Opinion
C/A No. 0:17-1856-DCC-PJG
07-13-2018
Helen Ruth Byas, Plaintiff, v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This social security matter is before the court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.VII.02 (D.S.C.). The plaintiff, Helen Ruth Byas, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the defendant, Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), denying her claims for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the court concludes that the Commissioner's decision should be affirmed.
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY GENERALLY
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i), as well as pursuant to the regulations formulated by the Commissioner, the plaintiff has the burden of proving disability, which is defined as an "inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a); see also Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1973). The regulations generally require the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to consider, in sequence:
(1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity;20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). If the ALJ can make a determination that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in this process, review does not proceed to the next step. Id.
(2) whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment;
(3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 ("the Listings"), and is thus presumptively disabled;
(4) whether the claimant can perform her past relevant work; and
(5) whether the claimant's impairments prevent her from doing any other kind of work.
The court observes that effective August 24, 2012, ALJs may engage in an expedited process which permits the ALJs to bypass the fourth step of the sequential process under certain circumstances. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(h).
Under this analysis, a claimant has the initial burden of showing that she is unable to return to her past relevant work because of her impairments. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. To satisfy this burden, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant has the residual functional capacity, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and impairments, to perform alternative jobs that exist in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(B); see also McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1983); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 1981); Wilson v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1980). The Commissioner may carry this burden by obtaining testimony from a vocational expert. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1983).
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
In January 2014, Byas applied for SSI, alleging disability beginning March 10, 2012 (which she later amended to November 21, 2013). Byas's application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and she requested a hearing before an ALJ. A hearing was held on March 23, 2016, at which Byas appeared and testified. Byas was represented at the hearing by Eleanor Swierk, a non-attorney representative. After hearing testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ issued a decision on May 4, 2016, finding that Byas had not been disabled since January 16, 2014—the date the application was filed. (Tr. 10-19.)
Byas was born in 1966 and was forty-seven years old the date the application was filed. (Tr. 17.) She has a high school education and has past relevant work experience as a housekeeper and a childcare worker at a church. (Tr. 208.)
In applying the five-step sequential process, the ALJ found that Byas had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since Byas's application was filed on January 16, 2014. The ALJ also determined that Byas's arthritis, diabetes mellitus, neuropathy, obesity, and decreased renal functioning were severe impairments. However, the ALJ found that Byas did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the "Listings"). The ALJ further found that Byas retained the residual functional capacity to
perform less than the full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b). Specifically, the claimant can lift, carry, push and/or pull 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She can sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour day, and stand and/or walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour day, with normal breaks. The claimant cannot climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and she can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs. The claimant can occasionally kneel, crouch, and crawl, and she must avoid working at
unprotected heights. She can perform frequent but not constant handling and fingering bilaterally.(Tr. 14.) The ALJ found that Byas was not able to perform any past relevant work, but that considering Byas's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Byas could perform. Therefore, the ALJ found that Byas had not been disabled since the date the application was filed on January 16, 2014.
The Appeals Council denied Byas's request for review on May 11, 2017, making the decision of the ALJ the final action of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-5.) This action followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court may review the Commissioner's denial of benefits. However, this review is limited to considering whether the Commissioner's findings "are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard." Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Thus, the court may review only whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied. See Brown v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 873 F.3d 251, 267 (4th Cir. 2017); Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980). "Substantial evidence" means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; see also Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015). In reviewing the evidence, the court may not "undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]." Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; see also Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, even if the court disagrees with the Commissioner's decision, the court must uphold it if it is supported by substantial evidence. Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972).
ISSUES
Byas raises the following issues for this judicial review:
I. The ALJ failed to properly assess the medical opinion evidence.(Pl.'s Br., ECF No. 17.)
II. The ALJ did not explain his findings regarding the Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, as required by Social Security Ruling 96-8p.
III. The ALJ failed to properly evaluate the subjective symptomology of the Plaintiff.
DISCUSSION
The court notes that numerous social security regulations and social security rulings (SSRs) have changed effective March 27, 2017. However, these changes specifically state that they are applicable to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.913, 416.927. Because the instant claim was filed before that time, all references in the instant Report and Recommendation are to the prior versions of the regulations and SSRs in effect at the time Byas's application for benefits was filed, unless otherwise specified.
