Opinion
Case No.: PWG–13–883
10-22-2015
Franz Butler, Plaintiff, v. William Windsor, et al., Defendants.
Scott Lamarr Little, Law Offices of Scott L. Little, Bowie, MD, for Plaintiff. Stephen Earl Whitted, Upper Marlboro, MD, for Defendants.
Scott Lamarr Little, Law Offices of Scott L. Little, Bowie, MD, for Plaintiff.
Stephen Earl Whitted, Upper Marlboro, MD, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Paul W. Grimm, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Franz Butler brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, with related state law claims, against Prince George's County, Maryland (the “County”) and County Police Officers William Windsor and Richard Reynolds, based on his arrest on June 7, 2012. Am. Compl., ECF No. 36. I granted summary judgment in the County's favor on all but Plaintiff's claims for violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Articles 24 and 26. ECF Nos. 30, 31. Further, I denied the individual defendants' motions for summary judgment on all counts. Id. At the end of a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Windsor and against Butler on all outstanding counts, and in Butler's favor and against Reynolds and the County on all outstanding counts. Order of Jmt., ECF No. 58. Specifically, Plaintiff was awarded $50,845.00 in compensatory damages against Reynolds and the County, as well as punitive damages against Reynolds in the amount of $100,000.00 with respect to his § 1983 claim and $50,000.00 with respect to his claims for violations of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and for false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, battery, and malicious prosecution. Id.
Defendant Reynolds filed a Motion for a New Trial, “or, alternatively, remittitur of the punitive damages awards,” arguing that “the awards are grossly excessive and violate Reynolds' due process rights guaranteed him under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,” such that they “result in a miscarriage of justice.” Mot. 1, ECF No. 62; Mem. 1, 4, ECF No. 62–1. Because a total award of punitive damages in the amount of $100,000.00 with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim and state law claims is reasonable and does not violate Officer Reynolds's due process rights, I will deny Defendant's motion for a new trial as to punitive damages in that amount, but grant his motion for remittitur of the punitive damages awarded in excess of that amount. And, because I find that the additional punitive damages awarded on Plaintiff's state law claims are excessive under the circumstances, I will afford the Plaintiff the opportunity to elect either to accept a total punitive damages award in the amount of $100,000.00, or to decline to accept this reduced amount, in which case I will order a new trial as to punitive damages alone.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the June 7, 2012, incident, Butler was outside with two friends and “had a brown paper bag in his hand that was ultimately determined to contain chips and a soda.” Stip., Pre–Trial Order 4, ECF Nos. 44, 46. Based on the fact that Butler was drinking a concealed beverage, id., and, in Officer Reynolds's experience, paper bags were used to conceal alcohol when it was illegally consumed in public, Officer Reynolds approached Plaintiff and searched him, then asked him to sit on the ground. Notably, Butler did not initiate the interaction with Officer Reynolds.
Evidence at trial showed that, when Butler did not comply immediately with the command to sit down, Reynolds, who “was bigger than [Plaintiff,] came at [him] full throttle like a football tackle” and “tackled [him] to the ground,” causing him to experience “[p]ain all over [his] back” and “all over [his] total body.” Trial Tr. 12:10–13:5, Def.'s Mem. Ex. A, ECF No. 62–2. Photographic evidence showed that one of Plaintiff's eyes was completely swollen shut from Officer Reynolds punching him in the face. According to Plaintiff, he sustained injuries including “headaches,” “contusions,” and “skin irritation ... on [his] right arm and [his] ankle” that healed in “[a]bout two months.” Trial Tr. 11:1–10, 14:11–12, Def.'s Mem. Ex. B, ECF No. 62–3. During those two months, he “was taking Percocets and [he] was taking Motrin, 800 milligrams” for the pain, as well as “Amoxicillin for something like infection, so it wouldn't get infected and things like that.” Id. at 11:11–16. Additionally, he testified that, when the trial occurred in July 2015, he still had a scar by his eye, “a little ache” in his foot, his “back [was] hurting,” and his “head still [was] hurting and dazed.” Id. at 61:8–62:2. Plaintiff's medical records and photographs taken immediately after his arrest indicate that he suffered a laceration to his head and face. Ft. Washington Med. Ctr. Emergency Registration, Tr. Ex. 6; Photographs, Tr. Ex. 15. Plaintiff also claimed emotional injury from “public humiliation” and having “no contact with his mother for over two months while his body healed.” Pl.'s Opp'n 6.
