Opinion
No. 05-06-00487-CV
Opinion issued August 31, 2007.
On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 05-01316-C.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, BRIDGES, and LANG-MIERS.
OPINION
Shannon Cain appeals from a summary judgment. In two issues, Cain asserts the trial court erred in: (1) granting summary judgment because the motion for summary judgment failed to address all of his causes of action; and (2) denying his motion to compel Safeco to produce its claims file. We overrule Cain's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
Cain was a passenger in a car that was involved in a single car accident. The car was driven by Wesley McNew and insured by Safeco. Cain suffered serious injuries as a result of the accident. Safeco repeatedly offered Cain the policy limits of settlement. Cain did not accept.
Cain sued McNew for negligence and Ford Motor Company for negligence and products liability. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, Safeco provided a defense for McNew. The jury found McNew liable and awarded over $4 million in damages. The jury found no liability on the part of Ford. Cain, as assignee of McNew, then filed this lawsuit against Safeco. Cain asserted causes of action for negligent defense, negligence, bad faith, and violation of the insurance code. Safeco filed a motion for summary judgment and the trial court granted it. This appeal timely followed.
Summary Judgment
In his first issue, Cain asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because Safeco failed to address all of his claims in its motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Cain asserts that Safeco failed to address his claims for negligent defense, negligence, and bad faith. Alternatively, Cain argues that Texas does recognize a cause of action for negligent defense in this context.
The standards for reviewing a summary judgment are well established. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). In deciding whether a disputed material fact issue exists, precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548-49. Further, every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor. Id.
A motion for summary judgment must expressly present the grounds upon which it is made and must stand or fall on those grounds alone. McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. 1993); Espalin v. Children's Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 27 S.W.3d 675, 688 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.). The prerequisite to all tort liability is the existence of a legally cognizable duty. Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 919 (Tex. 1993). A single ground in a motion for summary judgment, if applicable to all causes of action pled, is sufficient to dispose of all causes of action. Robins v. Kroger Co., 982 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), pet. denied per curiam, 5 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. 1999).
Cain contends that Safeco's motion for summary judgment failed to address his causes of action for negligent defense, negligence, and bad faith. Safeco moved for summary judgment on the ground that Cain's claim of negligent defense is not supported by Texas law. Safeco also asserted in its motion for summary judgment that it owed no duty to Cain and that it did not breach any potential duty. Cain's causes of action are tort claims. Duty is an element of each of Cain's causes of action. See Graff, 858 S.W.2d at 919. Thus, Safeco's ground that it owed no duty to Cain is alone sufficient to address Cain's causes of action. We hold that Safeco's motion for summary judgment adequately set out its grounds for summary judgment as to Cain's causes of action for negligent defense, negligence, and bad faith.
Cain does not contend on appeal that Safeco's motion for summary judgment failed to address his claim of violation of the insurance code. Thus, we do not address this claim in this opinion.
We now turn to Cain's alternative argument that Texas law does recognize a cause of action by an insured against his insurer for negligent defense. In asserting his cause of action for negligent defense, Cain stated the following in his petition:
The foregoing, among other trial activities, constitutes a negligent or unreasonable defense by Safeco who controlled the details of the conduct of the defense. The Stowers doctrine covers a broad scope, including investigation, preparation of defense, trial, and certain other matters within the agency relationship between the insurer and the insured.
Cain couched his negligent defense claim under the umbrella of the Stowers doctrine. In his brief, Cain asserts that a reasonable defense is an "expanded duty under the Stowers case."
Under Stowers, an insurer of a covered claim is required to exercise that degree of ordinary care and diligence which an ordinary prudent person would exercise in the management of his own business in responding to settlement demands within policy limits. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved). A Stowers duty is triggered by a settlement demand.
Cain argues that the Stowers doctrine has been expanded to include the duty to provide a reasonable defense to the insured. In Ranger Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Guin, 723 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1987), the supreme court stated that insurers have a duty of ordinary care that includes "investigation, preparation for defense of the lawsuit, trial of the case and reasonable attempts to settle." Some courts have relied upon this language as an expansion of the Stowers duty. Cain relies on two such cases. See Ecotech Int'l, Inc. v. Griggs Harrison, 928 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied); Wheelways Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 872 S.W.2d 776, 781 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1994, no writ).
The supreme court, however, later clarified that Ranger's broad language about the scope of the insurer's responsibilities was dicta. See American Physicians Ins. Exchange v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 849 (Tex. 1994); see also State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Tex. 1998) (holding that liability insurer not vicariously responsible for conduct of independent attorney selected to defend insured). "Texas law recognizes only one tort duty in [third-party insurance cases], that being the duty stated in Stowers." Maryland Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coatings Servs., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam). This Court has likewise refused to broaden the scope of the Stowers doctrine. See Dear v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 947 S.W.2d 908, 920 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. denied), disapproved on other grounds by Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 122-23 (Tex. 2001) (recognizing main contention in Ranger involved insurer's refusal to settle within policy limits and refusing to extend Ranger to fact situations other than those before that court despite its broad language).
In accordance with supreme court authority, we hold that Texas law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent defense by an insured against his insurer. See Traver, 980 S.W.2d at 628; Maryland Ins. Co., 938 S.W.2d at 28; Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 849. Under Stowers, Safeco was required to exercise that degree of ordinary care and diligence which an ordinary prudent person would exercise in the management of his own business in responding to settlement demands within policy limits. The summary judgment evidence established that Cain never made a settlement demand which would have triggered the Stowers duty. The evidence also showed that Cain refused Safeco's repeated offers to settle for the policy limits. Through its summary judgment evidence, Safeco conclusively established that it met its obligations with respect to settlement of a covered claim.
We conclude Safeco's motion for summary judgment addressed all of Cain's causes of action. We further conclude that Texas law does not allow an insured to sue his insurer for negligent defense. Accordingly, we overrule Cain's first issue.
Motion to Compel
In his second issue, Cain contends the trial court erred in denying its motion to compel production of documents. We review a trial court's discovery rulings under an abuse of discretion standard. Avary v. Bank of America, N.A., 72 S.W.3d 779, 787 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, pet. denied).
The clerk's record does not contain an order denying Cain's motion to compel. The docket sheet reflects that the motion was heard at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. In granting the motion for summary judgment, the trial court denied, by implication, the motion to compel.
Cain sought documents from Safeco's claims file. In his motion to compel and in his appellate brief, Cain argues that the documents are relevant to his negligent defense claim. Because we have held that such a claim does not exist under Texas law, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel. We overrule Cain's second issue.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.