A. Opinion Evidence
Byas first challenges the ALJ's evaluation of the opinion evidence from Dr. Jonathan Glen, one of Byas's treating physicians, and from a state agency reviewer. The law applicable to Byas's application provides that regardless of the source, the Commissioner will evaluate every medical opinion received. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c). Typically, the Social Security Administration accords greater weight to the opinion of treating medical sources because treating physicians are best able to provide "a detailed, longitudinal picture" of a claimant's alleged disability. See id. However, "the rule does not require that the testimony be given controlling weight." Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Instead, a treating physician's opinion is evaluated and weighed "pursuant to the following non-exclusive list: (1) whether the physician has examined the applicant, (2) the treatment relationship between the physician and the applicant, (3) the supportability of the physician's opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record, and (5) whether the physician is a specialist." Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 654 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). Any other factors that may support or contradict the opinion should also be considered. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(6). In the face of "persuasive contrary evidence," the ALJ has the discretion to accord less than controlling weight to such an opinion. Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). Further, "if a physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight." Id. (quoting Craig, 76 F.3d at 590).
Additionally, SSR 96-2p provides that a finding that
a treating source medical opinion is not well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques or is inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record means only that the opinion is not entitled to "controlling weight," not that the opinion should be rejected. Treating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 CFR 404.1527 and 416.927. In many cases, a treating source's medical opinion will be entitled to the greatest weight and should be adopted, even if it does not meet the test for controlling weight.SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5. This Ruling also requires that an ALJ's decision "contain specific reasons for the weight given to the treating source's medical opinion, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight." Id.
Moreover, ALJs are instructed to apply the above factors—including the length and nature of the source's treatment relationship with the claimant, the supportability of the opinion, the opinion's consistency with the other evidence in the record, whether the source is a specialist, and any other factors that may support or contradict the opinion—to all medical opinions, including those from consultative or one-time examiners. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c). Importantly, more weight is generally given to the opinions of an examining source than a non-examining one. Id. Additionally, more weight is generally given to opinions of treating sources than non-treating sources, such as consultative examiners. Id.
In this case, the ALJ evaluated Dr. Glen's opinion, as well as the opinions from the state agency reviewers, finding as follows:
As for opinion evidence, the undersigned has considered the April 2016 opinion of Jonathan C. Glen, M.D., that the claimant is unable to perform the demands of even sedentary work on a regular and continuing basis. Specifically, he opined the claimant could stand and walk less than 2 hours in an 8-hour day and sit less than 2 hours in an 8-hour day. He stated the claimant can frequently lift 10 pounds and occasionally lift less than 10 pounds and in addition to postural and environmental limitations[.] Dr. Glen further stated the claimant cannot hold objects, climb 2 steps, lift 5 to 8 pounds, or perform work activity for even 1 hour daily. (Exhibit 13F). However, in support of these opinions, Dr. Glen did not cite any objective findings in his questionnaire other than his mention of the claimant's right leg and bilateral hand weakness. Dr. Glen's own treatment notes do not support his assessment. For instance, in his most recent treatment notes, from February 2016, Dr. Glen merely documented the claimant's subjective reports of tingling of the bilateral feet and pain of the hands and wrists, but he documented no corresponding objective abnormalities, noting the claimant exhibited normal sensation and no strength abnormalities. He only noted that the claimant exhibited some abnormalities[,] tenderness over the hips/right buttocks, but no gait abnormalities or other musculoskeletal abnormalities were documented. (Exhibit 11F). Dr. Glen's prior treatment notes, from April 2015, specifically state that the claimant's
musculoskeletal and neurological examinations were normal. (Exhibit 8F). Moreover, February 2016 treatment notes from Beaufort Memorial Surgical Specialists state that the claimant exhibited normal strength and tone, and no weakness or objective abnormalities of the claimant's right leg or hands were noted. (Exhibit 12F). Accordingly, the undersigned has given little weight to Dr. Glen's restrictions and his opinion that the claimant is unable to perform all work activity, as those opinions are not supported by his own treatment notes or the other evidence of record.(Tr. 16-17.)
Little weight has been given to the assessments of the State Agency medical consultant in Exhibit 1A that the claimant can perform a reduced range of medium work, as the undersigned has accounted for the claimant's impairments and reports of pain in further limiting the amount the claimant can lift and carry.
Great weight has been given to the assessment of the State Agency medical consultant in Exhibit 4A that the claimant can perform a reduced range of light work, as that opinion is generally supported by the other evidence of record. However, the undersigned has imposed more restrictive postural limitations to account for the claimant's pain symptoms.
