Opinion
Civil No. 9:00-CV-1240 (LEK/GLS)
June 20, 2002
BENNY BUTLER, Plaintiff, Pro Se, Comstock, NY., For The Plaintiff.
ROGER W. KINSEY, ESQ., Attorney General State of New York, Asst. Attorney General, Albany, New York, For The Defendants.
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 15, 2000, plaintiff, pro se, Benny Butler ("Butler") filed a Complaint alleging that the defendants denied him adequate medical care in violation of his Eighth Amendment right. On January 8, 2001, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 19). Butler then filed a response (Dkt. No. 26). After reviewing Butler's claims and for the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted.
II. BACKGROUND
Butler brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking injunctive relief, compensatory and nominal damages. He alleges that his Eighth Amendment right was violated when the defendants: (1) failed to provide adequate medical care in treatment of his back pain; and, (2) ignored his various formal complaints. The defendants claim that: (1) Butler failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted;(2) they are entitled to qualified immunity; and, (3) they were not personally involved in the alleged violation. The court shall address each of these issues seriatim.
"A prisoner's transfer to a different correctional facility generally moots his request for injunctive relief against employees of the transferor facility." Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 415 (2002). In this case, it appears that Butler is no longer incarcerated at Upstate Correctional Facility ("Upstate") but resides at Washington Correctional Facility. Accordingly, this court finds that Butler is not entitled to injunctive relief because he is no longer incarcerated at Upstate.
Although the defendants allege that Butler raised claims against them in their official capacity, this court notes that it appears that Butler only raised claims against the defendants in their individual capacities (see Complaint at Paragraphs 3-5).
III. Facts
A. Medical Treatment
Benny Butler arrived at Upstate on August 9, 1999. On December 19, 1999, he had a consultation with a neurologist who recommended surgery to relieve his back problem (see Weissman Aff., Ex. A. 33). On February 8, 2000, Butler had a MRI request denied by the Central Office (see Weissman Aff., P. 2). A neurosurgical consultation was denied on June 1, 2000 (see Weissman Aff., P. 2). Butler had a consultation to evaluate his treatment options on May 8, 2000 (see Weissman Aff., Ex. 35). On June 8, 2000, a full evaluation of Butler's physical status revealed surgery was necessary (see Weissman Aff., Ex. 33). On April 12 and 28, 2000, Butler refused his pain medication (see Weissman Aff., Ex. 16 and 20). Furthermore, he had a MRI consultation on September 19, 2000 (see Weissman Aff., P.2). In addition, he had a neurosurgical appointment on November 2, 2000, and a follow-up scheduled for December 14, 2000.
The defendants claim that Butler refused surgery. As proof of this fact, the defendants point to Butler's medical records which document that he refused surgery. The court notes that in his letter dated February 6, 2000 addressed to Nurse Tousignant, Butler admits that he refused surgery (see Toursignant Aff., Ex. C). However, in his complaint, Butler claims that the neurologist at Coxsackie Correctional Facility wanted to operate but was precluded since his MRI was almost two years old (Compl. Paragraph 26). The physician needed an updated MRI to determine the extent of his back injury. Id. There appears to be a dispute on this issue; thus, the court will accept Butler's version of the fact for purposes of this motion.
The court notes that this particular date is taken from Weissman's Affidavit and the Statement of Material Facts. Actual documentation of this date has not been provided to the court. However, since Butler has not disputed this fact, it is deemed admitted. See Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) ("Any facts set forth in the Statement of Material Facts shall be deemed admitted unless specifically controverted by the opposing party.")
See Footnote 3.
During the first eight months, Butler was at Upstate Correctional Facility and he was seen 117 times on sick call, 4 times on emergency sick call, and 4 times by a nurse practitioner. He was seen for the following problems: blood on toilet paper, dizziness, scalp itch, urination problems, cough, lump near belly button, pain, stomach cramps, lung pain, corns, migraine headaches, foot pain, medicated shampoo, sinus, cracked lips, rash on [behind], hemorrhoids, hernia, chest pain, gas, knee pain and general aches (Tousignant Aff., Ex. F).
See footnote 3.
These last two dates reflect appointments made prior to Butler's departure from Upstate (see Weissman Aff., P. 2).