The jury awarded Plaintiff $50,845.00 in compensatory damages, which included $50,000.00 in non-economic damages, suggesting a finding of emotional injury. The jury also awarded punitive damages against Reynolds in the amount of $100,000.00 on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim and $50,000.00 on Plaintiff's state-law claims.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A) governs motions for new trial following a jury trial. It provides that “[t]he court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues—and to any party—... for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Whether to grant a new trial “rests within the sound discretion of the trial court but such discretion must not be arbitrarily exercised.” City of Richmond v. Atl. Co., 273 F.2d 902, 916 (4th Cir.1960); see Atkinson Warehousing & Distrib., Inc. v. Ecolab, Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 544, 546 (D.Md.2000), aff'd, 15 Fed.Appx. 160 (4th Cir. Aug. 9, 2001). The Court must “ 'grant a new trial[ ] if ... (1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, or (2) is based upon evidence which is false, or (3) will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict.' ” Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 639 (4th Cir.2001) (quoting Atlas Food Sys. & Serv., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 594 (4th Cir.1996)).
The court considers the “miscarriage of justice” prong when a plaintiff challenges the amount of punitive damages awarded, because “[t]he jury's determination of the amount of punitive damages ... is not a factual determination ... but is, rather, an almost unconstrained judgment or policy choice about the severity of the penalty to be imposed.” See Atlas Food Sys., 99 F.3d at 594. Although it is based on “the jury's underlying factual determinations about the defendant's conduct[,] ... the factual record provides no direct foundation for the amount of punitive damages.” Id. Therefore, “a court cannot generally test the amount of a punitive damage award against record facts.” Id. Indeed, “policy-related elements—e.g., the likelihood that an award will deter the defendant or others from engaging in similar conduct—are ... more appropriately decided by the trial judge,” whose “unique vantage point and day-to-day experience with such matters lend expertise and consistency.” Id.
When, as here, the challenge to the punitive damages award is that the amount of the award violates the defendant's due process rights, the court considers three factors: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” Wallace v. Poulos, 861 F.Supp.2d 587, 603 (D.Md.2012) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003)). This analysis “ensure[s] that defendants have fair notice about the potential penalty they face for engaging in prohibited conduct”; without this notice, “the punitive damages award violates due process.” Id. at 604.
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD
A. Degree of Reprehensibility
The first factor, that is, the degree of reprehensibility, is “ '[t]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award.' ” Wallace, 861 F.Supp.2d at 604 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996)). To determine how reprehensive the defendant's conduct was, the court considers
[W]hether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
Id. (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513).
Here, so far as the evidence at trial established, the conduct was “an 'isolated incident,' ” which militates against a finding of very reprehensible conduct, as “other courts have found [this factor] highly persuasive.” Id. at 605. But, Officer Reynolds initiated the contact when Plaintiff was not behaving disruptively or breaching the peace, and “ 'the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic.” See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513; Wallace, 861 F.Supp.2d at 604. Whether Plaintiff was financially vulnerable is not relevant. Moreover, the jury was instructed that, to award punitive damages on Plaintiff's state law claims, it first had to find “actual malice, that is, a sense of conscious and deliberate wrongdoing, evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure, or ill will,” by “clear and convincing evidence,” and, to award punitive damages on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim, it first had to “find by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendants acted intentionally and with a callous or reckless disregard or indifference toward Mr. Butler's constitutional rights.” The jury also was instructed that the relevant “constitutional rights” under state and federal law “concern[ed] the use of force.” Having been so instructed, the jury awarded punitive damages on the federal and state claims, and therefore necessarily found that Defendant acted with “intentional malice” and “an indifference to or a reckless disregard of [Plaintiff's] health or safety” when he harmed Plaintiff through the use of excessive force. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513; Wallace, 861 F.Supp.2d at 604. This Court “must accept the underlying facts found by the jury.” Wallace, 861 F.Supp.2d at 604. Weighing these factors suggests a high degree of reprehensibility in Reynolds's conduct. See id.