In challenging the ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Glen's opinion, Byas argues that the ALJ failed to observe that Dr. Glen specifically stated that he was not basing his opinion on Byas's subjective complaints. Byas also argues that the ALJ improperly relied on a medical record where she was seeking treatment for a mass on her lower right back that included a "generic statement that her entire musculoskeletal system exhibited normal strength and tone." (Pl.'s Br. at 15, ECF No. 17 at 15.) With regard to Dr. Glen's treatment notes, Byas argues that the ALJ omitted Dr. Glen's recommendation that Byas be referred to a rheumatologist for her recurrent pain and swelling in her hands and wrist, and further argues that Dr. Glen's reference to normal sensation and strength in a treatment note reflects findings for Byas lower extremities. Finally, Byas directs the court to treatment records from other sources indicating "carpal tunnel syndrome (not acknowledged by the ALJ), positive Phalen's test, positive Tinel's test, abnormal exams of wrists and elbows, and abnormal exams of her hands." (Pl.'s Br. at 17, ECF No. 17 at 17) (citing Tr. 329, 316, 371, 348, 369, 365-366, 382, 392-393, 449, 448, 453).
Upon thorough review of the ALJ's decision and the record, the court concludes that the ALJ applied the relevant factors in evaluating the opinion evidence, and finds that Byas has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Glen's opinion is unsupported by substantial evidence or based on an incorrect application of the law. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c); Mastro, 270 F.3d at 178 (stating that "if a physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F. App'x 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2015) ("An ALJ's determination as to the weight to be assigned to a medical opinion generally will not be disturbed absent some indication that the ALJ has dredged up 'specious inconsistencies,' . . . or has failed to give a sufficient reason for the weight afforded a particular opinion[.]") (internal citations omitted). The decision reflects that the ALJ weighed the opinion evidence and reasonably found that the medical findings and observations in the record did not support this opinion. Although Byas may be able to point to select medical records that arguably support the opinion, she has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ's conclusions regarding the opinion are unsupported by substantial evidence. Notably, it is clear that many of these treatment records and findings were acknowledged by the ALJ within the decision. Additionally, it is clear that the ALJ, as part of his duties in weighing the evidence, properly relied on medical records, treatment notes, examination findings, and evidence in evaluating the opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927; see also Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding the ALJ's finding that two treating physicians' opinions were entitled to minimal weight, in part, because the opinions were in the form of a checklist, unsupported by objective evidence, and based on the claimant's subjective complaints). Moreover, Byas's argument in this matter essentially asks the court to again analyze the facts and reweigh the evidence presented, contrary to the substantial evidence standard of review that this court is bound to apply at this stage in the proceedings. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 (stating that the court may not "undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]"); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that it is the ALJ's responsibility, not the court's, to determine the weight of evidence and resolve conflicts of evidence); Blalock, 483 F.2d at 775 (indicating that even if the court disagrees with the Commissioner's decision, the court must uphold it if it is supported by substantial evidence).
With regard to the opinion from the state agency reviewer, Byas challenges the ALJ's decision to impose more restrictive postural limitations to account for Byas's pain symptoms than the state agency reviewer included as opposed to more restrictive manipulative limitations. Byas argues that she reported pain in her hands, wrists, and elbows far more frequently than she reported it in her knees or back. However, the Commissioner points out that, although not expressly stated by the ALJ, the ALJ included more restrictive postural limitations as well as one more restrictive manipulative limitation. Here, the state agency reviewer opined that Byas had unlimited ability to perform activities requiring handling (gross manipulation); however, the ALJ limited Byas to frequent handling manipulation. (Cf. Tr. 77 with Tr. 14.) Further, Byas has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ improperly weighed this opinion evidence, and Byas has failed to support her general argument that her handling and fingering should be further restricted.
Thus, the court finds that Byas has not shown that the ALJ's decision with regard to the opinion evidence was unsupported by substantial evidence or reached through application of an incorrect legal standard.
B. Residual Functional Capacity
A claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") is "the most [a claimant] can still do despite [her] limitations" and is determined by assessing all of the relevant evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). In assessing residual functional capacity, an ALJ should scrutinize "all of the relevant medical and other evidence." 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). Social Security Ruling 96-8p further requires an ALJ to reference the evidence supporting her conclusions with respect to a claimant's residual functional capacity. Further, "remand may be appropriate . . . where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant's capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful review." Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013)) (alterations in original); see also Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 188 (4th Cir. 2016).