B. Formal
Complaints
On November 16, 1999, Nurse-Administrator Tousignant ("Tousignant") received correspondence from Butler, claiming that he was not provided with medical attention (Tousignant Aff., Ex. B). Tousignant responded to the letter from Butler after reviewing his medical records, and determined that he had been seen on November 5, 1999, by the facility physician and a neurosurgical consultation had been scheduled (Tousignant Aff., Ex. B). Tousignant again responded to a letter from Butler dated February 6, 2000, which claimed that he had not received medical care (Tousignant Aff., Ex. C). In his letter, Butler stated that "for the record the nurses have did [sic] everything in their power to assist me but now the concern is beyond them. . . . and I highly thank them very much for their help" (Tousignant Aff., Ex. C., P. 2). Again, after Butler's medical record was reviewed, it showed that a MRI was scheduled and that he had received medical attention (Tousignant Aff., Ex. C).
Later that same month, Tousignant responded to a letter from Butler dated February 22, 2000, in which he claimed that he had not received a MRI (Tousignant Aff., Ex. D). On February 25, 2000, after his medical record was again reviewed, Tousignant discovered that he had a MRI done but the results of the MRI had not arrived (Tousignant Aff., Ex. D). Thereafter, Tousignant responded to a letter from Butler dated April 26, 2000, claiming that the nurse who had visited him did not have a name tag, and failed to give him his medication (Tousignant Aff., Ex. E). On May 2, 2000, a reply letter explaining the name tag procedure was provided to Butler and an inquiry concerning whether he received medication was made (Tousignant Aff., Ex. E).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); accord F.D.I.C. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994). Moreover, it is well settled that on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593 (2d Cir. 1999). However, once this burden is met, it shifts to the opposing party who, through affidavits or otherwise, must show that there is a material factual issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Smythe v. American Red Cross Blood Services Northeastern New York Region, 797 F. Supp. 147, 151 (N.D.N.Y. 1992). The court may grant summary judgment only where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact [such that] . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). " When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . . an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the . . . pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2000). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment[.]" Rexford Holdings, Inc. v. Biderman, 21 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
Furthermore, in a pro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than that accorded to "formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994) (a court is to read a pro se party's "supporting papers liberally, and . . . interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest)." Indeed, the Second Circuit has stated that "[i]mplicit in the right to self-representation is an obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). Any ambiguities and inferences drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Thompson v. Gjivoje, 896 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1990); see LaFond v. General Physics Serv. Corp., 50 F.3d 165, 171 (2d Cir. 1995).
This liberal standard, however, does not excuse a pro se litigant from following the procedural formalities of summary judgment. See Showers v. Eastmond, 2001 WL 527484, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2001). More specifically, Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) of this court specifically provides that "any facts set forth in the [moving party's] Statement of Material Facts shall be deemed admitted unless specifically controverted by the opposing party." Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) further requires that the "non-movant shall file a Statement of Material Fact which mirrors the movant's statement in matching numbered paragraphs and which set forth a specific reference to the record where the material fact is alleged to arise." The courts of the Northern District have adhered to a strict application of Local Rule 7.1(a)(3)'s requirement on summary judgment motions. See Bundy Am. Corp. v. K-Z Rental Leasing, Inc., 2001 WL 237218, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2001); Giguere v. Racicot, 2002 WL 368534, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. March 1, 2002).
Furthermore, this Circuit adheres to the view that nothing in Rule 56 imposes an obligation on the court to conduct a search and independent review of the record to find proof of a factual dispute. Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, 288 F.3d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 2002). As long as the local rules impose a requirement that parties provide specific record citations in support of their statement of material facts, the court may grant summary judgment on that basis. Id.
In this case, Butler failed to provide the court with a separate statement of undisputed material facts in compliance with Local Rule 7.1(a)(3). Instead he has included in his motion "genuine issues of disputed fact" for the court to consider. Consequently, the court will accept the properly supported facts contained in the defendants' 7.1 Statement as true for purposes of this motion. With this standard in mind, the court now turns to the sufficiency of Butler's claims.
The court notes that this does not apply to the various conclusions of law contained in the defendants' 7.1 Statement.
