PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1996), is misplaced. While the PLRA requires a "prisoner" to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, the PLRA explicitly defines a "prisoner" as "any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program." § 1997e(h). Since Caldwell was released from the Texas prison system on October 5, 2002, (Pl.'s Am. Compl. at 1), he was not a "prisoner" as that term is defined in the PLRA and was not required to satisfy the exhaustion requirements of the Act. See Janes v. Hernandez, 215 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the attorney's fees provisions of the PLRA did not apply where plaintiff was not a prisoner when he filed his civil rights complaint); Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 210 n. 10 (3rd Cir. 2002) (collecting cases) (noting that "every court of appeals to have considered the issue has held that the PLRA does not apply to former prisoners").
Findings and Conclusions: A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenges a complaint on the basis that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss are disfavored and rarely granted. Gregson v. Zurich Amer. Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 2003). To avoid dismissal, the plaintiff's pleadings must show specific, well-pleaded facts, not mere conclusory allegations. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). The court must accept those well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Woodard v. Andrus, 419 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2005). Thereafter, the court focuses on whether the plaintiff's well-pleaded facts provide the defendant with fair notice of what the plaintiff's claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-513, 122 S. Ct. 992, 998 (2002). A court cannot dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957)).
I. Claims under § 1983
Defendant posits numerous arguments supporting dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims. Defendant's Eleventh Amendment argument takes precedence because if Defendant is immune from suit this court has no jurisdiction to address the merits of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims.
Dretke argues that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against him in his official capacity should be dismissed because the Eleventh Amendment bars such a suit. A claim for monetary relief against a state official in his official capacity fails as a matter of law because "a state official sued in his or her official capacity is not a 'person' who can be sued for purposes of liability under § 1983." John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Mem'l Found. v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667, 671 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989)). A suit against a government official in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the governmental entity that employs him, which, in this case, is the TDCJ-CID. Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S. Ct. at 2312. The TDCJ-CID is deemed an "instrumentality" of the State of Texas and is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Harris v. Angelina County, 31 F.3d 331, 338 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363, 121 S. Ct. 955, 962 (2001) ("The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court"). Section 1983 does not waive this sovereign immunity. Aguilar v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 1145 (1979)). Nor has the State waived its immunity by consenting to this suit. Id. at 340, 99 S. Ct. at 1144. Therefore, the § 1983 claim against Dretke in his official capacity should be dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment unless an exception to the sovereign immunity bar applies. See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908). However, the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, which allows an otherwise prohibited suit against an individual in his official capacity to proceed, does not apply because Plaintiff seeks monetary damages rather than relief that is "declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective in effect." Aguilar, 160 F.3d at 1054.
Although Dretke "presumes" that he is sued in both his individual and official capacities ( see Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 2), Plaintiff's amended complaint clearly states that Dretke is sued only in his "official capacit[y]" as director of the TDCJ-CID. (Pl.'s Am. Compl. at 2.) Therefore, the court does not address individual liability under § 1983.
II. Claims Under Title II of the ADA
Plaintiff's complaint, construed broadly, may state a separate cause of action under Title II of the ADA. Title II of the ADA, which prohibits a public entity from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability, applies to state prison systems. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209-210, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1954-1955 (1998); see generally 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. (1990). In order to obtain relief under Title II, a plaintiff must show that he: (1) is a qualified individual with a disability, (2) was either excluded from participation or denied the benefits of some public entity's services or programs, and (3) was excluded by reason of his disability. See Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 428 (5th Cir. 1997). In order to survive a motion to dismiss his disability claims a plaintiff need not plead every element of a prima facie case of discrimination, however, the plaintiff's complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the basis of the plaintiff's claims. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514, 122 S. Ct. at 999.
A. Applicability of Statute of Limitations
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Title II claims are time-barred. Neither § 1983 nor the ADA provide a specific limitations period within which an action must be brought. Under such circumstances a federal court borrows the forum state's most analogous statute of limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1942-43 (1985). In this circuit it is well settled that actions brought under § 1983 are governed by Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986), which sets forth the period during which a person may bring a suit for personal injury. See Piotzowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 515 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S. Ct. 573, 581-82 (1989). Although it does not appear that the Fifth Circuit or the United States Supreme Court has specifically identified a forum state's limitations law to be applied to an ADA, Title II action, since Caldwell is limited to recovering for any physical injuries he sustained while in custody of the TDCJ-CID, the rationale set out in Owens v. Okure, supra, dictates that § 16.003(a) apply equally to his Title II claim. See Eber v. Harris County Hosp. Dist., 130 F. Supp. 2d 847, 869-70 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (noting that the enforcement provision of Title II adopts the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)); Hickey v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F.2d 980, 982-83 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that § 16.003(a) was the appropriate statute of limitations to use in connection with claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act); Parude v. City of Natchez, 72 Fed. Appx. 102, 103 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no error in the district court's application of Mississippi's three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims to plaintiff's ADA discrimination claims).