Byas argues that the ALJ erred in failing to properly explain the residual functional capacity findings. In support of this argument, Byas alleges that "the ALJ fails to properly explain his determination that Byas could frequently lift and carry 10 pounds and occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds, and fails to properly account for the manipulative restrictions as addressed in the prece[]ding argument." (Pl.'s Br. at 20, ECF No. 17 at 20.) Byas repeats her arguments from the above issue, arguing that the ALJ failed to consider Byas's reports of pain in her hands and wrists and failed to consider the entirety of the treatment records when weighing Dr. Glen's opinion. As explained above, the court finds that Byas has failed to demonstrate any error by the ALJ warranting remand; similarly, the court finds that Byas has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ erred in assessing Byas's residual functional capacity or that there are any inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis that would frustrate meaningful review.
As noted by the Commissioner, Byas's arguments here and in the preceding section summarily assert that if Byas were limited to occasional fingering and handling, it would eliminate the jobs cited by the VE and by the ALJ in the decision; however, Byas provides no support for this assertion. On the other hand, the Commissioner points out (citing the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the vocational expert's testimony) that even if Byas were limited to occasional fingering, she could perform the jobs of usher, counter clerk, and furniture rental consultant, which exist in significant numbers. (Def.'s Br. at 16 n.5, ECF No. 18 at 16 n.5.)
C. Subjective Complaints
Finally, Byas argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating her subjective complaints. With regard to subjective complaints, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated that "the determination of whether a person is disabled by pain or other symptoms is a two-step process." Craig, 76 F.3d at 594. The first step requires there to "be objective medical evidence showing the existence of a medical impairment(s) which results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities and which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged." Id. (internal quotation omitted). During the second step the ALJ must expressly consider "the intensity and persistence of the claimant's [symptom] and the extent to which it affects her ability to work." Id. In making these determinations, the ALJ's decision "must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the individual's symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual's symptoms." SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *10. ALJs are further instructed to
Effective March 28, 2016, SSR 96-7p was superseded by SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029. See 2016 WL 1237954 (correcting the effective date of SSR 16-3p to read March 28, 2016). The ALJ's decision in this matter post-dates the effective date of SSR 16-3p.
limit their evaluation to the individual's statements about his or her symptoms and the evidence in the record that is relevant to the individual's impairments. In evaluating an individual's symptoms, our adjudicators will not assess an individual's overall character or truthfulness in the manner typically used during an adversarial court litigation. The focus of the evaluation of an individual's symptoms should not be to determine whether he or she is a truthful person. Rather, our adjudicators will focus on whether the evidence establishes a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the individual's symptoms and given the adjudicator's evaluation of the individual's symptoms, whether the intensity and persistence of the symptoms limit the individual's ability to perform work-related activities . . . .Id. at *11.
Further, "claims of disabling pain may not be rejected 'solely because the available objective evidence does not substantiate [the claimant's] statements' as to the severity and persistence of her pain." Craig, 76 F.3d at 595 (citations omitted) (emphasis and alteration in original). "This is not to say, however, that objective medical evidence and other objective evidence are not crucial to evaluating the intensity and persistence of a claimant's pain and the extent to which it impairs her ability to work." Id. A claimant's subjective complaints "need not be accepted to the extent they are inconsistent with the available evidence, including objective evidence of the underlying impairment, and the extent to which that impairment can reasonably be expected to cause the [symptoms] the claimant alleges she suffers." Id. The social security regulations inform claimants that in evaluating subjective complaints, the Commissioner will consider the following relevant factors:
(i) Your daily activities;20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3).
(ii) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of your pain or other symptoms;
(iii) Precipitating and aggravating factors;
(iv) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication you take or have taken to alleviate your pain or other symptoms;
(v) Treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other symptoms;
(vi) Any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.); and
(vii) Other factors concerning your functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.
