Opinion
A-13780
10-26-2022
CHRISTOPHER D. BUTLER, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
D. Patrick Phillip, Carlson Law Group, LLC, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Michal Stryszak, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
D. Patrick Phillip, Carlson Law Group, LLC, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Michal Stryszak, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer, David L. Zwink, Jonathan A. Woodman, and Thomas Jamgochian, Judges. Trial Court No. 3PA-18-01739 CR
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Christopher D. Butler was convicted, following a bench trial, of one count of driving under the influence. Prior to trial, Butler filed two motions to suppress the evidence obtained during his initial traffic stop, claiming (1) that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop in order to investigate him for driving under the influence, and (2) that his statements should be suppressed because the circumstances of the stop amounted to a "custodial interrogation" under Miranda v. Arizona.
AS 28.35.030(a)(2).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
After an evidentiary hearing, both motions were ultimately denied. Butler now appeals, renewing the arguments he made in the motions to suppress.
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, this Court views the factual findings in the light most favorable to upholding the ruling of the trial court, and we will not disturb them unless they are clearly erroneous. However, legal conclusions - such as whether reasonable suspicion exists or whether a stop is custodial for Miranda purposes - are reviewed de novo."
State v. Miller, 207 P.3d 541, 543 (Alaska 2009).
Burnett v. State, 264 P.3d 607, 610 (Alaska App. 2011).
First, we conclude that the officer in this case had reasonable suspicion that Butler was driving under the influence. When the officer stopped Butler's car at approximately 4:30 a.m. for a broken headlight, the officer could smell the odor of alcohol on Butler's breath. The odor grew stronger as Butler talked, and he observed that Butler's eyes were bloodshot and watery-signs of alcohol consumption the officer testified he had been trained to recognize. Butler also admitted that he had consumed alcohol at a local bar prior to driving. These facts were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence, and the officer could lawfully extend the traffic stop to request that Butler perform field sobriety tests.
See Hurlburt v. State, 425 P.3d 189,195 (Alaska App. 2018) ("Reasonable suspicion to conduct field sobriety tests exists when an officer has a 'particularized and objective basis' for suspecting that a motorist is under the influence of either alcohol or a controlled substance.").
See, e.g., Romo v. Anchorage, 697 P.2d 1065,1069 (Alaska App. 1985) (holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to justify a request that the defendant perform field sobriety tests, despite not observing any poor driving, when the officer smelled alcohol on the defendant and the defendant admitted that he had been drinking).
Second, we conclude that the officer was not required to provide a Miranda warning to Butler during the investigative stop. As a general matter, Miranda warnings are not required as a prerequisite to questioning during a traffic stop unless and until the initial stop ripens into "full-blown custody." The test for "full-blown custody" is not whether the driver is free to leave the interaction - because they are not - but rather whether the circumstances are "substantially more coercive than a typical traffic stop," and whether this "actually impairs the free exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination."
See Rockwell v. State, 176 P.3d 14, 18 (Alaska App. 2008).
Blake v. State, 763 P.2d 511, 515 (Alaska App. 1988) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)).
In this case, the uncontroverted evidence showed that the officer, who was alone, stopped Butler on the side of a public road while Butler was accompanied by a passenger. The entire traffic stop, from the time Butler was pulled over to the time the officer asked him to step out of the car, lasted less than four minutes. Butler himself testified that the officer was polite throughout the exchange and never handcuffed or otherwise restrained him.
We conclude that this interaction was not more coercive than a typical traffic stop. Indeed, Butler does not identify any circumstances that differentiate his case from a typical investigative stop.
See, e.g., Shay v. State, 258 P.3d 902, 904-06 (Alaska App. 2011) (concluding that defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes when detained by two officers and questioned for about thirteen minutes, during which time he was patted down, asked whether he had too much to drink, and told to sit on the bumper of the police car).
See, e.g., Murphy v. Anchorage, 2010 WL 986688, at *5 (Alaska App. Mar. 17,2010) (unpublished) (holding that the district court did not err in denying driver's Miranda claim when driver failed to present any evidence showing that he was detained under circumstances substantially more coercive than a typical traffic stop).
The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.