A federal court applying a state statute of limitations should also give effect to any applicable state tolling provisions. Jackson v. Johnson, 950 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1992). Under Texas law, imprisonment does not serve as a disability that tolls § 16.003(a)'s statute of limitations. Id.
Although Texas law governs the limitations period, federal law governs when a cause of action accrues. See Jackson, 950 F.2d at 265; Piotrowski, 51 F.3d at 516 n. 10. Under federal law, a cause of action accrues "when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 257 (5th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff filed his federal complaint on October 5, 2004. Thus, under the two-year limitations period applicable to his ADA claim, Caldwell's complaint may only encompass claims of discrimination that accrued on or after October 5, 2002. See Price v. City of San Antonio, Tex., 431 F.3d 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2005) (concluding that "the Texas Supreme Court would hold that § 16.003 requires a claim to be brought no later than the same calendar day two years following the accrual of the cause of action"); Medina v. Lopez-Roman, 49 S.W.3d 393, 397 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. ref'd) (holding that when computing periods of limitation based on years, a "calendar" year is used); Fisher v. Westmont Hospitality, 935 S.W.2d 222, 225-26 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 Dist.]1996, no pet.) (holding that § 16.003(a)'s two year limitations period runs from the day the cause of action accrues, to the same date two years later). According to the facts alleged in Caldwell's amended complaint, he was released from confinement on October 5, 2002. (Pl.'s Am. Compl. at 1.) Therefore, to the extent that Caldwell's ADA claims are based on his exclusion from, or denial of the benefits of, state services or programs at any date prior to his the last day of his confinement, these claims are time-barred.
B. Failure to State a Claim Under Title II of the ADA
Defendant also argues that Caldwell failed to state a claim under Title II of the ADA because Title II does not provide for a cause of action against individual defendants. However, as discussed, supra, Caldwell sued Dretke in his official, rather than individual, capacity. Therefore, this court must decide whether Caldwell's suit, seeking monetary damages against Dretke based on actions performed in his official capacity, states a valid claim for relief.
The first step in determining whether Caldwell stated a valid claim for relief is to ascertain whether Dretke is a proper defendant under Title II. As discussed, supra, Title II of the ADA prohibits "public entities" from denying persons access to the public entity's programs and services. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Under Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, Caldwell's claim against Dretke in his official capacity is treated as a claim against an instrumentality of the state, the TDCJ-CID. 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S. Ct. at 2312. Therefore, Caldwell has properly stated a claim against a "public entity."
In the recent decision in United States v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court held that "insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates sovereign immunity." ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 877, 882 (Jan. 10, 2006) (emphasis in original). As noted by the Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 881 (citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463, 67 S. Ct. 374, 376 (1947)). Therefore, to the extent that Caldwell's Title II claims meet the criteria specified in United States v. Georgia, he is not barred from bringing suit against Dretke in his official capacity.
At this juncture, the pleadings stage, it cannot be determined that Plaintiff's claims, see summary of Plaintiff's claims at pp. 2-3, supra, as a matter of law, fail to allege a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether such conduct occurred or was ongoing on October 5, 2002 — the date on which he was released from custody of the Texas prison system and the only date on which Caldwell's complaint would not otherwise be barred by limitations — may be addressed in subsequent proceedings insofar as Plaintiff's claims relate to the conduct of Dretke in his official capacity as an agent of the State of Texas.
As such, all but a discrete set of Plaintiff's Title II claims are barred by limitations. In reference to the claims that remain, and in accordance with the District Judge's earlier memorandum opinions related to other defendants in this case, the Magistrate Judge finds that Plaintiff's pleadings sufficiently state a claim of Title II disability discrimination. ( See, e.g.
Mem. Op., Feb, 2, 2006.)
RECOMMENDATION:
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Defendant Doug Dretke's Motion to Dismiss be granted with respect to Plaintiff's claims under § 1983 and Plaintiff's claims under Title II of the ADA that accrued before October 5, 2002. It is further recommended that the court defer any decision on whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Caldwell's state law claims pending further proceedings. A copy of this recommendation shall be transmitted to Plaintiff and counsel for Defendants.