In this case, the ALJ summarized Byas's testimony as follows:
At the hearing, the claimant tes[tified] she is currently unable to work due to her bilateral hand pain and swelling. She stated she has difficulty getting out of bed and bathing due to hand pain and requires assistance. She reported she also experiences swelling of her bilateral knees and ankles. The claimant tes[tified] she has a driver's license but generally drives only to the doctor and otherwise relies on others to drive her places because she has difficulty holding onto the steering wheel. She stated she lives with her sister, who prepares meals for her.(Tr. 14-15.) However, the ALJ found that "the medical evidence of record does not indicate that her statements are as limiting as alleged." (Tr. 15.) The ALJ then proceeded to summarize all of the medical evidence regarding Byas's arthritis, diabetes and neuropathy, obesity, and renal function. The ALJ observed Byas's subjective reports to her medical providers, as well as the objective medical findings and test results. The ALJ observed that despite Byas's reports of pain, there were no objective abnormalities documented and no decrease in strength or tone was noted. The ALJ found that the objective findings do not show greater limitations from Byas's arthritis than those included in Byas's residual functional capacity. The ALJ further found that Byas's diabetes was generally controlled with medications, but he also stated that he "considered the claimant's diabetes and neuropathy in limiting the amount the claimant can lift, carry, stand, walk and perform postural activities." (Tr. 16.) The ALJ also acknowledged that Byas's obesity may aggravate her ability to perform work-related activities, but based in part on records indicating that Byas could move about generally well, sustain consistent function, and had good muscle tone, the ALJ found that greater limitations were not warranted. Finally, the ALJ stated that he considered Byas's diminished renal function in limiting her to a reduced range of light work.
The claimant testified she currently weighs 298 pounds. She stated she has difficulty climbing stairs due to her knee pain, and she reported she can walk for only 5 to 10 minutes, sit for only 10 minutes and stand for only 5 minutes. She reported she elevates her legs while sitting to reduce her ankle swelling.
The claimant testified she has approximately 3 to 4 bad days per week and that on bad days, she generally lies down for the majority of the day. She stated she never performs household chores and relies on her sister and son to perform household tasks. She reported she prepares microwavable meals. The claimant testified she generally watches television. She states others visit her and that she rarely leaves her house.
Thus, the ALJ found that after careful consideration of this evidence that Byas's "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [some of the alleged] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision." (Tr. 16.) The ALJ also concluded that
[i]n sum, the claimant's allegations regarding her limited ability to stand, sit and walk are not supported by the objective findings of record, which reflect no significant strength deficits or gait abnormalities. The undersigned has considered the claimant's severe impairments in limiting the amount she can lift, carry, and perform postural activities. However, for the reasons set forth above, the undersigned cannot find the claimant's allegation that she is incapable of all work activity to be credible.(Tr. 17.)
Byas argues that the ALJ failed to consider all of the factors in evaluating Byas's subjective complaints and relied solely on objective evidence, contrary to applicable law. Byas asserts that the ALJ failed to consider a disability report indicating that Byas wore wrist splints and Byas's testimony that she drove less, was unable to babysit or fish, could only write a little, did not lift or carry anything, and could do very little with her hands due to her pain in her hands and wrist.
After carefully considering Byas's arguments and the record in this matter, the court finds that Byas has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ's evaluation of Byas's subjective complaints is unsupported by substantial evidence or controlled by a harmful error of law. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 (defining "substantial evidence" as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance" and stating that the court may not "undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]"); Blalock, 483 F.2d at 775 (indicating that regardless of whether the court agrees or disagrees with the Commissioner's decision, the court must uphold it if it is supported by substantial evidence). The ALJ's decision reflects careful consideration of the medical evidence and the limitations stemming from Byas's impairments during the relevant time period and provides reasons for discounting Byas's subjective complaints. In fact, the ALJ's decision acknowledges the limitations raised by Byas in her testimony; however, he simply found them not entirely supported. Further, the ALJ did not completely reject Byas's testimony and find that she had no limitations; rather, the ALJ found that Byas's testimony was not entirely consistent with the evidence of record and that she was not so limited that she was incapable of all work.
In this case, the court finds that Byas has failed to demonstrate that additional functional limitations are warranted or that the ALJ's evaluation of her subjective complaints is unsupported. As stated above, the court may not substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's and finds that the ALJ's conclusions are within the bounds of the substantial evidence standard. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 595 (stating that a claimant's subjective complaints of pain itself or its severity "need not be accepted to the extent they are inconsistent with the available evidence, including objective evidence of the underlying impairment, and the extent to which that impairment can reasonably be expected to cause the [symptoms] the claimant alleges she suffers"); see also Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (finding that the ALJ may properly consider inconsistencies between a plaintiff's testimony and the other evidence of record in evaluating the credibility of the plaintiff's subjective complaints).
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Byas has not shown that the Commissioner's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence or reached through application of an incorrect legal standard. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Coffman, 829 F.2d at 517. The court therefore recommends that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed.
/s/_________
Paige J. Gossett
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE July 13, 2018
Columbia, South Carolina
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).