B. Eighth Amendment Claim
The Eighth Amendment does not mandate comfortable prisons, yet it does not tolerate inhumane prisons either, and the conditions of an inmate's confinement are subject to examination under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1975, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Nevertheless, deprivations suffered by inmates as a result of their incarceration only become reprehensible to the Eighth Amendment when they deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)).
Moreover, the Eighth Amendment embodies "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . ." against which penal measures must be evaluated. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102, 97 S.Ct. at 290. Repugnant to the Amendment are punishments hostile to the standards of decency that "`mark the progress of a maturing society.'" Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958). Also repugnant to the Amendment, are punishments that involve "`unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain.'" Id. at 103, 97 S.Ct. at 290 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2925, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)).
In light of these elementary principles, a state has a constitutional obligation to provide inmates adequate medical care. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2258, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). By virtue of their incarceration, inmates are utterly dependant upon prison authorities to treat their medical ills and are wholly powerless to help themselves if the state languishes in its obligation. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103, 97 S.Ct. at 290. The essence of an improper medical treatment claim lies in proof of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Id. at 104, 97 S.Ct. at 291. Simply put, "in order to allege deliberate indifference, plaintiff must assert facts establishing that either his access to physicians for necessary medical care was unreasonably delayed or denied, or that prescribed medical treatment was withheld by a defendant for the sole purpose of causing plaintiff unnecessary pain." Nunez v. Horn, 72 F. Supp.2d 24, 28 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
The standard of deliberate indifference includes both subjective and objective components. The objective component requires the alleged deprivation to be sufficiently serious, while the subjective component requires the defendant to act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when he "`knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.'" Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979). However, "`the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.'" Id.
However, an Eighth Amendment claim may be dismissed if there is no evidence that a defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. An inmate does not have a right to the treatment of his choice. See Murphy v. Grabo, 1998 WL 166840, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. April 9, 1998) (citation omitted). Also, mere disagreement with the prescribed course of treatment does not always rise to the level of a constitutional claim. See Chance, 143 F.3d at 703. Moreover, prison officials have broad discretion to determine the nature and character of medical treatment which is provided to inmates. See Murphy, 1998 WL 166840, at *4 (citation omitted).
While there is no exact definition of a "serious medical condition" in this circuit, the Second Circuit has indicated what injuries and medical conditions are serious enough to implicate the Eighth Amendment. See Chance, 143 F.3d at 702-703. In Chance, the Second Circuit held that an inmate complaining of a dental condition stated a serious medical need by showing that he suffered from great pain for six months. The inmate was also unable to chew food and lost several teeth. The Circuit also recognized that dental conditions, along with medical conditions, can vary in severity and may not all be severe. Id. at 702. The court acknowledged that while some injuries are not serious enough to violate a constitutional right, other very similar injuries can violate a constitutional right under different factual circumstances. Id.
The Second Circuit provided some of the factors to be considered when determining if a serious medical condition exists. Id. at 702-703. Factors that the court mentioned were "`[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain'" are highly relevant. Id. at 702-703 (citation omitted).
In this case, Butler claims that he was provided inadequate medical treatment concerning back pain. Upon Butler's arrival at Upstate on August 10, 1999, he attempted to tell the nurse that the four packets of Tylenol provided would not relieve the pain from his hernia and back pain, but she walked off before he could finish (see Compl. Paragraph 24). Subsequently, the pain increased and Butler informed the Gallery Officer that he needed emergency medical treatment. After being given a packet of Tylenol, he was told to place his name on the sick call for the following morning (see Compl. Paragraph 25). On December 9, 1999, after various complaints, he was seen by a Neurologist who explained that an updated MRI was needed in order to determine if surgery was required to relieve his pain (see Compl. Paragraph 26). Butler alleges that the neurologist opined that without constant physical therapy, he would further injure his back and would require greater doses of medication to relieve his pain (see Compl. Paragraph 26). Thereafter, his pain increased extending from his lower back into his shoulder area causing his right arm to become numb and causing crippling pain (see Id. Paragraph 28).