B. Ratio of Comparative and Punitive Damages
As noted, the jury awarded Plaintiff $50,845.00 in compensatory damages, and a combined punitive damages award of $150,000.00, or just under three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded. In Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, where the defendant had committed insurance fraud, the Supreme Court affirmed as constitutional an award of punitive damages that was “more than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages,” and “more than 200 times the out-of-pocket expenses of respondent Haslip,” as well as “much in excess of the fine that could be imposed for insurance fraud,” although imprisonment was also a possible criminal penalty. 499 U.S. 1, 4–6, 23–24, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991). Contrary to Defendant's assertions, see Def.'s Mem. 10–11, criminal penalties are no longer relevant, as the Supreme Court eliminated that factor in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, deeming criminal penalties to have “less utility” in “determin[ing] the dollar amount of the award” than in determining “the seriousness with which a State views the wrongful action.” 538 U.S. 408, 428, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003).
The Campbell Court did, however, consider the compensatory damages award and reiterate the “4–to–1 ratio” of acceptable punitive damages compared to compensatory damages, noting that it had “cited that 4–to–1 ratio again” in BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S.Ct. 1513. The Court further observed that, in Gore, it had “referenced a long legislative history, dating back over 700 years and going forward to today, providing for sanctions of double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish.” Id. It stated that, “[w]hile these ratios are not binding, they are instructive. They demonstrate what should be obvious: Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the State's goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1, or ... 145 to 1.” Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 581–82 & n. 33, 116 S.Ct. 1589).
Notably, in Haslip, as here, the jury was instructed that punitive damages serve to punish and to deter the defendant but not to compensate the plaintiff; should “take into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence”; and need not be awarded should the jury choose not to award them. 499 U.S. at 19, 111 S.Ct. 1032. In this case, the jury's discretion was further constrained by the requirement that it find that Defendants acted with “actual malice” by “clear and convincing evidence” before awarding damages on Plaintiff's state law claims, and that Defendants “acted intentionally and with a callous or reckless disregard or indifference toward Mr. Butler's constitutional rights” before awarding punitive damages on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. Under these circumstances, punitive damages that are three times as great as compensatory damages are in line with Supreme Court precedent. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23–24, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (awarding punitive damages four times greater than compensatory damages); Gore, 517 U.S. at 574, 580–81, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (reasoning that punitive damages should not be more than ten times greater than compensatory damages and concluding that punitive damages with 500:1 ratio to compensatory damages was “grossly excessive”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425–29, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (noting that there was “a presumption against an award that has a 145–to–1 ratio,” and reversing the punitive damages award, which was 145 times greater than the compensatory damages, “in light of the substantial compensatory damages awarded (a portion of which contained a punitive element),” but also observing that “ratios greater than those [the Supreme Court has] previously upheld may comport with due process where 'a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages' ... 'or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine' ”).
C. Comparable Cases
Finally, a review of comparable cases is informative. Although an analysis of the punitive damages awards in these cases cannot be done with mathematic precision, because the facts of each case are different, even when similar causes of action are brought, the range of the awards imposed and affirmed in other cases creates parameters for an award for which defendants under these facts would have reasonable notice. Within that range, it is for the jury to decide the appropriate line, and the Court must be respectful of the jury's determination while mindful that the punitive damages award must comply with constitutional due process. See Wallace v. Poulos, 861 F.Supp.2d 587, 604 (D.Md.2012).
Francis v. Johnson, 219 Md.App. 531, 101 A.3d 494 (2014), cert. denied, 442 Md. 516, 113 A.3d 625 (2015), is informative. There, the defendant police officers took the plaintiff “from Baltimore in a police van, assault[ed] him, br[o]k[e] his phone, and then dropp[ed] him off in Howard County, in the rain, without shoes, socks or a way home.” The jury awarded $465,000 in total compensatory damages and $35,000 in total punitive damages against three defendant officers, with respect to the four claims that were submitted to the jury. Id. The court found the total compensatory damages award excessive and struck the $1,000 punitive damages award against one of the officers. Id. Plaintiff agreed to a remittitur, resulting in total compensatory damages of $300,000 and total punitive damages of $34,000. Id. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, noting that defendants failed to preserve their challenge to the punitive damages award. Id. at 510. Additionally, in French v. Hines, 182 Md.App. 201, 957 A.2d 1000, 1006–07, 1013, 1016 (2008), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed awards of $50,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages to Ms. Hines for the defendant police officer's use of excessive force in arresting her in a case in which she testified that the officer pointed a gun at her, made her handcuffs “too tight,” and “smashed [her] head into the side of [her] truck,” all of which the officer denied. She testified at trial that the handcuffs made her wrists bloody and that, because of the incident, her face still “bother[ed]” her. Id. at 1007.