Opinion
7:01-CV-172-R
October 29, 2002
ORDER
This is an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by an inmate confined in the Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Iowa Park, Texas. Plaintiff claims that defendants denied him proper medical care for a separated shoulder. Complaint ¶ V. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that defendants confiscated and then refused to return his medically approved shoulder brace/immobilizer, thereby, causing him to suffer great pain. Id. and attachment thereto. Butler has named sixteen defendants from whom he seeks monetary damages. Id. at ¶ VI.
In order to state a colorable claim for the denial of medical care under the Eight Amendment, "a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292 (1976). "Deliberate indifference" under the Eighth Amendment occurs only where a prison official subjectively knows of and disregards a substantial risk to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994); Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1990) However, it is well established that negligent or erroneous medical treatment or judgment does not provide a basis for a § 1983 claim. Graves it Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1993). As long as jail medical personnel exercise professional medical judgment, their behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutioual rights. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2461-62 (1982). A disageement over the appropriate medical treatment constitutes, at most, a possible claim of medical malpractice appropriately addressed under state law. Rig., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 107-08, 97 S.Ct at 293; Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991); Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1979).
In the case at bar, plaintiff was given the opportuniry to expound on the factual allegations of his complaint by way of questionnaire. See Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8 (5th Cir. 1994) (requiting further development of insufficient factual allegations before dismissal as frivolous is proper); Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirming use of questionnaire as useful and proper means for court to develop factual basis of pro se plaintiffs comp1aint). A review of plaintiff's answers reflects the following:
Butler sent numerous letters and/or I-60 prisoner complaint forms to various defendants from whom he seeks redress in this action. For each of the following defendants, plaintiff alleges some supervisory authority over the Allred Unit at its medical department and a failure to take action based upon his letters and complaints: Dr. Owen Murray, Harry Edwards and Warden Robert Treon. Butler claims that, because he sent letters of complaint, each of these defendants were aware of his medical condition and failed to take action to see that their subordinates provided the care he needed. See Plaintiffs Answers to the Court's Questions No. 19, 25 40. Unfortunately, plaintiff cannot recover under § 1983 on a. theory of respondent superior. These defendants cannot be held responsible forte alleged acts or omissions of their subordinates under § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978); Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987).
To state a valid claim, a civil rights plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the acts or omissions of a defendant and the resulting constitutional deprivation. Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d 1316, 1323 (5th Cir. 1981). Butler has alleged no facts to show either active participation by these defendants in the actions causing the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights or affirmative adoption by these defendants of policies which were wrongful or illegal and which caused the constitutional deprivation. See Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675, 679 (5th Cir. 1980) (requiring a § 1983 plaintiff to "establish a causal connection between an act of the supervisory official and the alleged constitutional violation."). Instead, Plaintiff seeks to establish liability simply by claiming that he mailed letters and complaints. Careful review of plaintiff's answers to the Court's questions reflects that he presents nothing more than conclusory allegations regarding the involvement of these three defendants. He has failed to articulate facts which, if taken as true, would demonstrate that any of these defendants were deliberately indifferent to his need for medical care. See Plaintiff's Answers to the Court's Questions No. 21, 27 42. Plaintiff has failed to allege that any of these defendants read or even received his letters. He has failed to show that any of these defendants had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk to his health or safety. A claim that letters of complaint were mailed to a person in a supervisory position, without more, is insufficient to establish liability on the part of that individual for a deprivation allegedly caused by a subordinate. See Risley v. Hawk, 918 F. Supp. 18, 24 (D.D.C. 1996), aff'd, 108 F.3d 1396 (U.S.App.D.C. 1997); Green v. DeBruyn, 1996 WL 476691*6 (N.D. Ind. 1996). Certainly, inmates are not be permitted to establish § 1983 liability against prison supervisory personnel by mailing letters of complaint to those individuals, thereby, circumventing the established prison grievance process. To hold otherwise would render the prison grievance process meaningless to inmates except as a procedural prerequisite to filing suit in federal court against every official to whom they sent a letter of complaint.
To the extent, if any, that plaintiffs claims against these tree defendants are grounded in negligence, the claims are without merit. Allegations of negligence do not present a cognizable basis for relief under the Civil Rights Act. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986) (holding that negligence is not actionable under § 1983); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986) (same). Therefore, Butler cannot prevail on his claims against Dr. Owen Murray, Harry Edwards or Warden Robert Treon.
Next, plaintiff seeks to hold defendant Tina Carroll liable because she denied his grievance. Butler claims that Carroll, the grievance officer, knew his full medical history and conducted a biased investigation of his claims. Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 46. Again, plaintiff seeks to establish § 1983 liability on the part of an individual defendant by claiming that he registered a valid complaint wither. Butler has failed to set forth facts that would show either active participation by Tina Carroll in the actions causing the alleged constitutional deprivation or affirmative adoption by this defendant of policies which were wrongful or illegal and which caused the deprivation. See Wanger, 621 F.2d at 679. A review of plaintiffs answers to the Court's questions reveals nothing more than conclusory allegations regarding the alleged deliberate indifference of this defendant. Buffer has failed to articulate facts which, if taken as true, would demonstrate that Carroll was deliberately indifferent to his need for medical care. See Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 48. His allegation that Carroll failed to conduct a proper or adequate investigation constitutes shear speculation and, as such, is insufficient to maintain an action against this individual. A claim that letters of complaint were mailed to a person in a position to investigate, without more, is insufficient to establish liability on the part of that individual for a deprivation allegedly caused by someone else.
In his answers to the Court's questions, plaintiff seeks voluntary dismissal of his claims against defendants Cleofe Palma, John Cole, Jr. and Kenneth Bright. Plaintiffs Answers to the Court's Questions No. 22, 28 43. Liberally construed as a motion to dismiss these defendants, plaintiffs request is granted and these three defendants are hereby dismissed as parties to this action.
Next Butler seeks redress against the Correctional Managed Health Care Provider. To the extent that this entity can be considered a state actor — i.e., acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 — plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim. The Correctional Managed Health Care Provider, serving as an agency of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, is not subject to liability under the Civil Rights Act. In the absence of consent, the Eleventh Amendment bars federal lawsuits by a U.S. citizen against a state or against a state agency or department. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908 (1984); Neuwirth v. Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry, 845 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1988); Voisin's Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1986). Sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment is applicable unless the State has expressly waived such protection Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3145 (1985).
A court will find waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity only where waiver is stated "by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] lean no room for any other reasonable construction." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1361 (1974) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171, 29 S.Ct. 458, 464 (1909)).
The State of Texas has not waived Eleventh Amendment immunity with regard to suits against the Department of Criminal Justice, Tex. Govt Code Ann. § 492.010(c) (West 2002), and § 1983 does not override the Eleventh Amendment. Voisin's Oyster House, 799 F.2d at 186. Furthetmore, a state agency is not considered a "person" acting under color of law for purposes of a civil rights action. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989). Accordingly, the Correctional Managed Health Care Provider for the Allred Unit is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and Butler's complaint against it shall be dismissed.
With regard to the remaining defendants, assuming the truth of his allegations, plaintiff has stated claims which could give rise to liability under the Civil rights Act. Service of process upon these defendants shall be directed by separate order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs claims against Owen Murray, Cleofe Palma, Harry Edwards, John Cole, Robert Treon, Kenneth Bright, Tina Carroll and the Correctional Managed Health Care Provider are hereby dismissed with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i).