Prior to Butler's arrival at Upstate in October/November of 1998, a facility doctor diagnosed him as being medically tolerant to Motrin and prescripted Naproxen in conjunction with physical therapy once a week (see Compl. Paragraph 9). The back pain worsened on March 3, 1999, when an altercation with a corrections officer at Sing-Sing Correctional Facility caused Butler's back to be stepped on by him (see Compl. Paragraph 10 -11). After the altercation, Butler claims that he experienced heightened pain (see Compl. Paragraph 13).
The defendants argue that the efforts of Tousignant to insure that Butler's complaints were being addressed shows that they were not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The defendants further contend that all of the medical staff repeatedly responded to Butler's complaints. The defendants repeatedly point out that Butler was routinely seen for numerous complaints and thus, they were not deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
The issue in this case is not whether Butler was seen every time that he requested sick call, but whether the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs concerning his back pain. Assuming that Butler had a serious medical need, this court finds that the defendants were not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. As previously stated, Butler had a consultation with a neurologist on December 19, 1999, and surgery was recommended to relieve his back problem (see Weissman Aff., Ex. A. 33). However, the physician determined that he needed an updated MRI. He had a consultation to evaluate his treatment options on May 8, 2000 (see Weissman Aff., Ex. 35). On June 8, 2000, Butler had a full evaluation of his physical status with surgery again being recommended (see Weissman Aff., Ex. 33).
Again, the court will accept Butler's version of this fact for purposes of this motion.
Although the court is aware that Butler's request for a MRI was denied by the Central Office, it is undisputed that he had a MRI consultation on September 19, 2000. While it appears that Butler disagreed with the slowness of the process to treat him as well as the course of treatment provided to him, this alone does not violate his Eighth Amendment. Nonetheless, a "complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment." See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292. Accordingly, this court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted.
C. Qualified Immunity
As an alternative reason to grant dismissal, the defendants argue that they are entitled to be dismissed from this suit based upon qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials who perform discretionary functions in the course of their employment. It shields them from liability for money damages where "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). It also protects officials from "the burdens of costly, but insubstantial, lawsuits." Warren v. Keane, 196 F.3d 330, 332 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and internal citations omitted).
The question of whether qualified immunity will protect a public official depends upon "`the objective legal reasonableness' of the action assessed in light of the legal rules that were `clearly established' at the time it was taken." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (citations omitted). Furthermore, the contours of the right violated must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official might understand that his actions violate that right. Id. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039; Keane, 196 F.3d at 332. Simply put, in determining whether a federal or constitutional right was clearly established, the court considers (1) whether the right in question was defined with reasonable specificity; (2) whether the right was supported by Supreme Court or Second Circuit precedent; and, (3) "whether in light of preexisting law the unlawfulness of the defendant official's actions is apparent." Charles W. v. Maul, 214 F.3d 350, 360 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1989)). See also, African Trade Information Center, Inc., v. Abromaitis, 2002 WL 1032405, at *3 (2d Cir. 2002).
Additionally, the Second Circuit has held that a court may dismiss a claim based upon qualified immunity without first deciding the substantive claims therein. See Horne v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 1999). Also within this decision, the Second Circuit suggested that the qualified immunity issue should be addressed before the substance of a claim. With this precedent in mind, the court shall now consider the defendants' claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
In this case, it is well established that a state has a constitutional obligation to provide inmates adequate medical care. However, it was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe that their actions did not violate such a right. The defendants provided Butler with medical attention concerning his back pain on at least four separate occasions. Moreover, Butler praised the efforts of the medical staff in tending to his needs concerning his back pain. Although some time had passed prior to his ultimate consultation for a MRI, it was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe that they were adequately tending to Butler's medical needs. As an alternate basis to grant dismissal, this court finds that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, this court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity should be granted.
D. Other defenses
The defendants claim that they are entitled to dismissal because the defendants named in this suit were not personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation. Regardless of the merits of this defense, the court has already determined that all of Butler's claims should be dismissed on other grounds. Consequently, the court need not address this issue and declines to do so.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that the defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 19) be GRANTED in favor of the defendants for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted; however, in the alternative, it is further
RECOMMENDED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity be GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report-Recommendation upon the parties by regular mail.
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may lodge written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court within TEN days. FAILURE TO SO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a), 6(e).